


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


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RUSSIA'S MESSAGE







TOLSTOI—PROPHET OF THE LAST GENERATION
Taken especially for the author in 1906

Russia's Message

The True World
Import of the Revolution

By

WILLIAM ENGLISH WALLING

ILLUSTRATED



New York
Doubleday, Page & Company
1908

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
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TO THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO IN ALL WALKS OF
LIFE ARE CONTENDING AGAINST THE FORCES THAT
ARE TRYING TO INTRODUCE INTO AMERICA THE
DESPOTISM AND CLASS-RULE OF EASTERN EUROPE;
TO ALL THOSE WHO, IN THE TRADITIONAL REV-
OLUTIONARY AMERICAN SPIRIT, ARE LEADING
OUR COUNTRY AGAINST ALL THE REACTIONARY TEN-
DENCIES PREVAILING IN POLITICS, MORALITY,
EDUCATION, LITERATURE, AND SCIENCE, TO ITS
GREAT DEMOCRATIC AND SOCIAL WORLD-DESTINY

PREFATORY NOTE

It is impossible to harmonise the Russian spelling, with its twenty-six letters of a different alphabet, with the spelling of any other modern language. As a consequence there are often half a dozen ways of putting into English, French or German letters the name of some well-known Russian, consequently the reader must not be surprised to see a Russian name which he has been accustomed to see spelled in one way, here spelled in another; for example, I have spelled the name of the present prime minister Stolypine, whereas the reader may possibly know the name better as Stolypin, or Stolipin.





PREFACE

NO ONE who has seen and understood the social upheaval now going on in Russia can doubt that the Russian people have a message. It does not need to be written down; it is carried abroad by every telegram. But to understand the whole message the situation must be seen and understood as a whole.

I have undertaken to make a plain statement of this situation, omitting no feature of the first importance and relating all together as a single whole. I have not written suggesting what we can do for Russia, but rather what Russia has to offer us; I have concerned myself with the universal qualities of the Russian people rather than with any aspect of their character and situation that is peculiar to themselves. I have not written historically for the benefit of the academic student, nor sought to dwell on the picturesqueness of those sections of Russia and aspects of Russian life that are most strange; I have not dwelt on personal experience, as the situation is too large to be presented in all its aspects in any personal narrative. I have sought rather, through the personal acquaintance with a majority of the most important leaders of all parties and elements of the Russian nation, to put myself in the most immediate contact with the inner ideas and spirit of the great struggle and to present this struggle to the reader as seen through the eyes of its leaders themselves.

Finally, I have written not for the casual reader or for him who draws from this tragic and inspiring situation a mere interest in the chances of the fight or in its melodramatic aspects. I appeal rather to those seriously interested in the Russian revolutionary movement for the light it sheds on that all-inclusive problem, the future of human society.

The greater part of two years I have spent in Russia in order to gain a rounded view. My attention was first drawn to the absorbing interest of this great struggle by Polish and Jewish

Russian exiles met while I was living among them in the University Settlement in New York. Leaving the United States shortly after the massacre of January 22, 1905, I spent several months in London, Paris, Geneva, Cracow, and Vienna among leaders of the revolutionary parties of all factions and races. Within a week after the Czar issued his October Manifesto I was in Warsaw, and a few days later in St. Petersburg, where I at once met Witte and the chief members of his ministry, and at the same time put myself in touch with the most conspirative of the revolutionary organisations. I spent the larger part of my time in that country from this date until the opening of the third Duma. Near the close of my last visit the press of the United States, and the leading European countries, announced the arrest of myself and wife and her sister and our detention for twenty-four hours in prison through the acknowledged mistake, or perhaps inconsideration, of the Russian Government. It is not true, as was suggested then in a few papers, that the Russian Government made either a direct or indirect request through the American ambassador that we should leave the country. We had wished to follow Russian events closely only until the meeting of the third Duma, and we left St. Petersburg on the day on which we had previously arranged to go. It was explained by the Russian political police that our arrest was due to our friendly relations with certain revolutionists. I have certainly had such relations with hundreds of leading persons of this movement, as with an almost equal number of their opponents.

I have to some extent made use of articles that I have written for various magazines — particularly the *Independent*, in which perhaps a score of my articles appeared in the course of 1906 and 1907. I have also made some use of articles published in *Collier's Weekly*, the *Outlook*, the *World To-day*, *Charities*, the *American Federationist*, and *Moody's Financial Magazine*. However, nine-tenths of the present book is entirely new.

Realising the immensity of the task that lay before me, I have confined my attention in the present work largely to the Russian part of Russia, leaving aside entirely all Asiatic Russia, the Caucasus and the Baltic Provinces,

Poland, and Finland. The Polish and Finnish situations are of such exceptional importance in relation to the Russian that I spent several weeks in visiting both countries, but I have not made them a part of my work.

One feature of the book needs perhaps a special explanation. The crimes of the Russian Government are so monstrous and so manifold that I have quite despaired of giving any satisfactory picture of them as a whole. In my first chapters I have dwelt at some length with this subject, but I have devised the economical measure of taking the Jews as my central theme, not because I consider that their persecutions are any worse than other peoples' in Russia, nor because they are more important than other nationalities, as for instance the Tartars or the Poles, but because they have themselves been selected by the Government as the centre of the whole persecution system. In other parts of the book I have tried to portray not merely the central feature but the whole situation.

If I had cared to burden my work with footnotes showing the source of all my information I could readily have done so; but this would have increased very largely the bulk of the volume, besides interrupting the attention of the average reader, interested rather in the facts themselves than in the source from which they come. I am prepared, however, to give my authority for every detail, just as much as if I had been writing a history or a scientific sociological work.

I owe little to writers of books and much to active leaders in the movement. Of these I have met hundreds. It would be impossible in a few pages to mention even their names. To a few persons, however, I am especially indebted; among the foremost are: Prince M—— who introduced me to the Czar's ministers, Witte and the rest, as well as to several of his most important generals and who kept me for the whole period of my visit in close touch with the situation in court circles and the ministry; to Mr. David Sosskis, the able correspondent of the *London Tribune*; Mr. Harold Williams, correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, a valued friend of the Constitutional Democratic Party; to Madame Turkova, one of the most active and important leaders of that party; to the Countess Bobrinsky of Moscow, one of the organisers both of the Constitutional

Democratic Party and of the Peasants' Union; to Professor Milyoukov, whose high personal qualities are appreciated even by his severest critics; to the poet Tan (Borgoraz), a founder of the Peasants' Union and of the National Socialist Party and an active leader in all the most revolutionary but non-partisan movements; to Aladdin, the most active and valuable, if not the most influential, of the Labour Group; to Volkovsky, Tchailkovsky, Gershuni, Chisko, Shidlovsky, and Madame Breshkovskaya, founders of the Socialist Revolutionary Party; to Isaac Hourwich, Nahum Stone, and James M. James, leaders among the Russian Social Democratic Party in New York; to Vladimir Simkhovitch, of Columbia University; to Prince Dimitri Hilkov, one of the most gifted and popular leaders of the whole revolutionary movement, and most of all to Bielevsky, Staal, and Mazurenko, founders of the great Peasants' Union.

I have selected these names somewhat at hazard and do not wish to imply that the list of those to whom I am most indebted is exhausted. I cannot leave the question of my indebtedness without expressing my gratitude to other prominent Russians with whom I have had only single long interviews or brief meetings. Among them are Tolstoi, Gorky, and Korolenko; the conservative leaders, Gutchkov, Maklakov, and Michael Stachovitch; the Social Democratic leaders, Parvus, Dan, Lenin, and Alexinsky; the brilliant leaders of the Polish Socialistic Party who make their headquarters at Cracow — not to speak of innumerable others, especially Duma members, editors, elected members of local government boards, and active organisers of all the popular parties, labour organisations, and of the Union of Unions.

I have written of course according to the possibilities of the moment. The time is ripe for a general review of the first act of the great revolutionary drama. The second act has not yet begun and it will be years before the whole drama has been finished. A few months ago it would have been impossible to gauge accurately the real intentions and policy of the Czar, the court and the Government *after* the great events through which Russia has just passed; a few years hence it will be possible to write a full and satisfactory history at least of a large part of the revolutionary movement. In the meanwhile, if I have been

able to give a general understanding of the first act, to spread the conviction that Russia has a message for humanity and to suggest what this message contains, the reader will be enabled to appreciate coming events at their true value and to feel that the Russian struggle is not far away, as we sometimes imagine, but nearer to us in the end than any of the smaller spectacles that are taking place in front of our own doorways.

Lincoln's Birthday, 1908.



CONTENTS

Preface	ix
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PART I

THE BIRTHPLACE OF SOCIAL FREEDOM

I. Why Russia is the Field of the Great Experiment	3
II. The Beginning — 1904, 1905, 1906, 1907	10

PART II

OPPRESSION

I. Nicholas, Czar	29
II. How Czars Govern	32
III. The Czarism Struggling for Existence	40
IV. The Slow Massacre System	51
V. Creating the "Internal Enemy"	59
VI. The Danger of Progress	70
VII. "My Chief Support"	80
VIII. What Happened to "The Constitution"	88
IX. "Prussian" Reform	100
X. Autocracy's Last Hope	112
XI. The People's Enemies are the Czar's Allies	126

PART III

REVOLT

I. The Russian People — A Mystery	145
II. The Russian People — Their True Character	153
III. How the Peasants Live	166
IV. How the Peasants Till the Soil	180

RUSSIA'S MESSAGE

PART III—*Continued*

V.	From Slaves of the Landlord to Slaves of the State.	192
VI.	The Peasant Gives His Orders	208
VII.	How the Peasant Became a Revolutionist	216
VIII.	The Village Against the Czar — A State of Mind	227
IX.	The Czar's Armies of Revenge	235
X.	The Village Against the Czar — A State of War	250
XI.	Waiting for Civil War	261

PART IV

EVOLUTION OF A NEW NATION

I.	The Nation United	271
II.	The Nation Chooses the Revolutionary Way	279
III.	The Unity Destroyed.	287
IV.	The Moderates Coöperate with the Reactionaries	295
V.	Begging for Crumbs	304
VI.	The Peasants Become Socialists	312
VII.	The Peasant Parties Abandon Hope in the Duma	327
VIII.	The Leaders of the People	338

PART V

REVOLUTION AND THE MESSAGE

I.	The Workingmen	349
II.	The Position of the Workingmen	358
III.	Organising	371
IV.	Planning the War	382
V.	How the Priests are Becoming Revolutionists	392
VI.	The Religious Revolution	402
VII.	The Russian Revolution	413
VIII.	Russia's Message	428
	Appendix	468
	Bibliographical Note	469
	Index	473

ILLUSTRATIONS

Count Tolstoi	<i>Frontispiece</i>
Nicholas II., "Most High"	22
Two high officials.	23
How the peasants are "pacified"	48
Executing political prisoners	49
The slayer of von Plehve	64
Marie Spiridonova	65
Krushevan, massacre organiser	80
Reactionary Duma members	81
Herzenstein and Kovalevski	96
Map showing political divisions in Russia	97
Teaching the peasants	162
A southern peasant	163
The landlord's palace	174
The peasant's cottage	175
The earthen cottage	178
The cottage's single room	179
A peasant's waggon	190
Agricultural implements	191
Peasants in winter costume	192
Famine-stricken peasants	193
Methods of threshing	208
Haying done by women	209
Bogoraz (Tan), the poet	240
Korolenko, the novelist	240
The village chief	241
A wise peasant	241
The village street	256
Social farming of the peasantry	256
Little Russian peasants.	257
Professor Milyoukov	276
Constitutional Democratic leaders	277
Labour Group of first Duma	284

RUSSIA'S MESSAGE

Social Democratic deputies	285
Executive Committee of Peasants' Union	294
Cossack liberals	295
A young village leader	298
Peasants' Union delegates	299
Peasant members of the Duma	326
An educated peasant leader	327
Anikine	330
Aladdin	330
Bielevsky, under "house arrest"	331
Father Gapon	356
Type of working man	357
A corner of old Moscow	364
Prince Kropotkin	365
Socialist Revolutionary leaders	384
Two types of village priests	385
Fathers Petrov and Kolokolnikov	400
Two types of the higher clergy	401

PART ONE

THE BIRTHPLACE OF SOCIAL FREEDOM



CHAPTER I

WHY RUSSIA IS THE FIELD OF THE GREAT EXPERIMENT

ON THE banks of the Neva, the Volga, and the Vistula," writes Anatole France, "the fate of new Europe and the future of humanity are being decided."

The future of humanity is being decided in Russia because it is Russia alone among the great nations that has not already definitely chosen the path of her development. The foundations of modern industry were laid in Great Britain more than a century ago, the political institutions of America have undergone no revolution for more than a hundred years. The other modern nations also are held fast in the framework of material and political conditions fixed by some long-dead generation. In this sense Russia is comparatively free. Without being out of touch with modern life she is not bound by any of the peculiar limitations of the other nations.

She is almost entirely free from those great business interests that dominate the life of other modern nations. Witte has tried the great experiment of turning Russia into a modern business nation by means of ukases of the Czar and the division of his plunder and the country's wealth with foreign capital. The result was the collapse in 1900 of the whole artificial industrial structure based on the taxation of the starving peasantry. The recent parliamentary experiment is also ended and the shadow of a constitution has disappeared. The Government is once more a despotism that leaves neither power nor freedom to the people.

Neither by political education, then, nor by economic necessity are the Russians tied to any one of the industrial and political institutions that characterise other peoples of our time, nor are they in any way wedded to an effete and outworn civilisation. The Czarism is a half-Asiatic, half-German institution imposed on the country from without, just as the Church

was bodily transported from Constantinople and set up without the slightest reference to religious ideas then in existence. We have the judgment indeed of one of Russia's greatest historians and sociologists, of the man who led the party that controlled both of the first two Dumas, to the effect that Russia is indeed without any national religious or political tradition in the truest sense of the word.

Scratch a Russian and you find not a Tartar but a new European. Old institutions are hated rather than venerated. There is no question among any important element of the population outside of the relative handful that supports the Czar, of not leaving the landmarks of Russia with all speed. Russia's unparalleled tragedy is not due to any innate conservatism in the national character, not to the grip on the people's soul of old customs and an old faith, but to an incredible incubus that has been imposed upon her from without and like a monstrous parasite has grown strong at the expense of all her best vital forces.

"The Russian," said Turgeniev, "is so convinced of his own strength and powers that he is not afraid of putting himself to severe strain. He takes little interest in his past and looks boldly forward. What is good (in his own past or that of other nations) he likes, what is sensible he will have, and where it comes from he does not care."

"The old is dead, the new is not yet born," says an old Russian proverb. It portrays the present condition of the country. The old Russian system of slavery and despotism is already dead in the minds and hearts of the people because enslavement either to private individuals or to the State wholly contradicts every thought and feeling of the Russian, as of every thinking and feeling man who knows of any other mode of existence. The new is not yet born because of the greatness of the changes that are coming into being. It is not merely a revolutionary change in land ownership or a new government that is demanded. It is, to employ an expression now widely in use among all classes, "new forms of life," new forms of national and individual existence. The peasants want the land and the nation wants to rule itself, not because conditions are growing worse, not so much because they are inspired with the horror of what now

prevails, as because they are filled with a sense of the greatness that is possible to a regenerated Russia.

Here is a great people in possession of half the continents of Europe and Asia, a people unhampered by inherent traditions, that has yet never experienced a great national awakening like other countries. Every thoughtful or enterprising Russian feels that in a well ordered society there would be room for his development. Every peasant knows of the better conditions and opportunities of America and Western Europe. Every educated person has read and thought over what is desirable and undesirable for Russia in this "Western life." Every trained person, publicist, artisan, professional or business man, has studied, planned and dreamed over the technical revolution already accomplished in other countries that is called for also in his occupation in Russia. But all feel that the absence of any real tradition in Russia, the long pent-up energies and revolutionary spirit in all things, should ultimately give her an advantage over the other countries, and sweep away many of the obstacles to individual and national development that exist in other lands either because their advanced economic condition has set them in the hard and fast lines of a fixed material and institutional framework, or because some popular, but none the less blind, political tradition has been allowed to sink its roots in the minds of the people.

The evil Russia is fighting does not exist, then, in the character of the nation itself, as a thing of the spirit, but as an arbitrary physical power. Nevertheless, the struggle of the new against the old Russia is not merely a physical conflict. The people's cause has long ago attained a strength sufficiently great to force the Government to break its silence and to cover its selfish, irresponsible, and anti-social action, often consciously hostile to the general welfare, by a whole universe of lies. To every appeal from glaring wrongs to reason, to justice, to the nation's welfare, or even to the most elementary rights of the individual, the Government's answer is — some falsehood.

Official Russia is in a land of lies. The Czar lies as to facts in signed documents, breaks his most solemn promises to the nation, and, finally, diabolically proclaims his God-given right to break his word. The ministers lie to the Duma and the Duma

fully exposes their lies. To retrieve its own national reputation lost in the war with Japan, the Government tries to throw the blame on the Manchurian generals and finally convicts them, apparently with justice, of every manner of fraud and degradation, even to telegraphing in official despatches of battles that were never fought. Every financial statement the Government has issued has been proved by the experts of Europe to be only a cleverly managed collection of misstatements. All the telegrams allowed to be printed in Russia are those of the Government agency, and every day proves some of them to be either lying half-truths or falsehoods.

Each of these lies covers a wrong. With the growth of the revolutionary movement all wrong-doers and parasites enjoying a wrongful or unearned income are herding together for defence. Whether the incompetent person is professor, administrator, engineer, or priest, whether the dishonest wrong-doer is official, banker, or landlord, makes little difference. They are all connected with the Government. The ramifications of the governmental power are numberless and few are the unscrupulous that have not secured some kind of protection or benefit. It would seem that there is nothing too old, too outworn, too repugnant to all humanity and reason, whether in government, religion, education, or science, for the Czar to cover with the Imperial sanction.

The struggle is not being carried out on a physical plane, largely because all the best life of the nation is absorbed in exposing this great system of falsehood. And as the hard-pressed Government takes shelter at one time or another behind nearly every one of the most used and dangerous lies that are oppressing humanity and have oppressed it for centuries, the leaders of the nation on their side have been forced to draw into the discussion all the greatest and most illuminating truths of history and of our time. The more hopeless the outlook for the immediate success of the revolution, the more enthusiastic, impassioned, many-sided and profound has been the public discussion of every far-reaching social problem, until it can now be said though she is without a vestige of political liberty that Russia is more vitally alive to every great political and social issue than the freest countries. In the brief periods of relative free-

dom of the press that have occurred several times during these revolutionary years no great problem of human destiny was left unstirred. All arguments, all philosophies, all history, the experience of all countries were dragged into the arena. Because nothing is settled in the nation's life, because the people are clamouring for everything that for generations may have been denied, and because all great questions are under discussion, nothing can be taken for granted in the argument. So there are marshaled in opposing camps in Russia all the forces of progress and reaction as in no other country during all the century that has elapsed since the revolution in France.

The issues of this revolution are greater than they were in France, the struggle is on a more extended scale, and the whole world is lending its forces to aid the Russian Government. The foreign influence that threatened the French Revolution through the English fleet and the Prussian and Austrian armies on the frontier, which finally forced the Revolution to choose between Napoleon's military dictatorship and extinction, is represented in the very heart of Russian life by the apparently inexhaustible supply of gold by means of which foreign money-lenders enabled the Government to provide itself with all the formidable machinery of modern warfare and to hire an army of nearly a million Cossacks and police to hold down the revolutionary movement. The Russian revolution is in no sense only a Russian question. It is against the financial powers of all the world that the revolutionists are fighting. This is why Russia's most profound thinkers cannot see an early end to the upheaval — though the whole world will benefit from their victory.

I saw Count Tolstoi just after the meeting of the first Duma, and told him I had come to spend several years to observe the revolution. "You had better stay here fifty years," he answered. "The revolution is a drama of several acts. This Duma is not even the first act, but only the first scene of the first act, and as is usual with first scenes it is a trifle comic."

If the revolution is long drawn out, if the losses are great, if the Czarism seems to be holding its power, this is only because new forces have been thrown into the balance, and means that a still greater battle will have to be fought, a battle that may

become what Carlyle called the French Revolution, "the account day of a thousand years."

But in order to realise what is going on it is not necessary to wait for the final fruition of the great movement. The soul of the future civilisation is foreshadowed in the conflict. The rising generation, the youth and even most men under middle age, those who will constitute the chief force of Russia in another decade, are nothing less than inspired by the revolution. Their devotion goes further than that of mere patriots engaged in foreign wars; they undergo denials, sufferings and actual tortures that make them more akin to religious martyrs. Patriots die freely in battle for their country — these enthusiasts submit to a whole life of unrewarded sacrifice. The vast majority of the young men of every social class except the most privileged, and a large part of the educated young women as well, are daily offering their lives, their liberty, their property and their future careers for the cause. Their leading motive is not hatred of the enemy, nor perhaps even love of their own friends and kindred, so much as the political principles and social ideals to which they have given all their most serious thoughts. The more thoughtful, active, and capable the young people, the more immersed we find them in the revolutionary movement. Nor do they leave it with growing years. The revolutionists of the former generation have for the most part remained steadfastly attached to their faith, and each of the great parties is still led by the last even more than by the present generation. Neither must it be inferred that it is altogether different with the fathers of the rank and file. As usual in wars or revolutions their positions and family cares do not permit them to bear the brunt of the movement, the active parts are necessarily taken by the young, but the parents often encourage, and rarely interfere with, their children's activities.

It is perhaps the first time in history that a whole nation has been infected to the point of religious enthusiasm by this purely social faith. Something like this occurred in France. But as the revolution there did not meet a tithe of the obstacles that this one has already met, it did not develop a tithe of the intensity, profundity, or universal scope of the present movement. This is why so many great thinkers feel that the

Russian revolution means more to humanity than any great popular movement, political, economic, or religious, that all history records.

As regenerated Russia, inspired by her victory and with the spiritual strength and character gained through the struggle, steps finally into the arena of the modern nations and faces the same situation as the rest, she is likely to lead in her solutions rather than to follow, to inspire rather than to act as a drag upon the others. Her poverty, her inexperience, her miserable past, will give to her young men the same stimulation as they have to our own, who in struggling against precisely such obstacles have created the greatness of the United States.

CHAPTER II

THE BEGINNING — 1904, 1905, 1906, 1907

IN THE brief space of four years Russia has gone through the experience of a generation: the war with Japan; the broken promises of the Czar and the false constitutional hopes of a part of the people; the indefinite postponement of the once impending bankruptcy; the failure of passive resistance called for by the national assembly, of the second great general strike, of the insurrections in the cities, of the agrarian uprisings in the country, and of the imposing mutinies on sea and land to shake off the hated Czar. The guerilla war and the killing of the most murderous officials by mortally injured and maddened citizens continue to cost the Government dear, but the very persons engaged in this kind of warfare know that by it alone the Czarism can never be overthrown. The people's parties are powerless and insignificant in the third Duma, but they have succeeded in planting their doctrines everywhere and even in partly organising the masses of the population. The three Dumas and the revolutionary movement have brought no great improvements in the political freedom or the economic condition of the people. But they have already brought the Russian problem before the whole world, and revolutionised Russian life, thought, and opinion.

It was at the beginning of war with Japan that the foreign press first directed its attention to Russia's internal affairs. The spectacular failure of the Russian arms in Manchuria, however, shed little light on the internal conditions of European Russia nearly ten thousand miles away. One particular fact, though, was made evident. From the events in Russia at this time it was clear to all the world that a large part of the people of all classes was opposed to the war. The leading newspapers, gagged as they were, managed to attack the war and the Government; and the troops began almost immediately to revolt.

The world learned that the Russian people had not brought on this war.

The real cause of the war soon developed. It became clear that the terrible conflict was brought on chiefly to further the private interests of the Grand Dukes, Admiral Alexis, and other favourites of the court. A quarter of a million lives had been destroyed and a sum calculated by a leading economist at four or five billion rubles, a tenth of the total wealth of this impoverished people, had been destroyed. The whole world then for the first time realised that the Russian Government is indeed a barbarous despotism, that it is sustained by violence, that the welfare of the people is subordinated to the interests of those who happen to be pleasing to the Czar. The true nature of the Czarism was probably as plain at that moment as it will ever be. All the other horrors, the massacre of the St. Petersburg workmen on January 22, 1905, the innumerable massacres of the Jews instigated by the police, the butcheries of Tartars, Armenians, and Poles in peaceful assemblies, the deliberate burning of a theatre full of educated people at Tomsk, however terrible to the foreign reader, were, taken all together, hardly so costly to the Russian people, hardly so significant of their enslaved condition, as the spectacle of a nation of a hundred and forty million people being driven by their despot to war against another people ten thousand miles away of whom they knew little and against whom they had conceived no grievance.

The events of the last three years (1905, 1906, 1907) are surely enough to show that there is no hope of this incredible and monstrous despotism reforming itself. Russia has listened to the Czar's broken promises for more than a generation. But the promises of the last three years have been heard one after another by the whole world. In October, 1905, the Czar promised a Duma and freedom and equality before the law. At present all continues as before: newspapers are confiscated and suppressed; every kind of meeting forbidden; Jews and Poles persecuted for their religion and nationality; workingmen and peasants arrested by the wholesale for striking; hundreds of speakers, writers, students and working people sent every day, without trial, to prison, hard labour, and Siberia; the starving peasantry crushed by the same overwhelming burden of taxes,

and the Duma abolished in all but name. The third Duma is entirely in the hands of the landlords, the sole important element of the nation outside of Government employees on which the Czar can now rely for loyal support — about one per cent. of the population.

It is not a question of reform in Russia but of revolution. The reader does not need to be reminded how large a part of the Russian people are of this opinion. Tens of thousands have died for it, hundreds of thousands gone to prison or exile, millions suffered persecution, fines and arrest. Tens of millions of Russians who do not happen to have been individually persecuted share their view. In the election an overwhelming majority of the people voted for representatives of the revolutionary factions. It was only a most unequal suffrage and unheard of arbitrariness of the officials that gave the moderately oppositional parties a bare majority. It will be remembered that this election law, though by no means distorted enough to give a Government majority and now replaced by one infinitely less democratic, nevertheless gave the noble landlord the same number of votes as a hundred peasants. And it will be recalled that voters and electors were publicly disqualified by the hundred thousand at all stages of the election for nothing more subversive than unfriendliness to the Government. But it is not generally realised that nevertheless an overwhelming majority of the votes cast were votes for revolution.

The intelligent newspaper reader is well aware that every attempt at revolution has failed to gain any concrete results, whether general strike, insurrection, mutiny, refusal of taxes and recruits, assassination of despots, guerilla war, or even the most peaceful parliamentary method of refusing to countenance the foreign loans on which the Government is absolutely dependent for every year of its continued existence. The general strike, which won the Czar's idle promise of reform, the well known Manifesto* of October, 1905, was carried to success by two causes that can hardly recur again — the unpreparedness of the Government, and the unity of the people. The strike was begun on the railroads and its effect was almost wholly due to the tying up of all the communication of the country.

* For the full text of this Manifesto see Appendix, Note A.

The Government has now organized the railroads on the Prussian military system and made it an offence punishable by immediate execution to have anything to do with a railway strike. After the passing of this law a second effort to strike, in December, 1905, proved an almost complete failure. This was partly due to the preparedness of the Government, partly to the hostility or indifference of a part of the population. The Railway Union in Siberia felt itself forced to leave the lines open to send the troops home from Manchuria. The troops in Manchuria, though sympathetic with the revolt, were more anxious to get home a few weeks earlier than to further the cause. In another section the union felt compelled to forward grain to the famine-stricken peasants. The peasants were sympathetic but not enough so to withstand a few more weeks of a state of siege for the sake of permanent freedom. The railway men knew then, and have since finally decided, that a strike can succeed against the courts-martial only if the communications are completely interrupted and the bridges as far as possible destroyed. They propose to wait until some large section of the peasants rises in revolt. The general strike depends then on the general insurrection.

But the general insurrection has also been tried and found wanting. The Moscow barricades certainly proved an unexpected and brilliant success at the outset, and this success was repeated at a number of other places. But no unity of action developed between the various points. The railroads remained almost intact and the Government was able to send reinforcements wherever it was hard pressed. In the meanwhile the revolutionists failed to get on their side a sufficiently large part of the army at any one point to be able to march to the rescue of their comrades.

The agrarian insurrections were even more isolated and fruitless. Numbering on the whole several thousand, they were yet so disconnected that never were more than a handful of villages able to act in concert. A hundred million rubles worth of landlords' property was destroyed, here and there an official was killed. Yet there was no call for, nor support of, a general railroad strike, the only measure that could have confined the loyal part of the troops to the cities and allowed time for the

organisation of the agrarian revolt. Again, in the summer of 1907, after the dissolution of the second and last real Duma, the whole of the southern part of the country was covered with agrarian revolts, but again these revolts were never so general as to be too much for the relatively few loyal troops, the Cossacks and mounted rural police. If the day should ever arrive when these revolts become general in any section, the Railroad Union, sure then of the support and aid of the people, promises a strike accompanied by the destruction of the lines. This would certainly leave the country districts in the people's hands. The half a million mounted soldiers who happen for the most part to be loyal would be as nothing spread over a large section of the country.

Events have shown conclusively that most of the peasant infantry in the towns are infected and that some are ready for mutiny or desertion. But there remains the semi-professional army of Cossacks and guards, and this has been the one great safeguard of the throne. The relatively few revolts among the loyal professional, and one might almost say standing, army have of course been made the most of by the revolutionists. But such mutinies have been directed often merely against the miserable food, and unnecessary regulations or discipline. The Czar has quickly realised the necessity of giving these soldiers no such causes of discontent. Their food has been entirely altered, their pay increased, their service eased and especially compensated in times of "campaigns against the internal enemy." The regiments of the guard were favoured in every way, stationed at the most important and interesting places, clothed, fed, paid, and treated better than the rest. The members of these regiments had been chosen from all the recruits, not only on account of their physical development, but also because of loyalty and zeal.

The Cossacks are even more favoured among the subjects of the Czar. They are truly professional soldiers and the children of paid fighters. Living in outlying parts of the country the Czar has devoted to their use for several generations, they are given every privilege the Government can afford — plenty of land, low taxes, and even local freedom to govern themselves. They are not forced conscripts like the rest of the Czar's forces

and all the great armies of to-day. They are well paid to follow the profession their fathers freely chose before them. Their privileged position puts them socially apart somewhere between the nobility and the common people. Without having the independent military power of the Janissaries or Pretorian guards, they are as much the indispensable prop of a detested government as were the mercenaries of the old Empires of Constantinople or Rome.

The reader has often noticed the undoubted zest with which these Cossacks have filled their murderous office, and he has doubtless felt the hopelessness of inspiring such born servants of despotism with devotion to the people. If he remembers that the Cossacks' privileges would also vanish with the institution of a people's army and a more democratic government, he will understand from the Cossack problem alone that the revolution has before it a task greater than that ever faced by any people fighting for freedom. An impoverished and unarmed people spread out in little isolated villages and towns over half Europe and half Asia has to face a modern army of half a million men, mostly hereditary fighters, perhaps the best horsemen in the world, well paid and rewarded, splendidly armed and disciplined, hated by the mass of the people and naturally returning with contempt this hatred, prepared by special schooling and the careful tutelage of their officers to despise democracy and peace, to love Czarism and war, already experienced in, and now thoroughly reorganised for the express purpose of, putting down revolt. It is this army paid by the money advanced by the financiers of Germany and France, that has checked the revolution. It is the activity of this army that explains why the peasant uprisings limited to a few thousand villages scattered over the land did not take hold of the others and result, as in France in 1789, in the driving of the last landlord out of the country. It was this army that suppressed the growing mutiny among the troops in every corner of the land. It was this army that recaptured the few towns and strongholds that fell into the people's hands and prevented the peasants and small towns from unifying their movements as was done by the federations in France, which organised a government that was able to defend itself for twenty years against the allied forces of all Europe.

The peaceful measures of revolt, as I have said, were no more successful. The failure to get a foreign loan would have forced the Government to yield — but the people's opposition to the loan availed nothing. In December, 1906, the Government reports showed that the country's finances were only a few million rubles, or a few days from paper money and ruin. The financial situation may indeed overwhelm the Government in another generation, but if allowed to reach that point it might first overwhelm the nation in utter impoverishment and economic ruin.

The only other "peaceful" means of forcing the Government to terms were those appealed to by the first Duma when it was dissolved. The celebrated Viborg manifesto,* signed by a majority of the people's representatives, called for every possible means of passive resistance, denounced the foreign loans, and proposed to the people to refuse taxes and recruits. These latter measures, certainly passive, could not long have remained peaceful. If the Duma's advice had been followed by any considerable proportion of the people, the savage and universal reprisals of the Government would inevitably have led to open outbreaks. The villagers that refused recruits were at once taken before the courts-martial, which were the supreme power in the country from that time, and punished by military "law." Both the people and the majority of the Duma members who had signed the manifesto, were thoroughly aware of the impossibility of a general insurrection. The people refused to take the first step where a second was out of the question, the moderate party within a few weeks repudiated the proposal they themselves had put forward, and passive resistance is no longer talked of as a means of liberating the land.

So far all the means of revolution have failed. But more remarkable than their failure is the way the people have taken their defeat. The reader must have noticed that the revolutionary spirit has lived on even after the hope of any kind of immediate and general movement had failed. All the more determined revolutionists have decided that the spark of revolt shall be kept alive until a way is found to inflame the nation to a final heroic and successful stand. Assassination, expropria-

* For text of the Viborg Manifesto see Appendix, Note C.

tion and guerilla war are on the decrease because they are not leading to the general movement their partisans had hoped — and the current has set against them as means of leading up to a general revolt. But confidence in Russia's future and undying hatred to the Government have driven the people to ever new and more successful forms of action, slower, more costly perhaps, but irresistible in the end. Some of the measures of repression still in effect are proving fruitless, and when the Government does successfully maintain its might it does so at the cost of making new enemies it can ill afford, or of a financial expenditure that must lead to a steady decay of its power.

The reader must have realised that the new election law by which the voice of the people in the third Duma is reduced almost to zero, while the nobility and landlords, scarcely one per cent. of the voters, are given a majority of the representatives, amounts practically to an abolition of the national parliament. He may, therefore, have concluded not only that the revolutionary movement is quelled but that the revolutionary parties, many of them formed or crystallised in the Duma, have been robbed of their importance. None of the popular parties had any hope that the Czar would allow the Duma to accomplish anything, and they finally succeeded in their great common object, which was to teach the people that nothing would be gained from the Government that was not taken by superior power.

Three years of revolution and three national assemblies have brought the Russian people neither freedom nor the control of their Government, nor any great improvement. If the revolution should now draw to a conclusion all the colossal struggle and waste of hundreds of thousands of lives would have been for nothing; but if it should continue, even though it takes a generation to overthrow the Czarism and establish the sovereignty of the people, all the sacrifice will be justified. Russia is willing to pay high for freedom because of the infamy of the Czarism, because of the qualities of her peasant population and the splendidly progressive character of the people of her towns. But above all she is making these unheard of sacrifices because of the greatness that lies before her. A people that will have overcome an enemy like the Czarism backed by the world's

money power, will not shrink before the greatest social regeneration the world has ever known.

The recent partial successes and complete defeats, the monstrosity of the evils she is fighting, the difficulties to be overcome, are only measures of the power the nation is developing in the struggle and the profundity of the social revolution that only such a struggle can call into being. The recent dramatic struggle, the incredible degradation of the present Government, the tragic spirit of rebellion among the peasants, the exceptional intelligence and public spirit of the educated classes, the daring and devotion of the revolutionists, has led the Russian nation to the most heroic, the most inspired, and the most revolutionary social movement of centuries.

Because of this revolutionary social movement the Russian people lead the world at the present moment in the unselfish devotion of individual to the general welfare, in the systematic study of social problems, in the intensity of their interest in other countries and other periods, in the subtlety and profundity of their analysis of the political, social, and moral movements of our time, and in the elevation of the individual type which is a necessary result of such a vigorous social movement.

When the coming regeneration of life, which is believed in as a religious faith by all sincere and disinterested Russians from the peasants to Tolstoi and the most moderate of liberals, is finally accomplished, the world may have to look to Russia not only as it does now for individuals with the most developed social character but for the community that will have evolved for the first time social equality and a truly social government. The germs of this future society are already visible, the truly social individuals are already here. That complete and glad devotion to social causes that must constitute the life principle of the men of the future is already embodied in innumerable individual Russians of the present generation.

PART TWO

OPPRESSION

CHAPTER I

NICHOLAS, CZAR

Russian People, who journey sad and trembling,
Serfs at St. Petersburg, or at hard labour in the mines,
The North Pole is for your Master, a dungeon vast and sombre;
Russia and Siberia, O Czar! Tyrant! Vampire!
These are the two halves of your dismal Empire;
One is Oppression, the other Despair!

—VICTOR HUGO (*Les Châtiments*)

NICHOLAS II., though born heir to the vast Empire of the Romanoffs and absolute master of a hundred and forty million people, was a most ordinary child. But he was not long allowed to remain normal or ordinary. All the unlimited resources and powers of a Czar's educators from infancy to manhood, were used to convince him that he is the God-born superior to every man in his Empire, and that he has been given the right by God to regulate to the last particular the lives of each one of his one hundred and forty million subjects. Such an education can lead to only one result — with ordinary children.

"I knew a promising young princess," a well-known old courtier told me, "who had inborn progressive ideas. She was given to asking most interesting questions. Her teacher was of course changed, and when I saw her again, a few years later, I did not know her, she was so much like the rest. It is impossible that anything good should come out of that poisonous and misanthropic atmosphere of the Court. I have abandoned hope." So with the Czar. He is a product of his environment. Or, better, he is part and parcel of the whole of the old system. For now that he is on the throne, he is daily creating his environment and his environment is daily creating him.

That Nicholas II., by nature an ordinary, normal man, should have developed into a perfect and willing tool of reaction and an enemy of progress, is a sign that the day for expecting liberty from Czars or benevolent despots has passed. The sustainers

of autocracy have read history and studied revolutions aright. They are now taking no chances with their despots. To prevent his becoming better than those around him, Nicholas, like his uncles and cousins, the notoriously dissolute grand dukes, was scientifically corrupted in his youth. He was allowed several mistresses. A Jewish girl whom he is said to have really loved was torn away from him by the Court. True love is dangerous to despotism, above all love for a member of a persecuted race. His notorious affair with the ballet-dancer, Kshesinkaya, which lasted to the very day of his marriage, was more after his uncle's heart. He was allowed to endow this woman with a palace and a fortune in jewels and gold.

And while his body was being corrupted by fast living and drink, his soul was under the sinister and misanthropic influence of fanatic old Pobiedonostzev, or the half-crazy mysticism of Father John of Cronstadt, who, while still preaching massacre, has now set himself up for a Russian Christ. It is natural that a mind so beclouded should shower honours on the necromancer Phillipe, and, as God-appointed head of the Russian Church, canonise the monk Seraphin, dead now for fifty years, for having interceded with God to send him a male heir.


Nicholas is by education an ordinary absolute monarch, as he is by nature an ordinary man. If he has lightly glorified war, so has William II. If he has publicly announced his hatred of millions of his subjects, has not the German Emperor called a party of three million of his subjects "dogs"? He differs from other autocrats not in his ideas or in his nature, but in his actual crimes. Unfortunately for Nicholas, history offered him the choice either to rise above the monarch to the true man, or else to sink from the level of inhuman feeling and opinion to the definite degradation of criminal acts. Nicholas chose as a Czar, and not as a man. As a consequence the Czarism has been preserved, but at this price, that the Czar has become an accessory before the fact to a policy as black as anything ever dreamed by Machiavelli, and to crimes more horrible than any that have been perpetrated in Europe since the religious wars.

It is said that Nicholas II. is not to be known or judged like ordinary mortals, that he is helpless against the grand dukes,



Photograph by Bulla, St. Petersburg. Permission of Collier's Weekly

NICHOLAS II., "MOST HIGH"



TWO HIGH OFFICIALS

Typical of those who execute the Czar's will. Left, Vice-Governor Budberg of Moscow; right, Governor Reinbot of Moscow

his family, and the court. But, as was pointed out to me by one of the most honoured and best-informed men in Russia, the Czar has long selected his own court and chosen his own family favourites. "An autocrat can be formed by his environment for a few years," said this man, "but since the age of thirteen Nicholas has himself created his own environment." Nicholas loved the old reactionary advisers left him by his father — his Uncle Sergius, Minister Sipiaguine, and Count Ignatiev. The revolutionists have taken these terrible persons away. He feared Von Plehve, who, before the Czar had yet obtained a secure control of the reins of government, had got a firm hold on the secret police, a position impregnable in a despotism. The revolutionists also solved this problem for him. But he has replaced the reactionaries he loved by new reactionaries.

He became jealous within a few weeks of the popularity of a successful liberal minister like Sviatopolk-Mirski. Witte he always hated, but held to him long because he better than all others could procure gold in billions from Germany and France. His present favourites are all either discreet reactionaries, men of blood and iron like Stolypine, or shameless reactionaries like Kaulbars. Noble leaders of the black league formed for massacres, Bobrinsky, Sherebatov, Apraxin, Konovnitzin, General Bogdanovitch, have constant access to the court. Men of relentless violence, like Prime Minister Stolypine, Deduline, and Durnovo, are given the ministries that hold the real power. Kaulbars, Skalon, Herschelman, and Meller-Zakomelski are entrusted with the fate respectively of Odessa, Poland, Moscow, and the Baltic provinces. They are all cynical, violent, and open reactionaries. It was Herschelman who upset even the military law of the realm by reversing the sentence of a military court, which had let off with a light punishment four drunken peasants who had insulted a policeman. Herschelman had them hanged. When new laws are being prepared it is the reactionary jurists, old Goremykin, Stichinsky, and Durnovo, not real experts, who are taken into the Czar's personal confidence. But above all, to swing the destiny of the tortured and suffering peoples and nations called Russia, one must win the favour of the Czar's boon companions, the extreme reactionaries Prince Orlov and the Queen's Secretary, Prince Putiatin.

Prince Orlov is the Czar's drinking companion, Prince Putiatin is endeared to him as a heritage from his late beloved Uncle Sergius.

Talents for despotism, flattery, and intrigue, these are all of value in securing a commanding position and power in the land of the Czar. "But the only way to succeed permanently," said one of the most trusted and best-known of my informants, "the only certain road is reactionism — open, active, and bitter hatred of progress. Nicholas sometimes tolerates a progressive person for a short time. But he is never really pleased with anything but reaction, movement backward toward his father's régime. All his sympathies are for reactionary things, all his feelings are for reactionary men. This is why we are governed by reactionaries, why Russia may have to go through far worse trials and horrors in the next few years than in those just passed. The Czar is oppressed and weighed down by superior intelligence, because it dwarfs his own ordinary powers. He can't bear it around him. His real favourites have always been, and doubtless always will be, dull and stupid men." Other opinions equally to be respected are in entire accord with this.

"The keynote to the Czar's character," said another authority, "is an inflated hypertrophied self-love, as is natural and almost inevitable with an irresponsible and absolute monarch. This self-love was consciously created in his youth and is purposely developed by all who approach the throne. It is the explanation of every important act of the reign. For instance, it was nothing but the Czar's self-love that brought us the Duma and a few months later took this Duma away."

At enmity with the people, surrounded by dull and brutal persons of his own choosing, endowed himself with a clearly expressed love for violence and the "good old times" of his father Alexander III., what is the use of seeking further Nicholas's political ideas? They are, of course, most rudimentary. His leading idea, expressed in every public utterance, is that his personal desires and the welfare of his immense empire are one and the same thing — that the preservation of his own unlimited, irresponsible, and absolute personal rule, and the maintenance of the riches and irresponsible power of his family and his friends, of the grand dukes, the high officials,

the high clergy, the high nobility and the court, are all entirely consistent with the welfare of the vast and varied peoples of the realm.

It was to the supposed interest of the grand dukes, the Czar's mother, the Russian police, the heads of the army and the court, to declare war against Japan. The nation, almost wholly opposed to the calamitous and terrible enterprise, was not consulted. But the Czar, justly certain that he was acting in accordance with the wishes of his family, his friends, and everybody he respected, entered into the bloody and unprincipled business with a light heart. He said, writes Prince Urussov, that he considered the Japanese attack "like the bite of a flea" and that he was "fully satisfied with the progress of the war" because it would call out an increase of the patriotic spirit, *because the agitation against the Government would cease and it would be easier to maintain order in the State.* This unjust, bloody, unpopular war was brought on, then, by the common human frailties of a single individual — the desire to please his friends and relatives and the determination to maintain his control of his inherited property, Russia, at any cost.

Nicholas happens to be absolute master of the lives and property of one hundred and forty million people, and that they are "the submissive servants" of his will is agreed by all defenders of the autocratic system. Imagine the wrath of such a master when the slaves are in revolt. Rebellious slaves have never been treated as human beings, and their revolts have usually been put down without stint of the utmost cruelties. In Russia, where not even the highest of the nobility have any rights against the Czar, a revolution is quite incomprehensible to the supreme power.

A certain Russian prince, internationally famed for honesty, moderation and public spirit, complained in person to the Czar about the frightful Bielostock massacre. After having shown that the massacre was carried out almost entirely by the soldiers and police, the prince said, "This thing simply cannot continue. It is wrong."

The Czar hesitated long, but finally answered: "Yes, it is wrong. It is wrong. But what can you do? These people are republicans and revolutionists."

The loyal prince excused himself in hopeless despair. "The people of Bielostock are republicans and revolutionists; that justifies any crime against them," thinks the Czar. But nine-tenths of the Russian people are, broadly speaking, revolutionists. The Czar is then simply at war with his own people — unhampered by any usage or principle of civilised humanity or of civilised war.

"What is the exact relation of the Czar to the crimes and horrors that are perpetrated in his name? Is the Czar himself primarily responsible, or are others more to blame?" I asked these questions of the men in Russia best able to answer, and had for my literal replies: "The court is the centre of the 'pogromists' and 'Black Hundreds.' The Czar himself is the chief of the 'hooligans.'" And I found such to be the almost unanimous opinion of Russia's most reliable men.

Prince Urussov, recently governor of Bessarabia, places a full share of the responsibility for the wholesale massacres of 1905 directly on the Czar. "A word from the authoritative mouth of the Emperor or any action would have extraordinarily facilitated the maintenance of order," he writes significantly. But every effort failed to obtain from Nicholas either any kind of declaration condemning the pogroms, or even the suggested manifestation of unspoken sympathy with the victims through some slight monetary present for their relief. "From 1903" writes the prince, "it became plain to all the world that the Czar himself, if not in action, at least in thought and feeling, was an enemy to the Jews."

A recognised enemy to the Jews, yes, but none the less an enemy to the Poles, Armenians, Finns, Letts, and Lithuanians, as the most credited representatives of all these races have testified, and to all the fifty million non-Russian peoples that constitute a full third of his subjects. For the actions and policies that have shown the Czar's attitude to the Jews, the most powerful of the "subject" peoples, have been repeated, almost exactly, toward the rest. A recognised enemy also of the overwhelming majority of the common people of Russian stock, the hundred million peasants and workingmen, as their representatives in the Duma testified. Friend only of the officials, the landlords, the very rich, the few hundred thousand

X pampered Cossacks, spies, and police, who altogether constitute the only real foundation of the throne. Friend, also, of the murderers who have carried out the massacres that have drenched the land in blood. Nicholas is no mere onlooker. To be sure he has not taken part in the shooting, as did Charles IX. in the massacre of St. Bartholomew, but he is literally throwing open the prison doors for all who have murdered "in his name." The pogromists at Kertch, at Volsk, at Nijni Novgorod, in Volhynia, in Bessarabia, at Tula, and a dozen other places, though sentenced by the local courts, have all been fully pardoned by the Czar. The Czar's pardon for three Kharkov assassins who murdered a lawyer in his home, carried with it an even more open excitation to a repetition of the act in the words, "A pardon is extended to X, Y, and Z, the men who killed the miscreant *revolutionary Jew*."

One of the chief organisers of the great Odessa massacre of October, 1905, when nearly a thousand were killed and wounded, was at last got behind the bars. The circuit court could not declare him innocent. It sentenced him, however, to only eight months' imprisonment. He soon received the full pardon of the Czar. Numerous other pardons followed, until the daily massacres in that city increased to the point that brought a diplomatic disgrace to the Russian Government. The combined foreign consuls felt impelled to raise a protest; it, however, accomplished nothing. Nearly every day shows one or more open and cold-blooded murders to be attributed directly to the unmistakable approval of the Czar. The chief of police, Novitzki, was finally forced to telegraph Stolypine: "It is not possible for the police to fight successfully against secret leagues which are *led by persons who guarantee the members impunity for crime*."

In Odessa the Government and the murderous League of Russian Men have become practically one. The local president of the league, Count Konovnitzin, is the aid-de-camp of the governor-general, Kaulbars; the latter is a member of the executive council and its meetings are often held in his palace. Nicholas himself is an honorary member of the League. A delegation, headed by the mayor, recently sent by desperate Odessa to the court to complain against the league's atrocities

was received by the Czar wearing on his breast the emblem of the League of Russian Men. That emblem was significant of his answer: he has delivered the great port of Odessa, with its half million of inhabitants, to the tender mercies of the League.

To the delegation which presented him his badge (and one for his little heir), together with an address setting forth the "loyal" and anti-semitic purposes of the organisation, Nicholas answered: "Thank in my name all the Russian people who have joined the league." Stolypine reported recently to the Czar that 60 per cent. of this notorious league was recruited from the criminal classes and scarcely $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. were educated persons. On Stolypine's report Nicholas wrote: "The league is the most loyal of all the parties and the most useful to the Government. It would be well to be patient and to give it time to improve and correct itself."

Dr. Dubrowin, president of the league and editor of its St. Petersburg organ, the *Russian Flag*, was asked recently the practical way out of Russia's difficulties. The justly notorious doctor replied: "It is necessary to hang eleven foremost leaders whom I could name, two hundred secondary leaders and three thousand party workers." To the question as to who could be found to execute such a cruel sentence, he answered: "The League of Russian Men would have the courage to do it." Dubrowin has made it clear that he reckons among those to be killed not only beloved popular leaders like Anikine and Aladdin, but also moderates like the economist Herzenstein, already assassinated by the league, if not by Dubrowin's own personal order. No Russian revolutionist has ever made a proposal of wholesale butchery — their victims are the victims of a guerilla war. It is not the revolution for freedom that has produced the Russian Marat. It is the criminal counter-revolution personally patronised by the Czar.

At first it was proposed to make Nicholas himself one of the three members of the league's executive board. Later the position was given to the Czar's new favourite and spiritual adviser, the priest Vostorgov. This "orthodox Christian" fire-eater stirred up race-wars in the Caucasus until he was forced to flee from the enraged people. Though only a common priest, he has now taken the place of sinister old Pobiedonostzev as the

theorist of arbitrary autocracy and reaction and the spiritual consoler of the court — while at the same time he guides the league for massacre. The Czar in appreciation has heaped exceptional ecclesiastical honours on his head and has given him a place in the Holy Synod. With the coming of Vostorgov it can at last be said that the League's end, the fusion of the "true Russian people" with the "Most High," has at last been accomplished.

The title "Most High" sounds almost blasphemous. But in the eyes of the advocates of absolutism the Czar can be guilty of no blasphemy, just as he can be guilty of no crime. What he does is not only right, but sacred. The heads of the Church are his servants, as much subject to his orders as any peasants. The Czar has been given by God the care also of his subjects' souls. Every important ukase, even if on a purely political subject, is read from every village pulpit along with the rest of "God's word," likewise emanating from the whims and dictation of Nicholas and other Czars. Every expression and activity of life, every book, every newspaper, every school, every church or private society, must be forced and distorted to express absolute obedience, submission, subjection, and servility to the Czar.

If a man in whom such a megalomania is cultivated from early childhood is not engaged personally in hunting down his subjects like Charles IX., it must be attributed to court custom rather than to anything in the conscience of the Czar. Young German barons around him who have led man-hunts against peasants they have harried into rebellion, receive his full sympathy, approval, and even promotion for their actions; while those who do not take a lively interest in such work are quickly marked with imperial disfavour and disgrace. This bloody business has gone so far that many who in the past have been reactionary or circumspect enough to rise to the highest rank, are now drawing back in horror and disgust. Not so the Czar, and no titles such a renegade may bear, no services rendered, can save him from the imperial wrath.

To an officer reporting a rather bloodless "pacification" in the west, the Czar replied after a long meditative silence: "Just the same, you have killed too few, you have killed too

few." To General Kazbek, reporting a similarly bloodless success against the revolutionists, the Czar listened without a word. After having given his report, the general was leaving and was already near the door when he heard a low, harsh voice behind him. He turned immediately round; the Czar was following him with a wolfish stride, and hissing through his closed teeth: "You ought to have fired just the same, general! You ought to have fired just the same!"

The famous General Subbotich, a member of the general staff and recent governor-general of Turkestan, not only did not shed any blood in his province but scandalised the court by making several speeches in which he promised that the Czar would carry out his promises expressed in the October Manifesto and soon begin the work of reform. He was removed from his office and robbed of his dignities and pension without any statement of the cause. He demanded a trial by courts-martial, and was refused. He was told only that he had not taken measures to suppress the revolution, and that the Emperor "had deigned to refuse to let him know the tenor of the accusations against him." He announced himself as a candidate to the Duma from the most conservative class of St. Petersburg, consisting of 2,000 members carefully selected by the Government, and received more than eight hundred of their votes. This vote is an evidence of the fact that the bitterness of all classes has reached such a point that only a bare half even of the most favoured and privileged can be persuaded to stand for the bloodthirstiness of the Czar.

The Czar has also his minor heroes of violence. A certain cadet heard disrespectful words about his sacred Majesty on the street. He struck the speaker two blows on his head with his bayonet and the latter sank to the ground. The Czar wrote with his own hand on the war minister's report to express his thanks for this "praiseworthy action" as he called it. A certain cavalry officer, a passenger on a local steamer, called the members of the Duma "rascals," entered into a quarrel with his fellow-passengers and finally opened fire with his revolver, seriously wounding a waiter before he was disarmed. His term was shortened by his Majesty's favour to three months' police arrest. A soldier shot a girl prisoner dead through the head for looking

out of the prison window against the rules. He was sent a present of five dollars by the Czar. Since then this act has been repeated by the wholesale in all parts of the country.

Nicholas II. is a criminal in the eyes of his people. In all sections, among all classes, among rich and poor, townspeople and countrypeople, the educated, the business men, and priests, there is one dominating opinion about the Czar — that he bears to the full his share of the responsibility for the monstrous system of crime and plunder called the Russian Government, that he is neither better nor worse than the average of his predecessors, and that nothing better is to be expected from his successors since even the Czars themselves are products of the Czarism it is sought to destroy. The people have no desire to wait until the Czarism produces a ruler who is not a Czar.



CHAPTER II

HOW CZARS GOVERN

IT IS not permissible to dip far into Russian history in the course of this review of present-day conditions. But we can thoroughly grasp the deep-seated and almost unconscious feeling of Russia about her rulers, only when we recall what kind of Czars the Czarism has actually produced. The first great Czar was Ivan the Terrible. He was a successful Czar and did Russia the inestimable service of driving out the Tartars and more than doubling the extent of the realm. But when he was not crushing the Tartars he was literally crushing the souls and bodies of his own people. He was trained purposely in his childhood to make what was then considered the strongest type of Czar, a man whose very name was to cause fear and submission among his subjects — and this principle of government not alone by the strong arm, but by fear of it, by “terror,” remains a leading principle of the Czar’s Government to-day. We have seen that Nicholas still demands bloodshed instead of unconditional surrender, and we shall see that this principle is not merely one of the chief policies of State but the very basis of the whole governmental system.

Ivan set an example of Czarism that has never since been equalled — though, to be sure, most of his actions have been repeated frequently since his time. When as late as the middle of the sixteenth century Ivan wiped the half-free and the half-democratic towns of Pskov and Novgorod off the map, he did not ask for surrender, but practised deliberate and continuous tortures for the space of five weeks, in which time, one chronicle says, he put to death in one of the towns, men, women and children to the number of sixty thousand. Moscow, in 1570, was treated to similar tortures, at which Ivan as usual assisted in person, piercing many to death with his hunting spear. The scene was on the great sacred place in Moscow, afterward

christened the Red Square, in front of the famous sacred church erected after Ivan's own plans and clearly announcing his insanity, but which has served ever since as a cherished model for the Czars, like so many of the traditions of this age.

Ivan's practice was to make a public spectacle of his "executions," but on this great occasion the instruments of torture and pots for boiling people alive frightened the public away, and they had to be brought back by main force to witness the performance. Men were tortured by the wholesale in all ways known to human ingenuity, and, what is rarer in modern history, a show was made of the disgrace and tortures of women and girls, a feature entirely in accord with the wild and cruel private orgies of this Czar. After torture and disgrace the women and girls were killed either by having red-hot spears thrust into their bodies, or by Ivan's own instrument. Philip, metropolitan of Moscow and head of the Church, he had burned to death for refusing to bless him after his debauchery and crimes, the court chancellor was cut to pieces, the treasurer boiled alive, and a certain prince lingered impaled on stakes for fifteen hours while his mother was shamed by the soldiers before his eyes.

Ivan's cruelties doubtless somewhat exceeded what might be calculated even by the most cold-blooded despot as useful to the maintenance of his power, but the fact remains that he was successful in increasing the might of the Czarism both at home and abroad, and his example has not been without its influence on later Czars. To Peter the Great also, who ruled more than a hundred years later, human life was nothing. He repeated almost exactly several of the tortures devised by Ivan, as well as the executions "in person." He also caused the death of his own son Alexis. Fortunately, however, Peter the Great was a man of ideas. If the building of St. Petersburg cost as many unnecessary lives as the destruction of Novgorod, there was at least a more positive result. Peter also had less time for cruelty than Ivan, since he was busied with what he considered, often rightly, to be real affairs of State. But like Ivan he governed by execution, torture and terror, enjoyed the cruelty in person, and indulged in as bestial and wholesale debauchery

as the world has known. In one respect he went farther than Ivan, insisting on forcing on all the nation every detail of his arbitrary and sometimes even whimsical "will." By regulating every detail of his subjects' lives, even to the cut of their beards, he reduced every individual of the nation to the position of his personal servant or serf.

Catharine II. was scarcely less debauched than Peter, and scarcely less cruel to the great mass of her subjects. But, though she undoubtedly caused the death of her husband and many others for whom she felt enmity, she showed as a rule a woman's gentleness to those immediately about her. However, as these last were her companions in luxury and debauch, the nation had little benefit from the descent of the great Empress to this ordinary virtue of the human race. Her successor, Paul, reverted to the arbitrariness of Peter. It would be more interesting to show the disastrous effects of this reversion on the people, which finally led to his assassination, than the ridiculous forms it took in his personal behaviour. But it is personal character that concerns us for the moment, and nothing reveals his character better than his compelling his subjects to kneel, in dust, rain, mud, or snow, to his holy person when his carriage passed; and he even snatched a cap from an infant's head when a nurse did not know how to honour his presence.

There can be little doubt that Alexander I. was privy to the murder of his father, and his reign, thus begun so thoroughly in the tradition of the Czars, was in perfect accord with his predecessors'. Europe, always densely ignorant of all things Russian and most hopelessly in the dark about the true character of the Czars, for some time took Alexander I. for a liberal, as it had taken Peter and Catharine, and has since taken Alexander II. and the present Czar. The original basis for this conception was slim; later the conception became absurd, for Alexander formed the Holy Alliance to battle against every great idea the French Revolution had introduced, and Russia became the mainstay of the reaction in Europe until her defeat, fifty years later, in the Crimean War and her replacement at this post of honour by Prussia and the German Empire of to-day. It was Alexander who added the Prussian military discipline and servitude to the other burdens of the nation. In his military

colonies the new militarism was combined with serfdom, till it became a full penal system of forced labour.

Nicholas I. brought the new military serfdom to its perfection, to the envy of Prussia and other "military" powers; and he went even further and applied this system to the post-office and other public service, to several industries and to the mines. When Nicholas's army crushed the liberties of Hungary in 1849, his generals, Haynau and others, were so cruel that even Turkey refused to give up the refugees, and America finally felt impelled to carry Kossuth away on a frigate of the Government.

Alexander II. again, who was forced to emancipate the serfs by the failure of the Crimean War and the impossibility of creating a modern army or raising the taxes under the old régime, was known as a liberal in Europe until his barbarous suppression of the Polish insurrection. It was only because he had taken away the very slight liberties he had granted that a group of revolutionists robbed him of his life. This revolutionary act in turn stirred the reactionary forces in the Empire to make a "martyr" of him, and gullible Europe, which for years had turned away from him in disgust, again took up his cause and still does honour to his memory as a "liberal" Czar. Alexander III., the present Czar's father, was a typical Czar, without any special talents, blindly devoted to reaction, absolutism, and the narrowest conception of the Church, surrounded by dull and servile flatterers and leading the narrowest personal life, absorbed in trivialities and drink. It was this stagnant, suffocating atmosphere that produced the "heroes" of the present reign — its half-crazy or sinister fanatic priests; its demoniacal and all-powerful police heads, von Plehve and Trepov; the organisers of the statesmanship of persecution of subject races, Ignatiev and the Grand Duke Sergius; the first theoretical defenders of absolutism, Absakov and Leontieff, who sought to keep out of the policy of the Russian State the new and "obnoxious principle of seeking the material and moral welfare of the human race."

Russia has learned something from her Czars. She has learned that it is one-man power itself that is wrong. Nearly all thoughtful Russians feel that the concentration of govern-

mental power in the hands of a single man is the worst curse that can befall a people. They know that the only possible defence of such a system is based on a lie, a radical misconception of the nature of the human individual and the race. And they know that the first result of this lie is to distort, corrupt, or pervert the mind and character of the ruler himself, so that there can be no benevolent despot unless by chance, and that such a despot, if intelligent, would have to deny despotism itself, and, if honest, put it to an end. In Russia there is no Napoleonic worship, no "great man" theory, no demand for, and no blind faith in, all-powerful leaders. There is too much similarity, as far as the masses of the people are concerned, between the reigns of the Czar-genius Peter and the lunatic Ivan the Terrible, between the reactionary "liberal" Nicholas II. and the conqueror of Napoleon and the French Revolution, Alexander I.

The present revolutionary movement of the Russian nation must have arisen under any Emperor. It is directed against Czarism rather than against any particular Czar. But in so far as the Russian ruler is really Autocrat and Czar, that is, in proportion as he rules by his own will and not that of the people, he is the living embodiment of the despotism. The present Czar, all future Czars, must stand or fall with the system of which they are a part. Since Nicholas II. remains head, or at least centre, of the old system, since he refuses to abdicate or share his power, and since he is neither a degenerate nor a weakling under duress, he must bear his share of the great crimes of the system of which he is a part.

This is the judgment of the Russian people. It is the judgment of their leaders and noted men: of writers like Tolstoi, Gorki, Korolenko, and Andreief; of public men of international fame like Kovalevski, Roditchev, Prince Dolgorukov and Milyoukov; of conservative leaders like Shipov, Stachovitch, Count Heyden, Prince Trubetzkoi, and Prince Lvov; of the liberal parish priesthood and its leaders, Father Petrov and the Archimandrite Michael; of recent governors and ministers and generals like Urussov, Kutler, and Subbotich—in fact, of practically every public man of the first rank outside of the Government service. Not only the masses of the Russian people, then,

but its best brain and soul are in revolt against both Czarism and against Nicholas II., because he is Czar.

This slow-witted, self-centred reactionary and blood-loving tyrant is recognised by the Russian nation as its most deadly enemy, not because he is stronger or more vicious than many others in high places in the State, but because he is on account of his position and his power the centre of the system that it is costing the country's best life-blood to destroy; not because he is any worse than his predecessors, or because his successors can be expected to turn out any better than he, but just because there lives in him and breathes in all his actions the very spirit of "the Czar."

But if Nicholas is no better than the machine by which he "governs," certainly the machine is no better than the Czar. In every-day life the Czarism exists only in the form of millions of irresponsible officials directing every detail of life even to the commonest business affairs — officials who get their directions either from the senseless, confused, and lifeless orders of irresponsible and neglected bureaus, or from the protégés of the court, who without the slightest thought given to their capacity or achievement have caught the eye of a favourite, or of the favourite of a favourite, of the Czar.

The court is the first and most indispensable support to the throne. Here is the mother, here are the uncles, the father's advisers and all the sure and tried supporters of the former Czars — the only channel in a Czarism or purely personal government through which the ruler can get even a slight idea of his nation. Nearly all the members of the court are of course also members of the bureaucracy. Some to be sure are merely rich idlers, such as ornamented the court in France before the revolution. Others hold sinecures, are called assistant ministers and appear at the bureaus a few times in a week, or attend the occasional meetings of some very honourable commission without any real function or power. Whether they are suited for it or not, those persons nearest the Emperor are usually given positions of exalted power. One grand duke is head of the army, another of the navy. The Russian Supreme Court, called the Senate, is filled with such men alone as happen to have been in the most intimate relations with the Czar, his father, or some grand duke.

The Czar must have some system or machine by which he expresses his power, and carries out the details of "government." This system, before the days of Peter the Great, was a sort of despotic feudalism; since that time it has been a bureaucracy of the Prussian type. This bureaucracy had to be made an integral part of Czarism, and this was accomplished not alone by sending the court into the bureaucracy, but by bureaucratising the court. Now the court and bureaucracy are inseparable. The court represents the unlimited and arbitrary power of the Czars over the lives and property of the people, the bureaucracy the only method by which it is possible for the Czar and the court to profit from this power. The army, the police, all governors and vice-czars, all those who have the right to exercise to the full the Czar's arbitrary power — that is to say, all the human tools necessary for defending by force the hated bureaucracy — all these are under the direct control of the Czar, subject neither to Dumas nor to bureaucratic ministries. On the other hand, all the tax-gathering, borrowing from abroad, all the banking, railway, and other business for supporting the arbitrary power of the court and the Czar, are necessarily systematised under the Government bureaus.

Peter's new bureaucratic machine of course immensely increased the work of the Government. New departments arose one after another, until finally the biggest businesses like railroads and banking fell into the hands of the State. Some of the most costly departments, the political courts, prisons, and police, the army of rural guards, the censorship, could not prove of any possible service in an intelligently organised and democratic society. With industrial development new sources of taxation were discovered; sugar, tobacco and petroleum were made to produce immense sums, and the entire profit of the liquor industry was taken over in the form of a monopoly by the State. Such of these profits and taxes as finally reached the central treasury were again the source of innumerable easily earned incomes in the "administration." Modern equipment, for instance, must be supplied and applied in the army and a modern fleet created. "Self-made" bureaucrats began to accumulate fortunes in plunder, with the aid of which they became irresistible in the most aristocratic society. Soon there

were more rich and successful bureaucrats in the court than there were pampered courtiers in the bureaucracy. Now, indeed, most of the ministers and chiefs of departments come from the former class. But the distinction is only superficial. In the long run the successful courtier must know how to make his way by means of the bureaus, must understand how to "govern" as it is understood by the loyal supporters of the Czars; while a successful bureaucrat can only meet a miserable end if he is not at the same time a true courtier, a believer in the reactionary principles of Czarism and a proved expert in the practice of irresponsible despotism.

The corruption of the court from the grand dukes down, the inefficiency of the bureaucracy, are proverbial. But this corruption of individuals is a commonplace, hardly worse than what exists in many other countries. If the Czar should ever succeed, as he no doubt desires, since it is the Czarism itself which is being despoiled, in developing a rigid system of inspection and control of Government bureaus irresponsible to the people, there would still remain the wholesale legal robbery and oppression that arises from the Czarism's mere existence.

The present Russian Government is a product of historical evolution. The main determining factor in its development from the beginning has been not the welfare of Russia, but that of each privileged class in exact proportion to its nearness to the throne. Every bureau of the Government is based on this principle; all are more or less anti-social in the very foundation of their methods and organisation, and in the training of their personnel. A high position is attained only through the sacrifice of many elementary principles of personal honesty and of reasonable, not to say legal, administration. It is held only by a complete abandonment of every principle for that of the mere preservation of the power of the Czar, the bureaucracy and the court, the maintenance of the Czarism.

CHAPTER III

THE CZARISM STRUGGLING FOR EXISTENCE

FULLY to picture the Czarism as a single whole and realise its life-principle, one must see it at the moment of a death-struggle to preserve its existence. Such a struggle began with the present revolutionary movement just before the war with Japan, reached its culmination with the Czar's Manifesto, and has by no means entirely subsided at the present time.

The negation of autocracy is constitutional government. If a constitution places any essential part of the Czar's power finally in the hands of the people or of a given social class the unlimited "autocratic" rule of the Czar has disappeared, since he may always be forced to terms with the new power. The promises of the Manifesto were so broad that it seemed to many that the beginning of a constitution had been granted and that the autocracy was a thing of the past. The 17th of October, 1905 (October 30th Western calendar), was then an intensely critical moment in the history of the autocracy, and this was fully realised by nearly all the court, bureaucracy, and other defenders of the old power. In the desperate battle for its existence that ensued, not only the organisation of the Czarism and its policy, but its very soul is exposed.

At this supreme moment the Czarism pulled itself together as a single man, called to the aid of the court and bureaucracy the only other classes from which support can be safely relied on, the land-owning nobility and the dregs of the city population, and fell back on the traditional policy of the Czars — i.e., to promote civil war by official lying and the machinery of the Government, and then to step in and crush the divided forces of the people. For this purpose any line of cleavage will do, religion, race, or social class. "Patriotism" is the general term employed by the Government to rouse and justify all such conflicts. Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Mohammedans,

and Russian dissenting creeds are not patriotic because they do not belong to the Orthodox Church. Poles, Jews, Armenians, and Germans, though they speak Russian and have lived in Russia a century or centuries, are foreigners. College graduates, professional men, and factory workmen had no part in old Russia and are rarely inclined toward the Czar; they are suspected classes in the official propaganda — they, too, are unpatriotic.

But patriotism, Orthodoxy, and Czarism are not sufficiently concrete conceptions to bind the whole of the reactionary movement together. There was need of a common enemy — an arch enemy, present everywhere, always more or less active. This enemy has been found in the Jews. For notwithstanding the confining of the majority of the Jews in one section of the country, the Pale, the minority is scattered everywhere and is everywhere pressing into the newest occupations and movements, and like all others of the oppressed nationalities is in universal opposition to the Czarism.

The whole philosophy, character, morality, and programme of the autocracy is expressed, then, in the cry "Down with the Jews." When in the height of its prosperity the Czarism has no need of popularity, it announces no programme and no philosophy. But when it is in need of popular aid, of loyal support and sacrifice other than such as it can command always from the nobility bought with privileges, or from the dregs bought with drink, it has resort to the cry "Down with the Jews"; and as conditions vary it adds, "and with Poles," or "and with the intellectuals," or even "with the workingmen." This invariably brings together the reaction as a man, and appealing, as it will be shown later, to the lowest passions of the non-reactionary classes, almost invariably draws a few of their weakest and most depraved members. There is not a criminal or degenerate impulse of mankind that is not played upon to maintain the integrity of "Holy Russia" and the power of the "Most High." Personal revenge, lust, crazy fanaticism, incredible superstition and ignorance, depravity in drink, desire for social position, greed, or mere envy and prejudice fanned to a flame of murderous hatred, are all motives to which a Czarism struggling for existence makes its daily call.

The propaganda begins necessarily with the secretly spoken

approval of the Czar himself, but it is also openly manifest to all in the numberless laws specially directed against the Jews. When Prince Urussov was sent to Kishinev directly after the massacre there, in response to the world-wide demand for a more liberal governor, he was warned by the Czar's famous Minister von Plehve to show "less sentimental friendship for the Jews." In a long talk with the Czar at this time the prince was unable to get from him any expression whatever on the Jewish question and had to drop all reference to the recent pogrom on account of the manifest displeasure of the Czar. It was clearly agreed between Nicholas and Plehve that the latter was to handle this vital matter. But there was no reason then, and there has been none since, to suggest any discord on this subject between the two. The attitude of all high officials and those most likely to know the Czar's will was, says Prince Urussov, "either to remain silent or to justify the position towards the pogroms reflected in the Russian anti-semitic press, and which therefore appeared in a certain sense binding on all persons in public service."

The impression of the highest officials spread down through every servant of the Government to the least privileged elements of the population. "We have come to carry out the Czar's will that we should massacre the Jews," said a crowd of peasants when asked by an official at the time of the massacre why they had come to Kishinev. This interpretation of the "Czar's will" certainly had a plausible basis, thinks Prince Urussov, in the numberless legal and illegal persecutions of the Jews by the officials and their denunciation by the highest persons in the land. For instance, these peasants could have read in Krushevan's paper, which was permitted by the censor, and subsidised by the Government both before and after the pogrom, the following:

Down with the Jews! Massacre these bloody monsters wallowing in Russian blood!

Act so that they will recall the Odessa pogrom, where the troops themselves helped us. This time they will help too, inspired as they are here by the love of Christ!

Brothers, lend us your strong arms!

Massacre these vile Jews!

We are already numerous.

[Signed] THE PARTY OF WORKINGMEN,
Who are true Christians.

As a reward for this and similar work Krushevan was afterward elected to the Duma with the aid of the officials and the Czar's Bessarabian favourites, Pureschevitch and the Krupenskys. Indeed, when Governor Urussov complained against this paper to the chief of the newspaper censorship, Senator Swerew, a trusted adviser of the Czar, he had for answer that Krushevan's tendencies and activities had *a sound basis*. Did not the peasants have good reason for assuming that the massacre was the will of the Czar?

The semi-official massacres that accompanied the Czar's Manifesto of Liberty were not a chance outburst of reactionary passion. They were not dictated by a mere desire of the reactionaries for revenge, but by the old and deep-laid plot to create a counter-revolution. They were the one possible solution of the crisis accepted by all the extreme reactionaries of the Empire. Furthermore, they did not spring directly out of the Manifesto. Soon after the January massacre of 1905 in St. Petersburg, and many months before the Manifesto, public opinion had already brought Nicholas to promise the rather empty form of an elected but purely *consultative* national council. To counteract the danger of this concession, arrangements had already been made to give the autocracy a new basis in a popular counter-revolutionary uprising, or wholesale massacres of intellectual leaders, Jews and organised workingmen, with the aid of the police, the Cossacks, and a part of the priests, the black monks. But owing to the unexpected general strike and necessity of signing of the Manifesto, the date fixed for the massacres had to be set forward. The Manifesto granted, the signal for the postponed murder was given.

The day following the Manifesto, at a hundred different points at once, the wholesale and prearranged massacres of men, women, and children began. Everywhere the bloody work was carried on by small bands of ruffians organised and led by the police and protected by the troops.

Urussov, as assistant to Witte, unearthed and exposed to the Duma and the whole world the direct responsibility of Trepov, Ratchkovsky, the head of the police, and many others of the Czar's favourites, in these massacres. Conclusive evidence in incriminating the police is scarcely lacking in one of the hundred

places where the massacres occurred. Lopuchin, the chief of the police department at the time, has come out with his statement that "Government officials have systematically prepared Jewish and other massacres. The facts were given to Witte and verified by another official . . . and one proclamation was approved in writing by Wuitch, head of the secret police."

The prefect of Sebastopol received on the 17th of October, the very day of the Manifesto, a telegram, signed Trepov, enjoining him not to publish the Manifesto before receiving money for a "patriotic (reactionary) demonstration." A few days later he received sixty thousand rubles for this purpose and a suggestion that he should retire the police. Similar telegrams were sent in all directions by the highest officials and favourites.

✓ These exposures in the Duma effected absolutely nothing. Trepov remained in office until his final sickness. The chief of the police is still in daily contact with the Czar. The court favourites are still the court favourites. The local governors and police who more or less actively took part in the massacres have largely been promoted and rewarded in person by the Czar. The actual murderers Nicholas is now letting out of jail by twos and threes and dozens, as a direct act of grace from the throne at a time when on grounds of public policy pardons are refused to all other persons.

At the time of the opening of the third Duma the country was quiet enough to bring some of the massacres and many of the revolutionary disturbances before the courts. It is significant to compare the wholesale sentences of revolutionists with the fate of the pogrom murderers. On December 7, 1907, to give a typical instance, there appeared in the same issue of the Russian papers two official telegrams, one about the trial and sentences of sixty-two sailors that had mutinied a few weeks before at Vladivostock, the other of fifty-four ruffians that had participated in the murderous pogrom of October, 1905, in Mohilev. Twenty-four of the ruffians were freed, twenty-four condemned to short terms of the mildest form of arrest, five to prison for less than eighteen months, and one to four years of forced labour. Of the sailors twenty were condemned to be shot, twenty were condemned to terms of forced labour far more severe than that of the one scapegoat ruffian just mentioned, and sixteen were

sentenced to arrest. Thus sharply does the Russian Government distinguish between a courageous revolt in the name of a high principle, and the cowardly massacre of unarmed men, women, and children in the name of racial hate.

The higher criminals, as I have said, were never even sentenced. Major Bugadowsky of the gendarmes was proved before the first Duma to have endeavoured to gain the favour of the St. Petersburg authorities by pointing out that he had caused to be widely distributed a proclamation calling on "all true Russian people, those who are for the Czar, the Fatherland, and the Orthodox faith," to gather together at the first alarm at a designated place "with arms, scythes, and pitchforks" and to hurl themselves under "the holy image and the portrait of the Czar" on the common enemy. The major, confident of approval, explained in his report that he had done "all in his power" to give the proclamations a wide circulation, as they would have "a happy influence on the peasantry." Stolypine explained to the Duma that the major had been called to St. Petersburg, but as the massacre did not actually take place he could not judicially be held responsible! "As to the rewards he received," added the Czar's mouthpiece, "they were for having reëstablished order."

Twenty-six provincial governors, all appointed in person by the Czar, were involved. Of these not one has been punished to this day, and the two or three that were removed from the reach of local vengeance were rewarded with high dignities elsewhere. The governor of Minsk, for example, has been made a member of the council of the interior with a large salary. On the contrary, all who did not aid in the massacres were removed by the Czar; as, for instance, the prefect of Sebastopol, Admiral Spitzky, who organised a militia to protect the defenceless population; the governor of Samara, who would not allow the lieutenant-governor to bring the massacres into execution; the governor of Ufa, who was removed for complaining to the prime minister against the preparations for the massacres; the governor of Terek, who, when asked by a personage he does not name but "too high to refuse" to prepare a massacre, preferred to be relieved of his office. These cases of forced resignations continue without interruption.

Before the whole Witte ministry was forced out, Ministers Kutler and Tolstoi had abandoned all hope of the Czar and thrown up their offices. Other self-respecting men, about the same time and since, have refused to accept these humiliating ministerial positions, including the new influential leader Gutchkov. These conservative leaders, among the strongest men in Russia, have refused to become ministers, as I learned from one in person, just because they know the Czarism and the Czar. The position is too humiliating for an honest and self-respecting man.

It is not necessary that a minister should himself be in direct relations with the "patriotic" leagues, as is usually the case. He may even be on unfriendly terms with them, but at least he must be tolerant. Often the right hand taketh not the responsibility for what the left hand doeth. Witte played the part of a liberal. His minister of the Interior, Durnovo, was the most reactionary the country has had since von Plehve. I was told by a minister that the two disagreed in every cabinet meeting. "But," he reassured me, "Witte gets his way in three cases out of ten." In the other seven cases Durnovo was arresting workmen for mere membership in the trade unions, sending out Cossack expeditions in all directions among the peasantry to revenge the landlords for property destroyed, and exiling hundreds of persons a day into Siberia or the mines on the mere suspicion of the police. Lopuchin has proved that Witte was informed of the preparations for massacre and neither took effective measures to prevent them nor honourably resigned. Witte even claimed in my presence and that of a third person that it was not the Government but the whole nation that was aroused against the Jews!

Stolypine's brother, editor of the chief reactionary organ in Russia, although he finds inadmissible the permanent coöperation of the Government with the murderers, confesses that in a crisis there is "no other choice than an appeal to the League of Russian Men." To save the Czar and Czarism, then, the minister must always be ready to descend to the principles of the St. Bartholomew massacre, the Mafia or the Spanish Inquisition. This is why, since the beginning of the Stolypine ministry, a helping hand has been frequently extended to the League

from the Central Government, to say nothing of the intimate relations encouraged in almost every local government between the officials and the local leaders of the league. This is also why, in both Duma elections under the Stolypine régime, the league has been favoured in every possible manner. Its local branches all over Russia were twice endowed with large sums directly by the Government, its conservative rivals were appealed to by the St. Petersburg authorities to ally themselves with the league in the elections, and in many places all popular or liberal rivals were crushed by the arbitrary arrest of the candidates or the wholesale striking of electors off the lists.

After the great massacres following the Manifesto, there was a brief respite. There were two reasons for postponing further killings. One was the financial needs of Russia. Too much bloodshed would have made it difficult for Russia to borrow the billion rubles she obtained from France and other countries the following spring. Too many official crimes would have made the Duma elections impossible, or made them still less favourable to the Government, and would have destroyed the object for which the Duma was created, to give the Czarism an artificial credit abroad for money and military allies. Notwithstanding these weighty reasons, it was all that Witte could do to restrain the Czar's over-zealous friends in the bureaucracy and the court. The plotting and planning went on, as was exposed later in the Duma by Prince Urussov. Finally the "patriots," patience gave way and the world was treated to the grandiose massacre of Bielostock. In this three days' massacre nearly a hundred persons were killed and as many more seriously mutilated.

The Bielostock pogrom was foreseen, as pogroms always are, several days before it occurred, and the leading and most respected citizens did all they could to persuade the local authorities to stop it. They obtained little satisfaction. Governor Kister, when complained to, refused to do anything; and even after his brief visit to Bielostock by a special train during the massacre, the slaughter continued. He doubtless knew he would not be permitted to act. The chief of police, Rodetzki, who was opposed to the pogrom, resigned on the very morning of the massacre and was replaced by a "surer" man.

Shortly before the massacre one of the colonels stationed at Bielostock said to his soldiers: "You are defending the Czar and the Fatherland. The Jews want to kill you. They have decided to exterminate you to the last man. I announce to you that *the authorities give you the right to do whatever you please on the 21st of this month.*" This colonel knew his Government and his Czar. He knew he would be thanked for his bloody work and given other opportunities in the future to rise. He was not disappointed — as we shall see.

The Bielostock pogrom was fully investigated and exposed by the Duma, then in session. The Duma branded the official report as a tissue of lies. The investigators found that the troops were present, calm and impassible, at all the crimes of the massacre. While the police and ruffians murdered, mutilated and plundered, they swept the streets with volleys "to keep away the Jews." The Duma decided that the pogrom was not only due to the officials, *but solely due to them*, that, contrary to the Government report, there was no racial, religious, or economic enmity between the Christians and the Jews, that this hatred existed only among the police; that the police knew all about the preparation for the massacre, and they themselves murdered and robbed; and that the troops shot down peaceable men, women, and children without the slightest cause.


But the Czar knew how to show that he was pleased by the massacre and suited by the official report. The guilty troops were at once sent his special and public thanks, as was noted in the official army journal of July 9, 1906. The mayor of the town was removed for questioning the truth of the official report. The Catholic Archbishop Ropp, who reported a meeting of those who were preparing the massacre, has been followed by the imperial vengeance until this day. Only recently he was forced out of his office on a trivial pretext, even against the protest of the Vatican.

The penalties for the atrocious mutilations at Bielostock are significant. Here is the sum total for the punishment: One prisoner received a rather severe sentence at hard labour, eight years — which, of course, may be later shortened by the Czar. One received a sentence of eight months in prison. The penalties of the others were nominal. Six were let go, three



BARON TAUBE AND PICTURES HE SENT HIS FIANCEE TO SHOW
HOW HE DEALT WITH PEASANTS

He wrote under the pictures: "Bringing the man to execution." "They are preparing to shoot; the men are at their places." "They are firing the second time; he is already dead." These pictures were produced before the first Duma by Alexinsky and caused a great sensation



EXECUTING POLITICAL PRISONERS

given three months in the disciplinary battalions. Two of the leaders, Popko and Peredo, along with several others, although under accusation were not kept locked up for the trial — "which circumstance," laconically explained the gagged Russian press, "much favoured their escape."

For a time the forces of reaction and massacre were somewhat frightened by the Duma's uproar about the Bielostock affair. But soon they were at work again. The first to act were, not unnaturally, the brave troops of Bielostock, one regiment of which was now transported to Siedlice in Poland. A frightful pogrom followed this transfer, this time entirely and solely carried out by the troops, as shown by two official reports. As is proved by one of these, Colonel Tichanovsky, the chief of the garrison, called a conference before the pogrom, in which he exposed his bloody plans, and answered every protest of one or two subordinates by a promise that he would assume full responsibility. This meant that he was sure of support higher up. The governor was complained to without result and the massacre put deliberately into execution. During the wholesale butcheries by the drunken soldiers in the houses and on the streets, Colonel Tichanovsky gathered together a soldiers' chorus "to raise the spirits of the troops," and "their singing resounded amidst the noise of the rifles, the spilling of blood, the plundering and conflagration." The colonel said that "in case he was killed he hoped the soldiers would honour his memory decently and bathe themselves up to the ears in blood." Though the killed and wounded amounted to hundreds, while only a single soldier lost his life, the colonel complained that there were too few dead. This is how Colonel Tichanovsky at least, given supreme authority by his superior, interpreted the personal thanks of the Czar for loyal services at Bielostock.

But now Stolypine was in office. However humiliating the position he occupied along with all other ministers in the court, and however helpless he was against the Czar, Stolypine saw with the minister of war that this particular manner of conducting these campaigns against the "internal enemy" was a dangerous, disintegrating force of the army itself. Already at Siedlice there was a threatening minority of the officers against the massacre. The soldiers of a whole regiment scarcely took a

hand in the business. A little more and there could have been a mutiny and the military massacres would have turned into a revolutionary movement.

Siedlice was the last military pogrom. We have now in the place of this short-lived institution the cherished politics of the League of Russian Men, the arming of the dregs of the population, and the steady beating and murder under the protection of the police of all persons "unfriendly" to the Government. The new system, which prevails at a hundred different points at once, received the sanction of the Czar, this time so openly and clearly that he could be sentenced for participation in the crimes before any honest jury or court.

CHAPTER IV

THE SLOW MASSACRE SYSTEM

THIS new "slow massacre" system, always popular, has now been supreme for over a year, and promises to remain an indispensable arm of the Government. Recently in Vologda, for instance, a respected citizen went to the governor to complain of the beatings the league was executing daily on the streets. As an answer he was sentenced to a month's imprisonment. Of course there is a party that prefers an intensification of martial law to this lynch justice of the dregs, and a reactionary group in the Duma has recently petitioned to this effect. But martial law means a setting aside of civil government, and even the existing chaotic "system" of the bureaus, plus the daily semi-official murder of liberal citizens on the streets, is better than the utter arbitrariness of a state of war. The first demand of the moderately liberal members of the Duma is not the extension but the abolition of martial law, since it bears down not on the "internal enemy" alone, but on the whole community. There is, then, no alternative for a poor Czarism harassed for its existence. The army cannot be used quickly to put an end to the business, for that leads to military disorganisation and revolt. It cannot be used to govern the country, for the price of its arbitrariness falls alike on the just and the unjust. The internal enemy must be left to the police and such voluntary allies as they can procure themselves from the criminal class.

In the first year of the national organisation of the counter-revolution on this principle, and before its universal adoption made it impossible to enumerate farther, there were over six hundred of these "patriotic demonstrations," \$25,000,000 worth of property was destroyed, over a thousand persons were killed and several thousand seriously or permanently injured; of Jewish families alone thirty-seven thousand were affected.

It is unfortunate that the figures do not show what was the part played by the employees of the Government and what by the organised mob. There can be little question that a large part, if not most, of the actual killing was done by the hands of officials, police, soldiers, spies, and Government employees in disguise. The massacres were so similar it seems likely that even the details were studied and ordered by the central committee; they were 'enough like those already mentioned not to need description here.

The new development of the "system" as practised in Odessa rests upon a triple basis of the Czar's patronage: his direct relationship with the organisation that prepares the massacres, the favours he extends to his leaders personally, and the pardons he distributes freely to any of the murderers themselves who may be sentenced through the occasional ignorance or simplicity of some honest court. The active aid of Stolypine, who claims to oppose it, is not necessary; with the Czar's personal relationships, favours and pardons, Stolypine, who is only a minister, has nothing to do. Moreover, the people's Duma has been abolished and nearly a hundred of the four hundred members of the new "landlord's Duma" are members of the massacre organisations, while the majority of the rest are ultra-conservative officials, noblemen, and privileged persons precisely in the situation of Stolypine, that is, without either the will or power to combat the Czar. Thus, having no influential opposition, the Odessa system will continue to reveal daily the life principle of the autocratic State.

In Odessa at the present moment everything reminds us of the St. Bartholomew massacre and the league during the civil and religious wars three centuries ago in France. Odessa is the chief stronghold of the league and Stolypine is naturally jealous, as it is his chief rival for the favour of the Czar. So bitter is the mutual jealousy that Konovnitzin, the local president of the league, has now brought an important legal suit against Stolypine for a criminal non-enforcement of anti-Jewish laws. Stolypine has naturally made a counter attack and recently exposed in full the Odessa excesses to the Czar — not out of any kindness of heart, be it remarked, for when Stolypine was governor of Saratov he permitted the burning of towns and

the wildest excesses by the Cossacks and the hired mob. But the prime minister could do nothing to shake the Czar's confidence in the organisation that so nearly responds to his desires, and he has allowed nothing to interfere either with Governor Kaulbars or the Odessa branch.

Even among the officials there are a few good men who have made complaint — but their voices are drowned in the reactionary chorus of the Czar's favourites. The civil governor of the province that contains Odessa, one Malajew, exclaims to little purpose: "We cannot close our eyes. Among all the races the Jews are the most oppressed and circumscribed. We need not fear them, but ourselves. One is astonished not at the grumblings but at the mildness of these people. We must do them justice, we must give them the right to live and breathe."

Grigoriev, until recently chief of police, strove in vain to do his duty and prevent the daily slaughter of the Jews. He finally went to Stolypine to report that he could do nothing against Kaulbars and that either he or Kaulbars must go. "Then you resign," replied Stolypine, aware of Kaulbars's unshakable position with the Czar. Grigoriev resigned. I arrived in Odessa a few months ago on the same train with the new chief Novitzki, who came with special secret orders from Stolypine, directed mainly of course against the league. The town had almost declared a holiday. The streets were lined with thousands of people to welcome their last hope. But the daily massacres have continued and Novitzki has had to give up in despair. He failed above all to muzzle the press of the league that calls for massacre from day to day. The head of the censorship in St. Petersburg complained of this paper and Novitzki issued the order to suppress it, but Konovnitzin, safe under the protection of Kaulbars, refused to recognise the order.

All the other leading criminals are also immediately under the governor's protection. Last year, for instance, the secretary of the league, Kahov, was arrested for distributing proclamations calling for the massacre of the Jews. Kahov's brother entered the police headquarters, abused the police, called up the governor of that time by telephone and made a complaint. Immediately after this he had a personal conference

with the governor and his brother was released. This governor, tired of his strenuous duties, resigned, and was later killed. He is acknowledged, even in reactionary circles, to have been a brute. But in his successor, Kaulbars, the Czar has found another man just as much to his taste. Recently a well-known and respectable citizen received threatening letters from the league. He called on Kaulbars. The governor in his presence called up one of the chiefs of the criminals familiarly by telephone and told him not to touch this particular man. Kaulbars's position in court, along with several other magnates of his character, remains as firm as the grand dukes'. When a delegation from Poland went to complain against Governor Skalon, Stolypine received its members with evasive answers and left the room. A minister who had been present asked them why they complained to Stolypine and if they could possibly be so ignorant as not to know that Skalon was protected higher up. It is the same with Kaulbars; he is protected by the "Most High."

The situation that has arisen in Odessa is by far the most damning to the Government of all the varied and innumerable horrors it has created. After a massacre last June the league organ, *For Czar and Fatherland*, declared quite truthfully that the organisation would act in the same way in the future. The continuous massacre began at once to increase its daily toll. By August the murderers were in such complete possession of the city that not even officials were respected. A teacher of the military school wearing his uniform pointed out to the police how members of the league at that moment, in broad daylight and the centre of the city, were beating Jews. The murderers by the grace of the Czar then began to beat the teacher before the eyes of the police. He fled, his face streaming with blood, into a leading hotel near the palace of the governor-general. The hotel was filled with high officials. Nevertheless the league members surrounded it and threatened to bombard if their prey was not surrendered. Two military officers tried to calm them in vain. Finally the proposed victim was saved by the chance appearance of the assistant prosecuting attorney.

During the massacre on the 3rd, 4th, and 5th of September, in which many were killed and still more mutilated by the new

curved knives and clubs of rubber and wire that break noses and beat out eyes, one of the leaders arrested in the act of plunder was let off merely with a "fatherly warning" by Kaulbars. The league issued an appeal in which it ominously recommended to those Jews who wanted to preserve their lives and property "to gather themselves together with the teachers and rabbis in the synagogue and to publicly call down a curse on all the revolutionaries and educated Jews, to forget all their clamourings for equal rights with the Christians, and to form a league of Jews for the maintenance of the unlimited autocracy of the Czar."

"Since the revolutionists are invisible," said the Count Mus-sin-Puschkin, "we must strike at the public." For striking at the public the league has in Odessa a fighting organisation of three hundred men armed by the governor and given headquarters in a government building. Besides this band, all very young men and some mere boys, there is a student detachment of eighty members. These are permitted publicly, as many of the other two thousand members are permitted secretly, to carry arms. But the overwhelming majority of the ordinary members are simply the young toughs and rowdies of a great port. The members of the fighting organisation are paid fifteen to twenty dollars a month, a goodly wage in a starving country. Their duties consist especially in revenging on the general public the killing of police by unknown anarchist or revolutionary groups. A recent "order" gives the following scale: for each policeman killed two Jews, for each roundsman four, for a captain eight, for the chief of police still a larger number, and in the case of the assassination of Konovnitzin or Kaulbars a general massacre. The scale is not literally carried out, but if we substitute two Jews seriously wounded for one killed it is executed almost to the letter.

The league murderers, who often wear a yellow jacket as a uniform, are organised under three captains or "attamans." It was to one of these that Kaulbars gave the telephone order already referred to. Another, Gazabatov, a typical western "bad man" nineteen years of age, who even killed a five-year-old child, was recently once more released from prison by Kaulbars. Under assumed but well known names he and another attaman sell passes of safety from massacre. Nothing else

secures one's life in Odessa now. An American friend recently saw a ruffian beat a man in the face. With the blood streaming the victim called for help and a crowd was soon giving chase. My friend joined in. Soon a policeman was reached. When appealed to he threatened the crowd, which he said he considered to be a mob, that he would call the Cossacks, and in the meanwhile the criminal escaped. Another policeman when asked in a similar case why he did not arrest the criminal replied: "Why, don't you know, he's one of ours?"

Let the reader note carefully each turn of events in the following outbreak, which occurred in Odessa, and he will understand the nature of that basic institution of Czarism, the pogrom.

As the body of a police officer, assassinated for an unknown cause, passed the *Jewish hospital* shots resounded. This firing shots near a Jewish house is a regular feature of the massacres, and in several cases, as at Bielostock, it has been proved that the shots were fired by a hidden agent of the police. There began a fusillade. Several shots hit the coffin and the corpse, *but not one of the leaguers was touched!* There was a wild panic; soon all the streets were deserted and all the shops closed. A group of the "yellow jackets" forced its way into the hospital, with revolvers in their hands. The police appeared with the Cossacks and put an end to the scandal, *but they arrested nobody.* The league members retreated *still shooting*, and a fourteen-year-old girl and a man of seventy-eight were wounded. Notwithstanding all those warnings to the authorities, the disorders were repeated, unhindered, the next day. Again there was a fusillade, an old Jew and an eight-year-old girl were killed, several Jews were wounded and many beaten. This occurred in the morning. At one o'clock in the afternoon the beatings began again; carriages and street-cars were held up and men and women passengers attacked. At two o'clock a funeral appeared accompanied by the Chief of Police Novitzki, by Cossacks, and by a large number of mounted police. As the procession neared the hospital again the traditional shots resounded, and a Jewish boy was severely wounded. After the funeral a crowd of yellow jackets again began beating and shooting in the streets, a young girl was wounded and a Jew killed before the police

put in their tardy appearance. For this carnival of crime ten members of the league were taken into custody and sentenced to *two months' arrest*, doubtless, as usual, in the very headquarters of their friends the police.

The official account of this affair, without mentioning the league, puts the whole responsibility, as is commonly done, on the murdered Jews. It begins as usual with a totally irrelevant account of the shooting of a policeman, for which the massacre is supposed to be the revenge — carried out by the Christian population of Odessa. Although the said assault took place after dark and the assailants escaped, the police nevertheless characterised them as Jews.

"On September 1st," says this report, "a detective named Vernik was passing about eight o'clock in the evening through Portofranco Street when he noticed two *Jews* stealthily approaching him. . . . One drew a revolver and shot Vernik in the left side. They then escaped. . . . The next day two or three *Jews* roaming through the street fired several more shots and then escaped into the crowd. . . . When the body of the dead Kharchenko was carried in front of the Jewish hospital, a group of *Jews* opened fire at the squad of police." This report, as are all police reports of such affairs, was nothing more nor less than clear invitation to repeat the massacre of the Jews.

The police incitement was successful in stirring up a massacre within a few days. In this affair the same performance, even to the funeral, was repeated, and in addition several hundred shops were plundered or destroyed. In the police report, since the "yellow jackets" did all the killing and the Jews only furnished the killed, the latter are scarcely mentioned. It says that "individuals" forced their way into a tea-room and wounded two "persons," that a "man" was wounded on the street, that the "crowd" destroyed various windows, that a certain "Stcherbakov" received a wound. Nobody familiar with the situation would question that the "individuals" and the "crowd" were leaguers, while the "persons," the "man" and "Stcherbakov" were all unfortunate Jews.

In the report of the massacre of the following week, the police again referred to the Jews six times in the brief space of a few hundred words. But it must be by no means inferred

that the Jews are the only subject of attack by the yellow jackets and police. A Russian smith who asked a mob of yellow jackets who were beating some Jews what offence these Jews had committed, was at once disembowelled by the mob. Three Russian workingmen were attacked in the house of the mother of two of them, and the mother and small sister were beaten. The mother died and it is doubtful if the men will ever recover from their mistreatment.

While these massacres go on in the streets, while Kaulbars is sitting in council with the league in the governor's palace, the life of Odessa has naturally become a chaos. During the sessions of the town council, the members of the League of Russian Men sit in the gallery and interrupt and terrorise the progressive members, while armed reinforcements are waiting outside in front of the building. Three newspapers were confiscated for mentioning the names of the liberal candidates for the Duma and their editors thrown in prison, along with one of the candidates himself. *For Czar and Fatherland*, the League newspaper, appears daily with the words of the Czar's famous telegram at the top: "The League of Russian Men will be my most faithful support," and on the next page, "Smash the Jews, Socialists, Caduks (Cadets), and other reptiles."

The anarchy in Odessa, unequalled in any city of Europe in modern times, unless in Constantinople, is no worse than in many other of the eighty-two (out of eighty-six) provinces of the Russian Empire that are now entering into the third year of "government" by martial law. It may well be disputed whether the martial law has brought on the anarchy, or the anarchy the martial law. But it cannot be questioned that both are the inevitable results of the anarchy of the Russian bureaucracy and the government by violence which history shows constitutes the ideal of the true courtier and the true Czar.

CHAPTER V

CREATING THE "INTERNAL ENEMY"

IN A recent conversation with the Czar which was at once carefully written down by the Countess Tolstoi, Nicholas said:

"I am very sorry that in the course of the last revolts and the massacres of the Jews public opinion of that great country (America) has turned against me. I am not guilty of all those troubles. I think the Jews themselves incite the mob to attack them. The time will come when the Americans themselves will hate the Jews and regard them, not as a nation of great intelligence and isolated from the others through their religion, but as the worst type of business-men and money-makers. All the revolts of the last two years have been agitated by the Jews. A Jew in common life may be good, but a Jew in politics is worse than anyone else."

Before exposing the roots of the gospel of religious and race hatred here openly preached by the Czar, let us read what is clearly expressed between the lines. The Czar was talking not in the abstract but of the situation in Russia at the present moment, and we would lose half the value of what he says if we did not recall just what questions he is answering and what the situation is to which he refers.

To begin with, most of his remarks cannot apply only to the Jews. If he expresses himself fully Nicholas must say he is sorry that "in the course of the recent revolts and the massacres" of the Poles, Lithuanians, Esths, Letts, Tartars, Georgians, and Armenians, the opinion of America and of *the whole civilised world* has turned against him. Neither he nor anyone speaking for him has ever withdrawn the accusation constantly issued by the officials that each one of these peoples has also agitated revolts. Nor has it ever been denied that their rebellious tendency is the reason why all non-Russian peoples are more

or less disqualified in the new Duma and legally persecuted by the courts. In speaking of the Jews as if they stood alone then, Nicholas creates an impression the exact reverse of the fact by failing to state the "whole truth." Sworn before an American court he would stand convicted of the crime of common perjury.

This is a fine specimen of the kind of lie by which the Czarism is trying to save itself. If the Jews, as the Czar implies, are hated by all the peoples in Russia, it looks badly for the Russian Jews. But if all the non-Russian peoples in Russia hate the Government and the Czar, and do not hate the Jews, then the overwhelming presumption is against the Government and the Czar. All the other false impressions created by this little gem of falsehood are made doubly vicious by this first general lie of omission that underlies every word. The great Autocrat finds it inconvenient to mention the other "subject" races because had he done so his attack would have appeared on its face so vicious and absurd that it would have sufficed in itself to convince any thinking person of the malicious hostility of the Czar toward all who for any reason oppose him.

Who is guilty of the massacres according to Nicholas? The Czar says he is not. He says the Jews are partly guilty, not daring, as do many of his officials, to put all the blame on them. The accusation that the Jews are bringing about the massacres, of which they are often the only victims, is ridiculous on the face of it and a monstrous perversion of facts with which, as I have shown, the Czar himself is perfectly familiar. Did not the Czar excuse his officials for the Bielostock pogrom, not on the ground that the Jews had incited an imaginary mob to massacre them, but that the Jews were "republicans and revolutionists"? How are we to know when Nicholas speaks the truth? Does he hold that the Jews incite the massacres, or that the Jews are against Czarism and therefore ought to be massacred?

But if, as he says, to the Jews is due only a part of the guilt, where is the rest of it? The Czar does not assume for his own Government *any part of the responsibility*, and has not caused a single official of any consequence to be punished for these crimes. Where is the missing guilt? Does it belong to the

mobs? But often there were no mobs, and in nearly every case where so-called mobs existed they were composed of the members of the League of Russian Men whom Nicholas has since pardoned, because such criminals are an indispensable element in what he considers to be "the best party" in the country.

Then comes the effort of the Emperor to stir up race hatred, the basis of his own power, in the United States. The Czarism is like an infectious disease, a sort of black death. It tends to spread its putrefaction in all directions, encourages by its military power the reactionary influence in Prussia, Poland, Hungary and even the horrible jacqueries of Roumania, corrupts with high interest on its loans the small bourgeoisie of France, and now hopes to defend itself by inoculating with its poison of lies and hatred England and the United States. Again, why does not Nicholas mention the other hounded and massacred peoples? Why does not the God-sent take the courage to tell us the unsuspected dangers of our Armenians, Lithuanians and Poles? All three races form numerous and valuable elements of our people, and the Poles from Russia are even more numerous in America than the Russian Jews. How does it come that they have received from the Czar the same treatment as the Jews and raise the same complaint against him? Why does not the Czar tell us that his officials are every whit as bitter against the Poles and Armenians wherever they are found in Russia, as against the Jews? Because Nicholas knows that to give the whole of his lying defences in a single statement would in itself be sufficient to convict him of falsehood.

We hear from the Czar's own lips that the Jews are a separate "nation" — that is, foreigners in his Empire. We know that this is the fixed view of the Russian law concerning both the Jews and the rest of the fifty million not of Russian race, but it is an unexpected frankness to have it so stated by the Autocrat himself. So there are fifty million foreigners in Russia, to be legally oppressed and on occasion enumerated among "the internal enemy"! And these same people are also "isolated" by their religion! Not in civilised countries, but in Russia we know that innumerable privileges are reserved for only the orthodox. Yes, once more and finally, we have from the

mouth of the Czar the secret of autocracy and the very foundation of all his power. Hatred, violence, war; these are the savage instincts in man by the development of which the Czar hopes to master. In the end always war.

The idea is very old. Every absolutism and every political slavery has so far been based on war. But Russia's manner of waging war is new. She has invented a system of universal war within her own borders that for the purposes of despotism excels the most ingenious contrivances of Macchiavellian or Roman Imperial politics. Russia might well surpass her predecessors and has in fact done so. History has never known a power more absolute, more despotic, than the Czar's, and the world has never seen an absolutism with a tithe of Russia's population, resources, territory, and organisation, to say nothing of the thoroughly modern equipment of her army and the half-modern exploitation of her wealth. Russia's absolutism is more than a success—it is danger to civilisation. If the Russian system can survive in the modern world, it will be copied in neighbouring countries, and so on indefinitely. It is a standing menace to the freedom and progress of humanity in the coming age. No free people can afford to view it with indifference.

The great and novel feature of Russian statesmanship on which the Czar stakes his empire is civil strife. The Empire is already too large for imperialism. The people are satisfied with the extent of their country, as large as the average continent, touching on all the seas and embracing nearly every clime. The foreigner is too far away to hate. Besides, an attack on one enemy exposes to another some flank of the unwieldy country. Like Great Britain, Russia will be glad with the addition of some few small pieces of territory she can easily get by treaty to keep what she already has. The recent treaty with Great Britain showed that both are essentially peaceful powers. Russia can scarcely defend her purely military form of government on the ground of danger from abroad. But since absolutism lives solely by violence employed against the people there must be some pretext or other for military rule, government outside of any law. Fortunately for the Czar the fifty million non-Russian subjects are not yet thoroughly intermarried

with the Russians nor evenly distributed over the kingdom. The pretext has been found. In the case of some races, as the Tartars and Armenians, the officials have been able to produce an actual war. With others, as with the Jews, it has been necessary to subsidise a war between them and the secret police and criminal element. By these means the Czar remains absolute master. He does not need to risk a foreign war, nor to wait for a favourable occasion. He can have his wars, or what is equally useful for his purposes, his "states of war" or abolition of civil order and civil government, when and where he wishes.

The Czar in this statement, then, is busied with inventing an enemy. For without an enemy there is no hate, no violence, no open or latent civil war; and without civil war the Czar would be supported, of course, by just exactly the number of people he could buy. A part of the Russian people, the officials and landlords, the Cossacks and the dregs of the population, he has bought. But the money was not his own, and without an unpaid increment composed of other elements of the population, the investment is a bad one. *For not one of the elements* so far bought produces any noticeable income to the State. They are all parasites, and a greater number of such parasites will be needed to keep the people down every day the people advance in wealth-producing power. Every step forward in the wealth-producing power of the nation, which is the objective of the people who lend the money in Germany or France, is also a step forward in the intelligence, organisation, unity, and revolt of the people of the Empire.

The Czar's appeal to hatred is not a sudden inspiration of malice or an instinctive revenge. It is a deep expression of what has constituted the life principle of the Czarism since the dawn of history.

The Czar's civil war is stirred up by a campaign of lies of every kind, is conducted publicly by Government officials and by means of direct attacks on the property and liberties of the non-Russian subject races, the Russian intellectuals and peasants — these officials acting either through specific laws requiring such persecution, or under the arbitrary power placed in their hands, or under administrative law, or under martial law, or, since there

is never any responsibility to the people in any case, even directly counter to all these so-called laws.

The aims and hopes of the official persecution are best shown by the official propaganda. Witness the proclamation printed on the official press of the prefect of St. Petersburg, authorised by the censor, cynically defended later in an official investigation by the prefect on the sole ground of this authorisation, and defended by the censor himself because its printing had been ordered by "a man who had not been without value" —supposedly to the reactionary cause.

"Do you know, brothers, workingmen, and peasants, who is the principal author of all our ills? Do you know that the Jews of Russia, America, Germany, and England have concluded an alliance and decided completely to destroy the Russian Empire?" asks this shameless document. In West Russia just such proclamations are launched against the Poles, in the Caucasus against the Armenians, in the Baltic Provinces against the Letts, in the country against the workingmen, in the city against the students, the educated classes or "intellectuals" and the Jews.

"When these betrayers of Christ present themselves," continues the proclamation, "slash them to pieces, kill them, so as to take away from them all wish to come." The document is vicious, ignorant and at once both calculating and naïve — it breathes the very soul of the statesmanship of Nicholas, the ministers and the court. "The order has been given," it says to the people, "to elect men who will represent you before the Czar (referring to the Duma). Remember that your natural defenders are the landlords, manufacturers, and orthodox merchants." How ignorant these governmental hopes in Russian peasants and workingmen! Except where under coercion, they did not elect a single landlord. The valuable document then makes a complete exposition of the court's favourite measures for "settling" the Jewish question. They are similar to those that have been practised for twenty-five years by the Czar and his "sainted father," Alexander III., whom he claims as pattern. This document says that the Jews, who kept out of half the towns, are to be expelled not only from all the cities of European and Asiatic Russia, but also from ten



A TYPE OF THE TERRORISTS WHO ARE CREATED BY OPPRESSION
Sasonov, who in 1904 killed von Plehve—the most popular terrorist act ever
committed in Russia



MARIE SPIRIDONOVA

The most famous woman terrorist of recent years. She killed the brutal commander of a "pacification" expedition

small towns of South Russia where they are now allowed to reside. Where permitted to live, they are not to be allowed to trade in grain, meat or wood, or to open banking or commercial houses or "similar establishments," or to own any real estate. All special Jewish schools are to be closed and the Jews are to be deprived of the right of entrance to all the Russian higher, secondary and technical schools. The author-officials recognise that it will take a complete sang-froid to execute these measures, but "the cause is holy," nothing less than "the lasting rescue of the people from the internal enemy."

The "holy cause" is at the present time especially "holy," not so much for the plunder the Czar's officials are used to extracting from the Jews and other "internal enemies," as for the hope that the people can be corrupted by a promise of a share in this plunder to turn their wrath away from the Government to the Jews. For this purpose all the legislation has been devilishly contrived from the outset. Whenever the country has become very quiet, of course the officials keep all the plunder for themselves; in other words, they allow the Jews to violate the law, or if paid enough they even moderate its provisions for a time. When revolutionary trouble begins again, the persecution takes the form of legislation and enforcement of the law, instead of secret blackmail. The purpose of the laws is not mere punishment or the satisfaction of an existing hatred, but an appeal to the greed and selfishness of all who compete in any sphere with the Jews and can draw a profit from the handicap set by the Government on their rivals in the race. There is no race hatred, but there is selfish and even criminal greed — in certain classes.

All during the last century the laws have been thus reversed according to the Government's varying need, either to let the Jew prosper and to plunder his wealth, or to ruin him to please his competitors and win an enthusiastic and aggressive support among certain elements of the population in behalf of the whole system of oppression that is called by the name of government. The law forbidding Jews to sell liquor was twice repealed and twice passed again; that forbidding them to deal in land was repealed, then passed again, then twice relaxed in practise, then strengthened until now it is absolute. The right to live

in villages was passed, repealed, passed again, and again strengthened. It was justified on what Prince Urussov brands as the pure hypocrisy of separating the Jews in order to protect them from the Christians!

The Jews, shut out of agriculture and many other occupations by law, are forced into petty trade and handwork. Here the wages and profit become so low from over-competition that other nationalities shun these occupations, until finally nearly all little shopkeepers and artisans are Jews. Then arises the cry for further persecution, in hope that it may drive the Jews from these occupations also. The cry arises, of course, not from the producers of raw material, since it is good to have many buyers, nor from the purchasers, who also profit from the competition, but from those non-Jewish little traders and artisans who remain. It is to these poor starving wretches that the Government appeals with its campaign of murderous plunder. Having artificially produced this desperate misery, the Czar and his servants turn part of these wretches against the others with a promise of their business when they are destroyed.

The relatively small but desperately needy class of Russian small shopkeepers has in many places succumbed to the poison, and wherever the Jews are numerous allows the Government to work them up periodically into a pitch of hatred, hardly murderous, however, since many Jews are their associates and friends. It is rather their wilder sons that furnish new recruits to the criminal and professional "patriotic" organisations. But the small merchants do enroll themselves, subscribe to the organisation and read its papers, and it is undoubtedly to the selfish interest of the small trader in the ruin of Jews that the Government makes its most direct appeal.

I talked with Tichamirov, the editor of the notorious Moscow organ of the League of Russian Men, who made clear to me at once the purely lower middle class basis of the league. He is close to the people, as he was a leader of the revolutionary party in the former reign. While an exile abroad he completely reversed his politics, and has written a book on the Czars which is said to be the most able defence of autocracy extant. He did not hesitate for a moment to acknowledge that anti-semit-

ism was the basis of the ultra-reactionary party and the hope of the Czarism. This anti-semitism he considers to be in its essence an economic movement, and it is by conservative economic reform, not political, that he hopes to preserve the domination in Russia of the autocracy, the Orthodox Church and the Russian nationality.

Politically, like all the leaders that stand with the Czar, Tichamirov favours inertia. All accept what the Czar has given without asking what it is, and all say that what the Czar has given, Duma or what not, the Czar can take away. Either they do not ask whether Russia has a constitution, or else they say definitely with Tichamirov that a pure autocracy still prevails. They accept the Duma, but they do not object to any of the innumerable limitations under which it has proven utterly powerless whenever opposed by the ministers of the Czar. The League of Russian Men and all extreme reactionaries are, nevertheless, in a certain peculiar sense democrats. They believe in the possibility of a mystical direct union of "the true Russian people" under their leadership with the Czar, and they profess to believe that no disagreement in this case is possible and that so autocracy and democracy can become one.

This peculiar union and harmony it is hoped to attain by purely economic reforms. The Czar is to favour those classes that are most loyal to him and his policies, and these classes are to grow and flourish until the whole people become the loving children of the "Little Father," the Czar. Naturally one must begin, not with the peasants, but with the small shopkeepers and the small landowners. The league has always bought for itself a fighting organisation of the very lowest social classes, but nowhere has it obtained any real foothold among the mass of the people, the peasants and workingmen. These classes are neither loyal to the Czar nor do they want small doles in land, but a sovereign people's Duma, expropriation of the landlords, and a social guarantee against accumulation of the land in the future in private hands. The league has definitely recognised that the workingmen and peasants, at least for the moment, have strayed off the true path. Tichamirov even confessed that he did not wish to see an extension

of peasant communal ownership, nor even of small farms, but only of those with from 132 to 266 acres.

Outside of the Government and nobility these small landlords and shopkeepers are almost the sole class from which the league gets the rank and file of its members, and that they succeed here is due solely to the diabolical machinations of the Government. An overwhelming majority, however, even of the small landowners belong to other less reactionary or even to merely conservative groups; while the larger landlords have a party of their own, the moderate reactionaries. The majority of the small landowners are probably conservative or reactionary, but certainly not very extreme since scarcely one out of ten took the trouble to vote. The small shopkeepers, on the other hand, took a lively interest. With the aid of the lower officials, everywhere openly or secretly connected with the organisation, and of the wholesale disfranchisements under the new election law, they carried many of the smaller towns. These small tradesmen, joined by the numerous class of landlords who are also officials, or officials who are also landlords, and by the higher clergy, elected over one hundred members or one-fourth of the third Duma.

To this anti-semitic party the peasants have contributed almost nothing. In eighty-four out of the eighty-six provinces (or states) they have refused practically to have anything to do with the organisation. Out of sixteen thousand township electors for the third Duma only fifty-one declared themselves members of the league, and of these thirty-three came from the one government of Volhynia, leaving several hundred even in that government in other parties. All unprejudiced observations agree with those I made personally in a score of Russian villages. Among the peasants there is almost no racial prejudice of any kind. Even in those governments into which the law has forced the Jews in abnormal numbers, there is scarcely a trace of hostility. Witness the Duma's report on Bielostock, already quoted, and Prince Urussov's conversations with Bessarabian peasants. These peasants did not understand why he should ask them such a foolish question as to whether they were hostile to the Jews, and simply answered with other questions: "What do you mean? What kind of hostility? Why any hostility?"

I learned absolutely nothing from the peasants about anti-semitism, because they don't know what Jew-baiting means.

It is all a question of plunder. The purely business reasons for the persecution are baldly stated by the "patriotic organisations" themselves. The Fatherland Union, of which Count Bobrinsky was chief organiser, states in its preamble, "If to give the Jews equal rights should prove to be detrimental to Russians, then no matter how convincing the arguments are, we shall be energetically opposed to it." This is as if we should deny rights of citizenship to emigrants, or to Americans who were not "Sons of the Revolution." For the Jews and other subject races have inhabited Russia for hundreds of years. "Russia is first of all for the Russians," says the declaration, apparently meaning those whose ancestors have been Russian for a thousand years; and further, "the more elements there are of foreign origin in the Russian Empire the stronger and more forcible must the real Russian nationality be represented in it." What if Americans were to say, the more foreigners we have the more we must restrict their privileges and those of their children to the last generation?

CHAPTER VI

THE DANGER OF PROGRESS

THE organisations that defend the autocracy are without exception the same that call for the persecution of the subject races and oppose the giving either of land or of civil or political rights to the people.

The Union of the Fatherland, the League of Russian Men, the Russian Assembly and the other "patriotic" organisations, are "absolutely opposed to any lessening of the Czar's power." One hundred and forty-six of their members in the third Duma recognise Nicholas as an absolutely unlimited autocrat. Why this self-renunciation, self-annihilation indeed? Because the leagues are sure of this and all future Czars. They know that the Czar created a Duma of officials and landlords. They know that he has restricted the rights of the small merchants' Jewish rivals to seats on exchanges or on merchants', artisans' and citizens' commissions, and they hope that he will exclude them altogether from these bodies. They know that even the Centre of the Duma, composed partly of mere conservatives rather than reactionaries, has abandoned the Jews. They have nothing to gain, and everything to lose then, by the most elementary political freedom, and so they believe in the unlimited autocracy of the Czar.

We are beginning to penetrate into the citadel of reaction. To the obvious fact that the Czar governs by the mere physical power of the army and police, we have added the less obvious fact that he governs by creating real or fictitious civil wars; to the evident hostility of absolutism to democracy, we have added its hostility even to the most elementary or conservative forms of political or legal order. The Czarism is opposed to all political rights and to any constitutional system. It is the complete antithesis not only of individual freedom, but even of law and order.

Now we can get a still deeper insight. In order to protect the Czarism from the demand of the people for justice, order and law, the Government and reactionaries are *compelled to attack every line of progress*. The spread of intelligence through the press, schools, and universities must be hindered, the coming into Russia of foreign culture must be prevented, religious evolution must at least be held where it is, and modern capitalism and business methods must be admitted with every conceivable restriction and foresight. The Russian bureaucrats and leading reactionaries are not a wonderfully endowed race, but they are no savages. They have as a rule half a higher education. They have read and travelled over Europe. They are not opposed to higher education, modern business, European culture, religious progress, and constitutional government, because they dislike these things in themselves, but because these things endanger their private positions and the whole system from which they draw their support. There are a few sentimental writers who work themselves up into a genuine hatred of progress. The bureaucrats give these writings their approval, pass them on to the people, and even paraphrase them in the laws. But of course they would not express any such views personally, as for example when in conversation with intelligent foreigners or their bosom friends. We must do justice to their intelligence. They are not fools. The lie by which they live and degrade themselves and the whole nation they command, is conscious and deliberate.

All the Government's campaigns against progress are conducted on the same principles as the attack on the Jewish tradesmen already outlined. The Government always appeals to the baser instincts of some element of the population that may draw a profit from the ruin of another, and it always manages to connect its enemies in some way or other with the Jews. The onslaught on the freedom of the press, on the schools and universities is, for instance, often enough defended on the direct ground that all these institutions are opposed to the old ideas of autocracy. But when the courage for such honesty is lacking, the attack is aimed first at the Jews. The teachers, the students, the press, it is said, are under Jewish influence. It is for this reason, then, that the already miserable

schools must be deprived often of half their teachers, the universities once more closed, and the last shred of so-called journalistic freedom, first created two years ago and already gradually attenuated to almost nothing, finally taken away.

Anti-semitism is the touchstone of the reaction. It was for some time a question whether the party which controls the third Duma, the conservative Octobrists, would on the whole prove moderately progressive or moderately reactionary. The doubt was short-lived. They have made a political agreement with the outright reactionaries by which they have abandoned the Jews. They will not even ask for Jewish equality before the law. This means, and is actually accompanied by, an abandonment of all the other subject races and oppressed classes of the Empire. In fact my talk with the leader, Gutchkov, made it unmistakably clear that the Octobrists will insist on keeping control of the Duma at every cost and that for this purpose they will work, as they must, almost wholly with the landlords and bureaucrats who constitute a large majority of the assembly. Gutchkov is satisfied especially with the landlords and says that at the bottom they are progressive men. I shall show later how this is the reverse of the truth. It is enough to say here that this alliance with the reactionary landlords is in itself enough to alienate from the Duma leader every other important element of the population.

Since the third Duma has decided to take up a position with the Government against the Jews and other subject races, it has the same pretext as the Government for every reactionary measure. It will not now be necessary to make a direct attack on progress, and the so-called moderates can even continue the polite and harmless verbal criticism on the bureaucracy and the court without coming to any serious disagreement with either. The campaign against progress in the form of the spread of intelligence, has already been typically instituted by Gutchkov's own organ in Moscow, the object being first of all narrowly selfish — that is, to destroy this newspaper's rivals — and only incidentally to aid the Government.

"The very fact alone," says this oracle of the third Duma, "that nine-tenths of our press is in the hands of the Jews is a disgrace. . . . We must see to it that Russians who know

that a certain paper is Jewish must not only not read it, but not even take it in their hands." This "moderate" party organ further suggests Duma legislation against the freedom of press, and finally adds a sentence that discloses the truth, which is that it is not really the Jews but the opposition in general that troubles it. For it is "not only the Jewish press but the present oppositional press, *preponderantly* Jewish" that is "in its spirit rotten and *foreign*." We also see here, as we shall see again and again, that what is foreign is scarcely to be distinguished from what is rotten by the truly reactionary mind.

How does this moderate onslaught differ from that made a year before by Trepov, speaking almost in the name of the Czar? "Don't you see," Trepov said to an English interviewer, "that a part of the newspapers of St. Petersburg are owned by the Jews and that the majority of their editors are Jews? Don't you see to what point the Jews are represented in the Duma? Say what you like, this revolutionary movement is principally the work of the Jews." But the Jewish writers in the capital are scarcely as numerous proportionately as the Jewish readers of the press, there are as many anti-semitic as Jewish newspaper proprietors, and there were only twelve Jewish members of that Duma instead of the twenty to which their numbers in the country entitled them. Even this small representation was, of course, a disappointment to a Government that hoped there would be none in its assembly, but the great disillusion was that there were not half a dozen anti-semites. In spite of all the outrages of the officials in the elections, and the innumerable inequalities of the election law in favour of the Jew-baiters, there were not six men in five hundred that voted against the full equality of the Jews.

The hostility to Jewish and oppositional freedom of opinion and enlightenment, leads directly to attacks on enlightenment itself. In a local government board in Bessarabia recently the question arose whether in the country town of Akkerman the library for teachers should be continued. No doubt it was the only library there. The notorious reactionist Pureschewitch, who happened to be a member of the board, spoke heatedly and for hours against the library.

"What do you teachers need books for?" he cried. "Either

you have learned enough already and you don't need to learn more, or you have learned nothing. In either case you don't need books.

"No more books! Through your books, through your teachers, sedition is being carried amongst the people. For the rooting out of this sedition, not the Manifesto of October 17th, but punishment expeditions are what we need."

In the meanwhile the Czar's Government is careful not to allow the chief prey and scapegoat by any possibility to go free. The Jews are not permitted in any of the thousand activities of life to fuse themselves with the rest of the population. The Jews, artificially held separate from the rest of the nation in the ways I have indicated, are also forcibly held separate in religion, in education, and in every other possible way. The most conservative rabbis only are permitted to perform their functions, and intellectually inclined Jews are by tens of thousands forcibly prevented from obtaining such an education as would allow them to become one with the educated class. We have seen that the reactionaries demand that all higher education be closed to the Jews. Already many such institutions as the St. Petersburg Normal, Dramatic, Electrical Engineering and Railway Engineering schools, the Moscow Agricultural and Medical schools are completely closed against them, while in all other higher institutions, though from a fourth to a half of the applicants for admission are Jews, they are allowed to form only from 2 to 10 per cent. of those in attendance. So perhaps not one young Jew out of ten striving for a higher education is *permitted* to attain one. In primary education the conditions are still worse, for here only the smallest number of Russian-teaching schools are provided by the State, while Jews are *forbidden* to teach children the Russian language. As a consequence, in one of the provinces where an investigation was held (Odessa), it was found that only 11 per cent. of the Jews could read and write the Russian language. The evident intention of the Government is to keep them separate for easier persecution.

In the schools, as elsewhere, the plan has some success. Of course there are far from enough schools for the population anyway. Under these circumstances only good students should

be admitted, and a large proportion of those passing the best examinations are Jews. But it is evident that for every good Jewish student excluded some inferior Russian can find a place. From this exclusion of Jewish students there results a double gain for the Czarism. The standard of dangerous intelligence is lowered and "Russianised," and at the same time the inferior Russian students are corrupted. Boys whose dulness already inclined them to reaction are often made "patriots" once for all by the selfish interest to keep a place they have no right to. So there is a certain minority of young reactionaries in the intermediate schools. But such students are not suited for higher professional studies. They become rather officers, bureaucrats, landlords, or merchants. In the universities there is scarcely a trace either of reaction or of hostility to the Jews. So strongly, indeed, do the Russian students stand up for the rights of their fellows that the universities must often be closed to make it possible to carry out the persecution of the Jews, as has recently happened at Odessa and at Kiev. The Government, moving ostensibly against the "foreigners," has had the satisfaction of being able to shut up at the same time some of the most important centres for the spread of general intelligence.

By the revival of religious persecution the Government hopes to enrage against the non-orthodox Russian sects, against Catholics, Protestants, Mohammedans, and Jews, all the narrowly fanatical and blindly superstitious elements of the people. But unfortunately for the Czarism, such elements are as rare in Russia as in any country in the world. This may seem strange, but the liberal Milyoukov, the reactionary Tichamirov, and the best observers of all schools are agreed that it is so. Perhaps the most obvious reason for no growth of deep-rooted traditions in Russia is the absence of sharply defined national boundaries, at least in the older and European section. In complete contrast with the rest of Europe there were in Russia no naturally fixed populations, little hereditary permanence of residence, little chance for narrow and local traditions to be created. Through the vast empire were always wandering and intermarrying families and tribes of Finns, Tartars, several very different races of Slavs, and even some

entirely foreign elements. There was no more possibility of deep-rooted prejudice than in the modern United States. Another ever-present reason for no traditions, denied of course by Tichamirov, is the very existence of the autocracy, at first perhaps a military necessity but later a sheer burden on every useful class. As each nascent national tradition had to have the official stamp of the hated Czarism, the people rejected it at the outset, and as far as possible decided their private affairs according to their actual conditions and without regard to the official traditions of the Church or State.

Neither Orthodoxy nor Autocracy are national traditions among the people. The only places where the official doctrines have obtained a certain hold on the people, are where Russia has defended the population in a recent generation against some foreign foe. The people of Volhynia, for instance, where the league obtained a few votes even among the peasants, were oppressed a few generations ago by the Poles. Then Russia, even with its Czar, was the Volhynian peasants' only hope, just as later the Orthodox Russian priests have been the chief means of reawakening among them the old Russian language and culture almost extirpated during the Polish dominion. Of course a result of this dependence on the priests is that Volhynia is one of the most ignorant provinces of the empire, and this ignorance again aids the reactionary movement. The condition is similar in Bessarabia, which was won finally from Turkey only a few generations back. There, where the people are not Russians, but Latin descendants of the ancient colonies of Rome, was the first great stronghold of Krushevan's League of Pure Russian Men, and there also was the first great massacre of recent years, Kishinev.

It was in Volhynia that the wild monk, Iliodor, preached recently to enormous assemblies a literal religious crusade against the internal enemies of the Czar; and it was in the neighbouring provinces of Kiev that the following appeal, among many others, was launched in October, 1905, to be circulated in Volhynia and other near-by provinces:

In the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost, the great anchorite of the Lavra in Kiev has ordered the people to be informed that Saint Vladimir who first christened the Russian people [Vladimir

was in reality a barbarian Czar] has risen out of the bowels of the earth, waked up the anchorite and wept with him about the Fatherland, brought to shame by the Poles and the Jews.

O God, where is the courage of Russia that once hurled back the foreign hordes? Shame and dishonour to the descendants of the holy Vladimir who tremble before a handful of cowardly Jews and street urchins they have employed. All of us to whom the name of Russia is still dear must know that the Jews and the Poles are thirsting for our blood, that they are trying to set us against one another so as to reach the throne over our dead bodies and overthrow the Czar.

Gather, all of you, in the churches, and take counsel there as to how the Fatherland is to be defended against the Poles and the Jews.

Do not kill the Poles and the Jews, but give the students who are sent by them the sound thrashing they deserve.

Each person who receives this letter must make at least three copies and send them to other villages and towns.

He who has not fulfilled this order in six days will undergo serious sickness and evil, but whoever spreads more than three copies of this letter will be granted recovery from incurable diseases and will prosper in all things. In St. Sophia Cathedral and the cloister of St. Michael many will assemble, and when they go out they will call out to the people that it shall gather itself together against the Jews and Poles.

The black clergy did assemble in several provinces, as a result partly of this denunciation, and led hired ruffians not to beat the students but to carry out the thinly veiled suggestion to kill the Jews, as well as the Russian students and workingmen that stood for their defence.

Certainly if the Russian peasants were narrow fanatics these appeals from the most holy places would have led to a monstrous and wholesale bloodshed, instead of to the cut-and-dried massacres prepared by the officials and police. As a matter of fact only in one of the eighty-six governments did they fall on fertile ground. Even here the promise of the league that every dues-paying member (the dues are twenty-five cents a year) will get land from the Government, is said to have had more to do with the movement than the limited popularity of the priests. It is chiefly the black monks and others getting an income directly through the State's money spent on the Church, that give real enthusiasm to the religious part of the Government propaganda. They are most numerous in holy Kiev, and a light on their political character is shed by the action taken at a recent meeting against the press, presided

over by Bishop Agapite. As elsewhere in Russia the press of Kiev is gagged and sobered by innumerable fines, yet it manages to make as progressive and intelligent a presentation of the news as that of Moscow or St. Petersburg. This skill and daring in saying something in spite of the censor had called down the wrath of these "holy" ecclesiastics, who resolved that the great majority of modern newspapers furthered ideas that are in direct hostility to religion, the Church, the Government, society, and Christianity, and therefore asked that the censorship be made more severe and that "a prescribed standard of reason, morality, and property" be required of all editors. Doubtless their reverences would like to examine the editors themselves before they are allowed to write. Or perhaps they are opposed to newspapers in general, like Pobiedonostzev. This old adviser-in-chief of Nicholas, head of the Church for the first decade of his reign, thought that newspapers were largely responsible for the democratic spirit that has corrupted Europe and the United States and brought them to the present low level from which God has spared the empire of the Czars.

Where the Government is unable to plan religious hatred, jealousy of the educated classes, or the greedy desire for the ruin of a persecuted race, it makes a direct call to sheer ignorance, invents domestic and foreign enemies plotting against the Russian nation. In one place it is the Poles and Jews that "form the majority of the agitators" and are "far more dangerous than our external enemies." These words were used by a colonel to his troops, of course where the Poles are numerous. In a proclamation, endorsed by the censor and the governor at Kiev, the enemies of Russia are "the Poles who cannot resign themselves to the fact that the Russians are not their serfs; the Japanese and their allies, the English and Americans, who instituted the war; and finally the Israelite Jews." Then follow citations from the scriptures recalling the biblical times when the Hebrews were massacred, and an appeal to repeat these massacres. Soon after came the massacres in the very places where the manifesto had prepared the way.

The vicious and glaring cartoons spread by "patriotic" organisations among the soldiers in Manchuria, leave no doubt

that the Government also at this time encouraged the last degree of hatred against England and the United States. The proclamation above mentioned, issued at the order of Trepov even after the war was over, is final evidence on the question. A very responsible editor of one of the semi-official Russian organs, the *Sviet*, has even warned the United States that Russia will not tolerate the insulting remarks made in American papers about the Czar. He calls for diplomatic action, and suggests as the explanation not that all truly democratic newspapers must necessarily oppose despotism, but that the American press is also owned by Jews.

CHAPTER VII

"MY CHIEF SUPPORT"

THERE is no end to the lie system by which this powerful Government prepares the persecution of its miserable subjects. Special lies are needed for the army, and other special lies for the lower servants of the Government. It is said the Jews do not make good and willing soldiers. There is evidence to show that before the present revolutionary movement of all the people began, the Jews on the whole made as good soldiers as any. Now, of course, special persecutions in the army have had their results. Jews are first given the worst of the recruiting, assigned to the worst regiments, denied all chances to rise from the ranks, refused any respect for their religious observances, their race is insulted in the addresses of the officers in which the soldiers are told to prepare to crush the Jews — and then they are accused of not liking the service. An officer ordered his soldiers to spit in a Jewish comrade's face. When some obeyed and finally the Jew struck one of them, he was courts-martialed for the act.

The Government and reactionaries endeavour to get the lower officials to hate the Jews on another count — that is, for systematically undermining the laws. Here, in a word, is the legal situation. In spite of civil and political disabilities and exclusion from State and charitable aid and State education, the Jews pay the same taxes as the rest of the people. But this is not all. Special taxes are raised on Jewish "kosher" meat, and even on the candles of the synagogue. These special taxes are supposed to provide for the institutions the Jews are denied. But no account is rendered by the Government for the millions of rubles raised, and the money is often spent, according to former Governor Urussov, for pavement of streets, for the maintenance of general institutions and of the police, for the notorious Russian Red Cross, and even for higher schools in



KRUSHEVAN

Professional Jew-baiter, preparer of massacres, and a leader of the extreme
reactionary party



Permission of Collier's Weekly

A GROUP OF TYPICAL REACTIONARY MEMBERS OF THE DUMA

Extreme left, Pureshevitch; extreme right, Krushevan, organizer of the Kishinev massacre

which Jews are not allowed. Thus the Jews are taxed twice over for institutions in which they have no share. Is it not inevitable that they should try to get around such laws? Yet this very fact is often made as pretext for the enactment of further restrictive laws.

Two classes the Government has long ago secured for its civil war programme, the nobility and the criminal element, the former on account of its intimate connection with the court, the latter through its relations with the police and spy system. The nobility, it goes without saying, is paid with privileges, governmental positions and disguised grants to landlords from the treasury of the nation; the mob, of course, with vodka or cash. I have spoken of the noble organiser of the League of Russian Men in Odessa. In Moscow Count Sherebatov is at the head, in Tula Count Bobrinsky, in Kursk and many other governments the head marshals of the nobility, in St. Petersburg Count Apraxin, gentleman of the Czar's bedchamber. Besides, the league reckons on almost half the court, including many princes, generals, court chamberlains, assistant ministers, judges and so on. All this nobility is vitally interested not only in the preservation of the court, the bureaucracy, and the privileges of landlords, but also in agrarian politics, beet sugar bounties, special railroad rates for large exporters of the grain of a starving people, the abolition of land taxes, indefinite loans from the State Bank, the free import of agricultural implements, especially of such as they use and the people cannot buy, and perhaps even paper money in the end.

This would seem to have nothing to do with the Jews. But it is obligatory for every reactionary element that seeks to share in the plunder to do so under the same pretext. Of course the landlords manage to get a special profit from the persecution of the Jews. There are no Jewish landlords to persecute, since Jews are not allowed to own land. But there are Jewish capitalists, and like other capitalists these want the whole state policy to be directed to benefit industry rather than agriculture. This unsympathetic attitude toward agriculture arises not from the fact that they are capitalists, the landlords pretend to believe, but from the fact that they are Jews. Under the accusation of being part of a Jewish conspiracy to undermine

Russian agriculture, even industry itself is sometimes attacked and every effort of foreign or Russian capital to advance it is branded as an anti-Russian, Jewish, German or English attempt to control the empire through the purse strings. From this same agrarian quarter metallic money is already criticised and may some day be repudiated as a Jewish contrivance, and the payment of interest on the international debt may some day be postponed as touching only foreigners and Jews. Already there are grumblings among the nobility against un-Russian money and the underhand influence of Russia's creditors. There is no doubt that at the time of a great financial crisis a tremendous movement against foreign capital could be created in dominant Government circles. Already Russian capitalists are pursued with fierce bitterness as friends and business associates of Jews.

That Brodski, a member of the Russian sugar trust, was a millionaire did not protect him from being beaten by "patriots" on the streets of Kiev. That Erasmus, a wealthy Jew, was seated at the table in a Moscow summer garden with a group of Christian manufacturers did not prevent a "patriot" leader from joining the group uninvited, openly boasting of his murderous plans, creating a quarrel, and, picking out the Jew for attack, shooting him dead in the arms of his friends. Trepov, the murderer, has not been punished, for he is the founder of the "League for Active Struggle against the Revolution," of which some influential persons are members.

The Jews "are the worst type of business men and money-makers," says the Czar. But they are half the business men and money-makers of his empire. When we add further than nearly every non-Jewish business man is intimately associated with Jews in business, we see that the Czar's feeling is really directed against the whole Russian business world. But does he attack them because they are money-makers or because they are Jews? One familiar with Russian reaction will hesitate for an answer. There must be hostility between Government by violence and business enterprise. Business men are hated by the reactionaries because of their own relative poverty and incapacity to earn. The plunder of the Government is an irregular source of income at the best and the big prizes are few.

The officials want modern business in Russia, but they want the profits for themselves. As they are not business men they plunder those who are. So when a reactionary says "Jew" he frequently means "business man." To many of these people the ordinary American business man would be thought of as, or even called, a Jew.

The Government's favouritism for the League of Russian Men in the recent elections has brought out the character of both organisations. The league's chief nominee for the Duma in Moscow was Schmakov, one of the most important of the league's leaders in the country. He declared after his nomination that he believed only in pure autocracy, recognised neither any Duma nor even merely a consultive assembly as being consistent with autocracy, and considered "that there was only one goal that made life worth living, only one task worthy of man, the struggle against the Jews." If elected, he claimed that his election would give him the right to say it was the will of the people to extirpate the Jews. In spite of all the aid of the Government and police he was not elected. All the fraud, bribery, and violence practised brought him in this immense city with all its corruptible elements, only a few hundred votes, largely those of the spies and other hangers-on of the police, such as the house-porters, who are used for police service, and the proprietors of Government saloons.

In Minsk the common candidate of the league and of the so-called moderates, Captain Schmidt, was triumphantly elected against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of the population. In 1901 Captain Schmidt sold the plans of the fortress of Cronstadt, was caught, convicted, sent to Siberia and lost all his titles and civil rights. The election law, aimed at the revolutionists, expressly disqualifies all such persons and was turned against Schmidt during the elections. But this traitor, convicted of high treason, had been pardoned by the Czar; he had only *sold* the plans, he was not a convinced revolutionist. Of course, the Government, taking its cue from the "Most High," interfered in his behalf and declared his election valid. After a solemn meeting of the league in a monastery in which God was thanked for His mercy, the moderates and the True Russian Men sent the captain to represent them in the Duma. "Even

if he is no Russian," said the presiding officer in one of the meetings, "nobody else defends so well the Orthodox faith."

Such characters are among the leaders of the organisation from which the Czar says he expects his "chief support"; ruffians, murderers, and men ready to sell their country for a song. It is these men and their noble friends in and out of the bureaucracy and court that are the most influential, because the most active, element in the "legal" political life of the Russia of to-day. It is they that demand daily in their official organ the exclusion of all the democrats from the Duma, the arrest of Hessen, Milyoukov, and Kutler, the most moderate leaders of the moderate reform party, and the regular and systematic beating, as part of their punishment, of all the hundreds of thousands of political prisoners in the jails. Nor are these demands unreasonable, viewed from the standpoint of recent actions of the Russian Government. Only a few years ago Prince Dolgorukov was exiled for merely expressing the moderate wishes of the official local government boards, and the entire membership of one democratic party is now locked up and under trial. The Government still declares the moderate party illegal; why should its leaders not be arrested? There is scarcely a prison in Russia where beating is not occasionally employed, to say nothing of the open flogging of whole villages of peasants; why should this beating not be made universal? The league demands also the removal of unsuitable "humane" chiefs of police, and more frequent shooting by the police of suspected persons. But has not General Rennenkampf already said, in an official order, that there were too few deaths and that the soldiers must shoot to kill? And has not the Czar just promoted the famous general in full knowledge of this notorious order, and of the general's campaign against the "inner enemy" in Siberia when he ordered a whole committee that came to him with a complaint to be executed? Why should not the league hope for the worst?

The league knows that the Government's legal persecution of the Jews has proceeded to a point where Governor Urussov confesses that it constitutes the chief business of the provincial governors. It also remembers its own successes; that its agitation and demonstrations brought on the great massacres

of 1905, that in many places the Government openly participated, as in Tiflis where the governor ordered the military band to lead their procession, and that at Odessa the governor, Neidhardt, to this day unpunished, quoted in the official pronunciamentos the league's own proclamation to the effect that "thirty thousand small bourgeois had threatened to burn the university if the revolutionary activities of the students did not cease, and that he lent them all his power to promote instead of to hinder the most horrible massacre of all the bloody history of the modern empire."

The league knows that at Tver its members were allowed to besiege in broad daylight the building in which the progressive employers of the local government board were holding a meeting, to set it afire and to kill and cripple those who escaped, all before the eyes of the assembled troops, until finally a single volley fired in the air easily put an end to the supposedly irrepressible disturbance. In Baku the German consul telegraphed a protest against the proposed demonstration which he was sure would lead to massacre. He received as answer that "German citizens" would be protected, and the massacre took place according to the schedule. The league knows also that to-day Government buildings are turned over to its use, that Government officials, especially local officials or those elected by the privileged electoral bodies of the Russian law, preside over its meetings, that the most influential persons are publicly or secretly connected with it, that the grand dukes and Government newspapers have expressed their cordial approval, and that the Czar has given them every encouragement within his power. Why should it not demand the arrest of all the moderate and liberal leaders and the flogging of the political prisoners under arrest?

No wonder, then, that they boldly attack even the Czar's prime minister for his desire to re-shape the Czarism, to convert it into a stronger and more orderly if not less oppressive system, and to place every activity of the league under legal and official restraint. There is raging a real war between the two powers, but it is of little benefit to Russia. Taking advantage of the state of martial law, Stolypine confiscates the league organ, the *Russian Flag*. But Dr. Dubrowin replies that

martial law applies to revolutionists and not to patriots like himself, and is sustained by the Senate, the highest court of the country. Stolypine sees that even martial law cannot be equally or evenly applied in a Czarism. But still under martial law he has an additional power and it is his only hold against the "spontaneous" and relatively democratic action of the league.

Against the disorder of the reaction, as well as the disorder of the revolution, Stolypine's only remedy is the disorder of martial law. What government by martial law is in Russia I shall show later. Here I only wish to show not only how the reactionary disorder can work through the disorder of martial law, but that it must inevitably do so since the army officers are on the whole as reactionary as any official body in the country, and every other group of officials to whom martial law is supposed to give this power of life and death are as bad as they. An example of non-military officials to whom it is proposed to give absolute power of life and death are the county "land officials" or "zemsky natchalniki." These men already have unheard of powers. The peasants have never seen the governor and higher officials even of the provincial government. For them this "zemsky natchalnik" is already czar, and most of the thousands of revolts of recent years have been directed mainly against him. These officials are almost universally reactionaries — none others would accept the popular hatred that goes with the function.

Everywhere the important "land officials" who may play such a rôle in the near future, are most active in the circles of the league. Recently one of them was entirely missing from his ordinary duties for several weeks. He was sought for in vain by the peasants, the marshal of the nobility, the other officials and the local and provincial police. He could not be found because nobody dared interfere with the more important labours to which he had abandoned himself. He was vice-president of the Smolensk league, was attending all this time league meetings and conferences in the provincial capital. This brings an ordinary picture of the fusion of the local government with the league.

The extreme reactionaries are indispensable to the new

Government, whichever way it turns. If the policy is to be the reign of martial law, made practically universal and steadily maintained, as Minister Stolypine seems to desire, then a large majority of all the more zealous army officers, those who perform with zest and interest this police work of crushing the "internal enemy," are connected with one of the reactionary leagues or unions. If Stolypine goes further toward the creation of local czars and special police whose chief duty it is to fight the revolution, he must rely almost entirely on the same type of men. If he wishes to return to the plan of creating an artificial counter-revolutionary movement among the people, he finds all the arrangements, prestige, and popular leaders already monopolised by the league. The league is also as strong in the Duma as Stolypine's moderate reactionary friends, and stronger in the upper house.

It cannot be questioned that the immediate future of Russia is largely in the hands of professional agitators of the League of Russian Men. The underlying reason for this lies in the simple fact of human nature, that intelligent and high-minded men cannot be obtained to serve a government at war with its own people. The work of drowning in blood the struggle of all kinds of people to secure the most elementary rights and self-government, is a task for dull and brutal men. Nothing is more to the credit of the Russian nation at the present moment than that the worst of her citizens as a rule occupy the higher position in the State.

CHAPTER VIII

WHAT HAPPENED TO "THE CONSTITUTION"

IN THE same audience in which Nicholas promised the League of Russian Men that he would "think over" their petition to refuse the rights of Russian citizens to the Jews, one of the league's representatives prayed His Majesty also that he should preserve the old principle of autocracy—in a word, that he should grant no constitution. The Czar replied in an unmistakable affirmative, that he would give an account of his power to God.

So we find always linked together the call for persecution and outspoken hostility to constitutional government. One of the persecuted races, the Mohammedans, formed a league "to further constitutional government in Russia." Several government officials thought the league might be legalised on the ground that a constitutional limitation of the Czar's power already existed in the fact that the Czar could not change the so-called fundamental laws without the consent of the Duma. The prefect of St. Petersburg took the opposite view, and the highest court in the country has finally decided with him that it is illegal in Russia for any organisation even to ask for constitutional government.

At the time of the great massacres constitutionalists were not distinguished from Jews. Indeed the chief purpose of Trepov and the grand dukes at that time was to put an end to the cry for a modern form of government. Their purpose reached down to the lowest officials that were superintending the killing. So in the small town of New Zybkov, in Tchernigov, the police captain, with a telegram from the governor in his hands, mounted a carriage and declared to the people:

"Gentlemen, there is no constitution, there are no liberties. What was said here yesterday was invented by our enemies the Jews, Doctor Ivanov and Bagolioupov. Now you can do

what you please to them. You are given this right." Immediately a part of the crowd commenced assaulting and killing the Jews.

One third of the members of the new Duma deny that there is a constitution and another third refuse to assert officially that there is one. The Czar and Stolypine in the meanwhile reassert the existence of an unlimited autocracy, and both refuse so much as to mention the supposedly constitutional promises of October 17, 1905, to say nothing of reasserting them. The *coup d'état* of the 3rd of June, 1907, by which the Duma was made over into an assembly of officials and landlords, practically annulled these promises in repealing the previous election statute that had been soberly granted by the Czar as a "fundamental" law. There is, then, no real need for the extreme reactionaries of the Duma to assert and reassert that there is no constitution, that whatever the Czar has granted he has the right to take away. Already he has done this. Already all semblance of a constitution has disappeared, and as long as the Duma has no control whatever over the Government it remains merely a king's council, no matter how the majority may try to dodge the plain statement.

Persecution reigns and the autocracy is triumphant. The anxiety of the extreme loyalists is not so much for the present as for the future. If the Czarism is to be preserved, the persecution must go on undiminished; if it is to be strengthened, the persecution must be intensified. So all the extreme reactionaries speaking in the Duma for autocracy and against constitution have occupied themselves almost exclusively with attacks on the Poles and Jews. And they have already succeeded in getting a majority of the body on their side against these races. Stolypine, too, willingly or unwillingly, must follow. A few days after the encouragement he received from these debates, he closed the Polish School Union that has opened 780 schools in the year or two it had been allowed to exist. His onslaught on the painfully-won liberties of Finland probably means that, even here where the conquests of the revolution seemed secure, nearly everything will again be taken away.

The chief party of the third Duma, the moderate reactionary Octobrists, have tried to avoid the issue. They secured the

consent of 212 out of the 440 members that the Duma in its address of thanks to the Czar should avoid both the words autocracy and constitution. As the democratic and Polish groups abstained from voting this remains the Duma's position on the question of the constitution, but not so on that of autocracy. Only 146 reactionaries voted to recognise the unlimited autocracy on this occasion, but more than a hundred others have recognised it on every other. If two votes were taken, instead of one, the Duma would vote against the existence of a constitution and in favour of the autocracy. The present anomalous position of certain timid constitutionalists by which they acknowledged autocracy every day and cannot use the very word constitution or any equivalent, is defended by such false and shameless subtleties as that the title autocrat refers only to independence from foreign powers and not to independence of the people, and that the discussion whether Russia has a constitution or is governed like China or Turkey is "a purely verbal" or "speculative question." This is the position of the Government itself in the *Russia*, its official organ.

In the meanwhile the Duma's cowardly refusal to face the one issue that is uppermost in Russian life and includes every other question, has forced it to make other and still more dangerous concessions to the Government's brutal power. In his declaration of his ministerial policy Stolypine did not mention the Czar's Manifesto of the 17th of October, the Magna Charta of Russian liberty, or at least the only official charter of Russia's hopes. A conservative member, Prince Lvov, moved that the Duma at any rate recognised the continued validity of this instrument. The party of the 17th of October thereupon voted down the motion and denied its own name and reason for existence. Like the extremists, the moderate reactionaries demand nothing, and accept everything, from the Government. Russia's so-called representative assembly claims neither a constitution, a fundamental law, nor any rights of the citizen. It is simply another council of the servants of absolutism, another arm of the already cumbrous bureaucratic system.

The leader of the new majority, Alexander Gutchkov, explained the position of his party in the following dark but explicable manner. In a few years of the new Duma there

would be no strife among its leading parties about this question of the form of government. They would all be satisfied with the practical results. His party was of the view that a constitution existed, that the Czar himself had limited his own power. But he would not insist on the extreme reactionaries recognising that there was a system of government other than the will of the Czar. All parties could agree to accept the Czar's own term for the instrument that had brought the change, namely the Act of October 17th. As we have seen, Gutchkov's intended friends of the extreme reaction would not bear a reference even to this instrument, since it is now tabooed by the Government. But, so satisfied apparently is he with the present Duma and the harmony to come from it, that he consented to abandon the only principle through which his party came into being. Or perhaps his consent was unwilling.

Between the moderate and extreme reactionaries is what we might call the reactionary centre, a group of over a hundred landlords without whom Gutchkov cannot hope to form a majority. The landlords by no means agree with Gutchkov; they have not decided whether they can expect more from the new Duma that has resulted from the Manifesto of October 17th, or from a return to the older form. They are not so optimistic about the Duma. Gutchkov's enthusiastic party is composed mostly of officials, rich merchants, and industrialists. Under the old régime the court influence of the landlords had only the bureaucracy to contend against. Gutchkov does not care about the constitution so much as about his Duma. The landlords don't care so much about the Duma and the October Manifesto as they do about their power over the Czar through the court. The landlords alone cannot control the Duma, any more than can Gutchkov, but they have carefully provided Russia with an election law that gives them a power equal to, or greater than, that of any other class. For the landlords, that is the nobility, can do nearly what they please; they are the foundation of the throne.

The leader of the Duma was careful to add to his confession of constitutional faith that he did not consider that the Czar's voluntary limitation of the unlimited autocracy had decreased his power. No, the new Duma would be a counterweight against

the encroachments of the bureaucracy and the court on the Czar's power. As we have seen, however, a part of this counterweight consists of officials, a second and larger part of the landlord nobility, the matrix both of the higher officialdom and of the court. The third part represents the wealthy merchants and manufacturers, by whom Gutchkov's party was first created, but in it is a considerable number also of the less reactionary landlords. It is, then, largely from the *increased* power of the landlords that Gutchkov hopes to control the court. Indeed he has said as much. It is also from the power of the most privileged of Russian capitalists, which the election law favours, that he hopes to curb officialdom. But I shall show that the majority of Russian capital lives from official privileges and Government contracts and has a corresponding influence in the bureaus, just as the landlords live from and control the court.

Gutchkov's career, his extensive travels, his service as a voluntary administrator of the Red Cross during the Japanese war and as president of the Moscow Municipal Council, suggest that he is a sincere reformer rather than a merely ambitious man. But he seems to have become a fanatic of one idea and a bitter enemy of all who disagree with his estimate of its value. That idea is that any assembly of men, however constituted and however limited in its power, that bears the name of Duma has the ability to regenerate poor Russia. The name "constitution" or "Manifesto of October 17th" he is ready to abandon. The name "Duma" retains all the wonder-working power of a Russian ikon. Indeed his paper speaks literally of the Duma's "sacred walls." He is the only disinterested public man of any great moment in Russia who expects the Russian landlords and contractors to relinquish their power over the officialdom and the court.

But what is the meaning of the Duma to the Government? First of all, the Government's financial credit abroad is steadily falling, and it hopes to impress the little French and German investors who keep it from bankruptcy, that Russia has a loyal popular assembly that votes all the loans and taxes the Government requires. That the majority of this Duma consists of individuals who are living by direct subsidies in one form or another

from the Government is a fact it is hoped the small investor will overlook. Second, the Duma serves a purpose inside of the country. It unifies the bureaucracy, the court, the landlords, and other privileged classes against all pressure of the masses of the people from below to secure a democratic form of government. It enlists definitely on the Government's side all those who are in any way dependent upon it, and gives to each element a definite rôle to fill in the national defence against progress—which, of course, depends entirely on the further democratisation of the state.

"The Government must have a firm will in this matter," said Stolypine to the Duma; "but this is not enough, the will of the Duma must be added to that of the Government." Count W. Bobrinsky, in the name of the landlords, the heart of the reactionary majority, had just used almost the same words: "The Duma without a strong Government is nothing," said he, "but the struggle of the Government against the revolutionary excesses without the Duma is unproductive. Without the Duma the Government cannot accomplish the pacification of the country." This pacification accomplished, it remains to be seen if the Government or the landlords will have any further need of the Duma. They do not have to abolish it. The Czar or the upper council can as hitherto veto its acts, more pressure can be brought to bear on the elections, or the election law can again be modified by the Czar or again interpreted by the Senate to suit the occasion. Or perhaps Gutchkov will see that discretion is the better part of valour, and in order to preserve the form of the present "sacred" Duma will definitely abandon, one at a time, every shadow of social reform.

For there is a party in Russia that is composed largely of capable and devoted reformers, a party that has at the same time given aid to the revolution only in an indirect manner as a last desperate resort. This party desires a constitution, fundamental changes in the structure of the Government; but it is so anxious for the social elevation of the masses that it has been willing to give up its greater hopes for the slow and difficult work which alone is possible under the present system. When the revolution seemed about to triumph, the party mem-

bers were ready to put aside their administrative work to lay the foundation for a greater edifice. When the Government was for the time victorious over the revolution, they were ready to take up again their difficult and almost hopeless task of trying to bring about a little progress in the local administration in the face of the hostility of the local officials and landlord caste. I am speaking of the party of the famous "zemstvos," or local government boards. The majority of the professional employees and workers were members of the Constitutional Democratic Party, a smaller part of the more conservative "peaceful regenerators" or even of the liberal wing of the Octobrists, Gutchkov's organisation. A few were populists or independent progressives, more radical than the Constitutional Democrats.

But the local government boards are elected mainly by landlords. Liberals were on the administrative committees and radicals were employed as doctors, veterinaries, teachers, agricultural experts and statisticians only because the overwhelming reactionary majorities among the landlords did not take the pains to vote. As soon as the revolutionary movement began among the peasants, their tenants and labourers, the landlords began to assert their principles. The results surprised even the Russians. Two years ago, of the thirty odd provincial zemstvos, nearly every one was liberally administered; now all but one are in conservative or reactionary hands, and in the several hundred subordinate district boards the proportion is similar. Experienced and devoted landlord administrators are giving place to ignorant and pronounced reactionaries, looked on as enemies by the people they are supposed to serve; or else occasionally, which is sadder to relate, some mild liberal surrenders his principles and remains in office. The elections showed only 5 or 10 per cent. of Constitutional Democrats and a still smaller proportion of liberals of every other variety. Faithful employees, of whom tens of thousands have devoted themselves heart, mind, and body to the peasants and the practical application of their science, have been discharged. Hospital after hospital, school after school, has been closed because the new administrators have been unwilling to make the sacrifices by which alone the old were able to sustain their work under Russia's wretched government.

The least public spirit ends at once the career of any employee, as it did that of Chief Engineer Skriabin, of Vologda, who merely complained to the governor of the tolerated beating of the Jews. The poor consecrated teachers with their pittance of ten or fifteen dollars a month, one-fifth of the rather low average of the whole United States, get the worst of it. All over Russia the conditions of the teachers are more or less the same. Two recent despatches from widely separated points testify what these heroes, on whom the future of this half-illiterate people hangs, are going through with. Each incident is similar to hundreds of the kind.

"The Glosov zemstvo treasury is empty. The men and women teachers have been wandering about the streets several days trying to get a few pennies to travel away with. Even in this they failed."

"Kuznetz. In the whole district there are only two teachers in freedom. All the rest are arrested." If this district is like the others in size, the despatch means that some hundred teachers were too radical to suit the landlords or police.

In these zemstvos lay Russia's only hope for a democratisation of local government, the basis of every free society. Very slowly, indeed at a most discouraging rate, but nevertheless surely, they were teaching the people modern culture through books, healthy living through doctors and hospitals, and modern farming through the sale of modern machines and the object lessons of the veterinaries and agricultural experts — to say nothing of the invaluable personal influence of Russia's most useful citizens, the zemstvos, employees. Besides, they were the only effective means of fighting the periodical cholera epidemics and the almost chronic famines. Without them even the insufficient sums dedicated to these vital purposes are desecrated or unequally distributed.

Now the zemstvos as reform institutions are a thing of the past, and the wish of the most hated of all of Russia's ministers is accomplished. Von Plehve several years ago recognised that the zemstvos were slowly modernising the Russian peasant. This is why he exiled Prince Dolgorukov who presented their wishes to the Czar, notwithstanding that the clemency of Nicholas had been promised. And this is why he executed his

notorious cleaning out of the Tver zemstvo that contained Roditchev and Petrunkevitch, later founders of the Constitutional Democratic Party, and other capable liberals.

In advance of most of the other local government boards, the Tver organisation was making a visible improvement in the province, which is as much as to say that it was moving in many directions against the reactionary principles of the St. Petersburg authorities. A notorious official named Sturmer was therefore sent to inspect, with full powers. Nearly all the employees were dismissed, the teachers not wishing to submit to individual persecution resigned in a body, the elected council was removed and von Plehve appointed his own nominees to take their places. To-day Sturmer is again being promoted for his zeal. But he is not needed for this particular work now. The landlords are awake and the machine of the Government is turned no longer against a single provincial group, but against the whole liberal organisation, and the Senate has once more declared the whole Constitutional Democratic Party to be outside of the Russian law.

Milyoukov in the Duma may well complain against the sincerity of Stolypine's political and social reforms. What more inevitable than that Stolypine should hand over his proposed reform of local government to a committee of reactionary landlords? Still more significant is the prime minister's land reform that must serve as the basis for the people's lives in the future. Two years ago even the most reactionary Party of Legal Order, when organising a peasants' section, was forced to incorporate a proposed measure, the compulsory alienation of the landlords' land for the peasants' benefit, in its platform. The moderate Constitutional Democrats still retain the measure as the only possible solution of the question — though they are willing that the State should pay a fair price. Now Stolypine actually proposes, to quote Milyoukov, instead of the expropriation of the landlords, compulsory expropriation of the peasants — a "reform" which would benefit only the relatively few small peasant landlords, to the injury of all the poorer peasants, as former ministers and imperial councils have repeatedly acknowledged. It is proposed to rob the peasants of the protection of their commune, by giving each individual for the



Photograph by Bulla, St. Petersburg

A VICTIM OF THE CZAR'S MURDERERS

To the left, Russia's greatest financial authority, Herzenstein, murdered by the League of Russian Men, the Czar's favourite organisation; to the right, the publicist Kovalevski



MAP SHOWING POLITICAL DIVISIONS IN RUSSIA

From the heavily shaded provinces the majority of the peasant deputies belonged to the revolutionary parties; from the lighter shaded provinces majority belonged to Labour Group; the peasants elsewhere also strongly oppositional. Conditions in Poland and Baltic Provinces too complicated to be shown on a map.



first time a right to sell his share in the village property. But in a famine ridden country this right to sell is a right to ruin. No peasant will prefer to die rather than sell his land.

Stolypine's land reform is, then, to create a few million prosperous peasants alongside of a class of landless labourers that will number five or ten times as many. But Russian industry is already overcrowded with almost starving workmen. These new labourers will have to sell themselves for a few crumbs to their neighbours, and in famine periods be supported even in greater numbers than at present by the State. They will have no power to raise their wages above the starvation point, for already agricultural strikes have been called rebellion. Under this "reform" the majority of the peasants will be the economic serfs of their close-fisted and often needy neighbours instead of belonging as now to the rich and often absent noblemen. The cost of keeping them alive and in subjection will be an added burden to the State, and no revolutionary movement will be too desperate to find its common soldiers in this element.

Stolypine, like his predecessor, Witte, has lost all hope for the mass of the Russian people "in this epoch." He says that freedom on paper can only become real freedom when small proprietors are created. In opposition to him Roditchev finds that all the Czar can do is to abolish privileges, make all equal before the law, first of all the officials themselves, cease to be a Czar of the nobility, and become a Czar of all the Russians. Stolypine's proposed extension of the so-called benevolent activities of the Government is simply a pretext for a simultaneous extension of its brute power. Half of his declaration to the third Duma was taken up with threats against officials, judges, and teachers who are not reactionary enough to suit the Government. Even the more liberal of the Octobrists were forced to protest. They wished to know whether officials were compelled to oppose their moderate reactionary party, whether the radical students, "our own children" as onespeakertruly remarked, were to be treated in the old inhuman way, and whether order could not be restored by lawful means. Stolypine had said that the Government would be compelled to do nothing by fear of a movement from below, that "com-

prehensive rights" would be granted only from a "superfluity of strength" and not through fear on the part of the Government. Milyoukov asked if these high-handed measures were those of confident power. Evidently the day of "superfluous strength" has not arrived.

The moderate reactionaries protested but they did not revolt. Stolypine cracked his whip, demanded them to vote against the reaffirmation even of the October Manifesto, the basis of their party platform, and was obeyed. The official Government organ gave them a scolding the next morning for their hesitation, and announced that the fact that the moderate liberals favoured the Manifesto was reason enough for all friends of the Government to vote against it. Even the most weighty official actions are "unpatriotic," then, the moment they serve progress. Has not the reproduction of the official reports of the Czar's own speeches been repeatedly prohibited by the censor?

With his inverted social reforms, his blood and iron, and his mastery over the national assembly, Stolypine promises to turn out a Russian Bismarck. But what is important is not whether he is a valuable servant, but whether he is a loyal servant, of the Czar. That he is loyal there can now be little question. This tells us where he stands. It is unimportant, then, whether he or the Czar is governing, whether he is seeking to discover his master's will or his master is forcing his orders on a willing servant. Well-informed and friendly correspondents of weighty and conservative European papers assured me last summer that the Czar was managing things himself or that he was superintending everything, and that Stolypine lacks the will, the ideas, and the statesmanship to have his way with the Czar.* Certain it is that the movement of the extreme reactionaries to depose the prime minister has several times made considerable headway. If the Czar governs we know by this time how he governs. If Stolypine governs he does so, as he must, to please the Czar. A certain countess, with access to the court and a leading woman in the country, assured me later that Stolypine himself was doing the work, even directing the Czar's personal appointees, the provincial governors, to whom he has no right to give orders, by means of personal correspondence.

* See appendix, Note D.

It makes little difference whether the supreme direction is in the hands of trained Czars like Nicholas, or the trained courtiers of trained Czars like Minister Stolypine; the court and the Czarism remain unchanged, and the words of Prince Urussov received with the prolonged applause of almost the whole of the first Duma remain true:

"The great danger . . . cannot disappear as long as the direction of the affairs of state and the destinies of the country remain under the influence of men who are marshals of the court and policemen by education and murderers by conviction."

Equally true will probably prove the words of Roditchev who was suspended for them by the present reactionary Duma after the most dramatic and scandalous scene of the three national assemblies. Referring to the hangman's noose by which Russia is governed to-day, he shouted above all the clamour with which the "patriotic" deputies sought to drown his voice:

"Yes, I say again, if the Russian Government considers as the only palladium what Pureshevitch called Muraviev (the recent minister of justice) collars and what will be called in the future Stolypine neckties——" Here he was interrupted by the tumult. Stolypine left the minister's box, and Roditchev, realising that he had taken the remark quite personally, went to him to explain. He passed two of Stolypine's seconds who had come to demand an apology. But he did not, as reported, regret his words. And when Stolypine said, "I accept your apology," Roditchev answered, "I do not apologise."

Expelled from the Duma Roditchev became the hero of Russia. His house was filled with flowers and he received hundreds of telegrams from all parts of the country. Already the overwhelming majority of all classes of the Russian people except the officials and nobility feel that Stolypine governs by the noose.

CHAPTER IX

"PRUSSIAN" REFORM

GEORGE III. of England wrote: "The times certainly require the concurrence of all those who wish to prevent anarchy. I have no wish but the prosperity of my own dominions, therefore I must look on all those who would not heartily aid me not only as bad subjects but as bad men."

So speaks in all ages the easy conscience of the despot born and bred. The times, not despotism, have brought the anarchy. The despot born and bred, like the slave-owner, denies that he could do otherwise than wish the prosperity of his own human property. Disobedient subjects are bad men, criminals, or malefactors. Those who heartily assist the despot are not courtiers, flatterers, self-seekers, or petty tyrants, but patriots and the best men of the realm. And the prevention of anarchy and the preservation of despotism absorb nearly the whole energy of the State.

To George III. the anarchists and bad men were happily to be found for the most part in America. To Nicholas II. most of his own Russian subjects belong either to a class to be suspected or to a class to be persecuted. For him the so-called war against anarchy and the internal enemy is a war against the overwhelming majority of the nation. The struggle of the Czarism to preserve its existence is a desperate business. One persecution, one arbitrary act, necessitates another, until the oppression as a whole assumes monstrous and finally ridiculous proportions. The unbiased foreigner asks perhaps why philosophical books must be censored or school-children kept in jail. If the country happens to be quiet he does not realise that a desperate and ceaseless struggle is going on, that a few lenient measures have often been enough to allow a cumulative, and for a time irresistible, movement of revolt to be set in motion. It is precisely in the Czarism's

worst feature, its arbitrariness and colossal violence, that it cannot reform.

Indeed as the people grow more intelligent and universally discontented the Government must become more oppressive if it is to preserve its existence. For instance, two lawyers have recently been punished, not by the judges but by the political authorities, for the political tenor of speeches made in court. This is a novelty even in Russia. But the reactionary organ, the *Russian Flag*, reminds the complaining lawyers' association that the provincial governors can, like the Czar, do absolutely anything; that they are appointed by the Czar and have unlimited powers. It quotes the law to the effect that "the governor, as the responsible head of the province entrusted to him by the most high will of his Majesty, is there the first protector of the infallibility of the most high prerogatives, of the autocracy, of the welfare of the State, etc."

The power of the civil governors is disputed. But it cannot be disputed that nine-tenths of Russia at the present moment has been placed entirely in the power of military governors and satraps by explicit laws created to "prevent anarchy" and "preserve the State." At the same time new civil laws are constantly being drafted, the reactionary Duma may lend its aid, and in time most of the arbitrary oppression and punishment now entrusted to individuals or to "military law" may be classified and embodied in the civil code. Such a "reform" would facilitate the preservation of order for the officials, and lighten the burden the loyal and privileged have to bear in times of "internal war." Whether it would lighten the oppression can be questioned. Under the present disorder some officials entrusted with irresponsible power are worse than any law, but just as many are more humane than the statutes.

The one reform on which all officials, courtiers, and reactionaries are agreed is that the nation shall be forced into order and tranquillity. But here the harmony comes to an end. Shall the new order be an "autocratic" or a "legal" order? The extreme reactionaries cannot see how an unlimited ruler can be bound by any laws. All their "reforms" propose rather to increase his personal power. They are opposed on abstract grounds to the bureaucracy and in order to control

it they want the Czar to institute a new supreme court governed by no law but his personal wishes. It is certain that every tradition of the Czarism is on their side.

For years every great new problem that has arisen has been solved, not by an extension of the law, but by lending to some newly created class of officials a part of the Czar's arbitrary power. When a few years ago, in response to the landlords' complaints that they could not bring their tenants and labourers to terms, the local "land officials" were created, they were subordinated not to higher local officials but to a St. Petersburg ministry more subject to the immediate dictates of the Czar. But this was not enough for Nicholas. The ministries are after all bureaus subject to laws, while the provincial governors are, as we have seen, the Czar's personal lieutenants. So Nicholas asked Prince Urussov whether he did not think it would be a great reform to subordinate the land officials directly to the provincial governors and so withdraw them entirely from the ordinary laws, and he was most displeased with Urussov's negative answer.

Of course, legal order, organisation, and system must be extended in Russia since it is a semi-modern State. In its enormous business enterprises, for instance, personal rule is unthinkable, and the State must be more or less modern in its methods. But the Russian Government has peculiar functions of persecution that can never be quite classified, ordered, or brought under the law. Such activities will be administered as before. Legal order based on violence will extend itself in some departments, but alongside it will grow the present order of sheer despotism, the brutal annihilation of all opposition to the ruling class through the gallows, prisons, mines, exile, and the knout.

This is a time as never before in Russian history of official talk of reform, and that there will be reform among the officials we make no question. The Czarism must reform its human mechanism or of its own accord disintegrate. The corruption of the Russian officials is notorious the world over and was perhaps never worse than to-day after the recent wars against Japan and the "internal enemies." Less known are the discord, jealousy and hatred that prevail among the innumerable bureaus

and the various ranks of officials within them; the generation-long delays in the most fundamental reforms, the arbitrary manner in which nearly every official fulfills his functions. That all this will be much improved with the aid of the new Duma, interested in such administrative improvements, to the exclusion of all social reform, there is little doubt. If administrative improvements are not made and made quickly the Government will not even make a temporary headway against the revolution. Even a part of its present allies, including a large part of the lower and even a part of the higher officials, will join the revolt. Already recent ministers and generals of the staff have gone over to the almost revolutionary opposition, a large majority of the railway, post-office, and telegraph employees of all classes joined the revolutionary general strike two years ago, and several hundred army officers are members of the revolutionary organisations. Policemen have struck, officials of all classes have aided the moderate opposition, a large part of the village clergy has become liberal, and judges have become lenient; Stolypine had to devote half his declaration to the third Duma to threats against officials that aided the opposition parties, however moderate, though he could not deny that all, from highest to lowest, are encouraged to join the extreme reactionary organisations that openly oppose the ministers as not being sufficiently reactionary. The officials must be reformed if the Government is not to be crippled by internal dissensions or lose its own employees to the revolutionary cause. Indeed the bureaucracy must be regenerated if even those measures that the Government itself considers most necessary are ever to be put into execution.*

The big business interests are now well represented in the new Duma, which includes not only merchants and capitalists but many landlords who exploit their lands in a business way, and the disorganisation and robberies have reached the limit of the bearable for any business interest. The railways, the banks, the coal mines, are crippled for lack of effective control, and the Duma will not hesitate to use effectively its sole power, that of inspection and exposure, a power sufficient to this end.

It will never be known which of the losses in the recent war

* See Appendix, Note E.

were due to thieving officials and which to the real superiority of the Japanese. It is known that the supplies for the Red Cross were pilfered, that a thousand carloads of coal vanished so completely that an investigating committee was unable to say when they disappeared, and that the Czar wrote in his own hand "poor fellows" on the report telling how soldiers had had their feet frozen from boots that wore out after a few days of service. It was not that this could be done only under cover of the excitement of the war. After the war was over the Government declared that Russia must learn from her defeat that a new and better army and navy must be created and that better fortune awaited her. As a step toward the new navy it was decided to build seven gun-boats in the Far East on the River Amur. They were nearly completed and an inspector was just about to arrive when a fire destroyed them. The Russian press claims they were burned by the order of officials who had stolen a part of the money assigned to their construction. Why should we not believe it? Has not a recent minister just been convicted of having handed over an enormous contract for supplying grain to starving peasants to a stranger whom he had met through a woman of doubtful character? The grain was of course not delivered, and thousands of peasants starved. The criminal, Lidval, was let out of jail before he had been there a few months, the minister, Gurko, was dismissed from office but given no punishment.

It is not likely that this corruption will continue as it has been, nor is it likely that the old type of arbitrary official will always be tolerated. Like the Prussians, it is probable that Government servants of the future will be held more strictly to the line of their duty and the letter of the law. Here is a typical case of what has been happening. Prince Gortschakov, Governor of Viatka, went off for a three days' hunt on the estate of a rich merchant. He did not turn over his "unlimited" powers to his lieutenant, as is required on such occasions. An order came from St. Petersburg declaring martial law in one of the districts of the province. Nothing could be done, however, in this apparently critical situation until the prince returned. When he did so, instead of issuing special manifestoes to the population of the disturbed district, he decided to turn

it over to the mercies of a young officer friend named De Rochefort who was living in his house and whom he had brought with him to Viatka. This young official, though of high rank, was not on duty, perhaps on account of his notorious habits or his publication of a reactionary pamphlet against the Government. But still he was made czar of the disturbed district of Sarapul. Hereupon, though the elections were just beginning, the cholera breaking out, and this district was under martial law, the prince went off again officially for an inspection, but unofficially for another hunt, and for the journey advanced himself 1,000 rubles from the Government's funds.

In Prussia such idle nobleman administrators are not tolerated. If Stolypine has a tithe of the force of Bismarck and the new Duma, the "loyalty" of the Prussian Landtag, a few years will work great changes in the whole governmental machine. From the uncertain engine of oppression that it now is, it will become the admirable, smooth-working, soul-crushing instrument that is the Prussian bureaucracy of the present moment. The wildness as well as the humanity may largely disappear, but the result will be the impressive but highly deceptive efficiency of the Prussian bureaucrat. For the Prussians have certainly created a "legal" order, but they have as far as they were able annihilated individual initiative, hardened the lines of caste, and done all in their power to drill into humble and terror-stricken privates all the citizens of the country.

There can be little doubt that Stolypine and the majority of the third Duma envy and emulate in almost every particular the perfected absolutism and bureaucracy of Prussia. As in Prussia, they want a "legal" rather than a "constitutional" monarchy, a gradual increase of civil but not of political rights, a regenerated State rather than a regenerated people. How could it be otherwise? Prussia has, like Russia, a bureaucratic absolutism, a militarism, a State that can rely on the zealous loyalty only of its landlord nobility. Austria has been, and Hungary is still, not dissimilar. The curse of Russia lies not in any institutions peculiarly Russian, but in the fact that the people have not yet won their freedom by fighting for it. In all the eastern half of Europe — Prussia, Saxony, Austria, Hungary, and Roumania — elements of the same evils that are seen in

Russia are still prominent. France and England have had their revolutions and are politically free. In these other countries the people have been beaten and have just such freedom as corresponds to the interests of the ruling class.

A larger part of the Russian practices that shock Englishmen and Americans as outrages, glaring there because vigorously resisted by the nation, are but better disguised commonplaces in Germany, carried out under the forms of law and accepted by a people that has no hope whatever of immediately overthrowing the Government. The Prussian Landtag is, like the Russian Duma, composed of officials, landlords, and the privileged classes, but the proportions are still higher than in Russia, for there are no Socialists and only a handful of opponents to the Government; while in Russia there are fifteen Socialist deputies and the opposition numbers about one hundred and fifty, or one-third in the Duma. The police terrorise the voters in Russia, but in Prussia this is not necessary; the voting is public, and the "disloyal" voter is black-listed by the landlords and the Government. Indeed the radicals of Prussia are now agitating for the secret ballot that Russia has already adopted.

We forget that Prussia is an absolutism as much as Russia, and that the King of Prussia even refused the crown of the German Empire in 1849 solely because it was offered to him by a constitutional assembly and not by the kings, his equals. We forget the boundless Prussian reaction of 1849, and that "the rights of man" are not even guaranteed by the present constitution of the whole German Empire. We look at Prussia as a modern State because her people are so clearly a modern people, at least in part. We forget that politically the Prussians have been able to make almost no progress against their Government since 1848, and that there is actual retrogression in such vital matters as the schools, the very basis of Prussia's reputation as a modern government — to say nothing of the antiquated relations between church and State and the handing over of many local governments to the nobility.

It is preëminently natural, if not inevitable, in a country ridden by an absolute monarch, his army, officials, nobility, and church, that the people's schools should be neglected. The official organ of the Russian Government finds that a slight

increase of 7,000,000 rubles expenditure for the nation's schools would be a “luxury.” The Russian budget is 2,500,000,000 rubles. Four hundred or five hundred million go every year to the army and navy, and this year the amount will probably be raised forty or fifty million rubles. The schools are getting in many places one-tenth of what they do in the United States, and yet an increase of twenty or thirty cents a head for the children of the people is a “luxury.” There have been years when the increased expenditure of the backward schools of New York City has been as great.

But this is not a Russian phenomenon; it is a normal result of absolutism. In proportion to her greater wealth and better organisation, the Prussian schools are better. Prussia also enjoyed a generation ago some sweeping school reforms, under the able Minister Studt. But this was at the time of the victorious wars with Austria and France, that seemed to give a *raison d'être* to absolutism and reanimated all its branches. Since 1871 there have been no wars, and the degeneration soon set in; the common schools stood almost still while the country moved forward, until now an incredible low level prevails. We can not dilate upon the antiquated teaching of the one-sided religious instruction, the orders to teach the splendid achievements of the Hohenzollerns “in every branch of civilisation,” the condemnation of all revolt and the glorification of war. But we can point out that outside of the large cities, where wealth and public opinion have brought some improvements, there are sixty-three to seventy-four pupils to a single teacher and the expenditure per pupil is from thirty-five to forty-eight marks; the better schools of America expend this much in dollars, so four times as much — for it must be remembered that in the present high-taxed Germany a mark buys no more than a quarter of a dollar in the United States. There are ten thousand half-day schools, many teachers have even three sets of children a day, or as many children as two hundred. Three thousand schools are without teachers, either, as in Russia, because of their liberal opinions, or because of the niggardliness of the landlords who control the schools. It seems that these latter need the children in the fields, and to secure the children's labour, often declare holidays of several days or

weeks. Recently a teacher who protested was removed and a preacher that supported him given a good scolding for resistance to his superiors.

This is what Russia may hope to rise to in her present course. For a change to Prussia's condition would be a rise, since after all only a small per cent. of the Prussians remain without some education, miserable as it is. Further Russia will scarcely go until the people have captured some share in the Government. With an election law like Russia's or Prussia's, there is even a likelihood that the weak national assembly will degenerate into a more and more servile tool of the Emperor and officials. The Prussian Landtag is much more backward than it was sixty years ago. Of over four hundred members 161 are landlords, 111 officials, and more than a hundred others represent the wealthy classes. It is thus not necessary for the Prussian Government to consult the common people either of the towns or of the country, nor any part of the inhabitants of the towns. The Russian Duma is not yet so bad, but the pressure of the Government on its dependents and the interference of the police may even bring about, after the coming elections, a less representative assembly than the Landtag.

Indeed the analogy with Prussia is almost indispensable for an understanding of the present Russian Government. Of course Prussia does not as a rule tolerate the wildest reactionaries as Russia does, yet we have the notorious Count Pickler going about for years unpunished and preaching that the day would come when the Germans would have to massacre the Jews. Even when he was finally arrested "in the fortress" he was allowed a leave in which he went home to his estate to drill the peasant troops he was preparing for the coming event. Fortunately for the Government, the insanity of the count has just relieved it from its embarrassing predicament.

The similarity between the two neighbouring governments is more than an analogy; it is due to common causes, a largely common history, and parallel development. For instance, the Czars of Russia are very much more German than Russian, and this has been the case for two centuries. Of a hundred of the present Czar's ancestors scarcely ten are of Russian blood and education; nearly all the rest are German. Indeed

Catherine II. and several other Russian monarchs have been wholly German. The nobility and the bureaucracy are also largely German. Of a recent cabinet six members, or about half, bore German names; of fifty-three members of the Council of State eighteen were Russian Germans; of forty-six members of the first department of the Senate twelve were German; among noted generals are Kleigels, Kaulbars, Rennenkampf, Neidhardt, Müller-Zakomelski, and Bauer; of recent prime ministers von Plehve and Witte were German; of the chief organisers of the massacres nearly half bear German names. Of course these are all Russianised Germans, but at the same time they come for the most part from the Baltic Provinces where they preserve their German culture and are in constant and intimate relations with their Prussian neighbours, only a few hours away. Very many have much Russian blood, but very many noblemen and high officials bearing Russian names are largely German. The truth, more accurately expressed, is that the highest Russian nobility and bureaucracy owes a third or fourth of its blood and traditions to the Germans.

The bureaucracy and military are not only inspired by their own German tradition, but are consciously modelled and remodelled on the German example. Sometimes the process has been reversed. Doubtless Peter the Great was something of an inspiration to Frederick, and Nicholas I. to Wilhelm I. The chief influence of Russia on Prussia has been as a possible enemy, a bogey to frighten the Prussians into militarism and subjection. But Prussia, in this exchange, has given more than she has received. Peter's bureaucrats were mostly Germans and, in the later reigns, the proportion was even increased.

The evolution of Russia in the last generation and at the present time, so incomprehensible to the English, French, or Americans, seems like an old story to the educated Prussian. The serfs were emancipated in Prussia from 1808 to 1848, in Russia in 1861; in both countries the conditions before and after the emancipation were remarkably similar. Both were military and bureaucratic absolutisms, in both society was divided by the law into nobles, peasants and citizens, and all the military and important civil posts went to the nobles.

In both countries the reforms came not as a social regeneration

from below, but as measures to save the State from disintegration after disastrous wars — in Prussia those against Napoleon, in Russia the Crimean war. "The idea" (in Prussia), says Seignabos, "was not to better the condition of the people but to rescue the State from ruin." Count Hardenberg said, "We wish to establish a monarchical government without democratic principles." His wish was accomplished and his entirely undemocratic State remains to this day intact.

After, as before the emancipations in both countries, the peasants remained for a generation or more under the police and judicial administration of their former owners and were still subjected to corporal punishment. In both countries the peasants had to pay extortionary and impossible prices both for their freedom and the tiny parcels of land that were left them. In both they lost their rights of access to the forests and part of their common pasture, and held their property on such precarious titles that the landlords in control of the courts were often enabled to steal it from them. Until 1891, eighty years after the emancipation was begun in Prussia, old land laws were still in force, and the proprietors were favoured not only by the courts but by the letter of the law. And it was not till the same date that the local government was taken away from the landlords, only to be placed in the hands of a bureaucracy which was, as I have shown, almost entirely in their control. This is what may be expected to happen in Russia to the proposed local government reforms.

In Prussia, as in Russia, the Government's borrowing operations were long kept secret, and a representation of the people was long promised but never granted. In both countries it took a tremendous struggle to secure the concession that the national assembly, such as it is, should be called periodically and not merely at the will of the ruler, and that new taxes at least must be voted by this body. But in both countries the budget is often voted after the money is already expended, and neither Bismarck nor Stolypine ever hesitated to go right on with their expenditures when the national assemblies were opposed. Finally, in both countries the ruler appoints the upper chamber, controls alone the army and foreign relations, appoints all officials and reserves an *absolute* veto over all laws.

Russia and Prussia, and even the whole German Empire, are unconstitutional governments — if for no other reason than for this: When a contingency arises that the constitution (so-called) does not provide for, the old laws hold. But the old laws were those of absolutism. It is because they recognise the fact that the Kaiser has the power in the last resort that the opposition parties are so timid, and that the most the majority of them claim is merely that the people have certain rights alongside the *equal rights of the Crown*. This is why local reforms are arrested, the schools stand still, the dignity of man is crushed under an iron heel, and Germany is threatened every moment with monstrous war.

The condition in Russia is and must remain similar until there is a revolutionary upheaval from below. But in the meanwhile there are two great differences between the two countries. Stolypine has provided such a reactionary election law that he may not have to repeat his recent *coup d'état* and call a Duma more friendly to the Government than the present one. In that case he will not have to perform Bismarck's act of trampling on the constitution. He can ignore it.

At the same time Stolypine has a vast disadvantage compared to Bismarck. He has no chance to wage war, fuse Russia together with blood and iron, and crush all opposition with renewed and victorious arms. Russia is not a small and defenceless country like Prussia was. Her peasants are not war-like; they are revolutionary. Absolutisms arise from and are nourished by war. And without wars all absolutisms will perish. With no prospect of patriotic bloodshed the doom of the Czarism is sealed.

CHAPTER X

AUTOCRACY'S LAST HOPE

THE problem before Nicholas II., an ordinary man and an ordinary Czar, remains after the lapse of two centuries the same as the problem before the Czar-genius Peter the Great. It is an insoluble problem. The desire of the Czars at their best is to develop the people without giving up to them any of the autocratic power. The result is not mere paternalism, but a withering benevolent despotism that defeats even its own object.

Peter's system was to create governmental institutions and electoral bodies in a country where systematic organisation and the regular participation of any class of people in the Government were almost unknown. And, indeed, the people were forced for the first time, rather arbitrarily to be sure, to think about the best form of organisation of the country, to feel deeply over real questions of state. The policy of the first ten years of Nicholas's reign forms a striking parallel. Nicholas is not a genius, but perhaps Witte is. This is a business or economic age. It is not then merely political institutions that Witte has created, but railways, manufactures, gold currency, an enormous liquor monopoly, and banks. It is not of political questions that the people have been forced to think and feel, but of the great economic questions of modern life.

But the parallel holds good. "Peter was possessed by the abstract idea of state," says the Russian historian, "the people were only ciphers in the total." But the people could be forced into ciphers only by whips and the sword. Peter instituted for the first time an elaborate system of espionage, revived many of the tortures of Ivan the Terrible, and still failed. His great state machine became a Frankenstein and threatened its creator's existence. His new bureaucracy became corrupt

and rotten with bribery, and came to be an additional burden on the state.

Witte is possessed by the idea of the state as the universal capitalist, as the great owner, manufacturer, banker, and employer. His is a state socialism beyond the dreams of Bismarck. If the Russian Government were to continue to absorb private capital at the rate it did in the ten years of Witte's reign over Russian finance, half a century would develop a perfected state capitalism (a more accurate term than state socialism) and the monopoly of industry and banking by the Government. To accomplish his reforms Witte did not have to resort to whips and the sword like Peter. As long as the instruments of violence could preserve the Czarism from revolution, Witte had no need of their direct use for his reforms. Quite the contrary, where they were in use he often had them abolished and replaced by more modern instruments. Starvation of the people is, as I shall show, literally the foundation of Witte's reforms. But actual starvation is unable to bring about the permanent economic prosperity of any community. It cannot be said that Witte's plan has failed, for it is still in practice. But it must lead to the greatest economic cataclysm the world has seen.

Peter's whole system, says Kostomarov, was directed against the prevailing want of public spirit, the lack of independence of action, the absence of initiative capacity. Mentioning his proposed reforms and the Czar's October Manifesto, Witte says in the budget of 1906: "The steady growth of the consciousness of the masses will undoubtedly soon lead them to true comprehension of economic progress, and arouse in them *a desire* for real improvement of national well-being. A sure pledge of the awakening of *public life* is Your Majesty's call to the nation to enter the path of *independent* action, and also the equality before the law granted to all Your Majesty's subjects." After the lapse of two centuries Russia's statesmen are still trying to inoculate her Czar-cursed people with initiative, independence, and public spirit.

That Witte failed as Peter did is due not entirely to himself. The proposed equality before the law and the popular assembly for which he finally obtained the Czar's promise against all the

nobility and the court, have now been definitely abandoned. If Witte could have spoken more openly perhaps he would have deplored not the lack of desire, but the lack of hope, for real improvement among the masses of the people. But Witte's error lay not so much in a too loyal hopefulness and confidence in the false Nicholas, or in a too bureaucratic contempt for the people, as in a fundamental misconception of his own business, finance. It is he that has the lack of true comprehension of economic progress of which he accuses the Russian people.

Peter could not, says Kostomarov, "inoculate civic courage, the feeling of duty, or love of one's neighbour," he could not create a new and living Russia by means of violence. Witte could not inoculate initiative, independence, and public spirit on the basis of the starvation of the peasants, which is the basis of his conception of economic progress.

Peter the Great laid the foundations of the modern absolutism; Witte has set it on the road of its last hope. Perhaps Witte at the last was even conscious of the desperate character of his experiment, of the need of compromising with democracy, the arch-enemy. It was no accident, however, that the road of state socialism was chosen. If Witte had not been there, another man or other men would have assumed his burden, and the same results would have been reached, perhaps with the loss of a few years, or a few billion rubles to the Russian state. The reason for choosing this road is not far to seek — the necessities of war; a reason fearfully painful to consider, for poor, starving, Czar-cursed Russia is, after all, part and parcel of the great modern world, flesh of our flesh and bone of our bone.

Russia is part and parcel of the modern world if for no other reason because she must defend herself against it. She is our neighbour, she controls a fourth of the best cultivable land of the earth, her people are of our own white race and of the same religions as ourselves. Even at the time of Peter the Great she had already decided to utilise all the machinery of modern industry that does so much to make our life what it is. Besides, millions of her people have all our modern culture, and half the rising generation can read and write. Why do we forget all these obvious facts and try to judge Russia as a thing apart? Even Japan and Turkey are dragged into the circle of modern

civilisation, above all by the necessity of defending themselves by modern means. It was especially by the necessities of war that the Czars have been compelled to keep step with many modern ideas, and it was the absolute need of getting money to support her enormous armies and costly fleets that inevitably forced Alexander II. to abolish slavery and his son Alexander III. to call a modern financier like Witte into power. It was likewise inevitable in a country where all the power rests with the Government, that Witte in strengthening capitalism should seek to establish State capitalism, just as Alexander II. in abolishing the slavery of the agriculturists to the landlords, should establish instead a slavery to the State.

The crushing defeat of Russia by France and England in the Crimean War necessitated revolutionary changes in the Russian army if the country were to preserve its independence. The professional army of military slaves forced to twenty-five years of service, had to be replaced by the much larger modern army of all the young men of the nation enlisted for a few years and trained by a certain "patriotism" as much as by fear. The peasants, breaking out more and more in revolt, had to be made over not only into loyal but into zealous subjects. War railroads had to be built, and a new fleet and modern armament were indispensable. At least there had to be enough clothes to keep the soldiers from freezing, as happened so frequently in that war; there had to be medical attendance for the sick and wounded, the miserable lack of which had caused more losses than the enemies' bullets; and enough powder, also lacking, for the cannons and guns. But the country could pay no more even for these important purposes. The serfs had to be liberated then and modern railroads and industry introduced, or the country would be divided up by the foreign powers. It was not an internal situation that abolished serfdom and moved Russia once more into modern Europe, but the imperative necessity of keeping up with her neighbours or belonging to them.

Modern civilisation is a whole. It is doubtful if modern machinery can be used without introducing modern ideas and a measure of liberty for the individual and democracy for the mass. To be able to borrow the money for railroads, passing

through a non-industrial region that does not give profits in the early years, one must have high taxes to pay the interest on the railway bonds. To get carrying profits even from the grain-trade in an impoverished country, the export business must be developed. But high taxes can only be secured from the high profits of modern industry and modern agriculture, and it is only the latter than can produce enough surplus grain to keep going an export trade. Modern industry needs metal and not paper money. A debtor nation must have a large export trade, and the export trade may make possible gold money. It is all one piece — modern armies and fleets and military railroads, a large government debt, high taxes, gold money, large agricultural exports and a protected industry. And all this was forced on the unwilling Czars by the fact that Russia is an integral part of the modern world.

State capitalism went further in Russia than elsewhere. In monopolising the manufacture of spirits Witte undertook one of the very largest businesses in the country; in founding mortgage banks and pushing the active participation of the Government banks and railroads in the furtherance or hindrance of this or that business enterprise, he became the financial dictator of the country as much as the Czar, his master, is the direct dictator over its political and military life. And as the Czar, his master, was helpless before the great fact of human nature, that men cannot be governed by external violence, so Witte was helpless against the great economic fact that the prosperity of a nation cannot be attained without the economic elevation of the masses of the people.

The Council of State confessed at the end of the year 1902 that "the Government is powerless for the reorganisation of the life of the peasants and the assistance of agricultural industry." This is an acknowledgment of the complete economic failure of the Czarism. Three-fourths of the Russian people are peasants and two-thirds of her wealth comes from agricultural industry. What is the use of State socialism or autocratic capitalism if all economic hope of regenerating "in this epoch" the chief national industry and the chief industrial class is abandoned? For Witte has used in the State budget the explicit words that this regeneration must belong

to a future epoch — that is, a future generation, or even a future century.

Witte was forced to avow his helplessness not by war or revolution, for neither had yet begun, but by the inevitable industrial crisis that must arise when it is sought to build up a modern industry among a people a large part of which is starving every other year, and is happy to have enough to eat let alone being able to purchase the product of the countries' factories or to give goods or passengers to its railroads.

But before this frank confession of failure had been forced on Witte by the tremendous panic and crash of Russian industry in 1900, which he himself had feared, he had already succeeded in one-third revolutionising the economy of Russia. I say one-third revolutionising, for many of the best Russian economists contend that the same policy by which he revolutionised Russian industry is largely accountable for the progressive and constant decay of agriculture.

As I have suggested, the modernising process in the national economy began at the time of the emancipation of the serfs in 1861. It took a much more rapid course, on the ascension of Alexander III. in 1882, under Witte's predecessor Wishegradsky. It was he that first introduced the high protective customs tariff and increased every other form of indirect taxation on articles of consumption. As fast as the peasants began to use some manufactured and imported article, or rather as fast as the non-starving minority were able to do this, the article was burdened with a crushing taxation. A part of the peasants began to drink tea with sugar, to wear cotton, to use petroleum and matches and to employ steel ploughs and iron nails. Almost in proportion to the increased use the taxes were raised. Again and again this happened, and was repeated under Witte, and was repeated again in the last two years, until the already miserable Russian peasant now pays two, three, and four times as much for these articles as do the people of Germany or France. The result has been that, although the cost of producing such simple articles is falling enormously everywhere and the consumption doubling again and again, consumption has risen very slowly in all Russia and still more slowly among those most in need. The peasant can afford only the fewest nails, the

cheapest plough, and almost no petroleum. His single shirt must last a season, sugar is a luxury and his beloved tea an occasional drink.

Under Witte's predecessor the peasants were already beginning to bear the new load of the railroads and manufacturing industry, added to the already crushing payments they were forced to make to their former masters for their so-called freedom and the possession of a part of the land they had always occupied. In 1891 the customs tariff was again increased; during Witte's first ten years, 1892-1902, the mileage of the Russian railways was doubled, the operations of the State banks were still more rapidly increased and a new bank was formed for lending money to the nobility; in 1894 the State monopolised the alcohol industry, and in 1897 the gold standard was finally established.


All these measures were again bound together as a single whole along with the export of grain. For evidently the gold standard could not be maintained unless from year to year Russia should receive from abroad in payment for her exports a sum of gold sufficient to enable her to pay the interest on the huge sums she was borrowing. But the peasants export very little, since they produce scarcely enough for their own elementary needs. While they were crushed with the indirect taxes required to support the new huge and artificial economic structure, their enemies, the landlords, were allowed to reach their hands into the treasury of this poverty-stricken State. They were loaned money below the current rates and in amounts greater than their properties justified. Having one bank for this purpose, another was created with the high-sounding name of "Peasants' Bank" to enable the most needy landlords to sell out at high prices to the few prospering peasants who had elevated themselves by usury to their starving neighbours and in their turn have become rich proprietors — some having by now millions of acres. But more than this, Witte stated that he did what he could in this starving country, which was no little, to keep up the prices of grain for the landlord's benefit.

But the famines came along regularly every other year, bountiful foreign crops or financial crises lowered prices in spite of him, and Witte confessed finally to the Czar that they did not

possess the economic dictatorship of the earth. Witte was fond of saying to his own associates: "But you don't know the cards." He had not played his last card and had a most disagreeable surprise in store for the landlords and the Czar. We need not accuse Witte of duplicity at this point. He had always favoured industry — even though sometimes only as a home market for agriculture. He now felt himself strong enough, and his policies far enough in practice, to display his hand.

The budget speech of 1897 is already addressed to a greater power in the end than the Russian landlords, that is, to international capital. Of course his relations with the great bankers were private. The budget address is aimed at their protégés, the small investors. The minister of finance finds now that low agricultural prices have their good sides for other elements than the landlords. And he boasts that the product of industry is now greater than that of agriculture. Industry had increased rapidly though artificially, but Witte used here a very vulgar prospectus writer's trick. The product of agriculture he reckoned at one and a half billion rubles, that of industry at two billions. But a large part of the value of the product of industry is due merely to raw material. The expert De Vaux reckoned the net product at this time as four hundred million or one-fifth as much as Witte.

Instead of being the rich country Witte boasted, Russia is almost incredibly poor. One of Witte's modern devices was the savings banks. The pennies of the non-starving minority of the people were collected in Government saloons, post-offices, railway-stations, ships, barracks, and even schools — from the first to the last always the pitiful total of about five rubles from each depositor. In the fifteen years of Witte's administration (1891--1906) the total of the depositors increased from one to five million, of the deposits from two hundred to one thousand million rubles. The bank was a good piece of business for the Government. But it is only another sign of the poverty of this vast nation. The bank has ceased to grow so rapidly and probably most of the available pennies are already collected. What is a billion rubles among a hundred and forty million people? The savings banks of other smaller countries have ten times as much.



This money of course nearly all goes over to the Government. It is like another tax. The Government pays low interest and gets high. At first the money went directly into Government bonds. But wise and modern Witte has put it into his railways and his land banks. And in spite of all, the show remains a wretched one. In 1902, after all Witte's borrowing, Russia had only forty-two thousand miles of railways to two hundred thousand in the United States. Moreover, perhaps a fourth of Russia's roads are merely military and most of them are miserably built and equipped. The estimates for all the Russian state railways (two-thirds of the total) in the budget of 1906 were pitifully small—for construction forty-two million rubles, for improvements twelve million, for rolling stock two million, and for repair of locomotives three million. Divide these figures by two to bring them to dollars and they will not by any means be as high as those of several private American companies for the same year. No wonder the bitter and ceaseless complaints that appear from day to day in the Russian press from every branch of business. Every day products are undelivered, factories closed for lack of fuel, perishable goods ruined in transport and whole train-loads destroyed by accidents.

Russia is wretchedly provided with railroads; the United States has eight times as many miles for each soul of her population. But still Russia will find it difficult to build more until it is arranged that her people shall cease to starve. Witte boasted that the annual loss on the railroads, had fallen from one hundred and seventy-six million rubles in 1892 to ninety million in 1897. According to the juggled official figures it fell to only thirty-five million in 1901, but by 1903 it had risen again to sixty million and is not likely soon to fall.

Far worse, and in the end a greater waste, for the country is the almost complete absence of roads. I have seen almost no paved roads except for a few miles from the towns and across some of the properties of the grand dukes of the Czar. The mileage of paved roads in France is one hundred and in Great Britain six hundred times as great as in Russia.

In fact Russia has none of the elements of great wealth except the raw materials of the earth that would have been there were the land without people at all. She has neither a great

agriculture, a great transportation system, a great industry, a great internal, or a great external trade in proportion to her population. The value of the products of Russian industry as reckoned by Witte in 1897 was less than one-tenth, that of agriculture one-fifteenth, of those of the United States. The Russian farmers, confesses Witte, are in the economic position of European farmers of 1800 or 1850. I shall later show this to be a fact.

The Russian farmer gets only one-third the product per acre the English or German does, though he has a much better soil. While the total wheat product of the United States increased more than a third during the last decade, that of miserable Russia increased less than one-tenth, not as fast as the population. During this period while Russian exports of wheat remained about the same, ours nearly doubled.

But as I have shown, the whole economic structure of Russian society and the credit of the Government rests largely on the exports, of which two-thirds are grain and all but 3 per cent. raw or half-raw products. The export of animals and animal products in this vast country, so much better adapted to the purposes of animal raising than Canada, is less than one-tenth that of the latter comparatively small country. Russia exports less wool than she imports and less than ten other smaller countries.

The total trade of Russia increased in the last decade before the war, only 25 per cent., less rapidly than the population. The exports, however, increased only 14 per cent. and the so necessary favourable balance of trade, or superiority of exports over imports, fell by one-third. More recently, in 1903, 1904, and 1905, it seems surprising to find that this balance has doubled. The explanation of this, according to a personal remark of Finance Minister Shipov, was that the peasants were so necessitous that they were forced to sell products needed by their animals and themselves, and these products were then exported. But even then the balance was only about four hundred million rubles, not enough to pay the annual interest on the foreign debts of the State, the railroads, and the great industrial enterprises. And then came, in the years 1906 and 1907, the periodical famine.

The false policy of the minister of finance kept up the exports the first of these years in order to pay the country's bad debts, but now even reactionaries are demanding the prohibition of the export of the food of a starving people. The Government has not forbidden, but it has discouraged, the shipping away of grain, and this has rapidly diminished.

But in the coming decade, as in the last, reckoning every second or third year as a famine year, as has been the case for several decades, the excess of exports over imports will scarcely average more than two hundred million rubles, or less than half enough to pay the interest, to say nothing of payments on the principal, on the foreign debt.

Whether the Russian Government is a failure as a business institution or not, it is certain that the nation under its present masters is not a successful business concern. The Government has the advantage over the nation in that it can secure money from abroad, either through the hope of the lenders that it will be able to shoot and whip more taxes out of the people, or that it will lend the aid of its rifles and cannons or warships to some foreign ally. In either case the foreign investor is lending not to a business, but to an army of mercenaries.

And in either case there are two sides to this bargain. If the foreign investor in Russian bonds agrees to ask no question as to where or how the Czar gets the money to pay him his interest, the Czar must furnish the guns. He is subject to a large extent to the wishes of the creditors to whom he must appeal year after year. Already the most powerful reactionary and Governmental organ has protested angrily that it is not the Duma but the foreign financiers that constitute Russia's real parliament.

This, then, is where the new finance and the last hope of the autocracy has led — to a permanent financial dependence on foreign capital. And if internal poverty is the weakness of Witte's policy, it is this external dependence that is its strength. The international bankers are exacting, but they are the powerful and invaluable friends that are keeping the Czarism together. For the Czarism is not supported by Russia — the Russians would have destroyed it long ago — but by the whole world through its gold.

Russia is poor but the world is rich. The Russian finances in themselves are as hopeless as were those of France before the Revolution. But at that time there was not a tithe of the wealth there is in the world to-day, and all the nations but England were poorer than France. Now there are four great nations each with several times the wealth of Russia, and four smaller ones as rich. All the older countries are overflowing with capital seeking profitable investment, and Russia, like India or China, has become a financial protectorate of international capital.

Already Russia is the heaviest indebted as well as the poorest of the great nations. The Government has borrowed five billion rubles for military purposes and three billion for the railways, while Russia's private railways and industries have indebted themselves for an almost equal sum. From 1890 to 1896 there were four large Government loans, from 1897 to 1903 most of the borrowing was private. Since the war every year again requires large borrowings from abroad. The taxes have been brought nearly to the limits; the chief expenditures, the military and naval, are about to be increased, for only by maintaining her armed strength does Russia obtain her foreign military allies and loans. It seems that the deficit of several hundred millions, euphemistically called in the budget "extraordinary expenditure," must remain. Every year or two will see a new loan, just as every two or three years sees a new famine. The sums paid for interest will increase and the Government's financial position will remain of the most difficult. It will not mean bankruptcy unless there is some international military or financial crisis. For if the Government has not the power to make fundamental financial reforms, it can, with the aid of foreign capital, maintain the present taxes and expenditure.

But the country is clamouring for reform and reform can mean in a position like Russia's nothing but decreased taxation or increased Government expenditure. Those who want anything fundamental, whether it is a new fleet or better schools, will have to solve the financial problem. And they will soon see that it is useless to go to the Government, and will begin more and more to look over the head of the minister of finance

and the Czar, to their financial masters abroad. Here also they will get no more than they have already gotten, and all the vigorous forces of the country, both revolutionary and reactionary, may turn against the foreign creditor. Already the revolutionaries have announced they will recognise no loan not authorised by a people's Duma, and the reactionaries almost as a man declare that Witte has turned over Russia to the international Jews (e. g., financiers). The popular measure would be the suspension of interest on the bonds or its payment in paper money, rather of course than the cruder cancellation of the debt.

In the meanwhile private capital is not accumulating to any great extent in Russia, simply because the larger share of profitable business has been monopolised by the Government. According to Witte's figures, already quoted, the private income of Russia cannot be more than two or three billion rubles. But the Government industries and railroads themselves produce a billion gross income and it takes another billion from the people in the form of taxes. The Government besides borrows several hundred million, which is several times as much as private enterprises get from abroad. The Russian people, then, already owes most of its income directly to the Government, whether in the form of salaries, purchases, or contracts. The way to make money, then, is not to go into business, but to stand in with the officials or to be one. Naturally the accumulation of capital under these conditions is slow. Without materially diminishing poverty State capitalism has made all but impossible the rapid accumulation of wealth.

Witte's conception of the omnipotent state went so far as to consider it as *the* "dispenser of credit" and arbiter of industry. He dilates upon the greatness of this power, but never once suggests that it might be used to enable the peasant to support himself and accumulate capital enough to modernise his agriculture. Witte simply delivered the economic policy of the Government for a short time from the hands of the landlords and gave it over to the foreign financiers. The Japanese war loans strengthened the grip of the financiers, but the dismissal of Witte, the reaction against all liberalism, and the third Duma, seem again about to deliver it over to the landlords.

Still more likely is a return under the leadership of Stolypine and Gutchkov to the middle course followed during the reign of the father of the present Czar, by which Russian landlords and foreign capitalists inside and outside of Russia divide among them all the rich profits of the benevolent despotism that do not fall to the bureaucracy's lot.

Inertia, reaction, or merely formal reform, these are the three courses open to the Government, but the greatest of these is inertia. Inertia defeated completely the heroic measures of Peter the Great to Prussianise his empire and reduced his bureaus to parodies in later years. The impossibility of bringing about any great economic reforms in a country presided over by violence, and where neither freedom of contract nor equality before the law nor inviolability either of property or labour prevail, the contradiction of obtaining the funds for the carrying out of such reforms by promising the aid of the Russian army in case of war, or by guaranteeing the use of the same arbitrary power to squeeze the money in some way out of the people — all this is reducing to a still more tragic parody Witte's efforts to modernise Russia by marrying the autocracy to the money-power. The union has taken place and it has brought its fruits. But it is like a union of royal houses. The people were not consulted. But they are already surly and the strength of sullen resistance knows no bounds. There are economic laws even in Russia. Against these neither the Czarism nor capitalism is able to have its will. What these laws are I can say only after I have spoken of the people, of the new Russia that is in some degree independent of the Government, and of the several efforts to bring the people to a consciousness of the economic realities in which they live.

CHAPTER XI

THE PEOPLES' ENEMIES ARE THE CZAR'S ALLIES

NEITHER reform by violence nor the State Socialism (or State capitalism) has put any check on the campaign of the reactionary classes against progress. The present tendency of the Russian Government is the resultant of these three forces — the strengthening and better organisation of the brute power of the State, its absorption of private industry, and measures against liberty of the individual in every sphere of private and public life — the “coming slavery” that haunted Herbert Spencer.

This tendency will be maintained until the Czar has been forced to acknowledge, not that he has voluntarily granted some reform while his power remains intact, but that the people have compelled him to abdicate or to share his power.

The coming Government, like the present one, will be rich and strong. It will not need to bother about the details of the persecution of the individual. But it will still need the support, against the ever rising tide of revolutionary feeling, of certain classes that receive their income from privilege rather than directly from the coffers of the State. It will have to seek the aid of these through lending them the arbitrary power of the State to crush their rivals on the principle shown in an earlier chapter, or, as we shall now see, to crush their employees. It will be done, not in disorder as now, but by law as the moderate reactionaries suggest.

Western Europeans and Americans do not have the habit of mind of thinking of social evolution as sometimes going backward. There has been too much prosperity in the past century in America, Great Britain, and France for these countries to have a very defined idea of the reverse of progress. Nevertheless we all know that a nation can move backward, and we must realise that it is on the whole reaction which is desired

by a large part, if not the majority, of Russia's ruling classes — not because they hate progress in the abstract but because they hate it in Russia where it endangers their incomes, their privileges and their domination.

The changes will begin at the bottom, they will be tried first in the schools. There must be no more trouble from the unruly children of the rich and privileged who now absorb ideals of progress and liberty and upset the universities. They will be trained to worship the Emperor, to spend their youth in dissipation, to ignore every serious interest and study except that of their future official career, and to hate foreigners, peasants, and working people, as do the youths of the Prussian universities at the present time.

The monarchists' congress in Moscow (July, 1907) demanded a "sound Russian national school." A model specimen has indeed just been opened in St. Petersburg. We can picture how it may carry the Prussian school idea beyond anything ever approached on its native soil. In connection with the same propaganda for the enforcement of sound national ideas the congress insisted on the "effective" punishment of agitation in the press, as if the censorship had not already gone beyond anything known in modern times.

The reactionaries are clamouring for the same programme they were in the past, based, first of all, on opposition to all traces of democracy in the Government, and next on the "priority of the Russian race in Russia," with all the persecution this implies. They are still insisting on the continuance of the principles of Alexander III., followed by the present Czar without exception for the first ten years of his reign, and restored to the full in the creation of the new landlords' Duma. Whether the reaction has restored the landlords to power, or the landlords have brought about the reaction, will never be decided. No Russian could ever imagine either landlord power or reaction as existing independent of the other.

At the monarchist congress preceding the one I have just mentioned the president, the nobleman and landlord Sherebatov, declared that during the revolution the nobility had either kept silent or in the persons of its leaders had joined the enemy. Now the landlord class has awakened, expelled

from its assemblies most of these traitorous leaders, and its congresses together with the League of Russian Men have directed the policies of the Government. It was the landlords' organisation and the league that demanded the dissolution of the first Duma, and the *coup d'état* that dissolved the second and put the people's representatives in an insignificant minority by an election law framed directly contrary to the Czar's so-called unchangeable fundamental laws.

These monarchists congresses, then, have a great significance. They indicate clearly the position of Russia's ruling class, since both the league and the landlords are represented there. The president's speech in 1906 was a beacon in the often incomprehensible obscurity of reaction. If the Duma should be abolished altogether, says this courtier and landlord, let us hope it will be replaced by an assembly of the old Russian character composed exclusively of "the population that composes Russia's roots." The Czar did not follow this advice in its entirety; he preserved the name of Duma, and left a few representatives to the Caucasians and Poles. But he certainly went more than half way toward the goal. One more short step and it will be reached.

"The principle of the sovereign prerogatives of the Russian nation" must be expressed in several ways said Sherebatov. First, all the responsible official positions are to be filled with scions of pure Russian stock, and even at least half the clerks must be of the dominant race. The congress of 1907 went further and extended its protection not only to Russian clerks but even to Russian servants. It decided its members were to use every means to get positions among Christian families for such servants as were employed by Jews. It is indeed wise for the league to promise something to the servants, for it is among the most ignorant of these that it obtains in the larger cities most of its members.

The difficulty of the league and other organisations supported by the landlords, is not to influence the Government, but to get members. There are only about a hundred thousand noble landlords. The Government officials, house-servants and small shopkeepers do not form a tithe of the population. The peasantry, conceded Sherebatov, was in commotion and,

"without noticing it," he claims, "followed the revolutionists." It is hoped to win these back through the priesthood. The resolution passed by this congress about the punishing of any priests who make themselves offensive by their liberality in the Duma, or in any way opposing the league's principles, is being carried into effect. Every day priests who have assumed any kind of popular leadership are immured in the monasteries, those who spoke for the people in the Duma have been unfrocked, and two-thirds of the present delegation in the Duma is composed of reactionaries of the most violent character.

This extraordinary movement that professes to be so loyal to the Czar is strangely opposed to the Government. It savagely attacks officialdom for losing the Japanese war and wants an account of the nation's expenditures. It is opposed to the arbitrariness and corruption in the bureaucracy to the point that it would destroy the bureaucracy's power. But not by making ministers and officials responsible to the Duma. Oh, no, this would be democratic. They are to be made more responsible to — the Czar! To the Czar's thousand bureaus and councils is to be added another, a supreme court, above all the others and directly answerable to the "Most High." To this court each of Russia's sixty million adult citizens is to have access, and all will be well. Such is the political science of the reactionary mind.

The political economy of our "Czarists" may be summed up in a word. The State is all. I have spoken of the steps toward the State monopoly of industry, transportation and credit. The professional reactionist does not stop half-way; he always goes further than the Government. The State, which is all, surely need not burden itself with the necessity of keeping hoarded up a supply of gold as the basis for money. Paper money is not only a natural demand in a desperately impoverished and indebted country, it is the inevitable logical outcome of all the thinking and all the principles, such as they are, that underlie the Czarism.

The Czars have never ruled alone. They have always had the indispensable support of a powerful ruling caste. The autocracy has merely been the device by which this oligarchy has governed. While subjecting themselves absolutely to the

autocrat, the landlords have relied on the fact that it is from their ranks that are naturally chosen courtiers, ministers, generals and administrators. Landlords are the chief source of the Czar's information, teach him in childhood, advise him when he governs, execute his orders, and organise the demonstrations of loyalty that give some appearance of popularity to the system. In return the landlords have offered the Czar a loyal and zealous support. Whatever causes they may have had for complaint, no considerable part of the landlords have for centuries been so foolish as to attempt to overthrow a system that has worked so admirably in their interests. When the Czars have been wise, they have done everything in their power for the landlord class. When they have been weak, innumerable wealthy or ambitious landlords have crowded to the court to become the true governors of the land. But only rarely have the landlords tried to moderate, and never have they tried to abolish, the autocratic system.

So for a thousand years the people of Russia have been living under a double slavery — abject economic subjection to the landlords, and abject political subjection to the State. But always while the people owed a double servitude, the masters were really one. The Czar himself is the greatest landholder and the natural head of the class. The landlords owe their property, their privileges, and their power to their influence over the Czar. There were never those very serious conflicts among the members of nobility, and between the nobility and the chief ruler, that gave the people a chance to obtain a share of the power in other European states. There were no artificial boundaries to give rise to independent robber barons; the constant threat of Tartar and Turkish invasion strengthened the military power and maintained the absolute dominion of the Czar. There were no great seaports or trading centres to build up independent towns, no industries to create a buffer middle-class. When occasionally the Czar's generals and governors were chosen from among the people they at once became landlords, since the land constituted the sole great treasure of the State from which to draw their rewards.

For centuries the peasants have borne this double servitude under changing forms. During these centuries serfdom was

instituted and then abolished, and finally a "constitution" has been granted and elections held. But the Czar still remains autocrat with absolute and unlimited powers, he still governs in the interest of the landlord caste, draws most of the ministers and nearly all the governors and generals from the landlords, and relies almost entirely for his power on their enthusiastic and eager support. In the new Duma it is in the main the landlords, elected under the unequal election law not by the people but by themselves, that vote for the measures of the Czar. As for centuries, the Czarism and the landlord caste stand united to maintain their rule.

In the present revolutionary crisis the landlords are no longer entirely united, but none favour the peasants' programme. Practically all are loyal to the monarchy, and the overwhelming majority are zealously fighting to preserve the autocratic State. They are divided with few and insignificant exceptions into three parties: the extreme reactionaries, the conservatives or moderate reactionaries, and the moderate liberals. Perhaps the most influential are still the extreme reactionaries who demand a complete return to the old order: the peasants to be held on the level of serfs, the towns and industries to be left in the hands of an irresponsible bureaucracy limited only by the influence of the court party, which is and must remain the only possible source of control over the Governmental machine. For in a country as enormous and complex as modern Russia, government by an absolute monarch means government by the court party. No ruler ever lived that could impress his single will on such a State.

The reactionaries' programme may be summed up in the single word — repression. Let Russia be bathed in blood if necessary until the last spark of self-assertion among the people be destroyed. Then let the Czar abolish the Duma forever, revive the Orthodox Church, and renew the persecutions against Russian dissenters, Polish Catholics, and Jews. Finally, let a general economic reform be introduced of such a character that none but those sentimental landlords who happen to have some sentimental attachment to their estates could cavil at its terms — a reform that in turning over part of the land to the peasants would leave the landlords better off than before, and let the

nation pay the bill. Let the Government subsidise the so-called "Peasants' Bank" and let that bank gradually buy up estates. In this way, former Minister of Agriculture Kutler himself pointed out, the prices of estates stimulated by Government bidding would constantly rise, and the landlords would secure even more than the present rack-rent prices for their lands. Kutler was so outraged at this proposition made by Count Witte in 1906 that he resigned from the ministry and became the chairman of the second Duma's commission on the land question and is now the financial expert and leader of the moderate opposition party.

This "reform" would cost Russia three or four billion rubles, about as much as the Japanese war. I was actually approached by one of the most notorious leaders of the court party last fall, Count X., with an inquiry as to my opinion about the possibility of his interesting American financiers in such a loan. The count had heard that America was overflowing with money to be had by foreign governments on good security at 3 and 4 per cent. Might not America lend Russia a billion dollars or two on the security of her land? The count was of the same group of reactionaries which proposed to mortgage the Russian railways to some Morgan syndicate, and which actually succeeded in putting a large part of the securities of the "Peasants' Bank" in English hands, with hopes of continuing the process.

Until his "execution" by terrorists, the notorious Jew-baiter, Count Ignatiev, was the leader of this party in the court. Pobiedonostzev, head of the church, Trepov, military dictator of St. Petersburg, and the other chief advisers of the Czar with few exceptions belonged to it and were its principal support. Some of the largest landlords in the country, such as Prince Sheremetieff, also a power in the court, have spoken openly on all occasions since the October Manifesto in favour of a return to pure Orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationalist persecution.

This party, which might be called the "old" landlords' party, is "legal" — that is, allowed to hold public meetings and demonstrations; while all the large parties of the Duma, even the moderate Constitutional Democrats, are still "illegal." Yet the basis of its programme is violence, illegal governmental

violence, without the check even of military law, where governmental violence is effective, and wherever it is not, the arming of the dregs of the population against all the better classes. It is this class that has hired to guard their estates large bands of so-called Cossacks, often really only raw recruits raked even from the refuse of prisons. One noble landlord told me that he had instructed his ruffians, as soon as any peasant touched any of his property, to burn the whole thatch-roofed village down. This was in fact the official decision reached at the landlords' congress as to the action to be taken in case of peasant attack.

But why does this landlord party give itself up to counter-revolutionary violence rather than to its more profitable economic reform, the purchase of its lands by the Government at a figure beyond all criticism? The cause is this. First, the revolutionary propaganda among the peasants has given them the hope and the courage to demand for nothing the land that they have already repeatedly purchased with their sweat and blood. The peasants refuse to buy. In the meanwhile the revolutionary movement forces some of the landlords to flee and sell their estates. Second, the national credit is so low that the Government could scarcely get the money to make the purchase. After all the landlords, even the most violent, are business men. If by fair or unfair means they can crush the revolution, the field of exploitation will again be theirs. They do not have at their disposal any huge corruption funds like our corporation magnates. With all their millions of acres they are "land poor." But they are almost in complete control of this great engine of violence, the Russian Government, and by that means a large part among them still hopes to achieve their ends.

But the new landlord party in the court would rather follow the well-tried methods of the Prussian, Polish, Austrian, and Hungarian proprietors. They do not hope to bring about a return to old conditions. They do not want to abolish the Duma, but to dissolve it and change the election law back to the Prussian model, as was recently done in Saxony. They knew the Duma was created not by the Czar or the revolution, but by the foreign financiers, and that therefore it cannot be entirely done away with. They wish, not more violence, but the continued application of the present measures of repression

which have imprisoned and exiled two hundred thousand or three hundred thousand people during last year. They relied at first on the "constitution," which allows the Czar's "council" to counteract the Duma and in which event permits the Czar to enact the laws alone.

With the enactment of an election law that left three-fourths of the provinces entirely in the landlords' hands, and gave them nearly all the rest in common with an electoral body composed exclusively of the wealthy and privileged classes of the towns, the proprietors were inspired with a new life. In the third Duma the majority of the extreme reactionary group of more than one hundred members, and of the moderate reactionary group of 150 members, are landlords, while a third group that takes a position between the two, the so-called simple rights, is composed almost exclusively of landowners. Of these three groups the moderates hold the balance of power, but only when the democratic and popular parties, who are often so disgusted with the Duma that they refuse to participate, happen to decide to vote with their moderate against their extreme enemies. Otherwise not the moderate, but the centre reactionaries, control. This also often happens when the less moderate landlord members of the moderate group vote with their more violently reactionary friends. In either case the almost exclusively landlord party controls entirely the national assembly. And in any case, even when the landlords don't control, they entirely dominate the Duma.

The leader of this moderate reactionary party is the wealthy Count Bobrinsky. It has already become almost the official party of the landlords' congress. Perhaps to a greater extent even than the still more extreme reactionaries it now has the sympathy of the ministry and the Czar, and it is in close alliance with the Octobrists who actually propose certain moderate reforms. Both parties, however, are agreed that the landlords are to suffer no loss in whatever transformation is to come.

The least influential and numerous party among the landlords has been touched with the liberal ideas of the middle classes of the towns and feels that Russia can neither go back nor stop at the present point of her political evolution. They have joined in the movement of the Constitutional Democrats,

the Progressists or the "Peaceful Regenerators" in the belief that the victory of liberalism and the gradual evolution of a moderately democratic state, may stop the revolution and save them from threatened financial ruin. Some have formed the so-called "right wing" of the landlords' party; others have formed the more conservative and independent group of "Peaceful Regeneration." Such are the Princes Dolgorukov, Trubetskoi, and Lvov, Count Heyden, and former Minister Kutler. Their policy seemed the wisest for the landlords and at first promised to become the most successful. Their influence on the Constitutional Democrats has so far moderated the latter's position of revolutionary opposition to the Government that this party has lost what little popularity it formerly enjoyed among the people. The party owed its power in the second Duma almost entirely to a few hundred thousand city electors, who, under the unjust election law even of that Duma, controlled almost as many members as the twenty million peasants. But the Constitutional Democrats have increased their influence over the ministers and the foreign financiers as fast as they have lost it with the people. The party that in an early congress recognised the democratic republic as the goal toward which Russia must evolve, later defended the monarch in the Duma against all disloyal remarks. Its leader, Hessen, has declared that his party was ready to compromise both on the great political issue, on equal suffrage and on the great economic issue, the handing over of the land to the people.

Before the meeting of the first Duma the peasant party leader, Aladdin, reminded us that the Constitutional Democratic Party, of whom a considerable majority were landlords, could never understand or satisfy the peasants' demands. The leaders at that time were Petrunkevitch, Roditchev and Nabokov, all noblemen and landlords. These men were not members of the avowedly conservative "right wing" of the party, but of the centre. Public spirit certainly plays a prominent part in their opinions. Nevertheless they are landlords, and so little were the peasants, their tenants and labourers, satisfied with their lukewarm advocacy of the peasants' cause in the first Duma, that they decreased their number to a half in the second.

Many landlords joined this conservatively liberal party, but the peasants turned against it the more bitterly as the landlords joined. After centuries of oppression they have little confidence in a party half composed of landlords and fought at nearly every point by their own elected representatives. A generation ago they had a great experience with a reform amended and carried, if not originally executed, by the landlord class. The generation they have lived out since has proved one of the most bitter of history.

The peasants of that time were even opposed to their emancipation without enough land to keep them from starvation. Warned by the emancipation and pauperisation of the peasants of Prussia, and of the German and Polish parts of Russia a few years before, they feared an abject dependence on the landlords for bread more than they hated their blows. The landlords, on the other hand, came to look on the emancipation even with favour before it was actually put into execution. They looked forward to the institution of a new peasantry, free but not provided with enough land for their food, as the source of a cheaper and more reliable form of farm labourers than the serfs. Besides this, they were lured by three immediate economic rewards. The State agreed to force the peasants to pay both for their liberation and for the miserable plots of land that the landlords were forced to leave to them. In addition to these immense sums in cash, the landlords took the woods and the better half of the pastures, most of which had formerly been used, though not owned, by the peasants. The opposition offered by the landlords was merely a haggling for terms. When the great measure was finally accomplished it more than fulfilled the landlords' anticipations and the peasants' fears. No sooner was it put into effect in 1861, than a thousand peasant revolts reached an importance that required the intervention of military force. But it took a generation for this landlords' reform to produce its maximum of peasant ruin. The famine of 1906, following so many others, has brought the industry and class on which all Russian society is reared, down to an economic level scarcely higher than that they occupied a century ago.

In order to collect the new dues required by the enormous

sums handed over to the landlords, the screws of servitude to the autocratic State, which had never for a moment been relaxed, were turned on harder than ever. The serfs' bodies were taken from the hands of the landlords only to be turned over to another more brutal master, the State. The State has always been the worse of the two masters. In the generation that preceded the emancipation Nicholas I. had forced a large part of the peasants to a military slavery of twenty-five years duration and to the most inhuman "discipline." But what is less known is that this same terrible discipline was applied to all the miners of the land, to the post-office and all the lower employees of the State. And what is still more important is that a police system of an almost equally barbarous severity was also applied to half of the peasants working on the land; for to nearly half of the peasants the Czar was not only the great arch tyrant, but their sole master. The State owned literally not only the army which furnished servants and workingmen, the miners, the State employees, but also nearly one half the agricultural serfs.

By the "emancipation" this State serfdom was simply extended over all the land. The police were given a power more despotic and scarcely less immediate than that formerly the right of the serf-owners. New servitudes replaced the old, and it was largely, if not entirely, on the landlords' account that their severity was increased. To make easier the collection of the State taxes devoted for the greater part to paying indemnities and making loans to the landlords, and to prevent the escape of the landlords' quarry of cheaper labour, the emancipated peasant was again fixed to the land. He could not leave his village without a special and rarely granted legal consent. When the first rumblings of the present revolution were heard this measure was abolished "as a law" only to give place to an almost exactly similar regulation by the police. To make the collection of taxes more sure the village was made responsible as a whole for each delinquent tax-payer. The village was then given the right to inflict corporal punishment or forced labour on its delinquent members. With the alternative hanging over their heads of the ruin and destruction of the village by savage Cossacks, the villagers seldom hesitated

to use their powers under the eyes and direction of the police. But this is servitude. What more is there to serfdom than corporal punishment, forced labour, and fixture to the soil?

When after two decades the State found it could beat no more out of the pauperised and starving peasant, it imposed a new and immense and crushing burden of indirect taxes that he could not possibly escape. The plan worked so much better than the other that these taxes, as already indicated, have been increased from year to year until the wretched peasant is forced to pay several prices for his plough, the petroleum for his lamp, the shirt on his back and even for his poor luxuries, sugar and tea.

Not only has the condition of the people long ago ceased to improve, but agriculture has gone backward and the very soil has deteriorated. The average peasant farmer is to-day producing less per acre than he did at the time of the emancipation forty years ago — and this at the very period in which agriculture has made the most spectacular strides forward, and the American farmer is getting almost twice as much from a day's labour as before. Year after year the peasant's share of land is growing smaller, his horses and cattle are degenerating and decreasing in numbers from under-nourishment. The horses are already only about half the weight of those of France. They require less food, but even taking this into account three of them still get scarcely what is necessary for two. Even the men are habitually underfed — according to a Government report to the extent of 17 per cent. Farm machinery and even harness and the iron needed for waggons are almost beyond the peasant's reach, and are often replaced by devices of wood and rope. The harrows are of wood and the ploughs penetrate only a few inches into the soil. So when a dry year comes along the peasants obtain, as a recent investigation has shown, only half the crop of neighbouring landlords who are able to follow the methods of modern agriculture.

The frequent famines are worse in years of drought, but the drought is only a secondary cause of the suffering. With more means and modern methods the peasant would have twice his present crop even in dry years, and in good years he would be able to accumulate enough surplus capital to last him until

the next season, as do our farmers of the arid belt. As it is, he is forced by every drought to sell his farm animals and even his ploughs. It is at such times that the landlords contract for the peasants' labour for the next season, in return for a little bread, at a half or a third of the usual starvation wages. The conditions after each famine increase the losses and sufferings of the next, and every dry year brings a greater harvest of death. The annual death rate is already forty per thousand, twice that of any other civilised land.

The landlords do not profit from the peasants' starvation alone. The permanent land-hunger of the peasantry has reached such a point that the landlords are able to obtain, for land no more productive than at the time of the emancipation, four and five times as much rent as it then obtained. The lack of land is so great that the peasants are employing on their own land only one-fifth, and their horses only one-third, of their possible working time. To ward off starvation the peasants must either work for the landlord, or pay him a rent that gives him as much profit as he could extort by direct exploitation of pauper labour.

So the landlords have prospered while the peasants have starved. Year after year they are sending out more and more grain from the country, while the peasants and their farm animals are more and more underfed. In 1906, the great famine year, Russian landlords exported enough grain to feed all of Russia's starving millions. In some famine years, as in 1905, the exports were scarcely lowered at all.

The landlords have prospered not only because of the conditions created at the time of the "emancipation," but also by their steady influence over the Czars since that time. All the laws favour the landlords. The labour contract with the "free" peasants has been turned into a farce. The landlord, or any of his family, have a right to fine their labourers at their discretion not only for neglect of work but even for lack of respect. But even with this the landlords were not satisfied. Disagreeable and expensive quarrels with the peasants about wages and rents continued to arise. So a new official was instituted whose special business it is to settle all disputes between landlords and peasants. This "land official" has

become more hateful to the peasants than were the worst of their former landlord proprietors. He is responsible, not to local authorities, but directly to St. Petersburg —and is inaccessible to any except influential persons. He is backed by the full autocratic power of the Czar, prison, the knout, Siberia, and Cossack invasion. Furthermore, the Czar's ukase requires that he himself shall be a nobleman of rank, which is in most cases tantamount to a landlord!

These new officials, surrounded and courted by landlords, have made full use of their powers. Villages have revolted by the hundreds, only to be beaten and shot into subjection by the savage Cossacks, to have their houses burned and their women outraged as in the days of Tamerlane. When terror-stricken villages have answered the despots' orders with loyal arguments about the true will of God and the Czar, it has almost become the custom for these gentlemen to answer, "I am your God and your Czar."

Landlord influence has governed Russia from the institution of serfdom centuries ago, to the institution of the hundreds of landlord sub-despots in the last decade, and to the institution of the landlords' Duma of the present moment. The peasants are not again likely to leave their destinies in the hands of any party in which the landlords exert an important power. They showed in all three elections that they are more than ever attached to their own party and its programme. The immense price the peasants have already paid in beatings, imprisonment, exile, starvation and violent death; the hopes that have been newly raised; the evident justice of their demands for a controlling voice in the nation's parliament and for the early possession of the land, though evidently, starving as they are, they cannot pay for it and will not be able to for many years to come; and above all the results that their revolutionary movement has already brought to their cause —these things have decided all the parties that represent them not to await anything even from the most liberal part of their former masters, and not to wait indefinitely for the installment of an indefinite portion of their demands.

Even the Constitutional Democrats concede that fear of revolution is still a leading motive with the Government, as

it was at the time of the emancipation. Soon after the peasant disorders of 1902 and 1903 the Czar abolished corporal punishment and the confinement of the peasantry to their native village, as normal institutions of peasant life. After the disorders of 1905 the Czar gave the peasants a large proportion of the seats in the new Duma, remitted half of their direct taxes to the State, shortened the term of service in the army, and bettered the food of the soldiers and increased their pay. After the disorders of 1906 the peasants were given part of the crown lands, they were admitted for the first time to equality with other citizens before the courts and the law, and they were given for the first time the same rights as others over their own land. During 1907 there were few disturbances and no great reforms.

If we remember that this same movement of violent resistance of the peasants has procured them more respect from the police, has driven away some of the more obnoxious landlords, raised wages and lowered rents, and if we observe that this movement has become better organised, more sure and less bloody each year, we may realise why the peasants are clenching their teeth and holding up their heads as never before in a thousand years.

The peasants are full of hope; but even if the situation of the Russian people is desperate, if it is hopeless for the present generation, this is because of great historical causes over which this noble nation has had no control. And the chief of these is not the Czarism with its dependent army of Cossacks, officials, and police, but the existence of a deep-rooted and time-honoured governing caste, the owners of the white slaves of the last generation, a caste whose interests are against those of the nation and diametrically opposed to the regeneration the nation demands.

The majority of the first Duma has just been on trial for having provoked the disobedience of the people. The words of one of the people's own representatives addressed to the judges and the Government, is the judgment of the Russian nation on the third Duma.

"We see in you," said Chersky, "in this the greatest political trial of the century, the defenders of the interests

of Stolypine's one hundred and thirty thousand landlords, and the enemies of the law and the people."

This, then, is the final alignment of the Russian nation — on the one side the Czar, the court, the Government officials, the officers of the army, and the one hundred and thirty thousand landlords; on the other the one hundred million peasants, the working people and nearly all the middle class.

The power may long remain with the Government. Justice is with the nation.

PART THREE

REVOLT

CHAPTER I

THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE — A MYSTERY

THE Czar and his ministers continue to assure the world that the real Russian people, the hundred million peasants, are, and always have been, contented, loyal and devoted subjects. This has been the favourite slander in the long campaign of defamation of its own people that constitutes one of the worst crimes of the Government. We know some of the infamies of Czarism, but there are many of which we are entirely ignorant. Because of the rigid censorship in Russia of all the news, the systematic bribery of many foreign newspapers, and the favourable misrepresentation of officials on all occasions, it has been impossible to get at reliable and general information on the very subjects that are fundamental to all others — the actual conditions of the villages where four-fifths of the people live, the present development of the peasants, their attitude to the Czar, the Church, the officials, the landlords and the revolution.

With so little reliable knowledge we have been at the mercy of the unscrupulous official statements. Before the peasants had an opportunity to voice themselves in their national parliament, these official statements had succeeded in implanting in the consciousness and literature of foreign nations a vague and indefinite, but none the less obnoxious, picture portraying the peasants as a dull and indolent race, ignorant, hard-drinking, fanatically religious and stupidly devoted to the Czar. Naturally we have had small sympathy with a people we believed to have so little manhood and so little love of freedom as humbly to submit to the curse of Czarism.

In Russia itself the Czar's defenders have carried their attacks on the peasants' character so far as to reduce them to absurdity. As patriotic Russians they pretended, of course, that most of the shameful characteristics they attributed to the great mass

of their countrymen are after all virtues, and that the key to the peasants' psychology, the greatest of all virtues, is —self-renunciation. This is "the highest expression possible to the human individual" since it makes of him the perfect subject of those divine Russian institutions, the absolute Czarism and the "changeless" Church. According to the professional Russian patriots or Slavophiles, whatever is Russian is right. But the peasants of Russia are both poor and illiterate. Are their poverty and lack of education also part of the "highest expression possible to the human individual"? The late head of the Holy Church could well give an authoritative answer, since he was also the most venerated adviser of Alexander III. and of the present Czar. That terrible old man Pobiedonostzev opposed general education, newspapers, and everything else that might develop the slightest spirit of freedom. He carried his ideas to their logical conclusion and fearlessly announced to a world that still refuses to believe its ears and does not yet realise the full monstrosity of his doctrine, that "inertia is the fulcrum of progress" and that "poverty, lowliness, deprivation, and self-denial are the true lot of men."

Such are the ideas that have ruled and guided the present Czar.

This "official character" of the peasants, as I have said, has been so long and stoutly repeated as to have been accepted and passed on by foreign writers on Russian conditions. The three volume work of Leroy-Beaulieu is undoubtedly the most important foreign study of "The Empire of the Czars." By a scientific and historical method the author has covered every phase of Russian life, from the geography of the country to its latest political, economic, and cultural development. But he has refused to place himself at the only standpoint that can lead to a true understanding, that of the Russian people. He has failed to distinguish between that part of Russian life that emanates from the spirit and natural evolution of the Russian people, and that other alien part that has been forced on it by an alien Government which owes its origin and maintenance either to foreign power and influence or to the stern military necessity of defending the most exposed country of Europe against the Turks and Tartars.

This famous "scientific" but unsympathetic observer, attributing the barbarism of the Government to the whole nation, has branded the Russian people with the same vulgar libels that are current among those totally ignorant of the land. To him Russia is still essentially mediæval, the people mystical, fatalistic, inert. "Modern as Russia is if we look to the external side of her civilisation, to her army and bureaucracy," he says, "she is mediæval still in the manners and spirit of her people."

This brief sentence is yet such a conglomeration of truth, untruth, and half-truth that I can scarcely correct it, and to bring out all its inaccuracies I must offer a substitute. I am certain that the author in penning such a perversion of the reality was thinking of the only side of Russia with which his book shows any deep acquaintance, namely its government. The sentence should read "Modern as the *Russian Government* is, if we look at the external side of her army and bureaucracy, the *governing caste* is still mediæval in its opinions and spirit." Certainly the Russian army has a modern organisation and armament, certainly the Russian prisons and police are among the most highly developed in the world—this organized violence is indeed the very *raison d'être* of the autocratic form of government. It is alone to a certain aptitude and success in modernising the means of holding the people in subjection that it owes its existence. But this is the end of the virtues of the ruling caste. The whole history of Russia and of the present revolution shows that it is the spirit and opinions of the army of officers and Government officials that are reactionary and even mediæval.

Perhaps the most dangerous of all the criticisms of Russia is that which attaches some fundamental deficiency to the race itself. Leroy-Beaulieu, who is careful to make no direct attack on the Slavic peoples as such, nevertheless characterises the peasant of to-day as inert and lacking in creative power. But what permanently oppressed and starving people ever showed much sign of creative power? Are not the East Prussian peasants of to-day, though infinitely less poverty-stricken, both inert and reactionary, an accusation that can scarcely be made against the revolutionary and Socialistic Russian peasants. Have not the Russian peasants adapted themselves

quickly to every variety of modern life and industry that was opened to them? Are not former peasants working successfully in many instances the most complicated agricultural machinery, railway locomotives, the most delicate tools? In fact half of the five or six million working people in Russia's modern industries are former peasants.

Furthermore, Leroy-Beaulieu refers continually to "mysticism," "fatalism," and "passive endurance" as the chief traits of the peasant's character. Yet may not such passive qualities, as far as they really do exist, be simply the temporary results of oppression? Mysticism may arise from the very keenness of the desire for a rational explanation of life on the part of those to whom knowledge is denied; fatalism may come from the intensity of frustrated longing for a better régime; passive endurance from the futility of resistance to a stronger physical power. Leroy-Beaulieu himself acknowledged that he had only spoken of negative qualities, for he found it impossible at the time he wrote to give an estimate of the peasant's "actual creative power." It is precisely this positive creative power that we want to understand.

But this racial prejudice appears much more clearly in more recent and less scientific books than the one to which I have been referring, works which are nevertheless widely circulated and have had on the whole an immense influence. An American book that appeared just before the Russian-Japanese War is typical. The author, Senator Beveridge, is known to everybody in America and his views are sure to have had their converts. Among the most striking traits of the Slavic race he finds fatalism, indolence, stolidity, inertia, slowness, lethargy, conservatism, subservience, and lack of initiative. Passing from the people to the general spirit of the nation the writer finds the soul of Russia in the voice of Pobiedonostzev. But on this man's death the foreign press characterised him rightly as the best-hated man in all Russia.

The voice of Pobiedonostzev and of the officers, officials, landlords, bankers, merchants, and manufacturers, to whom this author expressly acknowledges his indebtedness for the information he gathered during the few weeks of his stay in European Russia, naturally supplied him with his view of

the nation's ideals. The author found that his interlocutors, whose identity he betrays when he speaks of the "ordinary Russian," "business man, banker, or what-not," "appears to be devoted to his Czar and Russian institutions," and that "the Czar is beloved by the great body of his subjects with an adoring affection not accorded to any other ruler." Finally he concluded that the Slav thinks that autocratic Czarism and the Orthodox Church are the "foundation stones of civilisation."

Unfortunately, many persons still believe that the Russian masses are devoted to their Czar and Church in spite of the plentiful evidence to the contrary in the recent revolutionary events. I shall deal with this fallacy in an early chapter. But in the meanwhile I shall show the superficial character of the broad assertions of this typical observer. The writer quotes without criticism or contradiction the statement of a landlord that the emancipation was granted by the "liberal" Czar "at the expense of the Russian nobility." The truth is that the chief cause of the present revolution is the crushing burden of taxes laid on the peasants to enable the Government to pay the nobility not only an ample, but often even an exorbitant, price for their losses both of land and the uncompensated service of the serfs. This same informant also told our writer that the ignorant peasants had not not known how to use their liberty and had even refused to use iron or steel ploughs. The truth is that the peasants had used iron ploughs even under serfdom, and as to the steel ones they do not employ them at the present day simply because they cannot afford the price. It is certainly not true that the peasant has ever refused to use any important agricultural implement within his purchasing power. Finally, this landlord informed our friend that the peasants had soon forgotten the severities of serfdom and remembered only "the comparatively trivial inconveniences" of the present time. I shall deal with these comparatively trivial inconveniences later. I can find no words for the ignorance, carelessness, or indifference of a person writing on the Russia of to-day for a necessarily ignorant audience, who reprints this phrase with every sign of approval and without giving anywhere a single fact or statement to counteract the singularly false and misleading impression it creates. The

present sufferings of the peasants may be less than those at the time of serfdom, but they are not trivial in comparison with those of any period through which humanity has passed, and to speak of them as inconveniences is a monstrous understatement of the truth.

The reader of Senator Beveridge's book knows that this writer's judgment has been condemned out of his own mouth. Writing just before the war with Japan he predicted in his book that there was no probability in international politics greater than the permanency of the Russian occupation of Manchuria. Writing after the outbreak of the great and bloody labour disturbances of 1902 and 1903, which he even mentions, he says that "there have been no considerable labour riots," that labour is submissive and there is no labour question. The year before the outbreak of the revolution he belittles what disturbances had occurred and expected nothing of a very serious character.

Another book is worth mentioning here as a sample of the malicious statements that have been circulated over the world as the truth. During the famine of 1906-7 Mr. Howard P. Kennard, M. D., an English "humanitarian," was in Russia to assist the Government and the landlords in relieving the wholesale starvation and disease they themselves had brought on. His book, "The Russian Peasant," he claims to be based on his own personal observation; however, in his preface he confesses himself indebted to such acknowledged friends of Nicholas II. and enemies of the Russian people as the Frenchman Leroy-Beaulieu, the Englishmen Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace, and the courtier Prince Nicholas Sherebatov, one of the most hated men in all Russia.

Mr. Kennard unmistakably suggests that the peasants have not progressed since the time of Ivan the Terrible. He describes a national peasant festivity, which he claims is typical, as an "unbridled bestial orgy." He finds that "natural laziness and addiction to drink have brought the peasant to the pass he is in to-day," says that the peasant's belly is his god, that he does not wish to improve his condition, and that they do not even wish "to learn to farm in any other way than that which has been handed down to them by their forefathers."

Mr. Kennard declares that the "Russian peasant, devoid of all capabilities in the matter of reading and writing, has a mind and imagination which are ripe for the reception of all trash that Church, State, those desirous of influencing him for good or evil, may pour into his poor besotted brain." Our savant friend then proceeds to state "that the *only* subject he knows about is the subject of devils," and that the peasant's first thought every morning is "what will the Domovoi (household demon) do to-day?" In brief, Mr. Kennard finds the peasant "utterly unable to understand what is meant by education, progress, or culture."

Finally he sums up the peasant in this manner: "The peasant emerges from the ordeal to-day but the semblance of a man — a thing with half a mind, a mortal without attributes; a morbid being blessed with life alone, and cursed with ignorance and imbecility until, in the twentieth century, his melancholy has become innate."

All of these statements of Mr. Kennard are about as false and vicious as any calumnies concerning a whole people, or a large majority of any people, could well be. His book must remain a classic example of the stream of poison and hatred that pours into some hearts in the presence of the ugliness of human misery. I have no hope of driving the writer who penned such words to shame. But I do expect to show that, badly educated as the peasants are, a very large portion of them have more than a modicum of education and that they are thirsting for more, that far from being devoted to devils the peasants have a kind of natural instinct for independent religious and ethical ideas; and I expect to show that nothing but a readiness to accept prejudiced statements, or a natural blindness to truth while in its very presence, or a deeply ingrained hatred of mankind, could have led any person who has spent several months among the Russian farmers to find in them merely a creature ranking somewhere between man and beast.

I trust it is clear to the reader that the Russian people have enemies in all directions, even among those who claim the most loudly to be their friends; and I trust that he will read what follows unswayed by the self-evident prejudices so widely circulated by writers like those referred to above. This im-

partiality is important, not alone because of the immense interest attaching to the peasant, but also because he has so long remained an unknown quantity, even to the most sympathetic and unbiased minds.

The real character of the peasant has remained a mystery until to-day. He constitutes the greatest unknown element of the white race. He is just for this reason the most interesting human problem of our time. If his nature is undeveloped it is in the same proportion unfixed and unspoiled — in other words, the nature of the generic man. He will come to his majority in the twentieth century more freed from tradition than our own pioneers in the nineteenth. The Russian revolution, bound sooner or later to end in his favour, will not only make him master of half Europe and Asia, and revolutionise the relations of the world powers; it will decide the fate of every democratic movement on the continent, and give a new inspiration to the international movement for economic quality.

CHAPTER II

THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE — THEIR TRUE CHARACTER

BUT at last the mystery surrounding the peasant, his low reputation, are beginning to be dissolved. Since the first and second Dumas, in which the peasants' feelings and opinions, kept dumb for centuries, were for the first time publicly voiced, we have begun to get a glimpse of the true character of the peasants, of their true attitude toward the Government. The people's own chosen representatives have pointed out that the peasants are and always have been in a rebellious state, that the history of the Russian peasantry has been that of an unending series of revolts, and that the only reason a revolution has not yet overturned the Government is the terrible brute-power of the half-million semi-foreign Cossacks who guard the Czar. It appears in contradiction to everything the Government has claimed that the peasant is a democrat in everything and a Socialist in regard to the land, that he is almost without race prejudice, and that he is liberal and even independent in his religious views. There can no longer be the slightest doubt of these claims; the two elections are substantiated by tens of thousands of village meetings, endorsing the action and attitude of the people's representatives, and by thousands of cases in which the peasants have gone to imprisonment and death for supporting their political faith.

It seems that the spiritual, if not the physical, resistance of the people has risen proportionately to the unreason, injustice, and violence of the ruling caste. Instead of devotion to the Czar, there reigns in the mind of the peasant a supreme indifference to the spirit of his laws and an almost equal indifference to the authority of his Church. In this the Russian is removed at once from the subserviency of the German peasant before his officials, and that of the Southern Italian before his priests.

The story of the origin of the Russian Church gives the best

symbol of its position to-day. Before their "conversion" to Christianity, the ancient Slavs had a very simple and flexible form of belief. They were not idolaters or worshippers of many gods, they had no priests, and their cult was limited to that of Svarog, the god of heaven and light, certainly a rather spiritual deity who might well symbolise the universe and its life. The Emperor Vladimir, however, descendant of one of the Norse conquerors of the land, was impressed with the glory of Constantinople and the Greek Church, and proceeded quite in the scientific spirit to send a commission to study it and the other Christian churches. The commission returned overcome by the beauty of the singing, temples, and service of the Greeks. They declared that they found no gladness among the Bulgarians, and no beauty in the temples of the Germans, but among the Greeks they found such beauty that they knew not how to tell of it, they no longer knew, they said, "whether they were in heaven or on earth." "It is there," they reported, "that God dwells among men, and their service surpasses that of any land." So influenced by the beauty of the Greek Church's temples and service, and in return for the hand of a princess of the Eastern Empire, Vladimir was baptised, and gave up his promising design of capturing Constantinople, which if accomplished might well have transformed the history of Europe and the world. No sooner was he Christianised than with the true gesture of a Czar he ordered his people led to the rivers and baptised. Thus was Russia converted to the Greek Church.

In the same spirit a law among the statutes to-day requires every Russian citizen who does not belong to some other "recognised" creed to attend at least once every year the Orthodox service. Innumerable other enactments of the kind have followed without interruption since the time of Vladimir's baptism, and naturally have had no spiritual effect. To-day it is the pleasure taken in the service and singing that attracts the peasant; the priest does not as a rule enter seriously into his life. The priest is nearly always paid in kind for each service and so is economically dependent on the poorest peasants, who often find they can make a bargain better in proportion to the amount of vodka they can persuade him to drink. The priests also are forced to serve as the political agents of the

Government, and this the peasants do not fail to feel and resent. For instance, the priests received full instructions as to what they were to say and do during the elections for the Duma. The outraged peasants replied by ceasing to go to church, by refusing to do any labour for the priests, and even in some cases by proposing through the village meetings to take away their land. Subjected economically to the peasants, and politically to the police, even the relatively small number of the priests that possess the attributes to assume moral leadership are usually without the power to do so.

In what, then, does the peasant's loudly proclaimed Orthodoxy consist? In the first place he has shown an unconquerable tendency not to be Orthodox at all, but to do his own religious thinking. When two centuries and a half ago one of the Czars appointed a commission to study again the original forms of the Greek Church, which were supposed to have degenerated, the new ceremonies that were enacted were met by a variety of passive resistance as obstinate and successful as the world has ever seen. The passive resisters, the "Old Believers," were satisfied with the "Slavic" Church and the forms of service they themselves had helped to develop. The genius of the people, working through the Church, has developed an original and truly beautiful music that is a real source of inspirational delight. The people loved these forms as they were, they considered they had a God-given right to them. So they obstinately refused these Czar-imposed changes — refused them though persecuted and tortured relentlessly. The Czars, on the other hand, have realised that one freedom leads to another, and have claimed with equal obstinacy until to-day that God, having entrusted them with the absolute mastery of the peasants' bodies, has also made them tyrants of their souls.

A large portion of the peasants still go to the Czar's church, for in the sombre, isolated and often starving villages of the forests and the steppes, the most beautiful or least ugly spot is the church, and the most interesting occasion is its service. But they do not obey the Czar's priests and they have developed a morality of their own making. Another large part have not been deterred by the most terrible persecution from creating a religion also after their own ideas. The tendency to break

away altogether from the priests is general. A large part of the "Old Believers," especially those who settled in outlying districts where priests were difficult to obtain, decided finally to do without them altogether. The idea spread all over the country and of course led these "priestless" ones, as they are called, to do their religious thinking for themselves. The result is perhaps as large a body of sincere and rationalistic religious thinkers as is to be found among the people of any land.

But the religious evolution did not stop here. It has continued and grown with the increase of education and travel, and with the new life and new occupations of the people in this already half-modernised country. Along with a political revolution as profound as the French, is going on a popular religious reformation comparable only to the peasants' movements of Luther's time. The peasants have created systems of new religious belief on an entirely independent basis. The subtlety, simplicity and dignity of these beliefs has charmed, and even won, many of their observers. It is enough to remember that Tolstoi has confessed his deep indebtedness to both Molokani and Doukhobors. Though these numerous sects are still in progress of growth and development, their adherents are already numbered by the millions.

The Government, of course, is at present straining every nerve to repress and conceal these schisms and to strengthen in every possible way the Orthodox Church. Persecutions relaxed for a year or more after the Czar's famous promises of religious liberty, are every day being renewed. The warfare between the people's genuine religious instinct and the hated State Church is bound to go on undiminished.

The peasants have shown as much character in their attitude toward the laws of the Czar as toward his Church. The thousands of bloodily suppressed revolts, and the hundreds of thousands of cases of rebellious peasants who have languished away their lives in prison and exile, are only the lesser manifestation of the hatred for the Government. Where the people have been literally beaten into submission by the Cossacks, and this has happened at one time or another in most of the villages, there has arisen a spirit of passive resistance which has often ended by a complete victory over the Czar.

The Czars have always been able to exact from the peasant a terrible tribute of taxes and recruits. They have been able to tie the peasants to their villages and to prevent their escape from these exactions, but when they have attempted to interfere with the villagers' internal affairs, the imperial will has been shattered against the people's own ideas of right and wrong. Especially when they have tried to upset the peoples' own laws of property, it has been the autocrats who have had to surrender. The peasants as a whole have not yet permitted the Czars to subvert their laws of inheritance or their equitable system of distributing the land.

The hundred thousand villages where the mass of the Russian people live are in their internal affairs so many little immemorial republics. At the present moment, as at the earliest dawn of history, they are ruled by a pure spirit of democracy not only in political but in economic affairs. A large part of the peasant land is village property used by all the villagers in common; the rest is divided, and from time to time redistributed, according to the ideas of equity of the whole village. An estimate is made of each family's claims, either at the death of its head, or at the time of a general census, and the family is allotted a certain proportion of the village ploughed land. But no person is ever allowed to claim a right to a particular piece of soil, he has merely a right to a certain quantity. There is no such thing as title and private ownership of the land itself, since it is not a product of individual labour but a "gift of God." A family is allowed possession of a definite piece of the land long enough only to secure the family the fruits of its labour — that is, for the three years' rotation of crops which prevails — then triennial redistribution of land takes place. This is why the peasant deputies in the Duma can say with perfect truth that the peasants do not want the land to buy and sell, but merely to plough. They want more land in order that they may have more work. They have never in their own experience known what rents or unearned profits from land ownership are.

The village community, since it controls the peasant's means of livelihood, has an unlimited power over his existence. But this power is as democratic as it is unlimited. All the peasants live in the village, and are infinitely more intimately related

to one another than a country-people living on isolated farms. They work together and are always under one another's eye. The spirit is profoundly social, and has been made all the more so by the village ownership of the land. The democracy is therefore profound and rests on the feeling of full social and economic equality, which is the only sure foundation of democracy in any land. The village meetings concern themselves principally with questions of the chief and only great business of every member, the winning of the daily bread. And so the equality of these tens of thousands of little communities has gone deeper than any other equality we know, because it rests on a social and not merely on a political democracy.

There is no conflict between this village government and its citizens. The villages do not elect temporary masters to rule over them, like many so-called democratic communities. The starosta, or head of the village, is in very truth the servant of the community, and remains its servant in spite of all the St. Petersburg Government can do to make of him an authority of the despotic order always so necessary to a Czarism. The Czar has enacted that the starosta shall receive a good salary and be immune from taxes and corporal punishment; the Government has endowed him with enough insignia of office to buy the souls of the nobility of some European countries. But the village assembly considers him as its servant and gives its orders at every meeting as to its secretary or clerk.

The real business of the village is concentrated in the assembly itself, and there are few villagers that do not take an active part. There is nothing more immediate or important in their lives. Conducted on a scale sufficiently small to enable all the elements of the vital questions under discussion to be understood by everybody, the village meeting has come to form a part and parcel of the peasant's existence. Public life is not a thing apart as in some externally democratic countries where private business overshadows public affairs and politics are a mask for private interests and the greed for office. "As soon as public service ceases to be the principal business of the citizens," said Rousseau, "the state is already near to ruin." Of all modern communities the Russian villages are perhaps farthest from this calamity.

In some cases there is already complete communism — that is, both common ownership and common cultivation of the soil, a system that allows the advantages not only of every modern method of agriculture but of large scale production and the use of machinery that no small farmer can afford. Peasant companies (artels) often buy or rent a piece of land, work it together, and share expenses and profits according to a pre-arranged plan. In all the villages the peasants manage their cattle in common, cut their hay in common, and in many cases they own a common granary. A large part of the peasants, and the most progressive and enlightened experts on Russian agriculture as well, hope and believe that this coöperation in production, a natural outgrowth of the prevalent social spirit, will so develop as to make it possible that common property in land will remain the basis of Russian agriculture and of Russian society. The peasants' party in the Duma wishes each province to be allowed to adopt communism if it desires. This privilege would certainly be widely accepted and would result in the abolition of private property in two-thirds of the land.

The Czar's Government has looked with suspicion enough at this village nucleus of democracy and Socialism. A generation ago Alexander II. was deliberating over the village commune, or mir. The dangers to the Czarism of maintaining such a democratic institution were obvious. But for several generations the Czarism has been caught between two equal dangers — one due to the education and development of the people within the country, and another due to industrial progress of the rival nations without. If the village commune were to be dissolved to give place to private property, this would do away with the immemorial village republics; but it would also hasten the economic development of Russia by creating two new classes, landless working people furnishing cheap labour, and a rural middle class to furnish capital and business enterprise. The development of capitalists and cheap labour might in turn enable Russia to develop her industry, to accumulate wealth and to build up an army and navy fit to resist those of other modern lands. But such a development seemed to many of the highest officials highly undesirable.

Both working people and small capitalists are democratic everywhere, and it was they that had brought about the European revolution of 1848. So Alexander decided to keep the mir. He preferred a democratic village to a free nation, a pauperised people to a constitution.

But the same Czar also used all his power to maintain another class, whose interests were in sharpest contrast to the peasants' commune. He had made the landlords free their peasant serfs, but he allowed them to take away part of the peasants' land, while he forced these famishing agriculturists to take on a new and crushing burden of taxes and payments of indemnity for their own freedom. The result was that the peasants starved more and more as the years went on, agriculture stagnated and even deteriorated, it became impossible to beat more taxes out of the villagers, industry was without country purchasers, and the State finances were hopeless. The finance ministers, as we have seen, had introduced every manner of taxation, had protected industry, established a gold currency, built railways, and borrowed billions of rubles from abroad; but the Counsel of State, during Count Witte's ministry, was forced to confess the failure of all these measures to reach their chief aim and to declare that the Government was "powerless for the reorganisation of the life of the peasants and assisting agricultural industry." Read for "peasants" the "mass of the people" and for "assisting agricultural industry" "preserving from ruin the economic foundation of Russian society."

The Czars had no hope for their people. But the condition could scarcely be worse, and they began almost automatically to reverse their older policies. So finally the present Czar decided to abandon the mir. If there were no chance to save the mass of the people from starvation, perhaps he might aid a few of the peasants to establish an agricultural middle class on the ruin and pauperisation of the rest.

Minister Stolypine now proposes to give the last stroke to the village commune — to allow every starving peasant the right of selling his land, and to assign the communities' political powers to other higher, newer, and less dangerous local authorities. It is doubtful if the villages will surrender their political power, more than doubtful if they will allow a few of their number

the right to buy up the land of the rest. For the popularity of communal property has been growing, and the well-defined Socialist and revolutionary politics of the peasant representatives in the second Duma leave no further doubt of the Socialistic principles Russia will some day apply to her land. The great peasant institution, the Socialistic commune, will have furnished the basis of the future Russian State.

The peasants, then, show every sign of creative power, in religion, in politics, in economic institutions. They are independent and positive in their individual thought and feeling, social and democratic in public life. Have they also the practical qualities that will bring the revolution to a successful conclusion? We can be certain of at least two of the characteristics most essential to a rapid and sound development, open-mindedness to modern ideas, and the spirit of unity among themselves. They are open-minded with regard to national institutions because Russia has had no national traditions except those imposed by the violence of the Czar. The peasants have neither assisted in the law-making nor, except under coercion, obeyed the law. They are progressive also because conditions have united them by a close material and spiritual bond with two other classes that are as progressive, if not more so, than the corresponding classes of any other country — the working people and the professional element.

In Russia, as in no other land, the city working people and the country people form a single whole. The city workingmen were drawn only lately from the country. Most of them are in the habit of returning to the country from time to time; many go back for every harvest, for often the city work, service, driving, and so on, is less important to them than their interest in the village property. Furthermore, this current from city to country is increased by the tens of thousands of rebellious workingmen the Government sends back to their villages. All these workingmen have brought back with them the revolutionary ideas of the towns.

The educated classes have succeeded in establishing the most cordial and intimate relations with the people of both cities and villages. It is as if the whole country were an endless series of social settlements in which the settlement residents

had not merely sacrificed a few luxuries and pleasures, but had accepted the risk of imprisonment, exile, and execution. In all the great popular organisations of the revolution, the *intelligentsia*, or educated and professional classes, have played a predominant rôle, have been gladly accepted by the people, and have acted side by side with the people's leaders, who often owed their education in turn to that same class. The political parties are governed almost exclusively by these tried and cultivated democrats. The still more typically popular organisations, the Peasants' Union, the Railway Union, the Councils of Labour Deputies, were also managed almost entirely by men of university training and by self-educated peasants and workingmen. From the greatest professors and lawyers of the land down to the village doctors and school teachers, there has been one common movement toward the people — a movement not only for union against despotism, but for bringing to the people all the great ideas and aspirations of civilisation. The culture of this educated class being in many respects superior to that of other countries — as for instance, in knowledge of foreign languages, literature, and history, and in the sincerity of their social theories — the people secured a corresponding advantage. Through this movement some of the greatest ideas and highest aspirations of humanity have gained common circulation among the masses. Many Russian peasants and workingmen are now seriously and intelligently interested in foreign history, literature, economics, and politics. The politics and economics of their own land are put into terse and readable form by the "intellectuals," spread over the country in a sea of leaflets and illegal or short-lived newspapers, and literally devoured by the people of every village and workshop in the empire.

Thus there has arisen a great unity among the masses, including the educated and professional class. On the other side and in favour of the Czarism, are only the landlords, officials and army officers and those who accept their pay. Neither the bitterness and class hatred that characterised Germany, nor the selfishness of the extreme individualism that was created by early conditions and still characterises the United States, have ever existed in Russia, to plant in the minds of



A UNIVERSITY STUDENT GIVING A FREE LECTURE TO THE PEASANTS
From a celebrated painting



A SOUTHERN TYPE OF PEASANT
From a painting by Repin

the people anti-social or non-social instincts that may take generations to eradicate. The origin of the Russian people, its common struggle against those united powers of evil that call themselves the Czarism, and above all the situation in which it finds itself to-day, have joined together to create the strongest social and the first Socialistic nation of history.

It is not only the psychology of the people, it is the present situation itself, that has created this Socialistic sentiment. For whatever the causes of the revolutionary crisis, the crisis itself demands and requires a social solution. The situation is in sharpest contrast to that which prevailed at the birth of our nation. The United States of America were formed by a democratic population whose problem was to people a vast and uninhabited land. The United States of Russia will be formed by a democratic nation whose problem will be to provide a vast people with land. Our internal problem was purely political, to protect individuals from the violent encroachments of other individuals. Most economic and social problems were left in the individual's hands, and out of the control of society. The result has been the most developed individualism the world has known. The Russian people, on the contrary, are confronted with a problem that is at once social, economic, and political. The political problem is to do away, not with the violence of individuals, but with that of the State. The economic problem is the common need for all classes of the nation to lift to the level of the times the methods of the national industry of agriculture and the conditions of the whole agricultural class. As the great mass of the farms and farmers are at present on the same low level, this economic problem is not only common to all, but one in the solution of which society as a whole can and will certainly take an active part. The great social problem has to do with the present and future division of the land. If the Duma were to allow unrestricted private property, free trade in land under the present conditions, the penniless and needy peasants would be at the mercy of such among them as had a little capital at hand with which to buy the others' land. The peasants are painfully conscious of this danger, and have declared at innumerable village meetings that the right of private property would mean the still further impoverishment,

the absolute pauperisation, of the many for the benefit of a new landlord class. Some are, therefore, in favour of the retention of the old form of property, the village commune, adapted to new needs. All are for special laws restricting the rights of the individual owner and possessor, and all are in favour of the absolute subordination of private interests as the foundation of the new law and the NATIONALISATION OF THE LAND.

The social spirit goes to unimagined lengths. It has no sombre exceptions for persons of foreign race. The same feeling that holds individuals and classes together has bound into one whole all the races of the enormous empire. Finns and Tartars, with their separate religions, have lived for centuries in friendly neighbourliness with the Russian peasants all over the country. In certain sections, German and Jewish colonies have been treated in a cordial and neighbourly manner for a similar period. The White Russians and South Russians have lived for generations in harmony with Letts, Lithuanians, and Poles. The Siberian settlers have gotten along with innumerable Asiatic tribes, as we failed to get along with our Indians, and as the English failed to get along with their native subjects. When the Czars have decided to undertake a special persecution and robbery of some subject race — like the Jews — they have not been able to get the least support from the people on racial grounds, and have had to resort to the same purely religious pretexts with which they persecute the purest Russian sects. The few popular persecutions of the Jews on Russian territory have been the work not of Russians, but of Poles or of Roumanians, like Krushevan. This absence of race feeling is perhaps the last and severest test of the profundity, the completeness, of the social spirit that binds together this great-hearted people.

It is not merely a new race or a new nation that is coming into being in the great territory that stretches half-way round the world, from the Pacific to the Black and Baltic seas. The new country, casting aside all governmental violence within and invincible to external attack in its freedom and immensity, will be held together only by the common social problem and the common social idea. By its freedom and power it will be constituted a great and almost decisive influence for peace

among the nations. An essentially new people on the stage of the world, in possession of a boundless and almost undeveloped land, unhampered by traditions, accustomed to economic equality, and permeated with the social spirit, the Russians are likely soon to become the chief inspiration of the other nations, a position recently lost after having been held for a century by the United States.

CHAPTER III

HOW THE PEASANTS LIVE

THOUGH Russia's hundred million agriculturists are free from the self-imposed shackles of accepted tradition, both of Church and of State, yet they are by no means free from limitations forced upon them by their own meagre lives, by exhausting and almost unremunerated labour, and by the calamities through which they have had to pass. To see a little way into the lives of these so little understood people — to know concretely the daily work that makes them what they are — to understand the present meaning of their recent history, and even more to know just what they are thinking to-day — to know how far they have advanced in their feeling about coming social changes, how far they dare to pit themselves against the Government, and what are the qualities by which they expect to win and hold the power over the greatest empire in the world — it is necessary not only to hear what sympathetic and educated Russians have to say, but it is also necessary to move among the peasants themselves. So after having interviewed in the towns numerous experts on Russian agriculture and the condition of the peasantry, I went out among the villages armed with introductions to doctors, school teachers, and other devoted persons of education living there, and also to certain of the more intelligent peasants who were able to put me in touch with the rest. I visited half a hundred villages, scattered from the northern forests of Kostroma to the southern steppes of Poltava, from near the Asiatic frontier to the former Polish province of Kiev, and talked with several hundred peasants of every condition and every class. I made it a practice to verify all statements made to me; I endeavoured always to avoid the prejudices of a given moment or a given place; and I checked by personal observations the statistics I had obtained in the provincial capitals, and then in turn I had my observations

criticised by the doctors, teachers, agricultural experts and statisticians who are giving their lives to the betterment of country conditions. In this business I spent half of the summer of 1906, while the revolutionary movement was still in swing, and half of the summer of 1907, when the revolution had greatly subsided and the peasants were hoping to overturn the Czarism only after a desperate struggle that would perhaps not even begin in its full intensity for several years.

A mention of some of the circumstances attending these trips will afford an insight into the internal condition of Russia. The Government is trying to quarantine the villages from all contact with the world's intelligence by means just as stringent as those taken to quarantine them from Asiatic cholera or any pest. Very many of the city persons to whom I was directed, although by no means active revolutionists, had just been hurried off by the officials to be entombed in prisons or exiled to the arctic deserts, merely because they had visited some village, or happened to be acquainted with a few peasants. Most of the courageous, progressive element had indeed disappeared on my second circuit of the provincial towns. Those that remained often did all they could to discourage me from the very idea of visiting any Russian village. Indeed, it is so difficult and rare for Russians to be allowed to travel about among the peasants that on my return from the first journey in 1906 I was eagerly interviewed, even by some who have devoted their whole lives to a study of the peasant question. Occasionally it happened that I would have to spend several days in a provincial capital of some one hundred thousand people, with the best introductions, before any one would dare to suggest the name of some friend in the country to whom I might talk without endangering his safety. In one province, after remaining several days, I had finally to abandon entirely the idea of visiting any of the several thousand villages it contained.

In this great quarantine, probably the lack of sufficient railways and the almost total lack of good roads does more automatically to keep the villages and towns separated from one-another than all the Government can accomplish with its oppression. Whenever I had to wait in a railway station I found dozens, sometimes hundreds, of peasants lying about

on the hard floors waiting for trains, where often they had waited for days. Sometimes the trains were late, but usually the delay was because the Government did not take pains to furnish sufficient cars for such very common passengers. This is doubtless a matter of much less consequence to the peasant than the fact that the cars he needs to transport his products are not on hand, and the further fact that the railways are not able to take the peasants' products to market but rather serve the largest estates and industries or are used merely for strategic military ends.

Away from the railways conditions are infinitely worse. Of course there are no roads whatever in the sense of paved roadways. Everywhere there is naturally some effort to drain off the most serious mud holes and to bridge over otherwise impassable streams, but even this work is so badly done that the roads are often utterly impassable for many weeks, while in many sections the bridges are in a passable condition only in that part of the year when they are strictly necessary. This condition is partly due not only to the poverty of the peasant, who in the Province of Simbirsk spends only half a cent a head per year on the repair of roads, but also partly to the Government which allows the landlords to have an absolute monopoly of the local government and even to pay no taxes whatever for such purposes. It is unnecessary to attempt a calculation of how many hundred million rubles such a state of the roads costs this miserably poor country that can so ill afford such waste.

In the great majority of the Russian provinces I did not see any isolated farm-houses. The villages, where live the peasants, are separated by many miles of forests or fields. Usually the first objects that struck the eye before entering a village were a large number of windmills. These are nearly everywhere constructed on the same primitive pattern and entirely of wood, apparently as they were a hundred years ago. It seems that the milling of flour on an economic scale has scarcely begun in most of the villages. It is also to be noted that the windmills are owned and operated in common by a group of several families, as is so often the case in Russian country life. The same coöperative habit can be noticed

in the presence outside the villages of flocks and herds tended by a single shepherd or cowherd, generally some small girl. The average family has only a very few head of cattle, and usually the herding is done in common.

The village consisted as a rule of a single street, a mile or more long. Here I was reminded at once of the ever-present despotism that weighs like a nightmare on the land. Most of the villages have the appearance of fortified camps, are surrounded by palisades, and toward evening have a guard standing at the gate. This is no mere figure of speech, for the Government actually does consider the villagers to be prisoners for the night. Here is an order issued by a "land-official" in 1899 which became a popular model for such orders among other such officials of his class:

Nobody shall leave the village at night *at all*, or in the day-time for more than twenty-four hours without reporting to the selectman where he is going and for what purpose. For any departure without permission the guilty one shall be punished. Anyone who departs at night is to be reported in the morning by the watchmen and sentinels to the selectman, who is to inquire into the matter and punish disobedience, *even if it be proven that there was nothing suspicious or improper in the departure.*

That this law is enforced more generally than ever to-day there need be little doubt. Further, the Government has not only guarded the villages, but in many cases has established a night patrol across the country as well — as is done in a conquered country.

There is a remarkable similarity among the houses in a village. As a rule there are not more than two or three houses in an entire village that differentiate themselves by some slight change from the others — though of course in different parts of the country the style and size of the cottage varies considerably. There is usually no iron employed, and even wood for doors is sparingly used. The single door is made so small that a peasant above the average height is unable to enter without bowing his head. Everywhere the people spend no small part of their time in re-thatching the roofs and re-plastering the cracks in their houses with mud. Extremely cheap and amateur construction make necessary a great deal more repairs than are required in other countries. Of course if the house

falls into a bad condition while the peasants are very busy, or when they have lost a hand by death, they are forced to stand the cold and moisture for a long period.

The cottage is generally fifteen by thirty feet, and half of it, without windows and constructed more poorly than the rest, is built for animals rather than for men. Indeed, every cottage is also a stable. As we pass through the low door we come into the animals' part of the house. Here we often stumble over cattle, chickens, and pigs, and some of the more valuable agricultural implements. It is impossible to describe this part of the house, for there is really nothing here to describe. Passing through the second door we come into the one room, about fifteen feet square, that serves as kitchen, sleeping and living room for the whole family of six to twelve persons — for a "family," it must be remembered, consists not only of parents and children, but also of the grandparents, and perhaps of a non-relative or two, for all single unattached adults of a community are divided up among the families.

The worked-out old people — they are the cause of one of the greatest tragedies of peasant life. They are the paupers of paupers. It is no easy situation for a family, the food-producers of which are starving, to be compelled to share its food with those who can contribute nothing. Sometimes the peasants find themselves looking forward to the time when the old people will be removed by a natural cause. Nor is this the worst of the tragedies which come from the fearful poverty and overcrowding in the cottages. It is unnecessary to picture conditions that often arise when ten or fifteen people of both sexes and all ages, sometimes not very nearly related, are piled up on a single broad wooden shelf and the single earthen stove that constitute the only cottage beds.

The only furniture in such a place is a table, benches around the wall, and the large shelf that composes the sleeping place of all the family, except the old people, for whom the top of the stove is reserved. Both benches and beds remind one of the jail furniture that in more prosperous countries is considered a part of the punishment of the convicted criminal.

Almost everywhere windows are few and very small; they are often broken, and often they are sealed so that it is

impossible to open them the year through. It must be remembered that in mid-summer Russia has the same hot and dry weather that prevails in America. The inability to open the windows in the summer is a very great evil, but a far greater one is the inability to replace during the long and terrible winter the broken panes on account of the cost of glass. In consequence many broken windows are boarded up a large part of the year. As soon as the weather becomes a little chilly even such as can be opened are immediately tightly closed until the return of spring. Many superficial visitors are disgusted at such an unhealthy habit; but this is not a matter of sanitary or unsanitary habits—it is a matter of expense. Nothing is more costly in many parts of the country than wood. To open one of the little windows, even partly for a whole day or night, would doubtless cost the peasant several kopecks for fuel. Perhaps it would be better for the health of the family if he would spend this little sum and eat a little less, already famishing as he is. Let us remember, however, that a large part even of the educated classes of Russia's neighbour, Germany, would unquestionably reach the same unsanitary solution wherever the question lay between expense and fresh air.

Do not convict the peasant too hastily of uncleanness. There is no doubt that he lives in contaminating proximity with his calves, chickens, and sometimes also with his pigs. The reason for this is not far to seek. In the long and severe winters the animals would often freeze if it were not that they got a little of the heat of the living-room. Furthermore, it is true the peasant does not often change his clothes. An answer to this charge is, he has not the clothes to change. In addition it can be said in his behalf that, as the public bath-house is an institution of his country, there is much more cleanliness in Russia than there was, for instance, in some parts of America in the early days when no such institution existed.

Not only do the peasants not have enough inner garments to permit cleanliness, but they do not have enough shoes and overcoats to keep them warm. I was shocked when I saw women passing along the roads in their short skirts on windy winter days and noticed that they wore no woollen clothing of any kind. It would seem to be possible for the peasant to have

at least enough of these cotton garments for cleanliness and warmth if the Government had not put such a high customs tariff on cotton and cotton goods that the wretched consumers are forced to pay several prices for all they buy. As it is, the man has not enough shirts or the woman enough skirts even for decency, not to speak of warmth.

As for woollen garments, they are rare. Is it not incredible that in this country, possessing more pasture land than any other on earth, there should be insufficient wool for the elementary needs of the population, and insufficient hides and leather to enable the people to wear leather shoes? For in the south, and in the north in the summer, the shoe is not of leather, but is of woven bark such as is used by many a primitive race. Even in winter one sees more boots of felt than of leather. But worst of all, these wretched people are not able to afford warm overcoats. It is by no means always that a peasant has a good sheep-skin coat. If he does possess one, it is often held together in tatters for many years until it reaches a disgusting degree of filth. Certainly a sheep-skin coat is the least expensive garment imaginable to protect him from the winter, but even that is all but beyond his attenuated means.

It is almost superfluous to speak of the dreadfully low quality and poor variety of the peasant's food. He himself considers that he is very fortunate when he has enough to eat, to say nothing of quality or variety. The staple diet is black bread and potato soup, with in summer green cucumbers or water-melons. The staple drink is not tea as is commonly supposed; on the other hand this is considered rather as a luxury. Their chief drink is "kvas," which is brewed from sour bread. It is not only tea which is looked upon as a luxury more than a necessity, but often also sugar, cabbage, and even a sufficient amount of salt. All these articles are to be seen in every peasant's cottage, but they are very sparingly used. The tea is diluted and adulterated until it is almost unfit to drink, the salt is coarse and dirty from long keeping until it is repugnant even to the eye. Of meat, even the coarsest cuts of pork are not eaten daily, but are a luxury indeed. A large part of the peasant families have meat only on the greatest holidays — that is, four times a year.

But in the preceding paragraph I have spoken only of the average. A teacher from one of the poorer districts, who knew all the peasants of her village, assured me that there, even when there is no famine, the ordinary peasant does not drink tea, that there are no vegetables in common use except green cucumbers, and that he who can put fat in his soup is considered by the others to be a rich man. Instead of meat on the ordinary holidays, they were able to purchase only a little dry fish. And during the frequent famines the food is infinitely more miserable; the flour, to increase the bulk of the bread, is mixed with hay, straw, bark, and even earth.

One feels keenly just what life on this basis means when one considers the life of the women. Of course, it is impossible for any woman that must work like a man in the fields to give any attention to cooking. Bread is baked once a week, and this is about all the cooking; occasionally, with a great effort and at a sacrifice of her already exhausted strength, a peasant woman will be able to cook a little potato or cabbage soup in the evening. Ordinarily she leaves a few pieces of bread at home for the children, takes some more with her to the fields and returns only after an absence of twelve to fifteen hours — for we must remember that the Russian system forces the peasants to work at a great distance from the villages. It happens not only occasionally, but very commonly, that the women give birth to children in the fields, that they are carried home only in the evening, and that in three or four days they are back again at work, taking the child with them. The inevitable result is that nearly every peasant woman of middle age is sick in some way or other.

Women who work and live and suffer like this are naturally unable to see anything of life or even of the commonest conditions immediately around them. One woman with whom I spoke, who happened to be very intelligent, had never been on a railway train in all the forty-five years of her life although the station was only four or five miles away. Twelve years before my visit she had been in a little town a few miles away, but not since. Her case was not an extreme one. This woman, as well as other educated persons in the neighbourhood, assured me that in a village not very far away the women were unable to feed their children after a few months, and that the children

were then nourished on bread previously chewed by the women and put into little sacks. Of course, such children die wholesale; the greater part of Russia's fearful mortality figures apply to children under one year of age. Also in the village referred to even the grown-up men were under-sized.

I spoke of these fearful conditions to one of Witte's lieutenants in St. Petersburg, and asked him what was the hope for the Russian peasant. Of course no satisfactory answer was forthcoming. But although he did not have a solution, he did have a point of view, and this came out as the result of his telling how it was very common among the peasants to wear a belt and to tighten it frequently to allay the pangs of hunger. "Why, under the present perfectly hopeless circumstances," he asked, "is this not a very practical device? Why may it not pay both the peasant and Russia that he should just take in his belt? The peasant is underfed, but there is not enough work for him to do. Why should he be kept in full strength? Is it not fortunate for Russia that her peasants do not have the habit of eating as much as they do elsewhere? For the most part they manage to live and cost the country comparatively little. This is lucky for the peasant, as there is no possibility of obtaining any more. Countries differ in respect to diet as in respect to everything else. There are many savage races that, forced by necessity, have accommodated themselves to the most varied and meagre diet. It is only by this power of accommodation that they manage to survive."

He was thoroughly aware of all the tragedies of the situation, but he accepted them as if there was no ray of hope in any direction. Like the minister of finance, he stated that Russia's grain exports were momentarily rising, because the people were too poor to be able to keep their food for themselves; he pointed out that the exports of eggs and butter from Siberia deprived the Siberian peasants themselves of these simple articles of diet. But when he finally took an economic standpoint in which he viewed the peasant entirely as he viewed a horse, the true inwardness of his philosophy came to the light. While we were speaking of the degeneration of the Russian horse and of the fact that it was also underfed, he insisted that it was not worth while feeding *such a horse*, and used the same terms with which



THE LANDLORD'S PALACE
One of several properties of Prince Kotchbue



THE PEASANT'S COTTAGE

One room for the family, and one for the pigs and calves. Thousands of such homes are required to maintain a landlord's mansion

he had spoken of the peasant. For the most part the Russian officials do not have any social philosophy, but this is the morality of those who do. The Russian peasants, they confess, are in a deplorable condition — so little advanced, indeed, that it would not even pay for the State to make any sacrifice on their behalf.

The terribly low productivity of the peasant's agriculture and the small size of his income are of course at the bottom of his suffering. He is receiving about one-third the income of a poor German peasant, one-fourth that of a French. He is producing only about one-half enough to properly feed himself and animals. To discuss a remedy for this condition leads at once to the whole social problem, the whole economic and political situation of the country, a matter on which conclusions can be reached only farther on; but in the meanwhile it can be pointed out how the situation is aggravated by the Government. There are two very reliable estimates of the portion of the peasant's income which goes into the treasury of the Government in the form of direct taxation; one from the relatively poor province of Saratov and the other from the relatively rich province of Moscow. In the poor province, where the net family income is only 114 rubles (\$57), more than half goes in the form of taxes to the Government. In Moscow where the income, the highest in Russia, is nearly four hundred rubles, nearly one-fifth goes to taxation. Of the taxes the most important are the indirect.

In proportion as the direct taxes have been slowly lowered, the indirect have been rapidly elevated. It must not be supposed, however, that direct land taxes absorb any small part of the peasant's income. Direct taxes going to the Central Government have been recently much decreased, but there has been at the same time a very large increase in direct taxes going to the province and the village. As the relation between the local and Central Government is so intimate the latter takes advantage of the new taxing power of the local government, made possible by the retirement of the central authorities, to throw off on the provinces many of its own burdens, and it may soon be that the sum total of all direct taxes will also begin again to increase.

In the last twenty-five years some of the indirect tax-rates have been raised almost every year. It is estimated that between 1880 and 1902 the tax on tea increased threefold, that on sugar, five, and that on cotton six; the increased duties on copper and iron have corresponded. The American Bureau of Statistics estimates that on account of the taxing system Russians are forced to pay four times as much for petroleum as they would otherwise. The result is not only that the people are paying several times more for ordinary articles than they should, but that they are absolutely unable to purchase very large quantities of any of the articles so heavily taxed. Where modern industries are arising, as in the cities, and the people are slightly better off, they are consuming five times as much sugar, ten times as much tea, eighteen times as much petroleum, as in the country.

The robbing of the people through this system is effected not only by the money taken by the State itself, but also through the abnormal profits the very high customs tariff gives to the Russian manufacturer. The latter is the chief beneficiary from the several prices which are paid for cotton goods and for sugar. But in other cases, tea and alcohol for instance, the profit of the system is almost altogether the Government's. Four-fifths of all that the peasants pay for alcohol goes into the coffers of the Government and half of what he pays for tea. On tea and cotton alone, the greater portion of both of which goes into the hands of the masses, the Government raises over a hundred million rubles.

If any considerable portion of all these sums, so vast for a poor country like Russia, came back to the people, perhaps there would be somewhat less reason for complaint. But if we were to examine the expenditure of the Russian budget (excluding expenditures for businesses like alcohol and railways which are privately operated in other countries) we would find that over one-half of the total sum expended for purely governmental ends, goes for the army and navy and the police, while another fourth goes to pay the interest on the over-swollen national debt. In reckoning the sum paid for interest by the Government as one-fourth of the total expended, I have not included the interest on sums borrowed for railways, although

a very large part of this money also served for almost purely military ends.

Considering the many millions of persons that have died in Russia in the last decade from direct starvation or diseases that are derived from it, the amount borrowed and spent on such an absolutely prime national necessity as the relief of famine has been trivial — a total of a few hundred million rubles in all these years. We cannot at all grasp the conditions of the life of the Russian peasantry without recalling the almost chronic famines. We must remember that not only do famines occur occasionally, but that in the larger part of the country they occur with the greatest regularity every two or three years. Of course I did not fail to enter into a famine district in order to see with my own eyes what the conditions were. In the district of Buzuluk, in the province of Samara, the crop had been so small in 1906, and what little grain there was left was so valuable, that the peasants pulled the stalks by hand, finding it impossible to use their scythes. There was even no hay for the horses, and in August they were already breaking down with disease and the people were feeding the thatched roofs of barns to the dying animals. In a small district seven hundred cows had already been sold, which meant, of course, more starvation for the coming year. Horses were selling at five and ten rubles, and goats for as little as seventy-five kopecks. The peasants had recently been forced to buy grain at a ruble and a quarter, the grain they had sold a few weeks before for three-quarters of a ruble. The children were already too weak to study and had left the schools — the village meetings had declared that they would soon die of hunger. Some parents, finding they could not feed their children by staying at home, had left them behind in the village, hoping they might be able somewhere or other to earn them a little bread.

The Government was doing something to relieve the famine, but the relief was ridiculously insufficient and outrageously administered. The peasants were being given for the whole season forty pounds of grain for each person in the village, whereas at least two hundred pounds would be required. The Government was feeding the people not with bread, but with a weak soup made out of potatoes and bread. Not only was the

Government ration insufficient, but in many places the grain sent for seeds was mixed with earth and manure, even to such an extent that in one case the peasants of a certain village had refused absolutely to accept it. In some districts the grain sent for food was rotten and full of worms; in others the seed needed for planting on the first of September had only been half delivered when that time arrived. In still others, as was brought out in the noted case of the stealing grain-contractor, Lidval, and his friend, Assistant Minister Gurko, a large portion of the sum assigned for this purpose was stolen outright. I have called attention elsewhere to the fact that Lidval was let out of jail on bail, and that it was impossible in the Government's courts to place any criminal responsibility on the shoulders of the former minister.

Let us recall that while the peasants are starving, the exports of rye, even from the very district where the famine occurred, continued, and that the total exports of the country in the famine year of 1906 even rose, and that the encouragement of these large exports is the basis of the whole financial policy of the country. And let us remember, finally, that the new law which allows the peasant for the first time to sell or mortgage his land, will rob him during such famine periods of the only assurance that remains to him of the slightest chance of extricating himself from his hopeless situation.

In 1906, when the official reports showed that thirty million people were on the verge of starvation, Russia's grain exports actually reached a value of more than five hundred million rubles—more than sufficient to have prevented the death by famine diseases of several hundred thousand children, and to have kept alive millions of dying horses and cattle on which the peasants' life or death in the future depended. If the peasants had not been pauperised by taxes, they would have bought this grain and never have allowed it to leave the country. If the landlords had not been subsidised for a generation, they would never have owned either the grain or the land that produced it, and the famine would not even have existed. For famine is a by-product of poverty. We have the same droughts in America as they do in Russia, sometimes even the same crop failures; but we do not have famines. Our farmers have too much money in the bank.



THE EARTHEN COTTAGE

In treeless parts of Russia the cottages are of unbaked brick, plastered with clay



THE SINGLE ROOM OF THE COTTAGE
The broad wooden shelf and the top of the oven constitute the beds

And this new law is Stolypine's great reform. The overwhelming majority of the people must continue to starve. The State is not prepared to make any great financial sacrifice or fundamental reorganisation of the Government in their behalf. But at any cost it must have a few million farmers of the German or American sort. So the State has decided to give over the mass into the hands of the more thrifty and business-like few, to sacrifice the ninety penniless families of the village for the five or ten that have a little cash. The penniless peasants are to be allowed for the first time to sell and mortgage their little lots. The very first famine they will be sold into the hands of their more usurious or thrifty neighbours. It will then doubtless be possible for many of these latter to build up quite modern little farms of fifty to a hundred acres with several of the former peasants as labourers, forced to accept all wages and conditions offered or to starve.

The Government proposes to reduce ninety million of Russia's peasants to a still lower level of dependence and misery than that on which they now live, in order, by handing over their property to the rest, to build up the prosperity of the remaining ten millions. This, in Governmental Russia, is what is called "social reform."

CHAPTER IV

HOW THE PEASANTS TILL THE SOIL

IT IS impossible for the peasants to extricate themselves from their terrible predicament. Their farming is doomed to pitiful failure from the outset. The youngest American farmer boy would die of irritation if he were set to work under the antiquated conditions that prevail everywhere in Russia. It is very difficult indeed to make the reader realise how far behind in this respect the Russian peasants are; yet we must not imagine them too backward. It was only a generation or two ago when many parts of America and several European countries were farmed in a similar manner; and in the United States even to-day there are to be found localities in the out-of-the-way mountains of the East where methods are not much more improved.

In the conditions of labour we can see, as in no other part of the lives of the Russian people, the extent to which they have been debarred from civilisation, and why their condition is hopeless without some revolutionary change. We have seen that the peasant is underfed; Kornilov shows that the men have 17 per cent., the horses 40 per cent., less food than they require, even to maintain their full working power. But the peasants want work as much as they do bread; they are even more underworked than they are underfed. A Government commission investigating the cause of poverty in central Russia found the men had enough work to employ only one-fifth, and the horses enough to employ only one-third, of their working power.

Here, then, were the great, incontestable truths underlying the peasants' condition. Neither the farmers nor the farm animals have enough to keep them from physical degeneration. Even if the peasant was sufficiently occupied to keep himself from starving to death, there would still be no chance for him to

save money and to accumulate that capital absolutely necessary for the regeneration of his agriculture; even if the men and farm animals had enough to eat, the peasants would still be idle three-fourth of their time and the horses one-half the time; there would be no money to buy better animals or better ploughs, no means to increase the miserable yield of the crops and to improve the lot of the miserable agriculturist.

We cannot account for these conditions by saying simply that Russia has not entered into the pale of civilisation as far as agriculture is concerned. Everywhere one passes great estates of the nobility and merchants, or occasionally of the very exceptional peasants who have become rich from usury and the very sufferings of their fellow-countrymen. In nearly every such estate modern agricultural methods are applied, often in the most advanced manner. Everywhere peasants are employed on these places, and after a little natural prejudice at the beginning, they soon master the most complicated machines. It is not, therefore, as if the people did not know what scientific methods are. We are facing in Russia not the poverty of barbarism, but the poverty of civilisation, a clear social product.

Anyone with a pencil and paper can verify in a few minutes the reckoning of the great geographer, Elisee Reclus, that Russia, cultivated like Great Britain, should sustain the population of five hundred million souls. Cultivated like the United States even, it should keep in prosperity half that number; whereas at the present moment a large part of its one hundred and forty million starves. Nor does the condition tend to improve. Every year, while the population increases 2 or 3 per cent., the agricultural production of the country increases only about half as fast. While American farmers have learned to get at least twice as much from an acre as they did half a century ago, the Russian peasants are actually producing less than they did at the time of the emancipation in 1861.

This is bankruptcy, ruin, and degeneration for the peasants' agriculture. Of course the soil is being robbed and exhausted and the farm animals are becoming weaker and smaller every year. In the agricultural section, too, men die twice as rapidly as in any other modern country. Every year half a million

human lives, more than those lost in the whole of the Japanese war, are sacrificed to the demon poverty.

This is the social evil in Russia, this is the marsh and quicksand on which courtier-statesmen are building their gilded and tawdry structure of mere police reform. Since Witte's Council of State declared the Government helpless to aid the peasantry, no minister has had the effrontery even to claim that anything could be done to strike at the root of Russia's ills.

When I went to the villages I knew that I saw conditions that have existed over half a century, that are not improving themselves to-day, and that the Government has no hope to improve materially "in this epoch," to use the words of Witte. When I saw how the Russian Government leaves the farmer to sow and reap, I saw at the same time into the very heart of hearts of the Czarism's pretensions. Laying aside for the moment the question of the right of any man to govern and master another without that other's consent, forgetting that the Russian peasant has a right to the full power over his own life, if for no other reason than because nobody else has any superior claim to exercise that power, let us see how the Czar has employed his "God-given" pretension to act as "shepherd to his flock," to employ again a favourite official phrase.

Before entering into the Russian villages themselves, even from the train windows, two or three significant features of the peasants' agriculture can be noted: first, that the fields are everywhere divided into very long and ridiculously narrow strips, often stretching as far as the eye can reach and only a few paces wide; and, second, that every third field is lying fallow all the year around. The strips result from the fact that all the land of the village is the common property of the whole. In their crude efforts to attain equality in the division of the land, and the absence of any method of exactly estimating the value of the different kinds of soil in the village's possession, each field is divided among all the several hundred villagers in this manner. Even where, as it happens sometimes in Western Russia, that a single peasant is allowed to own several "shares," the same method of division is used.

This custom, one of the greatest evils in the present system, and recognised as such both by the Government and the

peasants, is to be attributed almost entirely to the oppressive system of the Government. No sooner was there a measure of liberty a year or so ago, than both peasants and educated persons who worked in their behalf began to replace this awkward triennial redistribution of the land by some kind of graduated land tax, such as is already in practice in Australia. There is no tendency on the part of the peasants to abandon their almost instinctive insistence on the greatest possible economic equality, but it is evident that a graduated tax is a far superior method of reaching this end than the perpetual redistribution of the land, especially in these utterly impractical narrow strips.

The other feature to be seen from the car window, the fallow fields, indicate the still universal use in Russia of the ancient "three field system." The peasantry have never been rich enough to afford a rotation of crops, to be able to plant a field in root crops and to wait for a good yield; neither have they enough farm animals to be able properly to utilise these crops, or to manure the fields. If they stick to the old wasteful system it is not due to ignorance, but to the pressure of sheer economic necessity.

The implements used by the peasants are almost incredibly crude. The majority of the waggon I have examined were made without the least scrap of iron, as was sometimes the case among our pioneer farmers over a century ago. The plough is for the most part of a type that has been in use for more than a hundred years, while the so-called new plough, also in common use, is two or three generations behind the times. The harrow, like the waggon, is made without a scrap of iron. Nor is it iron alone that is too expensive for extensive use; it is very rare that the peasant can afford anything but rope or thongs of some wild fibre for the harness either of his carts or his ploughing implements.

In this beautiful and immensely rich agricultural country, with its long sunny days in the summer, its plentiful snows in the winter, and its very wonderful black soil, the vastest agricultural plain in the world, all the work of cultivating the soil is carried on in such a primitive and wasteful manner that far more of its riches go to waste than are economically utilised. Everything, of course, is done by hand. The seeds are cast out of a

sack or apron, as they were a hundred years ago. Naturally, the birds that are to be seen everywhere in immense swarms, get a large part. Then if there is too much rain, the seeds rot, or if not enough, it is very common for the wind to heap them up or to blow them away. The ploughing as a rule is about six or eight inches into the soil. In the eastern half of Russia, in the most fertile sections, droughts are very frequent. If a plough was here used that turned up from twelve to eighteen inches, to say nothing of the use of the modern dust blanket idea, there would be very few famines at all in the land, but at the worst only half crops. That this is no exaggeration is proven by the results already achieved by some of the German colonists that settled in the heart of Russia over a century ago.

In the summer of 1905, when there was almost a complete crop failure on the lower Volga, where I happened to be, I was able to secure some of the crop statistics of these German colonists and their Russian neighbours in nine German and eighteen Russian townships. These figures show that already the Germans have learned to produce one-quarter or one-half crop where the Russians get practically nothing. In the majority of the Russian townships, the rye crops showed next to nothing, while in the majority of the German there was almost one-quarter of a normal crop. While a large part of the Russian townships produced less than one-quarter of the normal wheat crops, the majority of the German townships were able to obtain from one-quarter to one-half of a normal crop. Now of course these Germans are also poor and have by no means introduced the most modern methods. Where they obtained a fourth, there is little doubt that our Kansas farmer could have obtained half a crop.

Of course the first cause of the peasants' agriculture is his poverty, just as the first cause of his poverty is his bad agriculture. The average peasant family is enabled to obtain an income altogether of only one hundred to two hundred rubles (fifty to one hundred dollars); the most friendly of the reformers do not undertake to promise him that he will be able to bring his income to higher than two hundred rubles within the first few years. To show just what these figures mean, we have many scientific investigations of the peasants' expendi-

ture. Such an inquiry in the province of Veronege showed that the peasants' total household expenditure, outside of purchases of food for men and horses, was a little less than one hundred rubles, that he invested for building thirty-four, for clothes twenty-five, for farm animals twenty-four, for implements about eight, and for furniture and vessels six. If we convert these figures into dollars it is not necessary to have any further explanation of the backwardness of the peasants' agriculture.

I took pains frequently to learn what the peasant paid for ploughs, harrows, and waggon — and these prices will indicate the inefficiency of the implements. For the most modern plough in use he was paying five rubles and every three years he had to renew the ploughshare at the cost of about 1.80 rubles. These ploughs were manufactured in the village with the exception of certain bolts, screws, and simple pieces that the smiths bought from the factory. I found that the peasants rarely paid more than ten rubles for a waggon, and one waggon-maker assured me a majority of those he made he sold for only five rubles and that such a waggon was the result of one week of his labour. The harrows with iron teeth, which are in rather common use, are worth five or six rubles, but I saw more wooden ones which were only worth a ruble or two.

I have traced the blame of these conditions first of all to the poverty and general condition of the country; but the Government, besides being responsible for this, has also a special blame. The tariff of the customs duties on iron has been placed so high that the peasants can scarcely afford to use even nails. As a result Russia uses per head one-tenth as much iron as the United States. The duty on the machinery the peasant requires is correspondingly high, and there can be no question that a large part of all his technical expenses are due directly to this high tariff policy of the Government.

The condition in respect to the live stock is even more illuminating than that of the implements. More than one-fourth of the peasants' households are entirely without a horse, another third has only one horse, while only slightly more than a third have two or more. The condition is not getting better, but worse. In the centre of the country, out of one hundred

families, one every year joins the horseless class. Still more striking is the fact that the average Russian horse weighs little more than half of the better breeds of France. In 1870 there were nine head of cattle for each household. Every ten years this number has fallen one; in 1900 the average number was only a little over six head of cattle for each household. Neither in cattle, sheep nor pigs are the Russian peasants one-quarter as well provided as those of Germany.

To make still more clear the remarkable inferiority of the agriculture of the Russian peasant, let us contrast the better farmers among the Russian peasants with those of the leading agricultural states of the American Northwest. The American farmer in this section has about one hundred acres of land, the Russian peasant about twenty. The value of the land of the American farmer is about four times as great, so we see already that the landed wealth of the American is twenty times that of his Russian competitor — for we must not forget that these two great grain-exporting countries and their farmers are competitors in the world market.

The value of the live stock and implements is in about the same proportion. We may reckon this in Russia to be about twenty-five rubles for machinery and seventy-five for live stock—that is altogether about one hundred rubles or fifty dollars; whereas the American farmer of the Northwest has more than two hundred dollars in implements and machinery and nearly eight hundred dollars in live stock. Witte estimated the value of the Russian agriculture products of 1897 as one and a half billion rubles; those of America were about eight times as great. The area of the crops in the two countries was about the same. This relative condition is not changing, for whereas in the last decade our wheat crop increased 39 per cent. that of Russia scarcely increased 9 per cent.

The contrast is even greater in regard to exports. In the fifteen years preceding 1902 the wheat exports of America nearly doubled, while those of Russia remained almost stationary. But I have suggested in a former chapter that the whole economy of the Russian nation, the maintenance of the gold standard, the payment of the interest on foreign loans, all depend upon a large grain export. The majority of the total exports of

Russia is indeed grain; butter and eggs bring up the proportion of agricultural products in exports to two-thirds of the total, and the rest consists of the raw materials, like wood and petroleum; manufactured products do not make 3 per cent. of the whole. If the agricultural exports, especially wheat, do not rise rapidly, then the whole financial policy deliberately chosen by the Government has proved itself a failure.

It would doubtless have been more wise on the part of the Government to have discontinued entirely the policy of encouraging grain exports from a country where both men and farm animals are starving for the need of grain. Only lately another repetition of famine has forced the minister of finance not only to reverse the former policy, but actually to discourage the exports. Both from the extreme reactionary and the extreme revolutionary party there was a strong cry for the forbidding of exports from starving districts, but it was only after her neighbour, Turkey, had taken this very essential means of protecting its population from wholesale starvation that Russia was forced to follow its example. Of course it is recognised by all writers on economic questions that the forbidding of exports must be only a temporary expedient, absolutely necessary as it may be in times of famine and war.

But the real source of the degeneration of Russian agriculture lies deeper than the exporting of the food of starving men and beasts. At the time of the emancipation in 1861 it was already recognised that a peasant family, in order to support itself, should possess at least twelve and a half dessiatines (or thirty-three acres) of land. When serf-owners allowed their peasants' land to fall below this amount, the Government insisted that the peasants should be transported to some of the newer sections, such as the Province of Samara. But in 1875 the average amount of land in the peasants' possession was already only about nine dessiatines (twenty-four acres) for each household; in 1900 it had fallen further to six and a half dessiatines (seventeen acres) — just about half enough, according to the Government's own calculation, to keep a peasant family alive. This does not quite represent the situation, for in some places the decrease has been relatively slight, whereas in the

south and west the peasants have at the present time less than a half of what they had at the time of the emancipation.

Only in the extreme south does the value of the average peasant farm rise as high as five hundred rubles, whereas in the leading agricultural districts in the centre and east it is between three hundred and seventy-five and five hundred rubles, and in the north and west under this sum. An American can get an idea of these farms only by comparing them with the miserable little holdings of our Southern Negroes. Even this does not represent the low level of the Russian agriculturist; the woods and meadows so necessary for the pasturing of cattle and the forests that supply building material and fuel are largely in the hands of the landlords. In the north where the land is poor, and in the east where the so-called "beggar's lots" exist, a large part of the revolts that have occurred in the last two years have had for their immediate cause some quarrel with the landlords over the woods and meadows. So far have the proprietors gone in protecting such monopolised property rights that they have even forbidden the gathering of berries or mushrooms.

The "beggar's lots" are those of the peasants whose masters at the time of the emancipation took advantage of the clause of the law allowing them to give the peasants a diminutive piece of land outright, rather than to sell them a larger piece. At this time these "beggar's lots" consisted usually of less than one dessiatine (two and three-quarter acres). Now, owing to the increase of population and division of these properties, the peasant owners are often possessed of no more than one single acre. Such owners of "beggar's lots" are of course forced to rent land from the landlord at his own terms if they remain in the country. The proprietors assign for this purpose the worst and least accessible of their lands, at rents which have very often been proved statistically to amount to more than the net product, and sometimes even to twice as much. Of course such rents are not, and cannot be, collected. They mean simply that the peasants are forced to do the landlords' work on the "rented" land for the price often of nothing more than the straw that is left over. As part of the rent of meadows the landlords often insist on the transportation of their grain to the

railways, usually at a considerable distance, and even on as much as two-thirds of the hay crop besides. Little wonder the helpless peasants revolt.

Meanwhile all these conditions are always getting worse. The peasant's poverty and the exhaustion of the soil enable him to get less from the land than he did a generation ago, whereas land values and rents have risen more than threefold. Far from being of any service whatever to the people in this hopeless situation, the Government is an even more oppressive financial burden than the landlords themselves. Professor Janson has shown that for many years continually (in fact, until two years ago) the Government taxes were often equal to the peasant's income from the land, and sometimes even twice as much. Again, it goes without saying, as in the case of the high rents just mentioned, that such taxes were not collected. But these excessive burdens meant that the tax-collecting officials were present at the time of the harvest and took every scrap of the peasant's property that was not necessary to prevent his immediate starvation. As we shall see later, the Government actually intended that this tax should make the former serf of a private individual the serf of the State. The taxes were so high that they took from the peasants not only all that the land could produce, but also a very large part of all that he could make by his labour elsewhere.

Professor Simkhovitch quotes figures from the province of Novgorod showing that the food deficit to be made up by labour of the peasants in the cities or on the estates of the landlords amounted to three million rubles, taxes to a similar sum, and that all that remained to the peasants of this province, after all their labour for themselves and for other persons, was only about twelve and a half rubles per household, from which infinitesimal amount they had to purchase their clothing, part of their food, and their agricultural implements. The same writer quotes the opinion of Professor Janson to the effect that the peasantry was economically better off even during serfdom than at the present time.


The result of this extreme poverty is of course to drive a very large part of the peasantry into the position of mere agricultural labourers. Of these there are now in Russia many

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
millions. What it means to be a farm worker in Russia one can very readily grasp from the wages they receive. One of the most scientific and complete studies on the subject has been produced by the local government board of Poltava. The wages of this class of labour from 1890 to 1900 varied from twenty-two to forty kopecks a day, with the exception of a single year. The average was thirty-three kopecks (seventeen cents). The monthly wages were on the average \$3.06, and the yearly wages \$29.46. The wages in the United States, except in the South, were in 1900 about seventeen dollars per month, or nearly six times as much.

This by no means indicates the worst of the Russian wage conditions in agricultural industry. We must take into account the good and bad harvests and the varying wages of the different seasons. During the harvest period wages have in certain years risen almost to fifty cents a day, and in the worst years they have fallen only about as low as twenty-five. But we must take into account the long spring and winter seasons when the wages have varied from nine to twelve and a half cents per day. We can indicate the fundamental condition that underlies such starvation wages by remembering that the product for a farm worker in the United States has risen in the last decade by nearly half, while that of the Russian worker has fallen to a little more than half what it was. Russia's hundred million people employed in agriculture are producing crops that, at the most liberal estimate, have only a fifth of the value of those produced by less than fifty million people in the United States. With the aid of our railroads, education, and farm machinery, a single American farmer is producing crops as valuable as those produced by ten Russian peasants, while he is actually receiving as much as fifteen or twenty.

There is a glaring inequality in the distribution of such wealth as Russia does manage to produce. The Government and the landlords take nearly half of the peasants' product; and, furthermore, in order to retain their large share of the spoils, the Government and the landlords will not allow the peasants enough income even to develop their agriculture. With a free government, as in America, and the land in the possession of the rural workers themselves, Russia would now



THIS WAGGON IS WORTH ABOUT FIVE RUBLES
It is made without a scrap of iron, which is too dear



CRUDE AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENTS

To the left, a plough of the type of 1800; behind, the usual harrow made without a scrap of iron

be producing tenfold the agricultural wealth she does to-day. And if the people had possessed liberty and the land a century ago the social problem in Russia would not be other than it is now in the United States.

But this opportunity has passed. The social evil has now become deeper in Russia than in any other modern country, the social problem has become greater, and the solution of this problem will have to be correspondingly more revolutionary and more profound.

CHAPTER V

FROM SLAVES OF THE LANDLORD TO SLAVES OF THE STATE

And as for the activity of landlords, nobody would even attempt to justify it.—TOLSTOI, "*What Is to Be Done.*"

WHITE slavery has been the basis of the Russian State for a thousand years. The so-called revolutionary change that took place at the time of the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 by Alexander II. was no more than a change of the system of servitude. Before that time a part of the peasants had been the slaves directly of the landlords and only indirectly of the State. By the emancipation they became directly the slaves of the State. The overwhelming majority of the Russian people, of absolutely the same blood as the landlord nobility, in this country where all are levelled before the Czar and a nobleman may be created overnight, were not merely serfs but slaves in the fullest sense of the term. For the so-called serfdom that prevailed for two centuries before the emancipation was nothing less than slavery. To be sure, the greater part of the peasants tilling the soil had some sort of a guaranteed legal relation to the land. But this was purely a matter of convenience. It was possible for the landlords and the Government to transfer them at any time into the class of domestic slaves, who were also called by the same name of serf.

After the fixing of the peasants to the soil over two centuries ago, which was the beginning of the new slavery, serfdom, there was a continuous contest between the Czar and the landlords as to which should exercise the dominant rôle over the slaves. Of course there was never any question that the landlord noblemen also were the slaves of the Czar, and that the serfs were therefore the slaves of slaves. But there were always many matters of state which hung on the question as to how far the Czar should interfere directly in the behaviour of



A GROUP OF PEASANTS IN WINTER DRESS
The coats are of sheepskin with the wool turned in



FAMINE-STRICKEN PEASANTS—TARTARS OF EAST RUSSIA

the masters toward the slaves, and concerning the extent to which he should exercise directly his power over them.

Both Catharine II. and Alexander I., over a century ago, saw that the landlords were becoming such despotic masters that they were starving their own slaves and depopulating the country, to say nothing of other vices of the system which threatened the State's very existence. Both monarchs saw that the serfs must be ultimately "free" — that is, they understood that the welfare of the country required a single form of slavery instead of both Czarism and serfdom, two systems that contradict each other at many points. For a long time serfdom, or servitude to the landlords, was maintained. In spite of the foresight of the more intelligent Czars, they valued the support and aid furnished them by the landlords even more than they did the health or even the existence of the common man. When the emancipation was finally enacted it meant only a partial accomplishment of the Czar's design of replacing slavery to the individual by slavery to the State; for while politically the landlord masters lost their old position, the emancipation was accomplished in such a way, as I shall show, as to make the peasantry economically more dependent than ever on the landlord class.

The contest between two systems, an oligarchy of slave-owning noblemen and a slave-holding bureaucratic absolutism with all the power centred in the Czar, has been a burning one from the outset. After the two hundred years of this contest that have elapsed since the reign of Peter the Great, it is still impossible to say whether the autocracy or the oligarchy of landlords has at last come out the stronger. We have just seen the creation of a landlords' Duma. Under Peter the Great the landlord nobility was absolutely crushed, and every individual nobleman that arose into any prominence, whether Menchikov, Biren, or Munich, was exiled, imprisoned, or executed. It might appear from this that the power of the nobility was increasing, but such is not the case. The victory fluctuates from one to another in each succeeding reign, and after viewing the two centuries as a whole we must rather conclude that all such conflict is equally unprofitable for both sides, and that the autocracy and nobility are absolutely necessary to one another's existence.

A few years after the death of Peter the Great, in 1730, the Empress Anne even signed a sort of constitution granting a noblemen's government. There was to have been an assembly of gentlemen, merchants, and the lesser nobility, a senate of the higher nobility, and a supreme council of twelve which was always to be consulted on questions of peace and war, taxation, the appointment of officials and the condemnation of the nobility or confiscation of their property, and even on the alienation of the Crown domains, the marriages of the royal princes and the fixing of the principles of succession. The Empress was to have a fixed sum for her household and was to command only the Palace Guards. Ten days after yielding to the landlords Anne tore this instrument to pieces. It had proved impossible to maintain any unity among the nobility and the nobles saw then, as they had often seen before and since, that the autocracy was a necessary method of maintaining their domination in the country — sorry as they might be to have to be forced to admit a despot above themselves.

All the palace revolutions, those of 1740 and 1741, of 1762 when Catharine II. got rid of her husband, of 1801 when Alexander I. allowed his father to be assassinated, were revolutions accomplished by the nobility for their own ends. At the same time the nobles had been taught by experience, and their purpose was merely the naming of a new autocrat. They had learned that the Czarism is as necessary to themselves as it is to the Czar. Catharine II., indeed, moved in an opposite direction from Peter and Anne; although she did not limit her own power directly she did the same thing indirectly by making the landlords absolute masters over the peasantry. Under her grandson, Alexander I, the severity used against the masses was even greater than before, and the peasants' complaints were not even tolerated. Alexander's chief favourite, Arakcheev, led in the tortures until he was finally murdered by his own slaves.

Alexander I., who reigned at the beginning of the last century, was one of the Czars who felt inclined rather to reduce chattel slavery in order to strengthen the servitude to the State; but, unfortunately, he had enjoyed such a good education that he also understood the absurdity of the State despotism. Hesi-

tating for a while between the reform of these two evils, he was finally caught in the wave of reaction that spread over Europe and accomplished neither. In the meanwhile his insight into the impossibility of absolutism led him to maintain the power of the landlord class.

One of the books that did the most to bring about the emancipation was "The Annals of a Sportsman" by Turgeniev, whom many think the greatest novelist the world has ever produced. In order to give an idea of the condition in which the fathers and grandfathers of the peasants were held, and of the opinions in which the present officials and landlords have been educated, I shall draw upon a few stories from this book, which was recognised by all the contemporaries to be eminently moderate and fair in its judgments. Though Turgeniev pictures a number of typical landlords, I shall refer only to the more humane ones.

As a sportsman Turgeniev's attention was especially called to proprietors who summoned peasants from their daily labour to use them as huntsmen. This shows that the so-called serfdom was nothing but slavery. It was slavery, as Turgeniev mentioned, because the landlords had the right to judge the peasants and to send them to exile or imprisonment for life in the military battalions. The landlords drawn by Turgeniev took advantage of their position to rob the peasants of land which they were supposed to have a right to cultivate. Even this right to work on a certain piece of land, the very basis of serfdom and the only feature that separates it from mere slavery, was all but ignored. In one case robbery had been accomplished by ceaseless beatings, and the land in dispute was referred to by the peasants in the neighbourhood as the "cudgelled land."

Since serfdom was supposed to differ in some respects from slavery, of course it was not supposed that the landlords had a right to allow and forbid the peasants to marry, but this right also they assumed. Turgeniev speaks of one cruel master who forbade all his maids to marry and had cruelly punished anyone who disobeyed; he relates the story of a peasant lover who was sent away for twenty-five years to the ruin of the whole family which was supported by him alone; and he tells of an

old-maid mistress who never allowed any of her serfs, male or female, to marry. "God forbid," she sometimes said, "here I am living single; what indulgence! what are they thinking of!"

The most cruel of the masters were under no illusions as to whether the system in existence was serfdom or slavery. "When a man's a master he is a master," explains one of them, who had advised every manner of torture for his slaves, "and when he is a peasant, he is a peasant." But what is the most interesting for our purpose, is that when the slaves were most disobedient and the masters most cruelly aroused, they spoke not of a slaves' revolt, but of a "mutiny." In other words, the most extreme form of servitude that these slave-owners could imagine was military servitude, the most extreme form of insubordination was military mutiny — that is, revolt not against private ownership but against the State, which was after all the more oppressive master at that time and has remained so until the present day.

Turgeniev hesitated to present in a work intended for general reading a full picture of the frightful degree which the oppression at that time had reached. But we must understand this if we are to understand the character of the present rulers of the country. The cruelties that follow are all supported by documentary evidence.

The proprietors were allowed to make their own laws for the most part as far as the peasants were concerned. One such law read as follows: "For insulting a neighbouring proprietor — to be whipped cruelly:" another, "if a serf omits to fast at the proper time and for a period ordained by the Church, he or she must fast for a week and receive five thousand strokes unsparingly." The preceding are from the private law-books. There is one from the public army regulations, chapter 29, that requires that the court must examine carefully in the case of a peasant's death why he died *so easily* and how it was possible for him to die *so easily*. The public laws set the example, and we must remember that half of the serfs were not owned by private proprietors but by the Czar himself. Catharine II. issued an order that the serfs were not to be permitted to complain to their masters, and when some peasants begged that they be killed or exiled forever rather than be left to the

mercies of their master, Count Alexis Lapuchin, Catharine ordered "half of them to be whipped publicly with rods in the market-place and other squares in Moscow, and the other half to be whipped in the villages in presence of the peasants; and then sent them to hard labour in the Siberian mines."*

When cases against the peasants did come up for trial they were judged of course by the landlords themselves. A certain Redkin, marshal of the nobility in the Government of Riazan, said frankly: "If I saw a gentleman who is my comrade kill one of his serfs I would take an oath without any scruple that I had seen nothing." This from the chief of the nobility of a whole province.

The slavery of white men of the same blood as their masters is even more demoralising than the slavery of another race that the whites can imagine inferior to their own. This demoralisation in Russia knew no bounds. A certain nobleman had his manager present to him on the day of his arrival at his estate each year, a list of all the adult young women of the two villages under the manager's authority. This gentleman then took each one of these girls into his seignorial mansion as a servant, and when the list was exhausted he went to another one of his estates. The same story repeated itself year after year. This, like the other cases I shall relate, is given by the best known and most reliable of the Russian historians. One of these servant women belonging to a proprietor named Karteev tried to escape. He had her whipped and put a collar with iron points on it around her neck. The unfortunate woman tried to drown herself but did not succeed, and the proprietor captured her again. He then had her foot chained to a post in the kitchen, and she was kept this way for five years until finally she was unchained in order to be allowed to work in the fields of the proprietor. This case of chaining peasants up like dogs was repeated elsewhere, although sometimes the chain was placed around the peasant's neck.

One proprietor, Sau Kanov, killed a boy of twelve years for having let a hare escape on a hunt. He felled the lad with a stroke of his bayonet, and continued the attack by kicking him in the stomach and chest. The boy died the same day.

*See Kennard, Chapter II.

The inquiry undertaken by gentlemen landlords discovered nothing. The doctor did not find any traces on the body, and the peasants kept a profound silence, terrorised by the promise of Sau Kanov to flay alive whoever should dare utter a single word against him. But the inquiry was again taken up, and this time the council of State brought out the truth.

It is impossible to imagine all the methods and instruments of torture that were in use on various estates. In the government of Saratov there is a document in the archives that describes some of them. From the list of hundreds the following are interesting: beating with salted sticks and rubbing salt into the wounds; putting on collars of iron with nails inside; beating with rawhide whips; burning the hair of women down to the skin; boiling in a caldron; roasting on red-hot grills. In this same government a proprietor named Garasky beat his steward so hard in the chest that the man died within a week. Police agents coming to make a search in the village found various instruments of torture in the proprietors' houses — a collar, chains, handcuffs, a mask that was placed over the head of the peasant and then locked in order to rob him of the possibility of eating. This latter end, by the way, is accomplished much better at the present time when the peasant has only half as much land as he had before the emancipation, and is more effectually placed at the disposition of his economic masters without the proprietor being forced to take any direct action.

It must not be supposed that these white slaves quietly accepted their servitude. The tradition of the days when they had had much greater freedom still lived on, and they knew that they were the same flesh and blood as their masters; but the means of revolt were narrowly limited and the first reaction among the peasants was usually desperate. Suicides were frequent, very many thousands taking place every year, sometimes in the most spectacular manner. One coachman belonging to a paralysed landlord drove the latter into a forest and hung himself before his master's eyes to a bare tree, leaving him alone and helpless until he was able to call others to take him home — a strange vengeance on the landlord by a servant who for several decades had suffered unbearable tortures.

Of course it often happened that the peasants killed the nobleman instead of themselves. Hardly a month passed that some such attempt of murder did not succeed and reach the ears of the public. How many murders were done, how many attempted, without being disclosed, will never be known. In the peasants' defence it must be recalled that the Czars condemned to the most terrible punishment any peasant that even had the audacity to complain against his proprietor.

Later I shall show how this slavery continues to-day under a new form. But first I shall touch upon the other form of slavery that existed before the emancipation, that is, slavery to the State. This served also as the historical foundation of the present servitude.

Nicholas I. was the monarch who developed this form of slavery to its height. He was the son of a very stupid German woman and was penetrated to the bottom of his soul with monarchical and religious prejudices. Although his successor was forced to introduce the Emancipation Act, Nicholas was violently opposed to it, and developed the country in the opposite direction. For while he did not believe that the landlords should themselves exercise much power, he was in favour of slavery as a general principle, and saw that it was necessary to lend the landlords some of his autocratic power. He did this against his will, for his favourite tyranny was of a purely military character.

He himself confessed that he and his brother Michael had received a very poor education, that "even in the matter of religion we had been taught only to make the sign of the cross at certain moments, to go to Mass and to recite by heart a few prayers without taking the slightest interest in what was going on in our souls." The sciences were completely neglected, and while the teacher was trying to instruct the children they were drawing caricatures. All their education, all their play even, had for its only end the development of a taste for military exercise. This confession, written by Nicholas for his own children, shows the way in which the characters and souls of Czars are formed.

From this training Nicholas became, according to the historian Childere, coarse, rude, haughty, and presumptuous. He

showed his hatred on every occasion of all that was liberal, and his love for Prussian military despotism. While on his visit to England he did not wish even to see the Parliament or to make the acquaintance of English statesmen; he passed all his time with officers and generals. In Prussia he delighted only in military parades and reviewing the army with his father-in-law, the King of Prussia. Dressed in the uniform of a Prussian regiment, he said to the soldiers, "Never forget, my friends, that I am half your countryman and that like you I am a member of the army of your King." Perhaps this was what gave rise to the Russian couplet, popular at that time:

The Czar's a German Russian,
His uniform is Prussian.

It was this same military Emperor who tried to revive the Holy Alliance in 1848, and to help all the kings of Europe to put down the democratic movements of their subjects; and it was this same haughty military despot that met his defeat at the hands of the liberal French and English in the Crimean War, and died probably of shame as the result.

It was a Czar of this soulless military type that brought the State slavery to its highest point of development. So far did he go that it was necessary first of all that he should prevent all intellectual development among his subjects, since his actions were such that no intelligent man could tolerate them. He forbade all discussions in the press on the subject of the Government. He created not one office of censorship but a dozen — the ecclesiastic, the military, the educational, the judicial, the political, the ministers' and the secret. When a distinguished citizen asked to be allowed to start a review, the Emperor replied curtly: "There is no need for it." The minister of foreign affairs ordered that, in articles on any of the foreign countries, the Russian press should not even print the words "parliament," "constitution," or "elections," and should not mention the demands, or even the needs, of the foreign working class. The minister of interior affairs ordered, in his turn, that there should be no description of the needs, or calamities of the Russian people or of any contemporary event that might excite the population, that no regret should be expressed concerning the position of the peasant serfs, and

that there should be no description of the proprietors' abuses of their authority. The minister of education ordered that there should be no mention of the historic facts that there had been struggles for freedom in Greece and Rome, and no mention of the names of the heroes of those struggles. In an historical work on Greek history the censor would not even permit to a former minister to make use of the Greek word "Demos," commanding that it be replaced by some other word. Recognising how much Nicholas I. had in common with Ivan the Terrible, the deviltries of the latter were not allowed to be mentioned in Russian histories. Let us remember that all these measures belong to but a little more than a half century ago, and that conditions are in many respects similar at the present moment.

Nicholas, however, went a little farther than any other Czars in his fight against intelligence. "His object," says a Russian historian, "seemed to be to enslave the people intellectually and to extinguish their souls." "Imagine," says another, "an enormous and solid prison, a prison for forced labour constructed purposely to contain all the peasants of Russia, and around this prison sentinels with loaded guns, and you will have an exact image of the whole policy of Nicholas I. as far as the peasants are concerned." Of course a man who thus treated the whole nation, considered the peasants to be not only less than men but merely pieces of wood, objects even rather than beasts.

Under Nicholas the State had ten million slaves directly belonging to it. We are interested not only in its behaviour toward this half of the peasantry, but also toward the enormous standing army and the million of other slaves that were employed directly or indirectly by the Government. Although the State did not as a rule deal in human flesh commercially, yet this practice also existed. The Crown paid 300 rubles a head for every young man that it was allowed to send to colonise Siberia, and it was very common for peasants to be sold to take the place of other recruits under the ironical name always of "volunteers."

I have already mentioned that the soldiers were slaves of the lowest order for the twenty-five years of their service, that

all the Government employees in the post-office and other departments, as well as in the mines; were nothing less than slaves, and that the State also permitted the manufacturers to deal with their employees in an utterly arbitrary manner. So we see that on the whole the State was a much more important master of serfs than all the landlords put together. Against the State there was another desperate remedy besides suicide and the killing of a few cruel masters. This remedy was revolt, such as has been in practice for Russia during centuries and is going on at the present moment all over the Empire

In 1841 four hundred persons organised a resistance to the soldiers, and thirty-three were killed and one hundred and fourteen wounded. Here was a little pitched battle of the same kind as has occurred so frequently in recent years. In 1842, in the government of Kasan, the authorities wanted to force the peasants belonging to the Crown to plough the land in common. Eight were killed, two hundred and thirty wounded and four hundred and twenty taken before the military courts. Then, year after year, until the emancipation in 1861, there were twenty to forty revolts, more frequent of course on the small and numerous estates of the proprietors, but of a far more serious import on the large properties of the Government. It was because he was frightened at these revolts, as Nicholas I. confessed, that he began to consider the question of emancipation, though he finally decided against it.

The State Council discussions upon emancipation are interesting as showing the intimate and interdependent relations of the landlords and the Crown. Although Nicholas confessed that the "present position cannot continue forever," he said also, "I shall never decide for the emancipation." The reason he thought conditions could not continue, he said frankly, was the spirit of revolt among the peasants. A councillor of state, seeing a little further ahead than Nicholas, proposed a plan of emancipation by which the landlord-noblemen friends of the Czar should not suffer. "In order that the peasants to be deprived of land shall not escape the labour of gentlemen," he said, "when emancipated they should form a class of obligatory peasants who should not have the right to change

their place of residence without the permission of the authorities." This is exactly what was finally done, and it had the desired result. For if the landlord owns the larger part of the land and the peasants are not permitted to leave the village, they have no choice but to work for him at his own terms or to starve. The proprietor might lose a few slave house-servants by the new system, but he would probably be better served with labour on the land. Councillors still more conservative feared that the Government would not be able to gather taxes regularly, and insisted that the peasants should have a certain amount of land, but should be forced to pay a tax beyond their power to the landlords. This amendment was also accepted, with the modification that the Government instead of the landlords collected these taxes. As the proposer of this amendment claimed would be the case, the peasants were thus obliged to work all their lives for the proprietor, with the advantage for the State and the public peace that the amount contributed was determined once for all by the law.

The State was probably persuaded to undertake the emancipation by three considerations: First, the necessity of promoting the prosperity of the peasants in order to get a new source of taxation for itself, so pressing after the disastrous Crimean War; secondly, in order to make possible the change from a small professional army to an army of the whole people, in which of course patriotism as well as military terror must be a part of the soldiers' discipline; and thirdly, in order to prevent the proprietors from literally eating up the peasantry and depopulating the country — for many of the landlords, after squeezing the last penny out of the peasants, spent everything on riotous living, invested nothing in agriculture, and were either unable or unwilling even to keep their peasants alive in famine times.

Such was the benefit received by the State. I shall now speak of the profit received by the proprietors. Let us recall, however, that whatever profited the nobility profited the State also. The Emperor Paul loved to repeat that the State had in the one hundred thousand noblemen one hundred thousand voluntary chiefs of police. The councillor of Nicholas I. whom I have just quoted, the Minister of Public Instructions Ourvarov,

said of serfdom, "This tree has taken a profound root; it shades both the Church and the Throne."

Although it was decided that it was impossible to give the peasants freedom without giving them land on which to live, nevertheless a very large portion received either no land or so little that it was impossible for them to keep themselves alive without another occupation. Seven hundred thousand domestics who before the emancipation were supposed to have the same claim as other peasants to a share of the land, were deprived definitely of all rights at this time; one hundred and sixty thousand other peasants were left landless without any excuse being offered; six hundred thousand received the so-called "beggar's lots." The extent of these lots was only one-fourth of the land the peasants had formerly tilled, the other three-fourths being left for the first time in the absolute possession and ownership of the landlords, unburdened by the duty of supporting as formerly the peasants that had been legally attached to the soil. Of the remaining four million *households* (the other four and a half million were the previously mentioned serfs of the State), one-half received allotments so small that according to the law of the Government itself, they would have had the right before the emancipation to be sent away to some new section of the country.

In all sections where the land was more valuable the peasants fell into one or another of the above classes. In the east and south, where the land was both rich and comparatively new, having been under cultivation only a few decades, the peasants lost from one-fifth to one-half, and even more, of all their property. In the equally rich but older centre of the country, they lost in every province, sometimes as much as 20 per cent. If we look at the total amount of land in possession of the peasants and proprietors at this time, we find that one hundred thousand landlords still were in possession of almost as much of the land as twenty million peasants.

The landlords gained, then, both by obtaining cheaper and more reliable labour and by getting possession of large amounts of land formerly in the peasants' hands. But this was not all. Whatever power over the person of the peasants they had lost was handed over to the police, who were also controlled either

directly by the local landlords or through St. Petersburg bureaus that were on the friendliest terms with the land-owning class. A typical law of these bureaus is that of the 12th of June, 1886, which gives the employer the right to make deductions from wages of the peasant for whatever he considered to be negligent work and even for *rudeness*.

The crushing burden of taxation laid upon the peasantry by the State has also been of tremendous service to the landlords in keeping the peasants in an utterly dependent economic condition. At the time of the emancipation the peasants who received the pitifully small allotments mentioned were burdened by the Czar with a debt of almost nine hundred million rubles, one-half more than the total value of their land. Of course they fell immediately into arrears — and at the present moment, according to a statement made in the Duma, have already paid more than one thousand five hundred million rubles. So crushing were these taxes which the starving peasants were forced to pay for freedom, that they often reached as much as 50 percent. of their total net product, and in the last decade of the nineteenth century even exceeded the peasants' income. But during this same decade the amount of money loaned by the Government to the nobility *below the market rate of interest* increased from nine hundred million rubles in 1890 to one thousand six hundred and fifty million in 1900.

In the meanwhile landlordism continued to flourish. Prince Galitzin, grand equerry of the court, has nearly three million acres; Prince Rukavishnikov, secret counsel of the ministry of the interior, has nearly two million; Prince Sheremetiev, of the Imperial Council, has nearly half a million, and so on. To show better the local conditions I shall mention some of the largest estates in the miserable province of Poltava, where I visited in the summer of 1906. There, where land is worth about one hundred rubles an acre (fifty dollars), the Duke of Mecklenburg-Strelitz has an estate worth about fifteen million rubles, Minister Durnovo's property is worth about four million, those of the Princes Kotzebue, Bariatinsky, and Gortchakov are each worth several millions. About one-third is in the hands of the rich or well-to-do proprietors, averaging more than four hundred acres of the valuable soil; while the majority of the

peasants own only from five to twenty-five acres per household, and two hundred thousand have less than five acres.

An examination of the economic basis of Russia's landlord nobility shows that there are two thousand persons, largely of princely rank, possessed of more than twenty-five thousand acres, fifteen thousand of the higher nobility and persons of corresponding wealth possessed of from twenty-five hundred to twenty-five thousand acres, and sixty thousand of the lesser nobility or gentry with two hundred and fifty to twenty-five hundred acres. The four hundred thousand individual farmers and other persons of a similar class are possessed of less than two hundred and fifty acres each. We see by these figures not only what a power the nobility has in the land, owning as it does one-third of the richest soil in the country, but also that the land is highly concentrated even within this class; for the owners whom I have called of "the higher nobility" are possessed of twice as much land as the mere gentry, while the princes own half as much again. The gentlemen taken altogether have thirteen times as much land as the middle-class farmers, excluding the fifteen million peasant households.

The condition is not fully represented by taking the country as a whole. In some parts the landlords are comparatively powerless, but in others they own such a large proportion of the land, are possessed of such large funds with which to buy the local officials and police, that under the Russian despotic system they are nothing less than a local oligarchy. In all the western and southernmost provinces, and in five others, the landlords own almost as much as, or more than, the peasants. It is in these provinces that the massacres have been organised, that the police have practised the most outrages in the so-called elections, that rents are most exorbitant and that the revolts of the peasantry have had the least success.

It is impossible, then, to consider that the peasants have ever been emancipated. Fully one-half of them, those that before 1861 had belonged to the State, are in approximately the same situation now as they were fifty years ago. The rest, besides being subjected to the State slavery that always overshadowed the private serfdom, are placed economically in the landlords' hands, and this economic dependence is enacted into

law by the statutes concerning wage contracts, strikes, rents and every other economic question. The germs of reform that are being planted at the present time, are not only without any chance of growing up into something of consequence, but they are insignificant compared to the revival of the wholesale use of direct violence on the part of the Government and the landlords, and compared to the institution of a regular civil war against that "internal enemy," the revolted peasantry.

Let us remember that the Government and the landlords, and all the innumerable writers and journalists in their pay all over the world, blame the peasants themselves for their tragic condition, and that the landlords have also managed to cajole many serious persons into crediting their statement. Let us then judge between this standpoint of hostility toward the Russian people, and that of the tens of thousands of true Russians who have devoted their whole lives to the peasantry and who take a diametrically opposite point of view. And then let us realise to the full the criminal character of a monarch and a nobility that can sustain their self-respect before the modern world only by this most infamous campaign of lies against the people to whose exploitation and misery they owe their very existence.

CHAPTER VI

THE PEASANT GIVES HIS ORDERS

AFTER the first Duma was dissolved it became more clear than ever that the great revolution is something far deeper than a struggle against the absolutism of the Czar. It is true that for more than a generation there has been growing up a strong agitation for political freedom — of the American or Western Europe type. This culminated in the general strike, the Czar's October Manifesto, the Constitutional Democratic Party and the Duma. It is also true that until the eve of its dissolution, the first Duma busied itself with political rather than social questions. The Constitutional Democratic majority as far as possible avoided the social problem — the question of the ownership of the land. In their party congress they had even omitted the land question from their programme, passing a mere resolution on the subject. In the Duma they postponed it to the last.

When, a few days before the Duma's end, the clamour of the peasant population, agrarian disorders and the direct pressure of the peasant deputies forced the Constitutional Democrats to take up the question that underlies the whole titanic revolt, they at once left the revolutionary tactics they had followed when purely political issues were at stake. From political revolutionism they passed, not to social revolutionism, but to mere social reform. They proposed very radical measures — to provide the peasants with more land, to seize all the larger estates for this purpose, to pay for them without considering in their evaluation the abnormal rents extorted from a hungry people, to abolish absentee landlordism, to limit the amount of land a man can own to what he can himself superintend, and to see that each peasant was provided, "as nearly as possible," with the "alimentary norm" of land — enough to furnish him means to provide himself with food, shelter, clothing



THRESHING BY FOOT AND BY FLAIL



HARVESTING

The haying has fallen largely into the hands of the women

— and taxes. They denied, through the mouth of their economist Herzenstein, the possibility of giving the peasant *more* than the alimentary norm of “providing work for all the people.” They hope, that is to say, that the peasant will not have to starve, but they despair of setting him on the road to prosperity. They expect that he will be condemned to much enforced idleness for the lack of land — they deny the possibility of the rapid improvement of agriculture, when they say that he cannot hope to have enough land to accumulate a surplus capital of his own. At the same time they proclaim the sacredness and inviolability of private property, and assert that they stand not for social revolution, but for social reform.

But the Russian revolution is not a mere political struggle for emancipation from an archaic form of government — it is a movement of the masses of the people to regenerate Russian society. An old order is doomed — its government, its ruling caste, its ruling ideas, its religion, its property, its property forms, its economic methods and its dominating social power. The new order cannot by any possibility be ushered in by mere political changes modeled on the political institutions of England or the United States. With the autocratic form of government will go many of the social wrongs that weigh down both the peasants and the relatively more prosperous and more educated people. Because the peasants are poor and innocent of book learning is no reason why, in the great transformation that is taking place, they should lose all the lessons of modern industrial development and the other social teachings of the hundred years that have passed since the revolution in France.

History is indeed preparing “new forms of human society,” as the peasant leader Anikine claimed — precisely because all the great forces of modern life are present in the nation — while the counter-forces are melting away. The greatest retarding forces, the national traditions, political, religious, and social, are already comparatively lifeless. The revolution is beating out of them what vitality remained. The national character is that of a youth, the character of the individual peasant that of a child. Both absorb readily every new and useful idea. The peasant is somewhat inert because he is physically and spiritually underfed. He grasps and devours a friendly book or

newspaper with as much avidity as a loaf of unaccustomed wheat flour. With the same appreciation of his needs he adopts and learns the use of modern agricultural implements and every modern method, when they happen to fall within his miserable means. The ignorance and poverty of the peasant do not constitute a national tradition, despite the doctrine of Pobiedonostzev. The peasants are as eager to improve their condition, spiritual and material, as are any poor and ignorant pioneers. Their inertia is only a resisting medium; it is not a reactionary force. It can delay the time of the final outbreak, and increase its intensity and profundity in proportion to the delay. To overcome this ignorance and poverty of the peasants there are present, on a greater or lesser scale, all the forces of modern civilisation, and a public spirit new in the history of the great nations.

The material development is backward only in the country and in the less accessible sections. Very many of the factories, mills, railroads, and steamships are most modern; so are many of the public buildings, theatres, many of the public institutions and schools, and nearly all the ideas, aspirations and theories of the truly educated class. No educated class in the world's history has ever made such a general, persistent, and heroic effort to reach the people. A considerable proportion of the Russian peasants, and the larger part of the Russian workingmen, have been familiarised with the most important movements and ideas of foreign lands by means of a sea of forbidden, and therefore all the more valued, popular literature. From the agrarian movements of Europe to our People's Party, and from the conservative trades unions of Great Britain to the revolutionary socialism of the continent, there is no great movement or social idea that has not been in this way brought to the people. I do not believe that there is anywhere any such deep and varied study of all that goes to make up modern Socialism as among the Russian working class.

The Russian upheaval is, then, a conscious social movement, and this is why it may develop into the most portentous historic event up to the present time. Like former revolutions and civil wars in France, England, and the United States, it claims for the citizens the political rights of men. But unlike any

preceding national cataclysm, it insists on social as well as political rights, on economic equality, on the right of every man to as much land as he can till, and of no man to more, and on the right of all the people to all the land for all time.

The first Duma was dissolved, not on account of the *revolutionary political* measures or the *radical social* reforms of the Constitutional Democratic majority, but because the peasant deputies were making ominous preparations for *social revolution*. The Labour Group proposed, not the expropriation of some, but the abolition of all landlords, along with their dependents the tenants and agricultural labourers; not the temporary suspension of the sacred right of private property in the time of a great social crisis, but its abolition for all time. They claimed it was the duty of society to provide work for all the people. Therefore, they proposed to provide every peasant labourer with all the land he could work with his own hands, or to come as near that standard, "the labour norm," as conditions would allow.

There seems not to be enough land in Russia to keep every tiller of the soil fully employed. But it is just for this reason that the land question has become a social problem. If there were enough land, each individual could be provided with his quarter section and left to fight it out with nature, as in the United States. Every man would cultivate as much as his brain and body allowed. Competition in the marketing of products there would be, but not cut-throat competition for the land itself. Russian agriculture is facing already a crisis that all agriculture will have to face in the end, when there is no more free land. The nations then either will have to take the land for all the people, or leave it a monopoly in the hands of a larger or smaller social class.

If Russia's supply of land is too small now, argue the peasants, even after the expropriation of all the landlords, why allow every individual the right further to decrease that supply by acquiring a disproportionate share? No one man is to own an acre in fee simple, and even his right of possession is to be restricted, not to what he can personally superintend, as the Constitutional Democrats suggest, but to what he can work with his own hands or in coöperation with fellow labourers.

In the words of Anikine in the Duma: "We need the land not for sale or mortgage, not for speculation, not to rent it out and get rich, but to work on it. The land interests us not as a merchandise or commodity, but as a means to raise useful products. We need the land only to plough, therefore we do not want private property."

But if economic equality is to be maintained there must be either equalisation by periodic redistributions, or a progressive tax against the more valuable properties. The peasants' group in the Duma adopted both ideas. If there is a rapid rise in land values, the surplus value of those benefited is forthwith to be taxed away for the benefit of the community. If the rise is large, there may also be a redistribution of the land. With a rise in the cost of living and a corresponding increase in the size of the "alimentary norm," the individual may demand a larger share, and always a landless worker may claim his allotment. The problem of the unemployed is to be solved by every labourer having the right to a farm — however small.

As the maximum and minimum land allotment the peasants propose to establish are the same — every man to have as much land as he can work with his own hands, and no man to have more — their goal is nothing less than a practical economic equality. Some margin is allowed for variations of exceptional individuals from the average in their capacity for labour, but the margin is not very wide. Numerous resolutions of peasant meetings give an accurate numerical measure. The peasants of the poorer lands would allow a man to hold from fifty-six to one hundred and thirty-two acres, those of more fertile districts from twenty-four to sixty-six acres, considering that the best worker in good health can scarcely do three times the work of his neighbour. This is almost equality. Certainly it is the recognition of the principle that no man should enjoy the fruits of another's labour.

The hundred million know very well they are asking for no simple social reform, but for a social revolution and the mastery of their country. They knew that they were not likely to see their strivings of half a century satisfied by a Duma in the full power of the Czar. The instructions, "ukases," they

sent to their deputies by the tens of thousands were filled with a sense of the probable bitterness of the coming conflict. "Fight on you fighters," run the exact words of one of these. "Fight to the bitter end. Go forward fearlessly for the people's cause. Many millions of dead-worn and tormented peasants look to you and wait. As long as you are with us we will stand by you." The deputies obeyed. In the Duma they denounced the Government and all its works; when the Duma was closed they called the people to armed rebellion. They fought to the bitter end — prison and the shadow of the scaffold. And the peasants kept their word too, as far as their power allowed, for they frequently offered their lives and liberty to save their deputies from arrest.

Another ukase shows clearly the cry for real, social equity — not a merely theoretical or political, but a genuine, concrete, economic equality. "Some tens of thousands own the land and live in luxury," it argues, "while tens of millions must go half starved and work for them their whole life through. We human beings are all alike and all brothers. We must enjoy equally the nature God has created, and therefore we have decided to ask the Duma to confiscate all the land and to have the State take charge of it and to allow only those to have access to it who will till it with their own hands. We rely upon the deputies we have elected to do all that is possible to relieve us from all kinds of misery and from the Cossacks. The Duma can count on our doing whatever will be required."

The following ukase of a Samara village typifies thousands:

We assembled here to write to you and after a discussion we came to the conclusion that the famine, the misery, and the ignorance of the Russian people, the shameful war with the Japanese, the unheard-of troubles, the continuous insurrections, come from the fact that the best lands of our country belong to gentlemen proprietors, to the Crown, to the State, and to the monasteries. In spite of ourselves we are forced to rent these lands and pay for them every year thirty rubles a dessiatine (\$5.62 an acre).

Until now we have not been allowed to think even of our rights. They confiscated our property, laughed at us as much as they pleased; and since the organisation of the institution of the officials called "Zemski Natchalniki" (land officials), we have fallen completely into the hands of the gentlemen bureaucrats. We cannot take a single step without the authorisation of this little despot. Our private and community

affairs, family and property matters, must all be submitted to their sanction. Some of them often tell us that they ought to be to us both "God and the Czar."

So we fear that all the ills of our poor country come from the fact that we are in the power of a little group of gentlemen, rich people, and bureaucrats. We have had enough. We are at the end of our patience, and we *order* our delegate Chuvalov to demand in the Duma:

(1) The right to send to the Duma as our representatives men whom we esteem and with whose convictions we are familiar. These representatives must have constitutional power. They must be selected by a direct, universal, *equal*, and secret ballot. [This is more advanced than in the United States, since the votes that elect our Senators are neither equal nor direct].

(2) The confiscation of State, Crown, monastery and private lands and their transmission into the hands of the whole people on the condition that every citizen may make use of it who works it with his own hands, with the aid of his family, or in coöperation.

The other demands are the repayment into the coffers of the State of all the money the peasants have already paid for their lands, the replacement of customs duties and excises by a progressive income tax, a general amnesty of political prisoners and exiles, the abolition of the death penalty, the election of all local officials, compulsory education, and the carrying out of all the liberties promised by the Manifesto of the 17th of October.

Already, then, along with the social ownership of the land, Russia's common people are insisting on every other line of revolutionary social advance: the elevation of the sacredness of the human individual to the point of the abolition of capital punishment; the gradual equalisation of wealth through the graduated income tax, and the most democratic representative government possible, a single sovereign chamber, with full legislative, judicial and executive powers, to be elected by direct suffrage, like the British Parliament, and by an equal and universal vote. Each one of these democratic institutions has been now thoroughly tried, but to our eternal shame and disgrace none prevail in the United States. The Russians have passed us in their political demands. They are making an heroic revolutionary effort to reach a degree of democracy and liberty that remains only a pious aspiration among the Americans.

The men the peasants trust and to whom they sent their

ukases and delegations are revolutionists. They did all it was possible to do in the Duma of the Czar. While the Duma was in session they insisted on a peaceful revolution, an immediate constitutional assembly. They proposed local commissions, elected by the equal vote of the people, to report to the coming constitutional assembly on the question of the land. But they expected and predicted that the Duma would be dissolved before anything could be accomplished. When this happened they turned to overt revolution, accused the Government of treason, called on the army to mutiny, on the population to disobey the officers of the law, on the peasants to take the land.

The peasant group are also Socialists — often former members of the Socialist Revolutionary or Social Democratic parties. They are independent of formulated party programmes, they are true democrats who believe that the peasants themselves will force the country in the direction of Socialism. The programme they proposed in the Duma was not their own, but that already worked out by the Peasants' Union a year before and endorsed by thousands of villages in the fall. With this programme as a starting-point, with the aid of some twenty thousand "instructions" they received while the Duma was in session, and with the advice of the six hundred delegates the peasants sent to St. Petersburg, they can surely claim to know what the peasants want.

The demand of the Peasants' Union, of the twenty thousand villages, and of the Labour Group has swollen from the old demand for "land and freedom" to the war-cry of the social revolution: "To the people *all* the power and *all* the land."

Russia's desperate struggle is not a mere reaction against hunger and the Czar. It is a world-event of unparalleled significance, a giant effort to win for Russia, and perhaps other nations as well, what no nation has ever attained — unlimited democracy in government and equality in possession of the land — the fulfilment of the French Revolution, the limit of purely democratic evolution, the conquest of the last of the rights of man, a fierce attack at the roots of private property and the laying of foundation for a free Socialist state.

This is the cause that Russians die for, the faith of the revolution — "to the people all the power and all the land."

CHAPTER VII

HOW THE PEASANT BECAME A REVOLUTIONIST

THERE was a time when we considered the Czar the god of the earth and the greatest of all benefactors. Now, the newspapers have opened the eyes of us common people. We see that he is only the richest of landlords and the first of all vampires. The blood that he has drunk will some day flow from him again."

This statement is typical of how the peasants talked after the Czar closed the first Duma and destroyed the faith of his people. It was spoken in a Volga village in my presence before a chance gathering of peasants, and I was requested to write it down and send it to America to show what the common people are thinking about their Czar. The Russian State is resting on a sleeping volcano of the people's hate. The real revolution — that of the hundred million peasants — is yet to come. When it does come the French Revolution will be eclipsed. For the forces to be overthrown by the Russian people are richer, wiser, and incomparably better organised than was the rotten feudalism of France.

What are the chances of an event of this inconceivable magnitude? At first glance the outlook is dark enough. Throughout all Russia the townspeople have abandoned themselves to depression or despair. The middle classes staked everything on the Dumas. Their last cards were passive resistance as to taxes and recruits, and the denunciation of foreign loans. Passive resistance having proved impracticable against active despotism, was definitely abandoned by the very party by which it was proposed. The denunciation of foreign loans is accountable at the most for a fall of not more than a point or two in the Russian funds. The Constitutional Democrats, partisans of those measures, managed to prevent the general disintegration of their party, but they have not been

able to prevent a wholesale desertion from their ranks. In the provincial capitals and country towns, where, like low thunder, the voice of the gagged and beaten peasants is beginning to be heard, there is a restless seeking for new parties and new means of combat to correspond with the magnitude and profundity of the growing revolt.

The workingmen are hardly in a better situation than the middle classes of the towns. The brilliantly successful general strike of October, 1905, brought the Manifesto, but it seems to have succeeded only because the Czar was unprepared. The workingmen's organisations were the first to recognise the fact. The next general strike must also be an insurrection, the St. Petersburg council of labour deputies decided within a few days after the strike had been brought to a close. The expected insurrection strike took place long before the councils were ready for it. The barricades of Moscow were reproduced at a dozen other important industrial centres. But the Government was prepared this time for both strikes and insurrection. Within a few weeks the last of the barricades had been swept away, the leaders imprisoned or shot, and the railroad men put to work under martial law and the penalty of instant death for leaving their posts.

This was the last spasmodic effort of the rebellious workingmen. Since the barricades, the masses of the towns have been vainly dreaming of, or sometimes vainly planning, another insurrection. This time it was to be an insurrection of soldiers and workmen — a mutiny strike. There were two insurmountable obstacles to the new plan. The workmen-soldiers of the artillery and sappers and miners were ready to die for the cause, and did die by hundreds at Sveaborg and Kronstadt; but the peasant soldiers, in the face of this type of munity, remained loyal to the Czar. The Railroad Union was ready to strike, but they were not ready to face the military courts unless the strike had some chances of success. To gain success, their congress unanimously decided, there must not only be a cessation of labour, but a tearing up of rails, blowing up of bridges and the destruction of the telegraph lines. The Government has declared a railway strike rebellion, the strikers to be instantly executed for high treason. Against this official "state of war"

the union proposed also to declare war. But for such a war the railway workers are not enough; they must have the support of the population along the lines. That population must be inflamed to the point not only of protecting and hiding the scattered and otherwise helpless railway men, but of aiding in the work of cutting and keeping out the Government's communications — an object eminently worth while in one case, but one only, when the peasants themselves are in revolt. The Railroad Union decided to wait.

Every path, then, that the "legal" opposition or the illegal revolution has trod has led finally to the peasants. Refusal of taxes, refusal of recruits, refusal to shoot on the revolted workmen, destruction of the railway lines, all depend on the peasants. And what has been their reply? We know what they did in the first two Duma elections; they sent the most radical and fearless deputies the Duma contained, men at the same time wise enough to lead the Duma even to its dissolution, and after that to the manifesto of "passive" revolt. We know how they supported their members with hundreds of delegations and some twenty thousand instructions as to what their servants, the deputies, were to demand. What do they intend, now that their Dumas are abolished, now that they have lost the only chance for a free discussion of their lot on a national scale that they have had for the thousand years since they left the pastoral stage of man, now that all other classes in the nation have cried out to them to act?

What did the peasants say when the first Duma was closed? The papers of the capital were not allowed to discuss the subject, the peasants no longer had Duma delegates with whom to lodge their grievances. But the provincial papers, caught in the irresistible current of free expression that prevailed during the Duma's session, were harder to suppress, and from them we see that in thousands of villages peasant opinion had so gained the upper hand over the village clergy and police that public discussion, even in official village meetings, went on much as before the Duma was dissolved. I went to the provincial capitals and smaller towns, and visited a number of villages, to make sure that these reports were correct. I found the peasants invariably familiar with all the larger aspects of the revolution.

I found that, trained by centuries of oppression and defeat, and having put little hope in the late Duma, they were neither surprised nor despondent at its dissolution. Having long hated the Government, they were now beginning to hate the Czar. Having long lost respect for the Government Church, they were now turning actively against it. Having put their case in the Duma and seeing it despised and their elected deputies thrown into prison, they now fully realised that they would get from the Government only what they could take.

"When Gapon came with the workingmen and a petition to the Czar, the ministers called them rebels," said the peasant I have quoted at the beginning of this chapter. "Then we believed it. When the Duma was meeting, the ministers stood against the people, and we knew that the ministers were our enemies. But now that the Duma is dissolved, we see that the Czar and the ministers are the same. Now we know that the Czar is our enemy, too, and we must upset the whole Government. And the peasants are ready to do it "

This statement of the peasant attitude is true. The massacre of the 22d of January, 1905, removed the last traces of loyalty from the masses of the workmen and the citizens. The brutal dissolution of the first Duma, and the abolition of the second, took away the last illusion and the last hope from the people of the soil. On the evening of the 22d of January a friend visiting Count Witte found him prostrate on his couch. With tears in his eyes, Witte said the last hope of the nation had been destroyed, the faith of the people in the Czar. That was true only of the cities then. It is true of the country and the nation to-day.

Listen now to the voice of another village. A little group was explaining to me the village opinion, and about them gathered the whole village, old men and young as they came home one by one from the fields, the women and the children. Many talked at the same time, but the peasants know how to talk together — as they have learned to do in their village meetings for centuries past. Out of the whole clearly came this common speech:

"We did hope the Duma would help us. But now we see that it was made for the rich and not for the poor. We were

told from the first that the Duma was a fraud made to lead us off by the nose, and that's all it was. We heard about the closing of the Duma a few days after it happened, but we did not hear the Czar's manifesto about it read in church. We do not go to church any more because when we hear the pope pray for the Government and the Czar, it is just as if some one turned a knife in our stomachs.

"We believed the October Manifesto, too, and in three days the Czar took it back. Now we all see we have nothing to expect. We've had enough of carrying the landlords on our backs. It's better to die for the right. If the other villages do anything we won't be behind."

"Do you believe in the Czar?" I asked.

"We believed in him once," they answered, without a protesting voice, "as in God, but our eyes now are open. Now we know it is n't the ministers, but the Czar himself who is to blame."

The villages I have mentioned were on the middle and lower Volga. Up toward the source of the river, by the northern woods that stretch up to the arctic tundra and reindeer land, I visited another little town. There the older peasants — splendid, erect, regular-featured men — were gathered together in the tea-house to make a business deal concerning the village hay with their friend, the agricultural expert of the Zemstvo, who had brought me with him. They, too, were unanimous in their opinions. They would gladly boycott the taxes and refuse recruits if this were possible. But a village can't resist a squadron of Cossacks, and the taxes, they understood clearly, were for the most part indirect and could not be boycotted. They knew all about the customs duties on cotton and tea, and the excise duties on petroleum, alcohol, sugar and vodka, that make them pay two or three prices for all they buy. They were clear as to what they thought about the Duma. They would not bother about another such as the last. The next one they would turn into a constituent assembly, and for that they would lay down their lives. They knew well enough what a constituent assembly was. It is a body, they said, that appoints all the ministers and officials. It must have all the power, and nobody (not the Czar) is to have a right to interfere with its

acts. While the older peasants were saying these things the younger peasants outside were singing as accompaniment the fiery, revolutionary words of the peasants' "Marseillaise."

The last hope of the Czar, the ignorance and disunion of his people, is giving way. In Russia the tendency of all despotism to keep the people in darkness and to exploit their divided state has been exalted into a perfectly conscious principle of State, freely expressed by ministers, bureaucrats, and heads of the Church. First, they say, do not let the individual know what the Government is about, and, second, if individuals do manage to learn, they must not be allowed any expression of what they think or want. The peasants were not only not taught to read by the Government, they were not allowed to read. If they had learned what the Government was about and wanted to hold meetings to discuss what they had learned, the village police sat by, closed the meeting when they saw fit, and arrested those whose speeches they did not like. As to meetings of several villages, they were tolerated under no form.

Since the war the new pressure against this system of compulsory ignorance has all but broken it down. The police are still on duty. Joint meetings of villages must be held secretly in the woods. Unnumbered tons of pamphlets and newspapers are confiscated and destroyed. But all the villages have now read more or less of the new deluge of newspapers, pamphlets, books, and peasants' weeklies. The peasants' intellectual appetite has grown incredibly, as I have already pointed out. They beg newspapers from the travellers, they send delegates to towns to get the students' aid. They spend the nights in barns or woods listening to readings of the French Revolution, or the history of Russia as it is not taught in the schools. Invariably they begged reading matter from our party, and I was often astonished by what they had already read. They pulled the most revolutionary proclamations out of their pockets, and asked intelligent questions about the conditions in the United States.

In a certain village I met a typical case of this development of interest. A young peasant who had been reading and studying through the long winter evenings for several years, under the guidance of a genial revolutionist librarian that

spent his summers nearby, undertook to rouse the people of his village by reading to them. Two winters before my visit he had found the villagers so little interested that even in the dull isolation of the northern night, they did not care to hear him read. The following winter all was suddenly changed; they eagerly followed and fairly consumed every scrap of printed matter he could offer; they were specially delighted with a little history of Russia, already circulated among the villages to the number of half a million copies. Picture the excitement of the peasants of a village that has slumbered from immemorial times when suddenly awakened to the dramatic story of their own wrongs, as freshly written by a Socialist writer with something of the simple style and the emotional genius of a Tolstoi!

Nearly all the peasants I met during my two thousand mile journey down the Volga had read an excellent peasants' weekly, published in Kasan. As a type of several others issued by the Socialist Revolutionary Party or the peasant group in the Duma and scattered in nearly every village in the land, a summary of its contents during the Duma and since will show the character of the peasants' new intellectual diet.

The *Kasan Peasants' News* seemingly neglected nothing that the peasants most needed to understand. Beginning with the late war, the whole ruinous policy of the Government was exposed and effectually damned. The weapons by which the Government maintains itself were sketched historically — Cossacks, "black hundreds" and the League of True Russian Men. It was pointed out that the village police and the new type of soldier-ruffians called rural guards, are paid twice as much as the village schoolmaster, who gets one hundred dollars a year. The Government's proposed reforms were laid bare in all their flimsiness, and there was a résumé showing how little the Government has done for the peasants.

The possibility of change was suggested by outlines of foreign forms of government, foreign election laws and foreign agrarian movements. There was a full account of the now illegal Peasants' Union, of the thousands of ukases sent by the peasants to the Duma, of the agrarian disorders, of the brutal expeditions of revenge sent out by the Government at the

demand and often under the personal direction of the injured landlords, of the killing and maiming of the peasants, of the retaliation of the latter in the Baltic provinces and in the Caucasus. To combat the Government's efforts to turn the popular excitement from itself to the Jews, Poles, Armenians, Letts, Lithuanians, this peasants' paper tried in every number to familiarise the peasants with the virtues and friendliness of these "conquered peoples."

The "black" papers, sustained by Government subsidies, or by the liberal subscriptions of high-place bureaucrats, generals, and landlords, carefully excluded any mention of these wholesome truths. But their influence was slight. Only in one village did I find copies of any of the reactionary organs sent gratis all over the land. For they were not only incredibly brutal and false, they were incredibly stupid in their judgment of the peasants. For instance, starving countrymen — and, be it remembered, there were thirty million of them in the winter of 1906-7 — were told that the reports of the famine were grossly exaggerated, and that if they suffered it was from their own drunkenness and laziness.

"Without the land officials and police and other benefactors," says one of those extraordinary articles, "the peasants would perish like a flock without shepherds." Now the hatred of the peasants for these same officials and police is too bitter and deep for words. Innumerable cases are on record in which these "shepherds" have beaten their sheep to death with clubs, or have crippled them for life. In Tambov, in the fall of 1905, some half hundred peasant rioters were captured while engaged in openly hauling off the landlords' grain, as the peasants did in thousands of villages at this time. The police "shepherd" had them bound and gagged, and held them prisoners in the barn which they were sacking. They were made to lie on one side for several weeks and beaten when they turned. One at a time they were "examined" and tortured within hearing of their comrades. Sixteen were thus before all slowly beaten to death, executed, not for murder, violence, or attack on the public officials, but for taking in broad daylight, or stealing, if you like, what they considered should in law and justice have been their own. Every village has seen or known of cases of the

kind. What influence can a press have that sees in these brutes the shepherds of the peasant flock?

If it were not for the assiduity of a part of the village priests the peasants would long ago have lost all credence in the official system of falsehood. One priest and patriotic agitator travels about calling the peasants' deputies in the Duma Anti-Christ's who had been bought by the Jews. Others preach the like in their churches; all are perforce tools of the Czar, must read his ukases and manifestoes from the pulpit. Not all, however, are still "black" in their hearts; thousands are openly liberal and some are secretly revolutionists. Those who are still loyal are being reduced by the population to narrow straits. Only a dozen families of the hundreds in the village, the money-lenders and shopkeepers, are contented. The discontented, when not rebels at heart, are incredulous; in many places they have deserted the churches; in others they are beginning to boycott the services of the priests, and in some cases the villagers are taking away from the priests the grants of village lands upon which they live. The village popes were never respected, and this lack of respect is turning into open hate. Their sermons, threats, and advice will not long seriously hinder the new flood of literature and public discussion.

In the last two years and a half there has been more reading and discussion in the villages than took place in the preceding forty-five years. The peasants, then, know the great facts of the situation, but they know also what they have yet to learn. They have discussed everything in their village meetings, and often several villages have met together in the woods. They have held frequent secret congresses at which dozens, hundreds, and even thousands of villages have been represented. They have gone further in some governments, where, with the aid of the revolutionists, the whole countryside is organised in a system of secret committees — village, volost (township), district (county), and government (state). All this reading, discussion, and organisation, however hampered and incomplete, is duly bearing fruit.

The idea of a peasants' union and a peasants' party, of the absolute necessity of a common organization for all Russia, has taken permanent root; also the idea that the people's Duma

was opposed, thwarted and finally abolished by the Government of the Czar; also the demand for a Duma with all the power of a constituent assembly; and, finally, the belief that the people should have all the land and that there should be no more landlords either now or at any future time.

The great majority of the villages hold in common the same ideas as to the means by which the people are to get the power and the land. They and their representatives — who had long ago proposed passive resistance, the refusal of taxes and recruits, and the denunciation of the foreign loans, measures that the Constitutional Democrats adopted only when the Duma was dissolved — were also the first to discover, as they had suspected from the outset, that these measures alone would never bring the Government to terms. Furthermore, the peasants have recognised that the measures of their own representatives were not at the time practical. After the dissolution of the first Duma the peasant deputies not only declared the Government illegal and at war with the people, but they declared all peaceful relations at an end. They left the accepted Fabian tactics of revolution of the Peasants' Union and joined with the Socialist parties in the proclamation of mutiny and armed insurrection before the army was ready to mutiny or the peasants ready to rise.

Now, what has happened in the tens of thousands of disaffected villages that cover the land? They read the proclamation of the peasants' group, and agreed heartily that the Government was illegal and was to be overturned. As for the proposal of insurrection, they served it as they did the call to passive resistance of the Constitutional Democrats; they labeled it as impractical and passed to the order of the day — the tried and developed tactics of the Peasants' Union.

Here is the peasants' programme: The Government evidently is not yet to be voted out, starved out or suddenly overthrown. But it can be worried to death, it can be gradually cut off from its sources of supply, the army can be gradually honeycombed with disaffection, the elections can serve as an excuse for agitation and disorders; the landlords, the only economic class supporting the Government, can be starved out, their houses and crops burned at night, and themselves literally driven from

the land; the life of the village authorities, officials, clergymen, and police, can be made unbearable — their property and lives forfeited if need be. Government property can be pillaged and Government officials killed. In cases of successful guerilla war, as in the Caucasus and the Baltic provinces, the guerilla bands can be provided with food and money, and at the proper moment bridges and railroads can be destroyed. And the forced service of the peasant soldiers against their relatives and friends can lead rapidly to the spread of mutiny, till finally the larger part of the army passes out of Government control. That all this can be is proven by the fact that it has already been. A general, simultaneous, armed insurrection may never occur. But there are many degrees of rebellion between this and the tame submission to such "legal" reforms as may be granted by a Government whose hands are red with the people's blood.

Revolution by secret and guerilla war may be long and costly — it may be proportionately thorough and profound. Russia may pay a price such as Germany paid in the Thirty Years' War — she has not yet made a tithe of the sacrifices we suffered for an alien race during our War of the Rebellion. But the facts are already here to show that, unfrightened by the Czar's access to all the gold of earth, Russia is treading with increasing rapidity the road of decentralised, general, and revolutionary violence against her Government, and that she will follow it to the end.

CHAPTER VIII

THE VILLAGE AGAINST THE CZAR — A STATE OF MIND

THE threat and the imminent possibility of a costly, bloody and terrible revolution of the whole mass of the people is the driving force in Russia to-day. A general uprising is in the last resort the only possible goal for the revolutionary parties, it being deliberately prepared for by the Government, and it is the only real argument with which the nation has ever influenced the Czar. Whether the uprising actually does occur this year, next year, or never is relatively unimportant. It is enough to shape Russian history that it is an imminent possibility. To understand the chances of the revolution, the motives of the revolutionists, the inner meaning of the policy of the Government, we must realise with all well-informed Russians that this mass movement is, under present conditions, just what may be expected to occur; we must see just what the Government is doing and may be expected to do to prevent it, and we must know what qualities in the people and what elements in the general situation give the revolutionists the remarkable faith in the people that inspires their action.

The Government is in a feverish strain to keep the peasants out of the revolution. This is the key to every action it has taken since Witte came into power. I myself have heard Count Witte say, as I have already mentioned, that he expected the first Duma — largely a peasant body — to be composed of Jew-haters; that is, he actually thought (or said he thought) that the peasants would send forward extreme reactionaries in answer to the call of the Czar. In this mistaken belief lies the reason for the original convocation of a body that proved to be so hostile to the Czar. A majority of reactionary peasants was expected by the Government, and this majority was to have offset the revolutionism of the zemstvos, the intelligent townspeople and the workingmen. But instead

of sending reactionary representatives, the peasants sent Aladdin and his confrères, and these men called on the peasants, when the Duma was dissolved, to revolt against a Government that had "betrayed" them, was guilty of "treason," and had forfeited all claims to authority and the obedience of the people.

Not only the institution of a representative assembly, but all the other real Government changes in Russia since the fall of 1905, along with innumerable false promises of changes, have been aimed at the growing peasant discontent. Take for instance the new so-called "freedom of worship." Immediately after the October Manifesto the popular faction of the Russian Church, the ritualists, or "old believers," were given religious freedom, while the Jewish and other religions remained in about the same position as before. Why were the "old believers" preferred? Because among them are fifteen to twenty million peasants. Then consider the only important change in the system of taxation. Witte had not been prime minister for many weeks before the peasants were relieved of thirty-five million rubles of direct taxation on the land — and in 1906 a similar burden was removed. To counterbalance this loss all other forms of taxation were increased. Then shortly before the closing of the first Duma came the sale of the Crown lands — a drop in the bucket for the individual peasants — but a very real loss to the Czar. Then a few months ago certain special legal disabilities of the peasants were removed. They were given, for the first time, freedom to come and go, and access to the same justice(?) as the higher classes. Finally the property disqualification — the inability of the peasants to sell or mortgage their share of the village land — has been abolished, and it is said that the village commune, along with its common responsibility to the Government for the taxes of individuals, must disappear.

All these concessions were made during or after the time of hundreds and thousands of armed peasant revolts. And what is the outcome? The peasants feel that they have forced the Government to terms. They are not grateful as they would have been had the changes been freely granted. They are only crying for more. For, of course, none of these reforms strike

at the roots of the evil — the peasants' poverty, the terrible indirect taxation on which the Government lives, the oppression by local officials, the lack of the least trace of individual freedom, and the lack of that public life which can only come from local and national self-government. Besides, most of the reforms that have been given are not in reality in force. Every vestige of new or old freedom or legal form is choked by a monstrous growth of military courts, military governors, political execution and exile without trace of legal procedure. And every reality has been diluted and adulterated by a mass of false and broken promises.

The Russian peasantry has always been an eminently rebellious people and the tradition of rebellion has been revered and kept alive for hundreds of years. Over two centuries ago, almost immediately after the institution of serfdom, occurred the revolt of the Volga pirate, Stenka Razin, in which millions of peasants took part. More than a hundred years ago half of peasant Russia was infected with the rebellion of the serfs against the masters under the pretender Pougatchev. In this rebellion hundreds of thousands of peasants died, apparently in vain, for freedom. But neither the authorities nor the peasants have ever forgotten the event. I passed through a Volga province last summer, where the peasants of a certain village had asked the priest to say a mass for the souls of Pougatchev and Stenka Razin.

All through the present century every province of Russia has witnessed the horribly bloody suppression of peasant revolts. In 1854 and 1855 the rebellions covered a large part of Russia, and the partly enlightened Alexander II. told his landlords that they must either consent to the proposed emancipation of the serfs or see it accomplished by a movement from below. Even this Czar, so autocratic in the last half of his reign, realised the power and probable will of the peasants *in extremis* to overturn the whole structure of the Russian State. The great emancipation, then, was accomplished neither from philanthropic motives nor from economic consideration, but from a highly justified fear of immediate revolution.

After the emancipation the peasants again showed their unwillingness to accept, unless through sheer impotence, either autoc-

racy or the well-disguised shadow of reform that the emancipation turned out to be. After passing through the hands of the landlords' commission to which the Czar referred it, the proclamation contained neither freedom nor even the more needed land. The State simply became the master and extortioner instead of the landlord, while the latter got an even firmer grip on all the better parts of the land. The following years were most busy ones for the Czar's Cossacks and dragoons. The peasantry of whole provinces were in rebellion, there was violence in every direction, and there were many hundreds of outbreaks sufficiently serious to justify the call for military aid.

Never since the emancipation has the ceaseless recurrence of village rebellions been interrupted. Five years ago, before the Japanese war, there were half a hundred revolts in two provinces alone, and the peasants had to be mercilessly beaten and executed into submission. And in 1906 the spirit and fact of rebellion became general throughout the nation — more general, perhaps, than ever in the history of the empire.

The Russian villages have never lacked the will or the courage to revolt. They have only been wanting in the physical possibility of revolting together. No army can act as a unit, divided into a hundred thousand contingents and scattered over the half of a hemisphere. Yet if not much more coördinated and organised now than before, the revolts have become more and more general, and more and more imbued with a common idea. The villages discuss for months and years a situation that is general in the land. National crises arise. The reaction on the villages is general, almost universal — all the villages are prepared for similar action by the same events. Some village makes a desperate beginning and the outbreaks spread like wildfire over the country. To the outsider it all looks blind and wild. The observer in the village is neither shocked nor surprised. So it has come about that the spirit and manner of the peasants' revolts have kept a general character and have evolved together as a single movement.

The first roots of revolution go down to the very sources of the peasant nature. The Russian peasant was originally enslaved only by the utmost cruelty and bloodshed, after centuries

of the same relative freedom as our Anglo-Saxon forefathers enjoyed before the Normans came. But the enslavement came a thousand years ago in England; in Russia it came but three centuries ago — ten or twelve uneventful generations — and the peasants never forgot their former relative freedom. The Russians were so little serfs in spirit that they attached the smallest importance to their emancipation in 1861 from a yoke they had never accepted in their hearts. The system had only succeeded in keeping alive the spirit of rebellion against all authority.

The State religion, as we have also seen, had no deeper hold. No people of Europe so thoroughly paganised the early Christianity with their own popular legends and their own truly popular saints. Many millions of peasants, separating entirely from the Russian Church, have formed some of the most rational and some of the most spiritual sects in existence, never halted in their growth by the continuous persecution of the Government. As to the rest, the so-called orthodox, they mechanically follow the set Governmental forms and are inspired with a sincere, if broad and loose, Christianity. But nowhere do they show any deep respect either for the priests or their State-directed utterances from the pulpit. Not in Catholic Italy or Protestant England is there more resistance to the Church as an institution, more independent religious feeling, more rebellion against established creed. The peasant is imbued and permeated in his religious feeling, that is in the depths of his nature, by a thorough spirit of revolt.

In morality and law the opinion of the village, and not that of the priests, fixes the living moral code. This code is vital and flexible, irregular and changeable, but on the whole most elevated and most humane — witness any great Russian writer, say Turgeniev or Tolstoi. As for the St. Petersburg law, true, it must be obeyed, for it is backed by whips and bullets, imprisonment and exile — but it comes from outside the village assembly, so it is obeyed only in its letter, and not in its spirit. The peasants are told by the Government not to try to understand it, but to obey. So they obey its letter without trying to understand its spirit, and in consequence fully half of the Czar's orders are reduced to naught.

The peasants are born and bred in an atmosphere of unconscious and even conscious passive resistance to both Church and State. They were ordered from St. Petersburg not to interfere in the passing of property from father to son. But the villagers have always been accustomed to consider all the land at the bottom common property of the village. When an heir had too little, he was given something from the village store; when he had too much, something was taken away. So the Czar's orders were disobeyed. His terrible Cossacks were as nothing against the quiet village will, the common and almost religious feeling of the people that the land belongs to the community. The majority of the villagers not only equalised the shares between heirs, but they equalised landed wealth among all the families of the village. The Czar's Government, seeing at every point in the present revolution the danger of this rebellious village spirit, has decided to abolish entirely the commune's control over individual property. It can be doubted if the Czar has the power. In the village, the village meeting is the sovereign rather than the Czar.

Before the first Duma met, before even the Peasants' Union had conceived the plan, the peasants' spirit of resistance had already led to boycotting taxes and recruits. Many villages had refused taxes on various grounds; many others had refused the last levies of recruits during the war. These methods of action were proposed a year before the Duma by peasants at all the congresses of the Peasants' Union and were adopted and spread broadcast over the land. When the Czar dissolved the first Duma, and the representatives of all the nation wished to find a means of general national resistance, they adopted as a national measure the peasants' plan of the boycotting of taxes and recruits. Thus the first great revolutionary measure ever endorsed by the Russian people as a nation, came neither from professional revolutionists nor any upper social class, but from the people themselves.

But long before the Duma had adopted this measure, it had already been sufficiently tested among the peasantry to be rejected by them as impractical, for it left every advantage in the hands of the Government, which, of course, did not scruple to use force. They had turned to less passive ways

of making their power felt. The first and most natural action was against the landlords, who constitute the main support of the throne both in St. Petersburg and in the country. As soon as the Czar had granted the October Manifesto, the peasants began to make their preparations. They argued that the Manifesto must have given something of a very concrete nature to the nation at large, as was evident to them by the enthusiasm with which it had been received in the towns. They knew that the only reality to them as country people was the land. Therefore the Manifesto must sooner or later enable them to acquire the landlords' landed property. They began to consider themselves as the future proprietors of the landlords' estates. The latter protested in vain.

Had the landlords not lived at the people's expense? the peasants asked, and had they not stood between them and the Czar? Did they have any place in the village religion, the village morality, or the village law? Had they not pillaged the peasants after the emancipation, and since that time had they not taken advantage of the peasants' economic weakness and starvation to mercilessly lower wages while they pitilessly raised rents? To take a business advantage of a starving neighbour may be well in America; it agrees neither with the law, morality, nor religion of the benighted Russian peasants. When the landlords heard how the peasants reasoned, they began to hire armed guards. Evidently, said the peasants, they propose to thwart the will of the Czar. The peasants would see about that.

Suddenly the latent class-hatred between the village and landlord broke out into a gigantic class war. The countryside from Poland to the Urals and from the Black Sea to the Baltic was lighted up within a few weeks by the fires of thousands of country mansions — in all some fifty million dollars of property was destroyed. Everywhere the movement was similar, since it was everywhere invited by a common situation and founded on the same peasant nature. It consisted of two procedures. First, the peasants moved as a village against the neighbouring estate, often in daytime, always with their horses and carts. They took possession of all the landlord's movable property — implements, animals, and grain — and divided it in more or less

equal proportions among themselves. They usually claimed to act either in the name of the people or that of the Peasants' Union. The second procedure was almost always the burning of the landlord's house as a war measure against this common enemy of the people, lest he should return and demand possession of what he claimed as his own. The landlord himself and his servants were rarely attacked. There was little or nothing of the spirit of personal vengeance.

This was the most universal plan of action in the months of November and December, 1905. With the coming of the winter snows, all the most active movements must relax. The peasants had time to think over this first plan of revolt, and their cooler judgment was against it. Cossacks came to the villages — not to all at once, there would not have been enough Cossacks in the Empire to do that — but to one at a time; they took back the landlords' property, beat the peasants into submission, killed a few of the ringleaders, and sent others to Siberia or the prisons in the towns. The landlords got back enough of their live stock and provisions to enable them to return. The plan had failed in every aspect. The peasants were neither on a better economic footing, nor had they achieved the least measure of freedom. They had only further embittered the landlords and police.

CHAPTER IX

THE CZAR'S ARMIES OF REVENGE

CIPHERED TELEGRAM N 929, JANUARY 5, 1906: To-day an agitator has been arrested in the Kagarlyk locality, government of Kiev, in the estate of Ychertkoff. The crowd demands with threats his immediate liberation. The local armed force is insufficient. I therefore urge you persistently, in this case as in all similar ones, to order the *mutineers* to be forthwith annihilated by force of arms, and in case of resistance their houses to be burned. At the present moment, it is necessary to uproot once and for all the people's tendency to take the law into their own hands. *Arrests do not attain their purpose now; it is impossible to judge hundreds and thousands of people.* The sole thing necessary now is that the troops should be penetrated by the directions given above.

(Signed) P. DURNOVO.

AT THE beginning of 1906 it was already evident the Russian Government was declaring war upon a large part of the Russian people. The measures proposed in this order of the minister of the interior are not legal measures, nor even the customary procedure of martial law. This means that, in the course of a few weeks, he had reached the last stage of governmental violence. On November 30, 1905, Durnovo had issued another order also directed against the Russian civil law, but still perhaps not in accord with a certain military conception of legality. He had addressed a circular to the local agents of the political police as follows:

I request you (1) to arrest all those revolutionary ringleaders and agitators who have not been arrested by the judicial authorities and immediately to take steps to have them confined under police surveillance; (2) not to make any special inquiries in regard to such cases, but merely to draw up a report stating briefly the causes of arrest and facts establishing guilt; (3) if persons known as agitators are liberated by the judicial authorities to keep them under guard and to proceed to act in accordance with (2).

I had a long interview with the Minister of War Rediger at this time. He did not fail to distinguish between military law

and levying war on the population. "When a detachment of soldiers in charge of an officer is sent into a village with an order to arrest and shoot such and such persons, or to burn down such and such houses, this can be accomplished without disturbing the ordinary functions and regulations of a modern army. Even if the officer is told to shoot every tenth peasant, or to burn down every tenth house, it is possible for him to execute this order. But what is the sense of issuing a command to a young officer to *pacify* a village (the stereotyped official phrase for the revenge taken by these military expeditions)? There can be no denying that a considerable proportion of the younger officers lack the character, education, and sense of responsibility to be entrusted with such a task. It could not be denied that many of the young lieutenants are often heavy drinkers. Stationed a few days or a few months in the village, with the power of life and death over all its inhabitants, it is impossible to say what outrages they might allow to be committed in their name."

If we remember not only that many of the younger officers are drunkards, as the minister suggested, but that they are themselves the very landlords or the sons of the very landlords that the peasants have attacked, we may be prepared to expect every possible cruelty and excess. We are not surprised at the execution of captured peasants by the dozens and hundreds, nor by the barbarous tortures that have been practised over and over again. I shall not even try to summarise the various notorious cases of torture, in many of which young girls were the victims, that have been proven to take place in the prisons. I shall not speak of the execution soon after torture of many prisoners in order to prevent them from reporting the scenes later to the public. It may interest the reader, however, to show the spirit in which this bloody work was carried on, to quote a well-authenticated case among innumerable others of the beating of a woman by the order of the notorious German Baron von Sievers at Fellin. During the thrashing the woman did not utter a sound but afterward declared in a strong and energetic voice to her tormentors, "This is against the law. There is no Russian law that allows you to punish people in such a

manner." Von Sievers's answer was an order for her to be thrashed a second time.

Already hundreds of thousands have been beaten and tens of thousands executed under this thin pretence of military law. But when we come to the wholesale beating of villages according to the first-quoted order of Minister Durnovo, we are no longer dealing with punishment at all, of however unjust and barbarous a character, but with civil war, for there is no pretence that more than a part of the people beaten are guilty of anything whatever, unless it be not aiding the Government in its brutal revenge.

Here is a typical case, quoted from the letter of an inhabitant of the village of Korovine in the province of Smolensk:

On the 8th of January a troop of soldiers was sent into this village. With the soldiers there arrived the captain of police, a colonel of the gendarmes, and other officers. The "judgment" (otherwise called pacification) commenced. The mayor of the village was called. "How did you dare to allow this brigandage in the village?"

"What could I do," replied the mayor. "One dares everything when one is starving. But to know which of us took part in this brigandage there must be a just trial."

"Take off his clothes and take him into the neighbouring barn. There they will give you a just trial."

Four soldiers, two armed with guns and two with rods, were sent into the barn. The soldiers with guns stopped in front of the gate and the soldiers with rods went inside. . . . The tribunal remained in the village the entire day. In Korovine all the peasants were beaten; nobody was spared, not even the old men. No interrogation was made, no inquiry — everybody was beaten without distinction. An old man aged sixty who had received twenty-five blows said on rising: "God be praised that they have not beaten me to death." This seemed to be an insolence and the old man received twenty-five more blows.

These situations are entirely beyond the power of an ordinary pen. I make no attempt to picture them to the reader's mind. Fortunately, Russia's writers of genius have made such an attempt unnecessary. Among these none is more devoted to the peasantry than Korolenko, the greatest writer of South Russia living at the present time, the author of many stories translated into every modern language, a publicist of the first importance, and chief editor of *Russian Wealth*, perhaps the country's leading scientific and literary monthly. Korolenko is not merely devoted to the peasants; no man in Russia has been

more active in their behalf, and therefore of course more hostile to the Government. Like so many of Russia's great men, he has spent a large part of his life in exile.

I talked with Korolenko about the conditions in his province of Poltava, and later I paid a visit to the very place that caused the writing of the famous letter which I quote in part below. I interviewed the peasants of the villages where these brutalities had occurred, and they substantiated in every respect Korolenko's facts and shared his views. I talked also with the liberal justice of the peace who brought the facts to Korolenko's attention, and he guaranteed that all was just as Korolenko relates. All the facts the letter contains are perfectly familiar to every Russian in hundreds and thousands of other cases; but the courageous statement by Korolenko was the sensation of the country for many weeks, and the celebrated author is still not free from the Government persecutions that were its result. The reader will be interested to know that the brutal Filonoff was afterward killed by the revolutionists.

Korolenko's letter:

SIR STATES-COUNSEL FILONOFF:

Personally I do not know you at all. Neither do you know me. But you are an official who has come into wide prominence in our province for the glorious war you have been waging against your own countrymen. And I am but a writer who asks you to take a retrospective look at a brief record of your deeds.

In the village Sorochintza (Poltava province) a number of meetings have taken place. The people of Sorochintza evidently thought that the Manifesto of the 17th of October granted them freedom of assemblage and speech. At those meetings speeches were made, resolutions passed. Amongst other things it was decided to close the Government liquor stores, and not waiting for an official sanction, they were in compliance with the decision closed.

On the 18th of December, for no cause whatsoever, a villager by the name of Besviconny was arrested. The Sorochintza people demanded that he be tried before a court, and that meanwhile he should be let out on bail. This they were denied. Then the Sorochintza people in their turn arrested an uriadnik and a pristav (police officials).

On the 19th of December, Assistant Ispravnik (a higher police official) Barabast, at the head of a hundred Cossacks, arrived at the village. He was permitted to see the arrested pristav and uriadnik. The latter advised him to release the arrested peasant. Barabast promised to do so. But then he changed his mind and decided to "punish" the Soro-

chintza people. He ordered the Cossacks to attack them — and a terrible collision between the attacking Cossacks and the unarmed peasants took place, as a result of which the assistant ispravnik was mortally wounded and about twenty peasants killed. The Cossacks were not satisfied with dispersing the crowd and releasing the pristav. They chased the peasants and killed them when overtaken. This was not enough; they dashed into the village and began to hunt down every one in sight . . .

So in the house of Maisinka the watchman Otrechko fell while peaceably cleaning the snow off the steps of his master; so Garkovenko, feeding his master's cattle in the court a kilometre away from the mayor's house; a Cossack took aim at him from the corner of the street, Garkovenko, wounded, fell before he had even seen his assassin. So the old pharmacist, Fabian Perevozki, coming back from the post-office with his son. A Cossack shot the son to death under the eyes of the father near the Orlov home. So Sergius Kovchine was killed a few metres away from his door. The wife of the peasant Mabvestki was killed at the same door. A young girl named Kelepov had her two cheeks shot away. I could tell you with details the conditions and the place of all the murders of Sorochintza — it is enough to say that eight persons were killed at the mayor's house and nearby, that twelve fell in the street near their houses or in the courtyards.

Now, Mr. States-Counsel Filonoff, I'll take the liberty to ask you: Was there committed in Sorochintza on the 19th of December one or many crimes? Do you think that only the blood of people in uniforms is valuable and that the blood of these common people dressed in simple peasants' clothes can be freely shed like water? Doesn't it seem to you that if it is necessary to investigate by whom and under what circumstances Barabast was killed, that it is not less necessary that justice should occupy itself with the investigation of the men who with rifle and sabre were butchering in the streets, yards, and orchards unarmed people who were neither attacking them, nor offering any resistance, and who neither were present at the spot of the fatal collision nor even aware that it had taken place?

It is not at all necessary for me to apply to this tragedy the great principles of the new fundamental laws (the October Manifesto). For this purpose any law of any country which has the most rudimentary conception about written or customary laws would be sufficient. Just go, Mr. States-Counsel Filonoff, to the land of the half-savage Kurds, to the home of the Bashi-Bazouks. Even there any judge will say, "Even our imperfect laws recognise that the blood of people in plain clothes appeals to justice just as much as the blood of a killed official."

Will you dare to openly and publicly deny this, Mr. States-Counsel Filonoff? Undoubtedly not! And, therefore, we both agree that the representative of the authorities and law in going to Sorochintza had a severe, but honourable and solemn rôle to fulfill.

In this place, seized by confusion, sorrow, and horror, he ought to

have reminded the people of the law, severe but impassionate, just, standing above all momentary emotion and passion, which severely condemns the mob's law, but which also (note, Mr. Filonoff) *does not admit the very idea about caste vengeance from the part of officials on the population* . . .

But to Sorochintza there was sent, not an investigating magistrate, but you, Mr. States-Counsel Filonoff, and upon you falls the whole responsibility that the military force placed at your disposal turned from guardians of the law into lawbreakers and outrageous oppressors.

You began from the very start to act in Sorochintza as if in a conquered land. You ordered the village assembly to be driven together — and declared that if it would not assemble you would destroy the whole village, "not leaving even ashes to remember it by."

Is it then to be wondered at that, after such orders in such a form, the Cossacks began to drive the peasants together in their own way. . . . that men were cruelly beaten, women and girls outraged?

First of all you ordered the people thus driven together all to get down on their knees — you forced them to obey your order by surrounding them with Cossacks with drawn swords and by placing opposite the crowd two field guns. All submitted and got down on their knees, their heads uncovered, in the snow. . . . Under the threat of death you kept them thus for four and a half hours. You did not even give a thought to this, that amongst these unlawfully tortured people there may have been those who had not yet buried those innocently killed on the 19th of December, brothers, fathers and daughters, before whom others ought to kneel and ask forgiveness for killing . . .

This crowd of people was necessary for you as a background to prove your Counselman's Almightiness and . . . contempt for the laws.

The further "examination" consisted in that you called out names of peasants from a list made beforehand.

And what did you call them out for? For examination? For establishing the extent of their guilt and responsibility?

As soon as the person called out opened his mouth to answer the question asked of him, to explain, maybe to prove, his utter innocence, you with your own Counselman's hands gave the man full swinging blows in the face, and handed him over to Cossacks who by your order continued the criminal torture begun by yourself, throwing him in the snow, beating him with nagaikas on the head and face until the prey lost his voice, consciousness, and all semblance to a man.

But all this seemed to you not enough, and casting your eyes over the people who stood before your Counselman Majesty, you were inspired with a new act of refined cruelty. You ordered the Jews to separate from the Christians, put them separately on their knees and ordered the Cossacks to beat them without discrimination. You explained this act of yours by this, that the Jews are clever and that they are the enemies of Russia. The Cossacks moved through the kneeling crowd, whipping right and left men, children, and aged people. And you, Mr.



BOGORAZ (THE POET "TAN")
A founder of the Peasants and Teachers' unions



KOROLENKO
Novelist of international fame, who has frequently been exiled



THE ELECTED CHIEF OF THE VILLAGE

Whom the Czar tries vainly to convert into a village despot



A WISE PEASANT

Tolstoi informed me this peasant knows more about conditions than Duma or Government

Counsellor of State, stood looking at their butchery and encouraging the Cossacks to greater cruelties.

Filonoff's expedition of course did not terminate in a single village, but covered a score. I followed in his path and found that everywhere his actions had been the same; and I also found that the peasants rejoiced at his death, and were far more revolutionary than before his visit. Filonoff's expedition was not an extreme case of brutality. According to all that I was able to find out, it was rather a typical case. Some of the officials were less brutal, but only a few. Multiply Filonoff's score of villages by several hundred, and we have some sort of a picture of the Government's revenge among the Russian peasantry. Add to these the far more serious wholesale slaughter and massacres among all the non-Russian races, Letts, Poles, Armenians, Georgians and others, and we get a general idea of the full extent of this chapter of the Government's colossal crimes.

Some of the worst of Stolypine's wholesale tortures while governor of the Province of Saratov, were for the purpose of coercing the peasants to bear false witness against themselves. I have a signed document, sworn to by a whole village, as testimony of this kind of action. The action described is only one among very many of Stolypine's exploits, and Stolypine himself is only a type of a hundred high dignitaries of the Russian Government who have behaved in this manner toward the conquered people. Here is the document:

The 18th of November, 1905, we, the undersigned peasants of the village of Khvalinshine of the district Sordobsk of the province of Saratov, having assisted at the meeting of the village assembly to the number of 215 persons, have discussed the question of the arrests in our commune made by the order of General Sacharov.

The 8th of November Mr. Sacharov arrived in our village accompanied by Governor Stolypine, by the chief official of the district, the chief of the district police, other functionaries and an escort of Cossacks.

A village meeting was called together before which Mr. Sacharov explained the end of his visit and the powers with which he was furnished (practically all the unlimited powers of the despot Czar).

The president of the village community and the village council wished to speak for the peasants in favour of sending to St. Petersburg a delegation to explain the peasants' misery, but they were immediately arrested and beaten till they lost consciousness.

After a brief conversation Mr. Sacharov retired into the office of the village court, after which Mr. Governor Stolypine called one after another the members of our commune, submitting them to the following questions:

"Have you pillaged the property of the landlord Beklenichev? Have you burned his house?"

"No," was the answer.

Then the Cossacks commenced to beat with their "nagaikas," to strike with their fists and their bayonets and the flats of their swords, to tear out the hair and beards of the wretched peasants. Several were beaten two or three times to force confessions from them. Some, all bloody, finally confessed. All this took place under the eyes of the officials, who gave the order to redouble the rigour of the punishment. Such was the manner in which the thirty-two men arrested were questioned.

After these savage punishments Governor Stolypine proposed to the other peasants that they should sign a decree, by which the commune declared that it rejected these thirty-two men from its midst as dangerous individuals. Indeed, we ourselves signed this decree, for after the terror through which we had passed we did not have the strength to refuse. All the arrested men are now in prison.

As soon as we became conscious of the illegality of the administration, we found that the functionaries who had come to us had acted on the evidence of the local police, of spies, and of other cowardly persons. Although the property of Beklenichev had been sacked, the culpability of the thirty-two peasants of our commune had not been established. All the men arrested are good people and have never been known to have committed any damaging acts in the village. They underwent their punishment at the instigation of police spies and officials. The decree that we signed on the 8th of November to have these thirty-two men exiled to Siberia, we consider to be illegal, because it was tortured from us by violence. In consequence, we have decided to address ourselves to the Council of Advocates, praying it to present our decree to the highest administration in order that it may be annulled, that a new inquiry may be ordered concerning the thirty-two peasants falsely convicted and that the administrators who tolerated the savage punishments inflicted by the Cossacks may be cited before the courts. We hope that our request will be heard.

Needless to say, it was not. But later, Sacharov, who was guilty in innumerable cases of shedding innocent blood, was "executed" by the revolutionists.

It will be seen that the village was by no means converted to loyalty to the Government by these terrible public tortures. No man ever failed more miserably to frighten the peasantry than Prime Minister Stolypine while governor of the province of Saratov. The following instance is quoted and condensed

from an account by the popular poet, "Tan," or Bogoraz, one of the founders of the Peasants' Union, a scientific writer on ethnology, a literary character of the first rank in Russia, who had visited the village of Ivanovka very soon after the presence there of a "punishment expedition" of Stolypine. The cause of this expedition was a resolution that had been passed by the village assembly after having been drawn up by a young educated peasant of the place. This young man, typical of the new village leaders, had educated himself at a tremendous sacrifice to become a teacher, but had been thwarted by the officials on account of his liberal opinions. Like all the other resolutions, this one demanded liberty of speech, press and meeting, a constitutional assembly elected by equal and universal suffrage, and the transference of the land into the hands of the people.

A few days after the passage of this the then Governor Stolypine arrived. "Rebels, revolutionists, who influenced you to do this?" he shouted.

"All the village," he was answered.

"You lie! Who composed the resolution?"

Bitchenkov, the young man, advanced and declared, "It was I!"

"You lie! Go and write!"

They took this man Bitchenkov into a neighbouring room and gave him pen and paper.

"Why do you not write?"

"Wait, I must think a little; I am very excited."

"You lie! Why should you be excited?"

"I was never so near such a great person as you."

In half an hour Bitchenkov composed, without seeing the old one, a new copy of the resolution.

"You lie! You learned it by heart. Shut your mouth; do not dare to reason with me!"

The demand for the nationalisation of the land enraged the governor more than anything else. After his fierce denunciation of the peasants an old white-headed man spoke: "Your excellency, we have listened to your speech. Now listen to ours. I have two sons in the war, and twenty-one persons at home to nourish and land enough for only one person. How shall we feed ourselves?"

The governor could reply only by the Malthusian theory: "Who forced you to reproduce yourselves in this way?"

"That is a sin what you are saying now," said the old man. "It is against God."

"Silence! No reasoning!" shouted Stolypine.

The assembly of peasants was surrounded by Cossacks and dispersed, while the elected chiefs of the village were imprisoned. After two hours of violent shouting the governor demanded that the village should place in his hands all its leaders, confess who had influenced the peasants to adopt such a resolution and draw up another to suit the official taste. That evening all the village consulted together over Stolypine's demands.

"Well, old men, have you come to a decision?" asked the governor of the peasants the next morning.

"Yes, your excellency, we have passed a resolution," returned the mayor.

"That is good; where is it, this new resolution of yours?"

"We have resolved to stand by the old one."

The governor was enraged. He himself questioned everybody, but everybody kept silent. The next day twenty of the most respected peasants were arrested. Eighteen persons were imprisoned for a month and Bitchenkov and an old man named Savelieff for two months.

There was only one traitor in the village, and when it was discovered that it was he who had denounced everybody to Governor Stolypine, the others declared a boycott against him without mercy. They burned his barns twice and finally declared to him categorically that he must leave the village. The wretched spy went to his son at Volsk; but the son would not receive him, and declared, "I have no need of such Iscariots." Finally, the wrecked informer had to go into another province.

While the arrested peasants were gone, the villagers performed all their work for them, and even gave bread and potatoes to the poorer families. A month later eighteen of the condemned returned, and were received as home-coming heroes. The commune sent to meet them eighteen waggons, in each four persons, the horse decorated with green leaves and red ribbons — and as the procession entered the village it was greeted by the singing of the Marseillaise. Bitchenkov and

Savelieff returned a month later. For them, too, a great celebration was prepared.

But, of course, the village did not escape so easily. Later Stolypine returned, and after a two days' stay departed, leaving a hundred Cossacks, one officer, and eight rural guards, to execute his orders. From that time the "nagaikas" commenced to whistle on the backs and heads of the peasants. The Cossacks beat not only the peasants of Ivanovka; they beat the passers-by, they beat everybody that fell into their hands. Some of their wounded victims they threw into prison, and held them there without any medical relief. They stole everything they could lay their hands on, from the smallest household object to the grain in the granary. When a respected peasant went, as representative of the village, to the head man of the Cossacks to beg the cessation of this persecution, he was killed by the Cossacks in broad daylight.

This is how Premier Stolypine's orders were executed when as provincial governor he was travelling about among the villages. All reliable persons in the province agree in saying that at this time he behaved more like a beast than a human being. This is the man the Czar has selected to "pacify" the country, and with whose labours he has expressed himself as amply pleased.

In addition to imprisonment, flogging, violent death, the ravishment of women, the peasants have had to endure a most serious economic hardship in consequence of the Government's "punishment expeditions." Wherever these expeditions have been most successful, advantage is immediately taken by the landlords of the peasants' depressed condition to lower their wages and raise their rents. Undoubtedly this is the first object of the proprietor in calling for these expeditions. For this benefit of the landlords no new forms of economic slavery have had to be invented in despotic Russia; the old tyrannical laws have merely had to be put again into practice. The Russian laws make explicit provisions for keeping agricultural labourers as far as practicable in servitude.

A recent circular of the governor of Poltava to the "land officials" is significant of the power the landlord has over the peasant labourer. "There is reason to believe," says this

circular, "that the agitation of the revolutionary parties in the country will be directed this summer to bring about the suspension of work by the agricultural labourers. Among the means of combating such proceedings, the most excellent is the quick and energetic interference of the authorities and the use of the law as soon as the violations come to light. The arbitrary leaving of work without sufficient ground, is a cause for a legal persecution upon the complaint of the employer alone. The result is that damages can be collected from the labourer up to the sum of the contracted wages for three months. However, the judgment of the land officials (themselves landlords, it will be remembered) can be put into execution immediately. But if the labourer is bound by a written contract, the employer has the right to give up the above mentioned damages and to turn to the police with the demand to force the labourer immediately to the performance of his labour." This order, I will add, was strictly enforced.

In the neighbouring province the landlords turned to the prison authorities with the request that, on account of the great demand for field hands, the prisoners should be turned over to them for field labour for a suitable wage. Now we see the perfect trap ready to catch peasants not able to support themselves from their own lands. As soon as the spirit of the disturbed district is sufficiently crushed so that field labour can be continued, the employers begin to lower wages and raise rents, with the assurance that they will have the armed assistance of the Government to compel the peasants to labour. There are two ways in which the landlord gets his initial "legal" grip on the labourer. First, if the preceding winter has been a bad one, it was naturally easy for the landlords to get the peasants to sign any kind of a contract (often for as little as a third of the usual wage) to avoid their immediate economic ruin or death by starvation; with this piece of paper in their hands the landlords are masters of slaves for the term of the contract. Second, if the peasant's absolute necessity has not forced him to enter into this "voluntary" servitude, the proprietors can still lure him to enter their employment under false promises. As soon as the peasant begins to complain of impossible food, of the fines that the employer is allowed to

place upon him, or of other frauds, and quits work, the employer has a civil case against him, which can be judged immediately by his landlord friend, the "land official." After the judgment the peasant has either to go to labour immediately under the old conditions or be arrested, and if he is arrested he is again subject to be driven to the fields, as the ancient slaves of Greece or Rome.

Every "punishment expedition" has been followed immediately by the lowering of wages and the raising of rents. Protest against these harsher conditions has meant a new expedition. The peasants on the estate of Prince Kotzebue in the province of Poltava told me how, it being impossible for them to keep alive either as tenants on account of the high rents, or as labourers on wages of twenty to thirty kopecks (ten to fifteen cents) a day, they had therefore decided to quit work and not to pay rent. Of course the Cossacks came, and were still there at the time of my visit. They beat the villagers from day to day, and the discontented peasants were sent away by the dozen and sometimes in shoals of as many as fifty at a time. The result of the strike, followed by the "punishment expedition," was that wages had again been lowered and rents raised.

But although the peasants' attempt to better their economic conditions by organised effort is checkmated by the guns and whips of the Cossacks, the peasants have by no means been terrorised as the Government desires; they cannot "strike" successfully as this is physically impossible against an armed force, but they can still plan and work toward revolution. They are ever learning new determination and courage in the great war. They are just reaching the height of that primitive lynch justice which doubtless has preserved the existence of many communities under barbarous surroundings. If they should ever learn the use of this measure as did the pioneers of our West, it would be an inconceivably powerful instrument in their emancipation. Here is a recent story that shows the new practice, adapted especially to landlords:

The landlord Pavlovsky of the town of Shestkovka, in the government of Cherson, had noticed a peasant's horse while riding through his fields. He turned to the peasant, who had come to get the horse, with the question why he had let his horse on another's field. The peasant

answered that the horse himself had run away to the place. Thereupon Pavlovsky fired a shot and killed the horse. The owner of the horse went thereupon with other peasants to the house of Pavlovsky and declared to Pavlovsky's people that the landlord had shot his horse and that he, its owner, would take instead a horse of the landlord. There arose a conflict between the people of the estate and the peasants, during which the people of the estate fired several shots, wounded the owner of the killed horse and killed his son. Out of fear of the lynch justice of the peasants the landlord's people hastened to the station where two of them surrendered themselves to the police and the third was arrested. As we were afterwards informed, a crowd of the peasants marched to the station, broke into the office, dragged out the landlord's people and practised lynch justice on them by beating them to death.

The new lynch justice of the peasants is not always directed against the landlords, but also against the landlord's allies, the local officials. In many places the so-called "land officials" have been resigning by the wholesale, and it is very difficult to find new men to take their places. In one province this class of official does not dare to appear in the villages without the accompaniment of several others of the same class and the accumulated bodyguards of the whole, that is to say, a hundred or more rural guards. In Voronege province the Government has to keep transferring the heads of the district police from one district to another, in the hope of preventing in this way the sharp conflicts that prevail as soon as these persons become personally known to the peasants. In one district of Jaroslav, of four "land officials" only one remained and this one feared to wear the uniform. Another, after holding the position only a month and a half, fell into acute insanity. He used to write petitions in which he implored the peasants not to tear him to pieces but simply to hang him. He had to be taken to the asylum.

It is becoming rather less common to attempt to resist the armed authorities by means of pitched battles such as took place in thousands of cases in 1905 and 1906. At that time it had become almost a custom for the peasants to go up into the church tower when the enemy approached and to sound the alarm. The immense crowds of peasants that would then gather were often equal even to a company of armed soldiers. Now, when Cossacks come to a village, they first of all go to the church and tie up the tongue of the bell or take it

altogether away. In some villages, even, "unknown thieves" (the police) have succeeded in stealing the bell.

More successful is the well-known war measure of burning down the enemy's property and source of supplies. The landlords' mansions are still being burned by the peasants in every section of the country. So far has this gone that now, to quote from the conservative organ, *Novoe Vremya*, "not a single fire insurance company in Russia issues any policies on farm stock or buildings, owing to the enormous spread of incendiarism. The landlords for a long time concealed the facts, misleading both the companies and the Government, but the true state of affairs at last leaked out." This is the most serious and pressing question that confronts the landlords to-day. A committee recently called on Prime Minister Stolypine with a plan of rehabilitating the fire insurance on country estates. Stolypine approved, but of course could see no way by which the Government could participate in such an unprofitable business.

But neither Mr. Stolypine nor any others of the savages in civilised clothing that are executing the Czar's orders have had or can have any permanent success in suppressing the growing and invincible revolutionary spirit that is already animating a large part of Russia's hundred million peasants. If the country people are on the defensive at the present moment it is not that they lack the will for the most aggressive and violent warfare against the Government, but merely that for the moment they lack the power. Whether this situation can long continue may most seriously be questioned.

CHAPTER X

THE VILLAGE AGAINST THE CZAR — A STATE OF WAR

WAS the spirit of rebellion crushed in the winter of 1906 by the twenty-five thousand exiles and arrests and the hundred thousand flayed backs of the insurrectionists? In Russia at the time this was the mooted question among all profound students of the revolutionary movement.

There was another great question. Had the peasants done their best and finally become discouraged? Events soon proved that the peasants had lost nothing of their rebellious instinct. They had only been forced to change the tactics of revolt. The spring of 1906 had hardly commenced when a new movement began, equally widespread with the last and covering nearly all the rich agricultural section of Russia. A strike of agricultural labourers was organised against all landlords who worked their own land, and a movement against high rents was directed against those who farmed out their estates.

The strike was highly organized, aggressive, and violent. In all cases the action was by village, often in pursuance of resolutions of the official village meeting. In one government of the south not only were whole villages represented in district committees, but the district committee sent their representative to a central convention of the whole government. The strike was aggressive, because the peasants were asking for an increase in wages that amounted often to 200 or 300 per cent. It was violent, in that strike-breaking peasants were not only beaten by their neighbours, but often also their houses were burned over their heads. Its results were highly satisfactory from the peasants' standpoint, the rate of wages per hour being more than doubled. Peasants who were getting thirty or fifty kopeks for a twelve or fourteen-hour day were often paid one or two rubles for a day of ten hours. In some cases those landlords who could not afford to pay the wages demanded were

told that they might sell their land to the village, but that the peasants' terms would not be lowered. The movement against high rents was equally successful, some villages in the east paying fifteen rubles where before they had paid forty.

This was the movement of the spring. The summer again marked another step forward toward revolution. The landlords had been beaten on the economic field but they were more embittered than ever by their new difficulties and more ready than before to make use of their allies, the Cossacks and police. So after the first Duma had met and it was evident even to the most credulous villages (some never had believed) that the Czar was going to grant none of the people's demands, the aggressive economic movement was supplemented by a still more aggressive attack against the landlords, who were justly blamed for a large part of the Czar's stubbornness. The principle of the boycott was applied to the landlords, their servants and the police. Every relation between the landlord and the village was made a source of trouble and even of combat. Some villages refused to pay taxes to the zemstvos in order that the landlord might be forced to build his own roads. Others refused to allow the landlord's horses and cattle even to cross the village land, or to furnish horses or lodging to the police. They beat, burned out, or expelled from the village, any peasant who did the landord or the Government a service.

But this was only the first step. In very many villages the movement went much further. In the fall of 1905 the peasants were burning the landlords' mansions in the daytime. In the summer of 1906 they were burning their farms and granaries at night. At first the destruction was merely a matter of war fare. Then it became the result of a bitter spirit of revenge. This spirit has gone still further, and very many guards and superintendents and a considerable number of landlords have been killed; also many of the village police and even members of the newly created military arm, the rural guards.

The reign of terror in some sections is already very similar to that of the towns and mining regions. Recently, in the province in which Odessa is situated, fires and murders became so frequent that the governor actually felt himself constrained to establish a *night* patrol. Does not this order indicate that

the rural revolution in this section has gotten beyond the control of the authorities? Imagine the practicability of patrolling large sections of rural Russia by night. Everywhere, too, the landlords are forced to hire Cossacks or special watchmen to guard their estates — an equally impractical, because altogether too costly, measure. In some districts the nobility do not even dare to go out to pick berries or mushrooms without their Cossack guards; in others almost every landlord has left the country for the capital or provincial towns. With the sudden fall of rents in the country has gone an equally general and rapid rise in the rents of good houses in the provincial towns.

This class war of pillage and arson and murder had already brought about concrete results for the peasants. I have spoken of the moderate measure of reform the Government had promulgated, largely under landlord pressure; I have also mentioned the rise in wages and the fall in rents. A much more remarkable and solid benefit has fallen to the peasants as a reward for their successful warfare — the landlords are selling their estates. In the single year since these present agrarian disorders began more than a tenth of the estates of all Russia have been offered for sale. What is still more important is that the peasants, expecting a far more considerable fall in prices, if not a free division of the landlords' property, have often refused to buy.

The peasants were rapidly, and with comparative ease, getting the better of the landlords, even to driving them from the countryside, when the Government redoubled its oppressive measures, restored the balance of power in favour of the landlords, and, as I have shown in the preceding chapter, helped them to win back *more* than they had lost. The struggle with the Government, backed as it is by the consolidated power of the landlords and those allies and relatives of theirs, the army officers and the bureaucrats, is a far more serious and protracted matter — is, in fact, the very substance of the war of the revolution. In this part of the struggle the peasants have had far less success, and up to the present time they have gotten decidedly the worst of it.

But let us not suppose that the Government is altogether invulnerable. In every village it has given the people hostages in the persons of the village policeman and the village priest.

Both are the subject of constant persecution in those sections of the country that are most advanced. In many cases these local representatives of the Czarism are already dominated by village opinion; more particularly, of course, the priests. In Kasan the peasants captured several of the local police functionaries and held them until the Government liberated an imprisoned leader of the revolution. Besides these personal pledges, there is in every village a valuable property pledge in the shape of the Government saloon from which the Czarism receives a third of its annual income. Every day the official Russian telegrams report the robbery or destruction of some of these saloons. How many are really attacked or destroyed cannot be known. New villages are daily taking up the campaign against this Government monopoly, and a new plan of attack has been devised—the boycott. The village meeting decides that the peasants shall not drink; an agreed schedule of fines is arranged for all those who do—one ruble for the first drink, three for the second, five for the third, and expulsion for the fourth.

So successfully have these various attacks hit at the Government revenue that the authorities have been forced to the most extreme measures of protection. Already all post-offices, railway stations, and every visible form of property have had to be guarded by soldiers or police. Now the same becomes true of all of the tens of thousands of vodka shops in Russia—a sufficient sign in itself of the revolution's strength. Through raising the price of vodka to the very limit the traffic will bear, the Government has succeeded so far in retaining the level of its revenue, but it is only a question of a short time before the State budget must show an enormous loss.

The measures of physical protection for the saloons are the least interesting of the Government's policies in this matter. In one government of the south, the governor-general has issued an order that any village which has boycotted the saloon must be made to pay in direct taxes the same sum which that saloon produced for the Government the year before. The Government has always encouraged the use of the vodka poison. It is now compelling it by nagaikas and bayonets.

The warfare of the village against the Government is being worked up into a science. The revolutionary bodies are direct-

ing the activities, but the peasants are quick enough to understand. Every possible form of worrying the Government, of upsetting the authority of the local officials, of cutting off the Government's income from the village, of implanting the spirit of mutiny among the new recruits, of coercing the landlords, is being embodied by the revolutionists into a regular revolutionary code. Congresses of local and village committees have been held all over Russia to discuss the best means for carrying out the war. It is generally recognised that the time for concerted action in the country at large has not yet arrived, and it is evident to the outside observer that it will not even arrive so soon as the revolutionists hope. What is sought now is not the common action of several villages, but the comparative study of the best modes of action for each individual community. So well do the villages understand this that some have not only themselves absorbed the new programme, but have undertaken to spread it far and wide among the neighbouring communities. I visited one village, for instance, where practically everybody was active in one way or another in this revolutionary work, and where the young men seemed almost without exception to be members of the fighting organisations of the revolution. It is especially in those villages where the peasants have been beaten by the Cossacks or imprisoned that the feeling runs most high and the action takes the most aggressive and intelligent form.

This is the situation at the present moment. There are also ominous preparations for a far more serious and violent manner of warfare. In several of the leading provinces the villages are making every effort to arm and to train up a secret village militia for future use. In the government of Saratov nearly every one of the fifteen hundred villages has its secret committee, and nearly every one of these committees has more or less arms. Some committees are small, consisting of half a dozen members. Others include a hundred or more—all the young men of the village. In some cases the committee has only a few old revolvers and guns; in others the peasants are provided with modern rifles. These local committees are all organised under the district committees, and the district committees under the committees of the Government.

The revolutionary committee of Saratov is preparing daily for future needs. The local militia are being secretly drilled, taught how to use their weapons and educated in the art of guerilla war. All the roads, bridges, and railway lines are being studied with the end of accomplishing the destruction of the means of communication in the quickest possible manner when the moment arrives. Of course, the peasant militia has the fullest assurance of the support of the whole Railway Union in this plan. Saratov is the model province of Russia from the standpoint of peasant revolt, but many others, especially among its neighbours and those provinces nearest to the Black Sea, are following Saratov's example.

Until a short time ago there seemed to be one fatal lack in the revolutionist plan—the means with which to purchase the large supplies of arms that will be needed before this guerilla war can be put on the same footing that it has reached in the Caucasus and the Baltic provinces. There are now scarcely a hundred thousand rifles among the revolutionists, even including these outlying parts of the empire. There must be several times that number before the guerilla war can be successfully begun in the central parts of the country. The money for this purpose was entirely wanting a year ago, but within the past year the well planned and executed robberies of the Government officers and large banks by the revolutionists (the robberies of the private institutions were of course undertaken only by the most extreme wing) have partly supplied the lack. Approximately some ten million rubles have been obtained in this way—sufficient, perhaps, to justify the carrying of the guerilla war into the heart of rural Russia as soon as the guns have been smuggled over the border, or secured by official corruption within the realm.

The peasants are striving for their liberty at a terrible cost, of which the blood tribute is the least important item. All this sacrifice of life, all the misery and hardship that it must entail, are not a very large price for the Russian peasants to pay for emancipation from age-long oppression, famine, and misery. The worst part of the situation is the reaction on their own character of the violence to which the Government forces the people to resort. When the peasant gets used to

killing overseers and police, he must have become more or less accustomed to the shedding of blood — as brutalised, perhaps, as soldiers during a war. But he cannot and will not stop there. Already the villager's hand is raised against his fellow-villager. The soldiers of brutal regiments that are still "loyal" to the Czar are beaten by the villagers when they return home. Peasants that refuse to take part in the general revolutionary movement or strike, are beaten or slain.

Even this is not the worst. Some villages may have among them no "traitors" to the cause; but there is in nearly every village a small class of peasants who have always been, and may for some time remain, openly loyal to the Czar. These are the privileged — the village usurers, the peasant landlords, the small merchants, the mail carriers, the contractors, the Government saloon-keepers and others favoured by the officials. They are usually only a half dozen or dozen families out of a hundred or two, but they are among the most active of all. Everywhere among the families of the common peasants there are also a few that are inclined to follow the lead of this village aristocracy. Between these and the majority of the peasants there is arising the most brutal and terrible war. The victory is not so easily with the majority as it might seem. A strong village policeman and a few well-hidden spies, a detachment of rural guards or Cossacks in the village or near at hand, will give the advantage entirely to the favoured few. In such cases some horrible incidents have arisen. The peasant aristocrats, following the illustrious example of the Czar, have even instituted so-called military courts for the execution of the leaders of sedition, and have executed such of their enemies as they could lay their hands on. With others, also emulating the Czar, they have proceeded to apply the well-established custom of the "red cock"—that is, they have burned down their enemies' houses over their heads.


But this last is a dangerous procedure, for it invites a fierce retaliation. The red cock is a principal weapon of the revolutionary element in the village, and as the property is to a large degree in the hands of the reactionary few, these few are the principal sufferers in this kind of a war. Such village feuds, resulting in the burning down of the houses of the enemies,



THE VILLAGE STREET, WITH ITS TWO LINES OF HOUSES



THE SOCIAL FARMING OF THE RUSSIAN PEASANTRY



TYPES OF LITTLE RUSSIAN PEASANTS

and sometimes by accident of neighbours' houses, or of the whole village as well, have always been frequent. Since the revolution began this incendiarism has doubled, and to the other plagues of Russia — war, famine, pillage, and Cossacks — must be added fire. In the short space of one year there were over three thousand such fires in a single government of the fifty of European Russia.

Worse than the public executions in the village and worse than fire, is the secret murder by night. Of course when the war reaches this stage it cannot last long, as the numbers are overwhelming on the side of the poverty-stricken many. But the spirit of bloodshed has been turned against neighbours, an infinitely more demoralising fact than the killing of those regarded as natural enemies, the landlords and police.

With this loss of regard for life comes an equal disregard of personal property and every other form of personal right. From pillaging the landlords it is a short step to pillaging the rich peasants. The latter reply where they can with a forced confiscation of the weaker peasants' goods. Soon a period of plunder sets in, directed very largely against those with whom the peasants have their scores to settle — that is, the rich peasants, the landlords, and the police.

The whole picture of the immediate future of the Russian village is such a terrible one that few large-hearted and cultivated Russians can bear to contemplate it. Many, in revolt against the only picture their reason tells them to expect, will yet deny some of the most obvious facts. Others, unable to argue away the facts, give up all hope and can see no end to the demoralisation once it gains the upper hand. I have been forced to confess, indeed, that the spread and success of the revolution depends probably, not so much on its successful organisation, as on the disorganisation of the Government and on the spread of the spirit of rebellion and desperation in the mind of the individual peasants. Evidently individual rebellion is subject to all the limitations of the individual rebel. A growing disregard for life, property, industry, and order, is inevitable as long as the revolution continues. The powers that are maintaining the Russian Government to-day can undoubtedly force the nation to this fearful and protracted disorganisation. The revolutionary

organisations and organised forms of revolt that make against this demoralisation, the Government can defeat and destroy. Against millions of individual rebels, who, however unorganised, are ready to give up everything for the cause, the Government can accomplish nothing.

It would be the grossest error to conclude that there is no organisation of the revolutionary forces. Only a few pages back I have spoken of the effort at secret military organisation. In addition there is a constant and often successful effort to create organisations of every kind, though such organisations are organisations only in an educational sense. The personnel of both leaders and rank and file is constantly shifting. Continuous and concerted action is out of the question.

The Peasants' Union gathered together, in a single programme and a single set of revolutionary tactics, the best opinion among the Russian radicals as well as the most widely accepted opinions of the peasants. It perfected and developed its programme through repeated national conferences, and it finally succeeded in spreading a knowledge of its tactics in nearly every village of the land. This is organisation in the deepest spiritual sense. Its central committee was imprisoned; its local committees were exiled; all its most openly active members were beaten or thrown into jail. Yet the idea of the union lives, and it unites the peasants in a common effort for a common end. The union remains as popular as ever among the peasantry. Whole villages are still anxious to be admitted to its somewhat mysterious folds. They know its programme; they do not and cannot know the personnel of its organisation. The intelligent peasants of nearly every village will tell you that they stand for the Peasants' Union. One peasant summed the matter up in this way:

"Of course I am for the Peasants' Union, whatever I may think of other organisations. It is like the hen that spreads its wings over all the smaller revolutionary brood."

After the Peasants' Union came another organisation, equally successful and equally popular. The radical and revolutionary peasants sent by the villages to represent them in the Duma formed themselves into the "Labour Group." This group adopted practically the entire programme of the Peasants'

Union, and urged the most advanced and democratic demands along every line. It was the members of this group, it will be recalled, that kept themselves in daily touch with the villages all over Russia while the first Duma was in session, and who issued, after the Duma was closed, the sensational appeal to arms. This appeal is the most dangerous document to the Government that has ever been published. It has not reached all the villages, but it has certainly reached a large majority. It is so violent and desperate in tone that there are doubtless some villages to which it would not appeal. However, it has been circulated broadcast, has met with approval in all directions, and in the villages that had received it I found it had called forth the most cordial and enthusiastic endorsement. A large part of the members of the Labour Group, like the organisers of the Peasants' Union, are now in prison or exile; but many are the villagers who have answered the call of the village bell to arms, or rather to sticks and pitchforks, when there has been a need to rally to the assistance of these members. Though known to thousands of peasants, and travelling about freely after the first Duma was dissolved, many, perhaps half, of the members of the group were enabled by the peasants' aid to escape abroad. The group's proclamation lives in the peasants' minds, gains ground every day, and may yet serve as a rallying cry for the great revolt.

Through these organisations, or frameworks of organisations, a very large proportion of the villages have been thoroughly ripened and prepared for revolt. Of course the revolt may never occur. It is impossible to say at what time the Government may become sufficiently frightened to make a complete surrender. The peasants will be satisfied with nothing less than complete surrender, and the only proposal that has appealed to them so far is that a constitutional assembly be instantly convened. If the Government should not surrender, as it shows no signs of doing at the present time, the guerilla war will some day take a more terrible form. The country will swarm with an army of guerilla bands, and the Government authorities may be forced to retire from the villages to the strong places the Cossacks are able to hold. The peasants will already have gained part of that for which they are contending. The

revolution would have to wait for further success on the capture of some sufficiently important stronghold to serve as a centre for an insurrectionary government and for the formation and organisation of a regular revolutionary force. Even then the Government armies might be able to put up a terrific resistance.

But whether events ever proceed so far or not, it is the imminent possibility that they may which constitutes the hope of the revolution, and the only factor that is able to force from the autocratic Government such fundamental and revolutionary changes as, in the minds of every important element of the Russian people, are now absolutely essential to the development of Russia.

The Russian people, perhaps more than any other, deplore all warfare. They stand squarely for the abolition of governmental violence in every form. But until the present inhuman despotism is done away with, neither war, nor capital punishment, nor imprisonment and exile without trial can be done away with. War is the excuse for the Czarism's existence. Administrative punishment and execution are its sole means of support. It is in a last hope of putting an end, perhaps forever, to war and bloodshed that the people have declared war on the Czarism and are ready to pay with their own blood for victory.

CHAPTER XI

WAITING FOR CIVIL WAR

THE military aspect of the Russian revolution must finally decide the great struggle. Nor does this military aspect concern Russia alone. The United States and several other modern nations think they are permanently free. But if the art of modern warfare is ever so developed that a fraction of a nation, the Government, has at any time the physical power to keep the rest of the nation in subjection, freedom has no concrete foundation on which to rest. Our liberties depend largely on the character of the arts of war. If coercive government is possible, it is because the modern means of war give a coercive government the physical superiority.

Since the invention of repeating rifles, rapid-fire cannon, and machine guns, no prominent people has been in general armed revolt against its government. We can neither say how heavy the popular majority would have to be to win against the disciplined and centralised armies of the government, nor if the people did win, can we say what would be the slaughter the victory would entail. Terrible and unspiritual as these conjectures are, they are of supreme moment and form one of the greatest questions that the Russian revolution has to answer. Some of the Russian conditions are special to that country, but this much is general—the Government has a monopoly of most of the machinery of modern warfare, the possession of the strategic points, the use of a large, disciplined, and centralised army of professional fighting men.

For more than two years past the Russian Government has practically been at war with its people. Military law prevails throughout the whole empire. The military courts are backed by an enormous military power. The war against the people is being carried on by a full score of modern army corps. An army of more than two hundred thousand men is holding down

the Poles, armies of from fifty thousand to one hundred thousand are burning and hanging in the Caucasus and the Baltic provinces. Armies almost as large are the sole means of preventing insurrections practically *en masse* of the people of St. Petersburg and Moscow. Every city in Russia is an armed camp.

In all these armies nearly all the more brutal and dangerous work falls to four hundred thousand Cossacks. They are loyal and enthusiastic killers, and, being half foreign, they are serviceable in massacring Russians, Letts, or Jews. It is for this reason that a large part of them are divided into small bands and kept occupied beating, maiming, and killing the rebellious Russian peasantry. But peasant rebellions have increased recently in number and intensity and the Cossacks have become insufficient. As there are no more Cossacks available, a large number being occupied on the Manchurian and other frontiers, a new army, called the "rural guards," has been especially created for this part of the governmental campaign.

On paper the Russian army, including these Cossacks, consists at the present time of some two million men. The mutinies of the last two years prove that few of this army except the Cossacks can safely be counted on for service in the present internal war. Several hundred thousand of the common soldiers, chiefly former workingmen, would even turn their guns against the Government if they could. The rest — more than a million peasant soldiers of the line — are clearly a neutral force. They have not the organisation, determination, dash, or physical ability to create a successful revolt. In case they did mutiny they would probably prove helpless against the loyal troops that are carefully mingled with them in every camp. On the other hand, they would certainly be glad to desert the ranks at the first opportunity — if for no other reason than to avoid the suffering and hardship of the Russian soldier's life. This life has always been hard, the discipline always severe, and since the revolution conditions are worse than ever. For the suppression of agrarian disorders, then, such soldiers could scarcely avail. An irresistible opportunity for individual desertion would be afforded the moment they were spread

over the land in the inevitable small detachments. Moreover, they have nearly all now taken part in peasant disturbances in their own villages before they were torn from their homes and taken to the barracks. They might mutiny, they would probably desert, they would certainly be useless in an agrarian uprising.

The Government can count on its four hundred thousand Cossacks and on some one hundred thousand other troops of favoured regiments. The newly formed "rural guards," if not very valuable, are probably loyal, as are also an equal number of the gendarmes and of the police. Here are some seven hundred thousand armed and disciplined men. Also there are some fifty thousand loyal army officers and several hundred thousand rural police, spies, ruffians and black hundreds which the Government has armed and can rely on where the warfare has not yet entered into a critical guerilla stage. Altogether, then, the Government has at its disposal a million armed men.

There are also determined partisans of the Government without arms — Government officials in the middle and higher ranks, large and small landlords, the merchants of the towns, village usurers and shopkeepers, petty traders who wish to get rid of their business rivals among the Jews. But, as the elections have finally proven, it may be doubted if the Government's unarmed supporters number, all told, another million.

The rest of the people, not less than twenty-five million fighting men, are opposed to the Government, and gradually are joining in the war against it. They are fighting men because nearly all have had four or five years training in the army, and several millions have been through the recent war. They are opposed to the Government because the Government has taken a clear and final stand against their wishes for a political and economic revolution, as expressed in the first Duma. and is using the most violent, savage, and murderous means to repress their discontent. What part of the twenty-five million are already prepared to go to war — i. e., to risk their lives for the cause — it is impossible to say. Certainly almost the whole youth of the cities and towns, probably the overwhelming majority of the young peasants as well. The older men, less valuable and slower to act, are fast moving toward the

same attitude. If the present conditions continue there is no doubt that a large part of the twenty-five million will soon be ready for the revolution's service.

What is lacking to the revolution is not men but organisation and means. It is here that the disparity is most glaring. The Government gets every year several hundred million rubles from foreign financiers, and will doubtless continue to get these sums at whatever cost. The Government has control of hundreds of forts and arsenals throughout the land, of innumerable rapid-firing cannon and machine guns. It monopolises the use of the telegraphs and railroad lines, and will continue to monopolise them even in the height of civil war. The revolutionists can always destroy the railways — the organisation to *use* them is lacking and must remain lacking until the Government has been overthrown. The same is true of the telegraphs. Even when all the lines are down, the Government will continue to have the use of its wireless system against the revolution.

The Government is not only highly organised, but it is organised especially to fight the revolution. By the side of the first Government, a second has grown up. There is one organisation of the railroads in time of peace, and another organisation in time of insurrection. In time of insurrection the roads are on a war footing. Every workman becomes a soldier, every superintendent an officer. So with the telegraphs, the post-office, and the police. Machine guns are within a few minutes of every public place, spies infest every restaurant and railway station, Cossacks are on the alert for the few cents of extra pay they get for every hour of "service against the internal enemy."

Against such an array of organisation and force what can the people do? There is no hidden answer to the question, no possibility of an easy escape from the colossal tragedy of the situation. The people must be ready to die. When they are ready to make the necessary sacrifices of life and everything that life contains, then only can they hope for freedom. A quarter of a million soldiers were sacrificed in Japan. This is a war of infinitely more importance to the land.

The war between the Czar and the people has already passed

the first stages. The armies have taken up their positions, and the first skirmishes, in which the Government has been uniformly successful, have already occurred. Nevertheless, the revolutionists have gained a great advantage. With a mere fraction of their army mobilised and in the field, they are keeping busy the total available Government force.

How many men of fighting age are subject to revolutionary orders at the present time? Probably two-thirds of the city population, most of the miners and railway men, practically the whole people of the Baltic provinces and of parts of the Caucasus, and a few hundred thousand Russian peasants. In all, certainly no more than a few million men — armed with a few hundred thousand revolvers and less than a hundred thousand rifles, financed with the few million rubles they have been able to seize from the Government, held together largely by purely local organisations and limited in their field of action to a fraction of the land. The workingmen are able to gather in mobs of several hundred or several thousand. Without arms they cannot be able to do much active damage, though it takes several large armies and numerous smaller detachments to keep them down. The guerilla forces in the Baltic provinces, the Caucasus and Poland, are composed of bands of only ten to a hundred armed men, but they destroy a great deal of Government property and keep three armies employed.

The peasants' contingents are only beginning to move. The whole peasantry is daily growing more bitter against the Government, but hardly a tithe have yet become soldiers of the revolution. Nevertheless, see what an army they have engaged. The Cossacks and rural guards in the country probably number not less than two hundred thousand mounted men. If the peasants' revolt continues to spread, if ever the dozen most revolutionary provinces of the Volga and the south rise at the same time, this force would not be a fraction of what would be needed to keep the peasants down. It is at this moment of the peasants' uprising that the Railway Union has agreed to strike, and with the aid of the peasants to destroy the bridges and tear up the ties. The national movements in Poland, Finland, the Baltic provinces and the Caucasus, would redouble at such an auspicious revolt. The Czar's loyal

army — that is, the part which is loyal — would do well if it held the strong places and a few important lines of communication. The country districts would have practically emancipated themselves at the outset, the cities would soon become centres of mutinies and barricades, and all Russia would be covered with the same guerilla warfare that has been waging for the year past on the borders of the Black and Baltic seas.

It may well be a protracted struggle, for it is most likely to end as it begins, a guerilla war. The revolutionary forces will strive for better organisation, more arms and more financial backing — but they will long remain relatively disorganised and poor in both money and guns. The size of the guerilla bands may increase from tens to hundreds, or even thousands; it will certainly be long before anything like a regular army is in the field. The basis of the operations of these bands may spread from a dozen outlying districts to a large section of Russia itself, the hundred thousand men now secretly or openly under arms may increase even tenfold; the Government will continue to count successfully on all, or a very large part, of a centralised army of nearly a million men. It will continue to hold for a long time nearly all the strong places, the cannon and the machine guns; the wireless telegraphs will remain; the railway soldiers will hold and operate the main lines and repair them sufficiently at least for the transportation of troops.

There is possibility of appalling bloodshed. No people is more lavish of lives than a peaceful people whipped and driven to revolt. If the Czar is determined, no man can see where the bloodshed will end. In our Civil War the United States, a nation of thirty millions fighting over the freedom of a few million blacks, and the preservation of the Union, lost a million men. If great Russia, fighting over the freedom of one hundred and forty million human beings and for the birth-right of a nation, should give the lives of a million or several million, could we fail to understand?

It is certain that the intelligence, daring and fighting powers displayed in any of the great revolutions of England, France, or America would not have been sufficient to win this present struggle. If to the resources of the tyrannical governments in all past cases there had been added an apparently inexhaustible

treasury, military railroads, and even wireless telegraphy, these revolutions might have taken generations where they took years to triumph. We must remember that as far as its need of the machinery of war to fight its people is concerned, the Russian Government's resources are inexhaustible; for France cannot afford to let Russia be without a modern army. And it must also be remembered that the cannon, machine guns, railroads, and telegraphs cannot be turned against their owners, as Westerners so superficially imagine. All that is necessary to protect them is an army of a million well paid and well-drilled mercenaries — and these Russia has, literally a professional army, such as is supposed not to exist since the introduction of universal military servitude.

Americans and Europeans would do well to take an interest in the new Russian military slavery by which a modern professional army of a million men can keep down twenty million. If the method succeeds, it will first be imitated by Prussia, Hungary, and other reactionary countries, and later perhaps by their more Western neighbours. A few years or decades would be enough to endanger all the liberty there is on this earth. The great world-danger of Russia's success is, it may encourage the hope of the privileged classes everywhere to establish similar military despotisms, and encourage the gradual growth of armies making the establishment of such despotisms possible.



PART FOUR
EVOLUTION OF A NEW NATION

CHAPTER I

THE NATION UNITED

IN STRUGGLING against Czarism the Russian people are fighting for the right of free development in every possible direction. The professors are struggling for academic freedom, the peasants for land, the workingmen for the right to organise, citizens for the right to govern themselves, publicists for the right to speak and write, and the people at large for every elementary human freedom. As a result there are as many parties as there are groups of people that emphasise one or another aspect of the struggle; but it by no means follows that these parties are turning aside to fight one another. On the contrary there is no fundamental confusion. The object of every *bona fide* liberal, radical, or revolutionary organisation, is to take all the power away from the incompetent, immoral, and murderous régime that is at present in control. All oppositional parties are agreed that the Government has never listened to any argument except that of violence; that the past warfare of the people against the Government, whether the best possible or not, has been entirely natural and justifiable; that no one but the Russian people itself should be consulted in the regeneration of Russia; that the Duma should have absolute and supreme power, and that a system of universal suffrage should be established by which the common people should control the destiny of the nation. In the words of Professor Maxime Kovalevsky, there is only one question in Russia to-day, that is whether Russia is to be a European or an Asiatic nation.

From this state of the public mind some kind of unity is a necessary and inevitable consequence. The various revolutionary and oppositional organisations often feel bitterly against one another for what they consider to be a misinterpretation of the main purpose of the revolution, or a dangerous error in the others' tactics. Nevertheless they coöperate practically

in that they have dropped into an unconscious and, perhaps even unwilling, but nevertheless perfectly definite, division of labour. The Liberals or Constitutional Democrats provided the parliamentary organisation and the leading parliamentary ideas; the Peasants' Unions and the Labour Group directed the peasantry into politics; the Social Democrats organised the workingmen; the Social Revolutionists are most actively occupied with preparations for insurrection.

The nation was first united at the time of the great general strike which brought about the October Manifesto. Before the Manifesto there were only two organisations which could be said to have any very important political influence. The first was the congress of the zemstvos, or local government boards, and the town councils; the second was the Union of Unions, which included organisations of all the professions of Russia and of nearly all their leading members. Of course all these local government bodies are, according to Russian election laws, placed in the hands of the richest, most privileged and most conservative classes alone. It happened, however, that their power was so restricted by the Central Government, and their functions relatively so unimportant, that none but the enthusiastic reformers took part in the elections. Therefore, although at least nine-tenths of the landlords and rich citizens that elect these bodies are ultra-conservative and entirely friendly to the Government, the zemstvos had nearly everywhere fallen into the hands of honest and enthusiastic, sometimes even quite serious and democratic, reformers.

The congress held at Moscow on the 6th of November, 1905, three weeks after the Manifesto of Freedom, shows the temper of the organisation at this time. The overwhelming majority of these relatively disinterested reformers voted in favour of all the essential features of the revolutionary proposals that were afterward made the programme of the whole nation in the address of the first Duma to the throne. One of the speakers, the well-known Roditchev, the only important public character in Russia who has been a member of all three Dumas, and who was also perhaps the leading orator in each, demanded that either the new elections should be general and direct or that the proposed Duma should not be convoked at all. As it was known

that the laws then being framed by the ministers did not concede direct elections this was a challenge and ultimatum to the Government. He insisted also on the "absolute separation of the Government from the reactionary court party." Prince Dolgorukov said that they ought to refuse to grant the Government any credits. Other speakers demanded a common action with the extreme revolutionary parties. One said, "Do not fear the word 'revolution;' we are also revolutionaries, at least in principle." Another said, "I am not a Socialist, but if any one will show me that the Socialists will save Russia, I shall be first to stretch them my hand; a temporary alliance is inevitable."

It was decided to demand an absolute amnesty of all political and religious criminals, and at the same time the punishment of all officials guilty of having stirred up the massacres and other disorders. This resolution justifies the whole movement against the Government even in its most revolutionary aspects, while it refuses any clemency toward officials guilty only of having carried out the well-known inclinations of the Czar.

It is worth while to stop and notice in this early congress the beginning of the only great division that now separates the Russian people. The more peace-loving and less aggressive members of the congress proposed, instead of the Duma elected by universal and equal suffrage, a national assembly to be composed of representatives sent by local government boards, town councils, universities, and so on, and suggested that this body should then elaborate the new electoral law. In favour of this proposition were the well-known public men Prince Trubetzkoi, General Kousmin-Karavaiev and Stachovitch. Another relatively conservative view was that of Maxime Kovalevsky, who said that he was not an anti-republican but that he was persuaded that the peasants did not yet want a republic, and therefore that although in France he might be a republican in Russia he was a monarchist. Count Heyden agreed with these ideas.

These points of view were not so objectionable as those expressed by Alexander Gutchkov, who has now become the leader of the third Duma, and of such reformers as are entirely friendly with the present Government. Mr. Gutchkov was

opposed to direct suffrage and also to any sort of alliance with the revolutionary parties. Finally, Prince Volkonsky, now become the leader of the notorious black hundreds, demanded, though without receiving any approval, that the congress lend its support unconditionally to the Government. It is necessary to note in passing these conservative tendencies of the minority of the congress, for since the revolutionary movement has stirred up the land-owning and otherwise privileged electors the recent zemstvo congresses have taken a position somewhere between that of Volkonsky and Gutchkov, and this must not appear as a reaction but merely as an assertion of neglected privileges on the part of a threatened social class.

At the same period also the famous Union of Unions reached its highest degree of development. This organisation had declared its support of the first general strike, and later, in view of a possible recurrence, decided to assess all its members one day's earnings for the support of the next great national effort. Nearly all the most distinguished engineers, lawyers, doctors, journalists, artists, actors, and authors had openly joined in the movement. Even the professors and school-teachers were organised, and the Railway and Peasants' Unions were admitted to membership. Besides, there was a union for the advancement of the interests of women, and the Union of Hebrews. The Hebrew union alone, I was told by a prominent Jewish editor, had more than one hundred and fifty local branches and fifty thousand members.

Here is the heart of the Union of Unions' revolutionary declaration on the eve of the second strike:

The Government has committed many new crimes. It has arrested the Central Bureau of the Union of Peasants, of the Union of the Post and Telegraphs, also the Council of Deputies of the Workingmen. It has closed the progressive newspapers and proclaimed laws that destroy civil liberty. The Government is threatening the rights which the people obtained for themselves by struggle, and which it confirmed (only) by the Manifesto of October 17th. The liberty of the people is in danger.

The Central Bureau and Committee of the Union of Unions, declaring a common cause with the Council of Workingmen's Deputies in its struggle against the Government, calls upon all citizens to defend their rights. The Government invites us to struggle; then let us struggle. The form of this struggle does not depend at all upon us. It depends

upon the actions of the Government, which by its invasions is trying to destroy the organisation of the working people, of the peasants and of the revolutionary professional classes. By its effort it is compelling the revolutionary movement to take an elementary road. If the Government keeps the power in its hands it threatens innumerable misfortunes and bloodshed. The Central Bureau and Committee of the Union of Unions invites all the unions which compose it to commence a mobilisation of their forces to be ready every moment to take part in the general political strike as soon as it shall be proclaimed.

The Union then demands the abdication of the "provocative Government" and the immediate convocation of a constitutional assembly.

As long as the Government allowed it to remain in existence the union continued its revolutionary activities. On the 3d of May, 1906, after the Government had secured a loan of 850,000,000 rubles without asking the Duma's consent, the union again issued an equally revolutionary declaration stating that this loan permitted the Government to reply to the popular demands in the same old way, by bullets, bayonets, imprisonment, and exile:

New cannons, new machine guns, armoured automobiles, the mobilisation of new Cossack regiments, the formation of new troops of rural guards, gendarmes, and secret police—these are the results that threaten us from this new financial operation. . . . The money of the people will be employed by those who are outraging it, our children will be compelled to pay for our enslavement.

The Union of Unions declares this loan a crime against the nation. It declares that, contracted illegally without the consent of the people, this loan cannot bind the coming popular Government, just as was declared last year by the Peasants' Union, the Council of Labour Deputies and all the Socialist parties. . . .

But the effective power of the people cannot be established except by a constituent assembly possessing full constitution-making, legislative, executive, and judicial powers, and convoked by a universal, direct, secret, and equal suffrage.

When we have had a glimpse into the programme of these two great organisations, the Zemstvo Congress and the Union of Unions, we have all the materials necessary for understanding the origin of the Constitutional Democratic party, which has occupied the principal position between the thoroughgoing revolutionists and the Government. The party so formed is indeed in a sense the leading political party of Russia, as we can readily perceive if we recall the fact that the large

majority of the people, hoping little from politics in Russia, have definitely organised themselves — when at all — rather into revolutionary organisations than into political parties.

At the very first congress of the Constitutional Democratic Party, in October, 1905, the position taken was thoroughly revolutionary. Professor Milyoukov's opening speech declared that the end of the party, and that of all the Russian people, was a constituent assembly based on universal and equal suffrage. He declared that the programme of his party was not only radical for Russia but the most radical of any similar organisation in all Europe, going further in the direction of the decentralisation of government and opposition of the principle of *laissez faire* than any of the rest. While his party wished to preserve the integrity of the Russian State as well as the inviolability of private property, it was in favour of giving the greatest possible liberty to all local branches of the Government, and of extending the functions of the State in every direction that forwarded the common good rather than of restricting them according to the principles of the radicals of half a century ago.

Not only did the party take up this advanced position but it looked forward to a strong revolutionary movement and continued to do so for a year or more. In the first number of the party paper, edited by Professor Milyoukov, he said: "We are for the revolution, then, in so far as it serves the cause of political enfranchisement and social reform." This was not an abstract or general position merely. Professor Milyoukov wrote some time later showing that he was prepared for great disturbances. "The disposition of the country," he said, "has not quieted down; it has only gone down deeper below the surface and is now going through some difficult preparatory process . . . As in the case of many organisms, the greater the interval between the moment of irritation on the surface and the final discharge of nervous energy, the more grandiose the latter becomes." Professor Milyoukov has so far changed his opinion of late — as I shall show in the following chapter — that I have considered it necessary to indicate definitely that he stood at this time with the rest of the Russian nation.

Indeed, we may well feel that the Constitutional Democratic leader was then too optimistic. He reported an interesting



PROFESSOR MILYOUKOV
Perhaps the ablest politician of the opposition



A GROUP OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRATIC LEADERS

Mouromtzev, president of the first Duma, seated in the centre; Prince Dolgoroukov at his left

interview that he had had with the then prime minister, Count Witte. He said that he had called Count Witte's attention to the mistake the latter (or the Czar) had made in not responding to the general wish of the Russian people by calling a constitutional assembly and bringing about a liberal but monarchistic constitution similar to that of Bulgaria — established, by the way, with the aid of the Russian Government. Count Witte answered that the public would now be satisfied with no constitution that was given from above. "In other words," says Milyoukov, "Count Witte proved more liberal than I." Professor Milyoukov's answer was that the public would not be satisfied with a constitution from above only because it did not believe it possible to get it, and he threatened that the first Duma would draw up an election law, demand a constitutional assembly elected on the basis of this law, and that only after this would a third and regular legislative body be convened. Professor Milyoukov, we see, from the very outset had an almost child-like faith in the powers of any parliamentary or legislative body to bring about revolution without reference to the guns outside its hall. He did not suspect that the progressive and revolutionary elements would be reduced to naught either by the election law or by the new Duma being ignored by the Government. Count Witte in this instance was the true statesman. He reckoned only with the real elements of the situation, the revolutionary movement, which would not be satisfied with any constitution from above, and was undismayed by Milyoukov's threats of paper laws to be passed by a powerless assembly.

But we must consider that even Professor Milyoukov had small faith at first in the Duma. He wrote a little later, "Until there is a definite admission from the Government that a constitution is finally established, and as long as open preparations for a *coup d'état* continue, it will be impossible to squeeze the revolutionary struggle into the framework of parliamentary combat. We are under no delusion about this and do not imagine that the weapons of parliamentary struggle are very great." Since the Government has now definitely refused to consider that there is a constitution, and the *coup d'état* Milyoukov feared has actually taken place, we must conclude from his own logic that the weapons of parliamentary struggle have

become insignificant, no matter what Professor Milyoukov may now say to the contrary. If Professor Milyoukov and the Constitutional Democratic Party have become more conservative, this is doubtless largely due to the fact that, instead of seeing that both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary revolutionary movements in Russia have no immediate outlook, he was disposed to be pessimistic only concerning the latter phase of the great movement.

Before the first Duma the Constitutional Democratic Party decided that they were actually to enter into the details of social reform rather than to continue a direct effort for a fundamental political change; they were already on a downward slope which could not but lead to the miserable fiasco later to be mentioned. But they had not yet deserted the Emancipation movement, and so we can speak of the unity of the whole Russian people in the first Duma.

CHAPTER II

THE NATION CHOOSES THE REVOLUTIONARY WAY

THE address of the first Duma to the throne was signed by all its members except an insignificant minority of seven. In this address the Russian nation presented to the Government and the world its *Magna Charta*. It was passed unanimously. While the seven extreme reactionaries did not vote for it they did not dare to vote against it, but merely walked out of the hall as if they did not know what had been passed. In the voting on every important question proposed in that address the majorities were overwhelming. Sometimes the vote was unanimous, sometimes the majorities were four hundred to one, to three, five, or six. This unity was secured not only by the powerful pressure and intelligence of the Constitutional Democrats who occupied the centre, but by the full recognition of the necessity of unity by both of the extremes. After the Duma was dissolved both the revolutionary and the peaceful extremists in the Duma were more than ever impressed with the necessity of making the great fight on the basis of the address to the throne. Whatever agitation and discussion of other revolutionary subjects may have been in the air, all the wise leaders of every oppositional and revolutionary party were at one in the necessity of concentration on this basis.*

The most important article in the address, the matter that came first of all before the Duma, was the demand for immediate and full political amnesty as "the first pledge of mutual understanding and mutual agreement between the Czar and his people." This demand for amnesty is a demand for the most revolutionary measure practicable under the present conditions of the country. Few of the hundreds of thousands of political prisoners are terrorised by their political punishments. The idea that people can be forced into submission by

* For the text of the address to the throne, see Appendix, Note B.

sheer terror comes down from the days of Ivan the Terrible and is utterly inapplicable at the present time. The Duma knew that when these political prisoners got out they would first look about to see if the Government was itself making a fundamental and revolutionary reform. If not, the revolutionary movement would be wondrously reinvigorated by these outraged subjects. Indeed the Duma felt that the revolutionary movement would become invincible when reinforced by a hundred thousand active recruits. The Duma likewise demanded the abolition of martial law, knowing well that this would leave entire provinces, and perhaps the larger part of the country, entirely in the people's hands.

The first Duma demanded universal suffrage, the responsibility of the ministers and all the Czar's officials to the Duma and not to the Czar, the abolition of the existing Council of State, and all laws that stood in the way of the full popular sovereignty. In a word, the representatives of the Russian nation demanded the full sovereignty of the people, and, whether monarchy or republic, a wholly democratic state. At the same time the Duma was very well aware that it was most unlikely the present Czar would grant this request for a comparatively free government, and it knew full well that the demand itself was leading to future revolutionary conflicts.

Quite as revolutionary as its political programme was the Duma's challenge to the reigning landlord caste. In demanding the expropriation of the estates of the large proprietors on the principle of eminent domain, the Duma was instituting a social conflict of the greatest importance. It was facing the fundamental social question in Russia, for, besides the Government, the common enemy of the nation is the landlord class. In taking this position the Duma was only fulfilling the mandates on which it had been elected, for all over the country the voters had united definitely against the landlords as well as against the Government. All the calamities that have happened since the nation's declaration of war against the landlords, have been traced by the Constitutional Democratic leaders themselves to a conspiracy between the Government and the Russian land-owning nobility to restore fully the old oppressive despotism.

The Constitutional Democrats not only took up a revolu-

tionary position with the rest of the nation at the beginning of the Duma; they maintained it in a sense until the close. The Duma's action, which was used by the Government as an excuse for closing it, was animated by the same revolutionary spirit as the address to the throne. The Duma proposed to post in every village in the country declarations to the effect that it intended to provide all the peasants with land. Although the proposal itself is entirely practical and on its surface innocent, its bearings can be well imagined. Neither the Government nor any considerable part of the landlords were ever willing to carry out such a fundamental social reform, and to do it against the will of the Czar and the ruling social caste meant nothing less than social revolution.

No sooner were the troops stationed around the Duma hall for the purpose of expelling the deputies than active members both of the peasants' and the Constitutional Democratic parties arranged to get a majority of the members then present in St. Petersburg to meet together at the Viborg in Finland, where they issued the now famous manifesto. In this historic document, signed by more than two hundred representatives of the people, it was predicted that the Government would use every effort to obtain a second and more servile Duma, and that if it succeeded "in suppressing the people's movement altogether it would summon no other Duma at all." As is usual with political predictions this one turned out to be true only in a very large interpretation. Before calling an obedient and servile Duma the Government again made an experiment with the old Duma election law, and in spite of all the efforts of the police the second Duma was more Socialist and more revolutionary than the first. But the prediction held strictly true for the third Duma, the elections for which were held after all only thirteen months after the Viborg manifesto. When, after deciding to dissolve the second Duma also, the Government had succeeded in suppressing the people's movement altogether, it did indeed summon no other Duma, if we use the word "Duma" in the sense in which it was employed by the signers of the manifesto. For the third Duma is no Duma at all, but merely a council of elected representatives chosen not by the people but to suit the Government's convenience.

The chief revolutionary proposal of the Viborg manifesto was that the Government had no right to demand taxes or recruits from the people without the consent of their representatives. As there was no such clause in the so-called constitution or in fundamental laws in existence at that time, this principle, however just, was entirely extra-constitutional and revolutionary. The manifesto also proclaimed that all loans raised without its consent would be illegal. That all three of these revolutionary proposals were belated and impractical, that the country was no longer in a revolutionary fever as at the time of the successful general strike a year before, is not of interest at this point. I insist only that these measures were thoroughly unconstitutional and revolutionary, being the same which had been demanded more than a year before by the Peasants' Union, the Railway Union, the Council of Labour Deputies and the Socialist parties — and which were then opposed by the timid Constitutionalists, at the only time when they had any chance of practical effect. During the Duma the Constitutional Democrats had been continually forced in a revolutionary direction, or at least held in a radical position, by the so-called "Labour Group," an offshoot of the Peasants' Union. At its close they fell almost entirely into the revolutionary position and the tactics elaborated more than a year before by that and other related organisations.

Among the signers of the Viborg manifesto were nearly all the important members of the Duma, the only exceptions being several leaders who were attending the inter-parliamentary congress in London, and a few conservatives like Heyden and Stachovitch. The parties that stood for the manifesto had much greater success than ever in the elections for the second Duma. The only regret expressed among the mass of the electors was that the meeting could not have been held in St. Petersburg and that the Duma did not then and there declare itself the Russian Government. Such an attempt would undoubtedly have led to the immediate arrest of the whole Duma. This would have had a much more electrical effect, would have been much more likely to precipitate an uprising of the whole nation than the passive-resistance measure actually adopted which called on the people to refuse recruits and the payment of taxes.

Moreover, these members of the Duma did not save themselves by not inviting their own arrest at this time, when it would have brought on not only a powerful movement in Russia but a great wave of international indignation such as has not been seen since the days of the January massacre in St. Petersburg — for they have all just been on trial and have been sentenced to three months' imprisonment by the courts.

In this trial Muromzev, president of the first Duma, asked how it could be possible that the people's elected representatives, and so the people themselves, should be declared to be enemies of the Government, and he claimed that such a view sets us back in the Middle Ages when the governments behaved toward the people as the conquerors in a conquered land. He asked: "Can we look on our people in this way? It is said that this is the patriotic standpoint, but this is not so; it is rather a standpoint of hostility to the very idea of the State."

We see that in the intervening two years the president of the Duma has not retracted his former principles, and we find that the revolutionary spirit of the workingmen and peasant deputies had on the contrary rather increased than fallen during this period. As there were only two of the most extreme revolutionary party among the peasants' deputies in the first Duma and forty were sent to the second, we can see to what degree the revolutionary feeling had risen between the two Dumas. The trial of the Viborg deputies is indeed, as the lawyers claimed, not a trial of individuals but of the whole Russian people. The Russian Government, by its decision in this trial, has convicted 90 per cent. of the Russian people of political crime and sent their representatives to prison as a punishment.

That the signers of this manifesto deserved well of the Russian people is witnessed also by the attack made on them by the reactionary leaders. The *Russian Flag*, the extreme reactionary organ favoured by a large class of officials and courtiers, demands for Muromzev, the president, and for the Princes Dolgorukov and Schackovskoi, the vice-presidents of the Duma, the death penalty, or, what is even worse, a life-long sentence of forced labour in the mines.

We must distinguish the action of the moderate Constitutional Democratic majority in this Duma from the action of the

radical minority. The majority of the Duma represented at the most a few hundred thousand city electors and small land-owners, while the Labour Group represented no less than five or ten million peasants. This group, after having signed the manifesto calling for passive resistance, went much further in its appeal to the population and called on them to enter into real revolution, "open violent rebellion." Its manifesto declared:

Nobody has a right to submit to such a government, it would be criminal to execute its decrees. The people ought everywhere to drive away the local authorities and replace them by elected authorities. They ought to confiscate everywhere and place in the hands of authorities legally elected by the nation, all the fixed and movable property of the State. . . .

The peasants ought to take their affairs in their own hands. They have not been given land and liberty. They must take liberty; they must take all the land, not in a disorderly manner, but by putting it from the outset into the hands of locally-elected authorities . . . Now is the moment for the whole country to rise as a single man to save the fatherland from ruin, and to pronounce the terrible judgment of the people against the betrayers of the country.

From the point of view of immediate practical results this appeal was no more efficient than the call of the Duma majority for passive resistance, but it had a far more revolutionary and permanent effect on the people, as I have already indicated in speaking of the state of mind of the peasantry. The signers of this proclamation were, however, quite mistaken as to the ripeness of the country for a great revolutionary movement. There has been a tremendous evolution in this direction, but the people were by no means aroused to that pitch of warlike spirit and readiness for martyrdom that would be necessary to overthrow a government having such financial and military resources as that of the Czar.

The revolutionary spirit of the first Duma lived not only in the largely increased number of Socialist and revolutionary deputies elected to the second — nearly one-half of the whole body in spite of the outrageous election law and the monstrous interference of the police — but also in a frequent reassumption by the moderate party of the revolutionary position it had taken in the first Duma. When this Duma also had made itself obnoxious to the Government and Nicholas dissolved it



Photograph by Sully, St. Petersburg

THE LABOUR GROUP OF THE FIRST DUMA
They are not workmen alone



Photograph by Bulla, St. Petersburg

SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC DEPUTIES IN THE FIRST DUMA

in a manifesto creating an even more outrageous election law, he specified certain accusations of political crime. From the standpoint of one wishing to preserve all his arbitrary power, these accusations were certainly justified. It was true, as Nicholas claimed, that the Duma in refusing to endorse certain measures of the Government was unquestionably encouraging the revolutionary movement. The Government asked for a law punishing the justification, in meetings and in the press, of so-called political "crimes." The Duma refused its consent. The Government proposed a law punishing more severely revolutionary agitation in the army. The Duma refused its consent on the ground that such agitation could only be fought, not by more severe punishment than that in existence, but by far-reaching social reforms. The Czar accused the Duma of having allowed a minority (the two hundred Socialist or semi-Socialist deputies, a pretty large minority) of using the Duma's right of questioning the Government as "a means of waging war against it and awaking the mistrust of the population." There can be no question that this accusation was practically true. Finally, the Government accused the Duma of not having examined the budget after a session of two months, and suggests rightly that this action was due to the non-Russian elements in the Duma in league with the revolutionists. It is true that the Polish delegates who held the balance of power were considering the refusal of the budget on the ground that the Government was continuing its oppression of the Polish people. It is also true that the Mohammedan group was probably more in accord with the moderate Socialists than with the Constitutional Democrats, and that by the union of these forces a majority entirely hostile to the Government on the all-important land question might have been created had the Duma continued.

The second Duma, then, was more revolutionary than the first, in spite of efforts of the moderate Constitutional Democrats to prevent its drift in the revolutionary direction. On all great economic and political questions the Constitutional Democrats in the Duma were disposed to compromise indefinitely with the Government, but on the most pressing and immediate questions they were forced by the overwhelming sentiment of the country to take up a revolutionary position.

Indeed the position that they took at this time in refusing to pass a resolution condemning the assassination of officials, without reference to the arbitrary and equally violent acts of the Government, is the one thing which will never be forgiven them by the reactionary forces of the country. It will be difficult for the most conservative members of the party to overcome this revolutionary past, and above all it will be difficult, if not impossible, for them to entirely reverse the party's position on this question of "The Terror."

The practical unity of the Russian people in favour of the revolutionary movement and against the Government was maintained, then, until the dissolution of the second Duma, when the Czar's *coup d'état* practically put an end to every shadow of constitutional and parliamentary government.

CHAPTER III

THE UNITY DESTROYED

WE HAVE now to deal with the only serious division that has taken place in the ranks of the people since the beginning of the Russian revolution. It is by no means as important a division as it appears, but owing to the fact that the Constitutional Democratic party, favoured by an absurdly unjust election law which they themselves have denounced, formed the majority of the first Duma and usually held the balance of power in the second, this division has become noised abroad and is overestimated by even the most serious foreign observers. There is no question that the Constitutional Democratic party after the dissolution of the second Duma had lost almost all of its revolutionary standpoint, and become an ordinary radical party. Such parties are vitally important and entirely justifiable in all countries that have any real constitutional government. It may be doubted, however, if this kind of opposition has any deep significance whatever, under the arbitrary government of the Russia of to-day.

That a group so timid and weak as to assume this moderate position during the present great crisis, has left the revolutionary ranks does not necessarily mean a weakening of the whole revolutionary movement. Quite the contrary. It means that the new army, composed only of such elements as are ready to fight the Government by all means until it is entirely overthrown, is more practically constituted, more profound in its principles, and much more powerful in every way. The Constitutional Democratic party has withdrawn from the revolutionary movement only a small minority of the middle class. The majority of the middle class, the overwhelming majority of the one hundred and forty million peasants and working people, remain as they were before, united in the move-

ment for a constitutional assembly and the absolute sovereignty of the people.

Nevertheless, this desertion of the *official* Constitutional Democratic party (let it be noted from the outset that the rank and file of those who have voted for the party have by no means forsaken the revolution), since it is the first and only great betrayal since the beginning of the movement, is the only spiritual calamity that has happened to the revolutionary movement. Though the loss was only of one part of one of the several corps of the great revolutionary army, yet the loss did destroy the complete national unity that existed during the first Duma when all elements of the Russian population were as one against the Czar, the nobility and their bought retainers and mercenaries.

We must examine this desertion carefully to find out whether, from the standpoint of the conservative wing of the Russian moderate party, there are any fundamental defects in the morality or the intelligence of the revolutionary movement. From the outset the Constitutional Democratic Party was an opportunist and political organisation. It was not endeavouring, like the Socialist parties, to unite the people on fundamental principles of social evolution; it did not endeavour, like the Peasants' Union or the Council of Labour Deputies, to bring together large elements of the population on the sole ground of their economical interests. It was a political party in the same sense as those of England or the United States, where political liberty has already been attained.

Nevertheless this party differed from similar parties in other countries. At the time of its formation it was impossible, and remains impossible to-day, to organise any large party in Russia, even if it is to have only one hundred thousand members, without taking in revolutionary and Socialistic elements. In the first congress of the party Professor Milyoukov, the president, stated that the party was composed of persons with two opinions in regard to the Socialist proposals — one class which were convinced that these principles were just but that they were outside the limits of practical politics, another that considered them unacceptable in general. Therefore, he urged that it was necessary for the party to take no position on these

fundamental social principles. "To put these questions in the foreground," he said, "and to include them in our programme, will have as an immediate result the dissolution of the party." We see then, not that the party was conservative, since it wished to take into its ranks a large number of convinced Socialists, but that it was opportunist. The leader, Milyoukov, was a confessed opportunist. The party executive, largely composed of members of the first Duma, was half opportunistic. The party members, on the other hand, were from the outset extremely radical and Socialistic if not Socialist. One may say without danger of error that a very large proportion of them were "opportunist Socialists" and far more friendly to the Socialist parties than to organisations more conservative than their own. When we come to those who gave their votes for this party, a much larger and more important body than the party members, we find a still more Socialistic and revolutionary opinion. In each election a very large portion voted for the Constitutional Democratic Party only because there was no other organisation between this party and the Socialists.

The party organisation itself has ceased to be revolutionary, but this change could hardly have come about except for the persecution of the Government. A large part of the radical members of all the committees have been arrested all over the country, leaving inevitably only the most conservative which the Government either could not or did not care to disturb. For instance, the radical members of the first Duma were disqualified by the Government for election to the second. As a result many of the new representatives came from the conservative wing of the party. Again and again the Government has been able to change the whole tactics of this party, which has insisted always on being strictly legal, by orders issued directly from the Government bureaus. Whenever anything the party was doing seemed especially radical to the Government, it proceeded to enact some new administrative regulation by which the agitation was eradicated. The party insisted on being legal. Is it necessary to expatiate on the absurdity of legality in the Russia of to-day? Step by step, as the Government has become more severe in its measures, the "legal" party has been forced backward.

Tainted with the vice of opportunism rather than that of conservatism, the party at the meeting of the second Duma seemed about to change its tactics once more and to adopt a more revolutionary rather than a more conservative position. During the second elections, and before the Duma met, it appeared that the Socialists would very nearly have a majority without the Constitutional Democrats, and Professor Milyoukov said in a public interview that the party would have to work with these elements. But when the Duma met it was soon clear that the aggressive tactics of the Socialists against the Government might lead to an immediate dissolution. Now as a purely opportunist and purely political party, the Constitutional Democrats were of practically no importance except by the Duma being in session. They were therefore forced into every possible measure for conciliating the Government and preventing the dissolution. They dropped all the revolutionary proposals addressed to the throne by the first Duma, postponed the demand for amnesty and declared through their leaders, Hessen and Milyoukov, that they were ready to compromise even on the absolutely vital matters of obtaining a just election law and expropriating the landlords for the benefit of the peasants. But this timid and conciliatory attitude, instead of bringing the Government to yield to their attenuated proposals, only made easier the Government's design of abolishing the parliamentary institution at least in all but name.

When the Czar dissolved the second Duma, and at the same time broke his own word and repealed a "fundamental law," he performed, according to the Constitutional Democrats, an unconstitutional act. In pursuance of their own principles, and concentrating all their strength in a fight for the constitution, they should have done everything in their power to resist this measure. All the organs and speakers of the party should have proclaimed, without cessation or fear of any punishment, the unconstitutionality of this act. Being unconstitutional it was also a political crime. By proclaiming this act a crime of the Czar, all the well-known leaders of their party could have got themselves imprisoned or exiled, and thus have created the utmost possible protest against this measure — which, according to their principles, was the worst the Government could be

guilty of. I am not defending the party's principles. I do not see that there was ever anything resembling a constitution in Russia. What I insist on pointing out here is that the party was not even true to its own fictitious and timid conceptions of how liberty is to be won for the Russian nation. We see again from this failure to act that constitutionalism is not the basis of this party, but that its very foundation is mere political opportunism — to keep moving a little bit in the right direction without reference to the rate at which the goal is neared. Having accepted from the outset in its resolution to be legal the framework made for it by the Government, the party is now operating within limitations so narrow as to make it appear quite ridiculous in view of the momentous, tragic issues at stake.

The Russian independent press has pointed out that the Constitutional Democrats have now taken the position formerly occupied by the confessedly anti-revolutionary reformers, the Octobrists. This party was in favour of the strictest "legality" in all measures of reform — that is, the strictest submission to the will of the Czar. Since the *coup d'état*, however, which the Octobrists also confess to have been a wholly illegal act, they have even lost this principle of legality, for it was by the new illegal election law that they were given control of the third Duma, and they are now opposed to any further changes in the law. In the same way the Constitutional Democrats, who were formerly constitutionalists, have consented to sign an address to the Czar in the name of the whole of the third Duma in which the word "constitution" is not mentioned. All that remains of their former principles is a sort of "legal" or "loyal" opposition precisely similar to the former opposition of the Octobrists. From their own standpoint, then, the Constitutional Democratic Party has taken the place of their most bitter opponents, the very position which they were denouncing a few months ago.

The degeneration of the party, after having reached this low level, continued apace. The new timid position assumed by the organisation while its more radical members remained in prison and exile, has given an opportunity to an entirely new class of men to secure control. The type that now has the greatest influence over the party congresses, however common

in other countries, is comparatively rare in Russia, trained as she is to a large degree of public spirit by her great struggle. In the empire of the Czars such public characters as do not live first of all for their country, but rather to make a success in their own private lives, are called "careerists," a term of the utmost reproach. In America many such anti-social but successful individuals are simply praised as self-made men. I do not imply that the Russian type is in any way different from that familiar in other countries, but only that the type is less common and less popular there. Individuals who have not been imprisoned recently, and are taking up such a position that they are not likely to be seriously persecuted by the Government in the future, those who have profited rather than suffered by the revolution, now compose the principal element in the Constitutional Democratic faction in the third Duma. I do not mean that such persons have not been persecuted more or less, but only that they are not being seriously persecuted at the present moment, although they still are submitted to the irritating annoyances of police régime. Examples of this type are commonly held to be Professor Milyoukov himself, Hessen, the other editor of the central organ of the party, and Struve, the principal theoretical writer. They are all more of the German professorial type than of the type of the Russians active in local government who were the true founders of the Constitutional Democratic Party.

In all that follows I must warn the reader to distinguish sharply between the degeneration brought about by these leaders and their relatively small following, and the opinions held by those who have merely voted for the party. But though we can exonerate the great mass of voters, we cannot exonerate the party organisation. The party, as well as its leaders, is responsible; long ago it chose the wrong road. Although the first party congress took up a clearly defined revolutionary position, the second, deciding that Russia was already a constitutional country, took the path of a purely parliamentary agitation inconsistent with any true emancipation movement in a despotic land. They adopted the theory that Russia had a constitution, and supposed that they were following politically advanced countries like England and the United States where

legal convictions must flourish and have played an important and useful rôle — *in times of social peace*. These Russian moderates have forgotten that no people have ever been more revolutionary and more practical in times of social war than the people of England and the United States. A Cromwell would have said of the second Duma, even before the Czar showed his scorn of it, "Take away that bauble." An American assembly would certainly have signed some declaration of independence even if they had gone to imprisonment or execution in the next moment. The German professors of the Constitutional Democratic Party decided to talk about a constitution in Russia until the people, and the Czar himself, should come to believe in its existence — until gradually their voices should force the Government to grant the reality in place of the shadow.

The first mistake of the Constitutional Democrats was in claiming that Russia had a constitution. Article 87 of the fundamental laws reduced almost to zero the right of the Duma to reject projects and laws which the ministers have the intention to propose, and reduced the right of the Duma over the budget, as Milyoukov himself confessed, to all but a pure illusion. The second mistake was to take seriously a parliament which had absolutely no power, and to act as if this were a genuine parliament. But this was only the beginning of a whole series of mistakes which necessarily followed.

The third incomprehensible error of this timid party was in not taking a more decidedly revolutionary position at the time of the Viborg manifesto and in not accepting their penalties at that critical moment instead of being convicted two years later of political crime. As I have indicated, this might have brought the nation much nearer to a crisis.

The fourth mistake of the party was when, after the dissolution of the first Duma, it fell practically into the hands of the mere opportunist and politician Milyoukov (I use politician, of course, in the true sense of a man devoted merely to politics without any ulterior motives). I have already shown how this came about, and that it led to the surrender of all the great principles of the Russian Magna Charta, the address of the first Duma to the throne.


The fifth great surrender of the party was its proposal to vote in favour of the Government on the question of the budget in the third Duma on the ground that it did not have any power over the budget anyway. Common sense, logic, and loyalty to principle would have taught, it would seem, the opposite conclusion: viz., that the less power the Duma had over the budget the more clearly it should express itself as opposed to the colossal robberies and frauds and waste of the public money which the budget contains.

The sixth and last error which has reduced the Constitutional Democratic Party to a nonentity in the great Russian crisis (unless it again reverses its decision), was its refusal to take up any effective position at the time when the Government itself took away a large part of what this party was pleased to call the constitution. Certainly the party was unable to prevent this action on the part of the Government, but it could have made a very effective protest by making an appeal to the Russian nation and the whole world, showing the impossibility of legal action in such a country; and it could have resolved itself again into a conspirative organisation like the Emancipation League of a few years before, which included the majority of the present leaders of the party.

Having taken the downward slope of mere politics the party has now come to the logical conclusion of such a policy. All real politics have now become impossible, and the party is reduced to mere empty words in a parliament constituted by the Government to suit itself and even then not entrusted with any sovereign power.



THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE PEASANTS' UNION OF THE DISTRICT OF THE DON COSSACKS





COSSACK MEMBERS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY
Even some of the Cossacks are against the Government

CHAPTER IV

THE MODERATES COÖPERATE WITH THE REACTIONARIES

THE report of the Constitutional Democratic party after Czar's *coup d'état* shows very clearly the illogical basis and impractical politics of the organisation. Instead of stating boldly the true meaning of the great illegal act of the Government, the party was satisfied with the most indirect indictment. "As to the political and judicial meaning of the change that has taken place by the act of the 3d of June," says the report, "there cannot be the least difference of opinion." But it is precisely the fundamental difference of opinion between those who reject this *coup d'état* and those who do not reject it, that constitutes the fundamental distinction between those who are really opposing the Russian Government to-day and those who are opposing it only within the lines of demarcation marked out by the Government itself as suitable for a "loyal" opposition movement. The report says that the denial of the constitution by the more revolutionary parties has injured the approval of the new-born, and far from perfect, constitutionalism that was growing up in the public mind. The Constitutional Democratic Party, then, far from being the practical organisation that it claims to be, bases all its politics on the shadowy notion in the public mind concerning an institution of which the Government itself, which alone has the power of interpreting the law of Russia, denies the very existence.

The Constitutional Democrats in this report accuse the revolutionary parties of having promised everything without reference to what they could obtain. The reverse is the truth. The Socialistic deputies selected by the peasants promised "to fight for the land and freedom," but the cases were relatively few in which they held out any hopes to the peasants of obtaining through the Duma the things for which they were fighting. On the other hand, the same report states it definitely as a

purpose of the Constitutional Democratic Party (in spite of the utter absence of popular government in Russia) "to realise *solutions* for certain national problems." The leaders of the party now confess privately that they have no hopes whatever for any such general solutions. The party claims of course that it could have persuaded the Government to grant something in the way of compromises, had it not been for the revolutionary attitude of the Socialistic peasant and workingmen deputies — but it must be noted that the representatives of the people did not wish to stand for such half-way and totally unsatisfactory measures as were called "reform" by the Constitutional Democrats. This may be seen sufficiently clear from the proposed "solution" of the agrarian question. The representatives of the people were in favour of creating a great land fund from which land should be granted only temporarily to the peasants or to local governmental units representing them. In order to defeat this proposition the Constitutional Democrats had to vote not only with the conservative Polish party, but with the party of the landlords themselves.

The report makes it very clear why the Constitutional Democratic party had taken up a generally conservative position. It rebukes one of the Socialist parties for asking a more conservative organisation to "plunge into illegality without any reference to any other social force and whether or not there is any general upheaval in the country." It is not true that the majority of the revolutionary deputies wanted any important section of the Russian people to plunge into illegality without reference to the other sections; all expected and still expect the overwhelming majority of all sections to act together in a revolutionary movement. But it is perfectly true that all the revolutionary organisations want all who claim to represent any important part of the people, to plunge into illegality whether or not there are any immediate hopes for success of the revolution. Where a government, consisting in considerable part of murderers and criminals, as it is agreed by all the oppositional elements, has in its power the absolute decision as to what is legal and what is illegal, it certainly behooves every honest opponent to repudiate once for all this official legality.

As the consequences of such principles and such politics the Constitutional Democratic Party cut a very sorry figure in the second Duma. Most of the great occasions were quite dominated by the Social Democratic party, consisting largely of workingmen; and even the peasants' deputies, though less educated and capable, got the better of their Constitutional Democratic opponents. When Stolypine had given his insulting opening address, the moderate parties, for fear of offending him, decided to make no reply, but the Social Democrats in the person of their brilliant orator, Zeretelly, took advantage of this great opportunity to tell the story of Russia's condition to the civilised world. It was perhaps the best oratorical effort of the whole Duma, inspired as it was from start to finish by an outright tone of utter hostility to the Government.

"By all its actions," said Zeretelly, "the Government has opened the eyes, even of the blind, to see and understand the indissoluble bonds that exist between the autocratic Government and a band of landlord ex-serfholders who prey upon the millions of homeless peasants."

Zeretelly then went on in his famous speech to expose the Government's efforts to subdue, terrorise, and crush into submission the miserable peasant population. He pointed out that two-thirds of Russia had been placed under martial law, transformed into a number of entirely independent satrapies and given up to the arbitrary will of authorised generals to accomplish their purposes. He recalled the organisation of the massacres by the Government and the bombardment of whole villages and towns and the killing of innocent people, and made a convincing argument that the actions constituted nothing less than warfare against the nation. It took courage to use such language at this time. Zeretelly knew almost certainly that he would be imprisoned for many years for his words, as he was talking in the very claws of the Government, surrounded as the Duma was by overwhelming military force. He was not disappointed and is now in prison for a term of years, not only losing a large part of his youth (he is not thirty yet), but risking his life, for he is dangerously ill.

The concluding part of his speech was even more outspoken


than the first, being a direct appeal to revolutionary action outside of the Duma:

We, the servants of the people, must direct and concentrate all our energy, all our aspiration and efforts toward helping the people to unite and organise, because only with the help and direct support of the people will it be possible to stop the wild debauch of the oppressors who are devastating the country. You, fellow citizens, representatives of the people, probably remember well how ten months ago the deputy Nabokov (Constitutional Democrat) from the height of the Duma platform rightly said to the Government, "The executive power shall be subordinated to the legislative power." Two months after the executive power, supported by bayonets, dispersed the legislative power. I am saying all this simply to show you that we have no real constitution, that there are only symptoms of one, and that every step of ours must be directed first of all toward solidifying the people into an organised force capable of wiping off from the face of the earth its autocratic Government.

Let the revealing voice of the representatives of the people sound through the length and breadth of the country and wake up to the struggle those who are not yet awake. And let the Duma at the same time organise and rally the awakened masses through legislation; let us stir up in this way the actual force of the people which is the only support to any real constitution. Without this force the people will never get either freedom or land, will never be able to take them from the hands of the Government. This force is growing every day, every hour. The people, once conscious of their rights, will sooner or later unite for the realisation of those rights. This movement cannot be stopped by the autocratic Government. May be, I say may be, this Duma will be no more in a week from now, but the mighty popular movement which succeeded in leading Russia from the old shores will succeed with the Duma, or without it, in forcing a path through all obstacles in freedom's way.

And now since the hour has not yet arrived, we do not yet call upon the Government to submit to the people's power. We turn to the people's representatives with the appeal to organise that power. We do not say with the Constitutional Democrats that the executive power *should* submit to the legislative. We say, "In union with the people, bound up with the people, legislative power will force the submission of the executive power!"

The Constitutional Democrats not only refused to join issue with the Government at the opening of the second Duma; they failed to represent the nation again and again during the session. The demand for complete political amnesty, the first words uttered in the first Duma, was laid aside by the second Duma. The Constitutionals, defending their timidity on



A TYPICAL YOUNG VILLAGE ORATOR AND LEADER



TYPES OF DELEGATES TO PEASANTS' UNION CONGRESSES

this question, claimed that they had no "legal power" over it. It was on the same grounds that they decided to vote in favour of the budget and in favour of granting the very recruits that were being used for the bloody "punishment expeditions." Perhaps even more traitorous was the conduct of certain members of the party in voting in favour of the validity of the elections in Poltava, where conservatives had been returned by the most outrageous official frauds. The stolen seats were held by the reactionaries through the aid not only of the conservative members, but also of part of the so-called moderates, who in this act more clearly than any other showed themselves to be the humble servants of the Government.

Several of the great debates deserve to be noticed, as showing how the Constitutional Democrats have retreated from their former position, and as showing the widening gulf between them and the radical opposition. In the discussion of the budget the Constitutional Democrats allowed their criticisms to be conducted chiefly by ex-Minister Kutler who had just joined their party. His criticism was entirely taken up with matters of petty details, just as if this discussion had taken place during an ordinary peaceful period in any free country. The revolutionary Social Democrat, Alexinsky, of St. Petersburg, scathingly denounced the Constitutional Democrats along with their Governmental allies, since in this case there was no fundamental disagreement. Further on Alexinsky said:

When a representative of the Government, a representative of State authority, comes before the representatives of the people with his first account of his financial activity, he ought to give them not merely a formal justification, he ought not to refer to clauses and paragraphs of dead old laws. He ought to bring a living justification — that is, a justification from the point of view of the people's interests, a justification for those enormous expenses which have exhausted and impoverished our unfortunate people. This real justification has not been given us. . . .

The minister told us our indebtedness and the unfavourable condition of our finances are to a great extent due to war expenses. He pointed out to us that there was a time when Russia stood as the defender of the whole of Europe. He referred to the beginning of the last century and considers the rôle that Russia had played then to be a sufficient reason and justification for the nine billions of debt that now rests on our State treasury.

I must say that the workingmen that have sent me here, people who are less informed perhaps on the question of finance and politics, have reasoned thus: It is true that Russia has played an important rôle in foreign events and in the international conflicts of Europe; but it is not enough to play an important rôle; the question is, what kind of a rôle and to whose interest is it? And in studying the history of Russia the workingmen have come to the conclusion that when the Government of Russia tried to be the guard of "law and order," at home and in other countries, it has always been striving to play *the rôle of an international gendarme*.

Alexinsky's last phrase, which may seem dark to us, is worth making clear. France has furnished immense sums of money to the Czar which he has used for the purpose of crushing the movement of freedom in Russia. France loaned this money only because she thought she could make use of the Russian army in the event of war with Germany. Russia has agreed to help France against Germany almost entirely in return for this money. The French bankers, then, were paying for mercenary aid from the Russian Government. The Russian Government may be maintaining law and order in Europe, but it is doing it only in order to help herself to maintain her authority and continue her oppression at home.

The most sensational debate was that over the granting of recruits. Here, as before, the position of the moderates and that of the Government were all but identical. The real conflict was between the moderates and the revolutionists. The moderate deputy, Hessen, pointed out that the Duma did not have any power according to "Article 119 of the fundamental laws," to decrease the number of recruits. It seemed to the radicals that this was all the more reason that the Duma should express itself clearly on the subject. Constitutional Democrats of the new conservative type, ex-Minister Kutler and the jurist Maklakov, tried to warn the radicals that the rank and file of the Russian people would not stand for this "unpatriotic" attack on the army, showing that their real motive in supporting the Government was not the Duma's lack of power to deal with the question but rather the moderates' lack of faith in the people, the most deep-seated curse of this rapidly degenerating party.

The peasant deputy Semenov, after the manner of intelligent

but half-educated persons, went straight to the heart of the subject and accused the Government of increasing the number of recruits in order to "keep us in slavery as before, so that we shall be under oppression and get it from the nagaikas, bayonets, and machine guns as we have always got it." He continued:

What do the soldiers serve? The State and Fatherland? No, they serve the officers who compel them to take care of their dogs. . . . All we are taught when we enter the army is the title, forename, and father's name of the sergeant, officers, and others. What kind of science is this? The soldiers ought to be taught business. . . . We ought to recollect the saying, "that the soldier is no good if he has no ambition to become a general." But can the soldier who has to take care of the officers' dogs ever become a general?

"We promise to defend Russia, but we will never defend the landlords!" cried another peasant deputy. Others spoke to the same effect, showing the deep-lying hatred of military service and the officer caste that exists in all classes of the people. But it was the Social Democrat Zurabov, an army officer himself, who created the greatest sensation of the season. Speaking as an officer, a Socialist and a revolutionist, Zurabov quickly came to the point that there existed a war in Russia between the people and the Government. He said:

We do not consider it possible to declare an armistice; we do not find it possible to enter into any negotiations with the old power; we are on the field of battle and therefore it would be insanity on our part to grant this old power the armament it demands. . . . In order to make the army serve as a blind tool for its own purpose and interests, the autocratic Government terrorises it by an iron and utterly merciless discipline which makes of a living human being a soulless machine that neither thinks nor is conscious of its acts, that can be turned and compelled to act in any direction wanted by its chiefs. . . .

It is impossible with the little money the soldier is paid to meet the demands of barrack life, to have boots, to mend clothes and to provide himself with soap and blacking and so on. For all these needs, to say nothing of others, forty-five kopecks a month is certainly not sufficient. The soldier, in order to provide himself with what he is compelled and ordered to have, resorts to robbery and thieving, and thus becomes in the end demoralised. . . . As far as our army officers are concerned, it is a well known fact that the majority are the most ignorant of men. And this is true not only in regard to their general character, but even in regard to their own specialty. As the result of all this we

have an army which is from top to bottom entirely unfit for outer defence; no wonder that this army has given us such chiefs as the Renenkanovs, Orlovs, and Karilbavs. That they are the dumbest of men nobody can doubt. . . .

Our army under the autocratic state, no matter how often we are told differently from these benches, will never be fit for the purpose of outer defence. Such an army will successfully fight us (the people) and will successfully disperse you (the people's assembly), but it will always suffer defeat from the East.

Here began outcries from the reactionary deputies against the speaker, accusing him of treason, and here occurred the greatest and final disgrace of the Constitutional Democratic Party. The organisation was now hurried into a sensational reactionary position by the notorious Jew-baiter, Pureschevitch. Pureschevitch interjected repeatedly and at the top of his voice, "Get out!" and Golovine, the president, Constitutional Democrat, instead of calling him to order, turned to Zurabov and asked him not to make such remarks in the Duma as there was "no ground for such opinions." But in the recent trials of the generals that conducted the late war with Japan it has become clear that Zurabov was probably right; Russia would have little hope of victory under the present régime. Golovine postponed the sitting and when it was resumed later proposed the suspension of Zurabov from the Duma, because "of his insulting expression regarding the Russian army." As a result the peasant and workingmen deputies, representing the vast majority of the Russian people, left the hall.

After a second secret session held the next day, the Social Democrats returned to the attack and exposed clearly the true ground for the Constitutional Democratic position. Quoting from Struve's paper, the *Northern Star*, Alexinsky showed that the writer had claimed that only a standing army in the hands of the "conscious elements of the country," that is, of the liberal landlords and middle classes which Struve represents, could serve as a reliable means *against* popular outbreaks. We see then that the leading motive of the Constitutional Democrats of Struve's type at least was probably already, not only to win the friendship of the Government by concession, but also to make use of the army to crush the revolutionary movement. Alexinsky again reproached the Constitutional Demo-

crats, who had a few months before counselled the nation in the Viborg manifesto not to give a single soldier or a single kopeck to the Government, for having betrayed the people. It was true certainly that the Constitutional Democrats voted for recruits, which a few months before they had called on the people to refuse at the risk of their lives. It was also true that they had every reason for supposing that within a few weeks an even more critical situation might arise.

Again during this speech the reactionaries showed that they were at one with the so-called Constitutional Democrats. Count Bobrinsky interrupted to exclaim, "Against the common enemy we will fight as one!" A few moments before Pureshevitch had called out to Alexinsky, "The whole question is who is who will hang whom — I you, or you me." In the most violent attack that the reactionaries ever made on the people's deputies of the Duma, the Constitutional Democrats found themselves at one with the defenders of all the iniquities of the Czarism.

CHAPTER V

BEGGING FOR CRUMBS

IT APPEARED clearly after the dissolution of the first Duma and at the opening of the third, that the moderate leaders had not carried with them the mass of the party adherents. In its last congress the Constitutional Democratic Party was faced by a serious internal crisis. As usual, Professor Milyoukov presided. In his opening speech he stated the ultra-parliamentary view that the October Manifesto and fundamental laws, though practically broken on June 3rd, still remained judicially in force, and that the party still considered its policy to be the carrying on of the struggle on a legal basis, so long as this proves *in the least degree possible*. We see then that the Government has only to leave to the Constitutional Democrats a petty and insignificant field of legal action in order to make it a perfectly harmless organisation.

Milyoukov said in conclusion that his party, although it would be in the minority of the third Duma, would represent the people. This is untrue. The Russian nation, as is clear from all three elections, is represented by parties far more radical than the Constitutional Democrats. The very tragedy of the situation for this legal party is that it has neither the legal power of a Duma majority nor the moral power of an organisation that can claim to represent the Russian nation.

Milyoukov is such a power at the moment that perhaps his position should be further explained. It must be remembered that before the revolutionary movement began, he was quite sympathetic toward it. In his book, "The Russian Crisis," he speaks in favour of a direct agreement between the liberals and revolutionists, in favour of the radical idea of a single legislative chamber, and also in favour of the State making a large financial contribution toward the solution of the land question. The latter reform he seemed ready to

abandon when, at the time of the second Duma, he expressed himself as hoping to get some agreement with Stolypine on this question. He has now entirely dropped his agitation in favour of the single chamber; and finally, he has become the most active opponent of the revolutionary movement in his party. He is becoming a mere opportunist, stating recently in an interview that the party would enter the Duma with certain principles but would be ready to abandon any of them if this would bring it the least nearer to its main goal, a constitution. In explaining his desertion of his "revolutionary friends," he said that he had done this because they had no longer any power. It is quite true, of course, that their power is very limited, but it is also true, as has been shown, that the moderates have very little power over the Duma, or through it over the Government. If every section of the revolutionary army were to desert every other section on the ground that the "other fellow" had little or no power, at this depressing moment the revolutionary movement would break up entirely.

Milyoukov's attitude at the time of the great crisis, the *coup d'état* of June 3rd, gives us a very deep insight into his reasoning. Instead of attributing this calamity, not to any moral cause, but to the sheer immoral physical power of the Government, he seeks to find an answer to the questions: "Where lies the blame? In the ill will of the rulers? In the bad statesmanship of the governing class? In the mistakes of the leaders of the emancipation movement? In a reaction against the revolutionary excesses?" We might very well answer all these questions with a whole or partial affirmative, but we still would not have given the real answer. The Government dissolved the Duma almost wholly on the ground that it had the power to do so and that it found the Duma to a greater or lesser degree inconvenient to its plan of oppression.

In a conversation with Professor Milyoukov about this time, I asked him on what real force outside of the mere justice of the cause he thought his party could rely. The only answer which he gave was that such a force existed in "the disorganisation and anarchy in the country caused by spontaneous, disorganised acts of rebellion and individual crime." The present Government being totally incapable of successfully

repressing this kind of blind revolt, Professor Milyoukov thought that it would one day be taught to rely on the capacity of his party to restore order. There is no question that the disorganisation referred to — robbery, arson, and assassination — existed on an enormous scale at that time and continues almost unabated at the present moment. But let us consider the logical consequences for this party from placing its sole reliance on unorganised and semi-criminal disorder. In doing this Professor Milyoukov's party is depending upon the forces entirely outside of its own control. A party that relies on factors outside of its control is not only opportunist, but exclusively opportunist. In hoping to benefit indirectly from the reigning disorder, Milyoukov and his followers are depending on a destructive tendency, and they lay themselves open to the accusation that they themselves passively welcome this anarchy. Of course it may be that this anarchistic tendency will be successfully suppressed by the present Government. In that case this accusation will have no further application, but to-day the party still remains guilty of having based its hopes on chaos.

Milyoukov, Struve, and other leaders are even making overtures to the enemy. Thus the party paper, after the dissolution of the second Duma, said that the fate of the third would depend wholly on the class of proprietors, but that they had not lost faith absolutely and still hoped that in this class there would be sufficient vitality and intelligence to repudiate an egotistic policy of special privilege. These living elements would shatter "the reactionaries' illusion of the unity and solidity of the big land-holding class." We have seen that the big land-owning class is in fact the heart of the reaction, and that opposition to this class, rather than any effort to obtain such insignificant reforms as could be secured with its aid, is the life principle of the revolutionary movement. The position here taken does not materially differ from that of the confessedly conservative leader of the majority of the third Duma. In a conversation I had with Gutchkov at this time he said he also considered the landlords to be sufficiently liberal, and explained then he had no ideas of any fundamental economic reform for the peasantry, and that he was aware that the Government measures which he favoured would throw millions of peasants

once and for all in the class of absolutely pauperised agricultural labourers. He also confessed that he believed in the existing military courts and that he was sure that they would do no injustice!

This then is the leader alongside of whom the Constitutional Democratic organ took its position in the most practical question of third Duma politics. Later at the congress of the party the same conservative elements that were responsible for the article just quoted, were able to put through a resolution allowing an agreement between this so-called Constitutional Democratic Party and Gutchkov's Octobrists, who in their congress declared first of all for "the restoration of authority," then against equal rights to the Jews, against any reform of the Czar's new election law, and in favour of the agrarian politics of the Government. When the Duma met an Octobrist was elected president and secured, among others, the votes of the Constitutional Democrats. In his opening speech he said that the purpose of the Duma was to fulfill the "sovereign will of the Czar" and made no mention of the constitution.

At this time Maklakov, one of the Constitutional Democrat leaders of the Milyoukov type, explained in an interview that it was only necessary "in order to completely suppress the revolution" that the Duma should be placed on a firm footing and that he believed in "a loyal opposition" and was satisfied that the majority of the Duma (landlords) was progressive. This so-called popular leader was then satisfied with the very element that he knew had actively engaged in and aided the massacres and persecutions conducted by the Russian Government.

It is unnecessary to add that these hopes in the landlords, whether genuine or only meant to flatter, are coming to nothing. The moderate party expressed its hopes to accomplish in the third Duma, with the aid of the landlords, at least two reforms — that of the local government, and that of the administration of justice. The local government reform has already fallen to committees formed of the very landlords who have done the most to corrupt it, and justice is being regenerated in an equally ludicrous manner. New justices of the peace are to be instituted and the old detested "land officials" abolished, but the new

justices are to have qualifications which make it certain that few if any of them will be peasants, while at the same time the popular peasants' courts of course are to be abolished. But there is an even worse judicial "reform" — a reform carried even through the reactionary Council of the Empire by a majority of only four votes among a hundred and fifty. In his speech in favour of this typical governmental reform the Minister of Justice spoke practically in these words: "The Government cannot exist if the possibility is taken away from it of conducting the inner politics of the country. The right to choose the personnel of State institutions (the judges) is a mighty weapon for the direction of politics on the road *prescribed for them by His Majesty.*" This reform will consist, then, of a new supreme court to be as usual entirely under the thumb of the Czar.

Against the moderate new politics of sacrificing everything for such "reforms," the revolt in the party itself is serious. When Milyoukov and other leaders of the last party congress voted down the proposition that the party should take a strong oppositional stand and avoid all rapprochement with the Octobrists, and that it should only support laws which would lead to the increase of freedom of the people or to the democratisation of the Russian institutions, the progressive element at last realised where they stood. Already Mandelstam, whom a recent referendum had shown to be the favourite candidate of half of the party members in Moscow, had resigned from the Central Committee. Another important leader and member of the first Duma resigned from the party altogether, and the principal independent and radical newspapers of the country nearly all took up a more or less hostile position to the organisation, even though they had been very friendly before. Many other active party members turned aside from party work into a new educational propaganda, with a view to getting the nation ready for a new revolutionary movement in later years.

In the recent congress Mandelstam accused the party management of the second Duma of having failed to reassert the principle on which they staked everything during the first, that of the responsibility of the ministers, not to the Czar.

but to the national assembly, and of having foolishly supposed up to the very day of its dissolution that the Government, pleased by their new docility, would allow the Duma to continue. He claimed it was a mistake for the party to accept peacefully the *coup d'état*, and that it should rather rely on the new wave of revolution which must arise. He thought that the party ought now at least to see that, since the Duma was elected to suit the Government, the latter would make concessions rather to its extreme reactionary friends in that body, than to the Constitutional Democrats or other oppositional elements.

"In a pseudo-constitutional régime the chief task," said Mandelstam, "is to define the means of securing a real constitution, and behold we are told (by Milyoukov and his friends) to try and convince the Government." Another speaker, Safonov of Kostroma, a member of the first Duma, who represented a very large part of all the party members and a still larger part of the voters themselves, said that the party would find itself in the third Duma in the hostile camp of the anti-Constitutionalists, that compromise was not only dangerous to the party, but to the whole social movement, and that the proper function of the party in the third Duma was purely one of criticism. The only important point in Milyoukov's answer was the claim that the voters had shown they were satisfied with the party. As I have made plain, this is wholly false.

This was not the final fall of Milyoukov. When Roditchev, a Constitutional Democratic leader scarcely less important than Milyoukov, during an early session of the third Duma, made his sensational attack on Stolypine, saying that in future the gallows would be called "Stolypine neckties," Milyoukov with several other party members in the Duma took part in the reactionary demonstration of sympathy for Stolypine! So shocking was this act to the Russian nation that even the Central Committee could not stand it and Milyoukov was called before it for a reprimand. Certainly he could not have degraded his party further in the opinion of the country.

I have given so much attention to Professor Milyoukov and his opinions and his actions, that I cannot avoid at least a brief mention of another type of leader, Prince Shakovskoi.

In the element of the party to which he belongs are found nearly all the original founders of the movement and those who have made the largest sacrifices for its benefit. The party has two very capable women members, the Countess Bobrinsky and Mme. Turkov, two unprejudiced, and I believe most intelligent, observers of the situation within the party. The former in a conversation with me called Shakovskoi the heart of the whole moderate movement; the latter has given him the title of "the fisher of souls," claiming that it was he, before any one else, who brought into the movement its most valuable and devoted members. Prince Shakovskoi is still in the party and likely to remain there. Besides being one of its very first organisers, he was the secretary of the first Duma. In contrast with Milyoukov, in the opinion of several party leaders with whom I conversed, he is a democrat always, while in the past, like many other moderates, he has been not only friendly toward, but actively interested in, the whole revolutionary movement. Perhaps he and the other leaders of his type are hardly such prominent characters as Milyoukov, but instead of being viewed with suspicion even by many members of their own organisation, they are loved and respected by all.

Professor Milyoukov, however, has long been the chief figure in his party and is so well known abroad that it has been necessary to define his position with the utmost clearness, to show definitely why he is so unpopular in his own country, and to show that he is not a leader of any large part of the Russian nation. His leadership, his and his followers' opinion that their party can accomplish something "legally" under a government which recognises no law, has led only to the miserable fiasco of the organisation.

One American editor, at least, writing in the *New York Globe* of January 14, 1908, has grasped the situation so clearly that his words deserve to be quoted. They are in part as follows:

Milyoukov is an absolute parliamentarian — now. Revolutionary activity is as foreign to his programme as to the minds of most stable Americans; hence in him Americans recognise a kindred spirit, a champion of the fundamental principles of human liberty and human justice that we ourselves won a century and a quarter ago. Milyoukov's aims are our ideals and our fixed standards. Milyoukov's tactics and methods

to-day in Russia are precisely our tactics and methods. So it develops that the very elements in Milyoukov's policy that appeal to a greater number of Americans than the policy of any other Russian who has ever come to us, also alienate him from a vast section of Russia — the element that believes that Russia's freedom must eventually be purchased by precisely the same means as our freedom was purchased. The shackles of slavery were not struck off by act of Congress. The rule of taxation without representation was not ended by act of Parliament. The tyranny of the Czars, the incredible oppression of autocracy, may cease through the legislative efforts of the Duma, but a large section of the Russian people fear not. Milyoukov represents the optimistic minority.

Last winter it was our privilege to welcome and listen to two other Russians whose stirring appeals moved many thousands of our people. One of these men — Nicholas Tchaykovsky — now lies in the grim old fortress of SS. Peter and Paul, while the other — Alexis Aladdin — has been obliged to remain in exile from his native land. Such are the penalties these two brave men are paying for their appeal to America — not for material support, but for sympathy and understanding. [They are paying these penalties rather for other and greater services to their country.]

Wherever Tchaykovsky and Aladdin journeyed in this country they were introduced as representatives of "two of the great parties of Russia's liberal movement." In Professor Milyoukov we have the representative of the third and last great party of progress . . . Tchaykovsky was frankly a revolutionist. He believed that constitutional government could be permanently established only through fighting. Aladdin based his hopes on the parliament, but held armed resistance in the background as an ultimate resource — trusted in God and the Czar, but kept his powder dry, as it were. Milyoukov stakes everything on the parliament. He stands ready to compromise everything save the merest forms of parliamentary government. "Half a loaf is better than no bread," according to the old adage. "Crumbs are better than nothing when there is small hope for even the half loaf," says Milyoukov.

But what crumbs he has obtained he has gotten only by abject humiliation and the betrayal of former principles. A party that only begs for crumbs has no longer any claim to be considered a part of a great emancipation movement.

CHAPTER VI

THE PEASANTS BECOME SOCIALISTS

THE masses of the Russian people took the dissolution of the first Duma far more seriously than did the moderate parties. This act of the Czar's had the same electrical effect on the peasantry that the massacres of January 22, 1905, in St. Petersburg, had on the working people. The outraged nation expressed in the second elections an opinion so radical that a national unity on the basis of the comparatively moderate Viborg manifesto was no longer possible. While the moderate party was becoming more moderate the population was becoming more revolutionary.

In spite of the election law that favoured the reactionary and moderate parties and the arbitrary actions of the police in many provinces where they openly robbed the democrats of their victories, the second Duma came within an ace of being an outright Socialist body. Out of twenty million voters the results showed that at least fifteen million had voted for revolutionary and Socialistic organisations, which having been tested in the first Duma were thoroughly well known to the people for what they really were. Of the other five million votes the majority went to revolutionary nationalist parties, such as those of the Poles, the Caucasians, the Letts, the Tartars, and the Armenians. Only a million or two at the outside cast their votes for moderate and reactionary parties. A majority of the people then voted for recognised Socialist candidates, and an overwhelming majority for revolutionists.

If we take into account the fact that the delegations from several provinces, according to the Duma's decisions, had been stolen by the officials, we can say that the majority of the deputies actually legally elected were Socialists and revolutionists. This is a very remarkable result when we consider that the election law made one landlord equal to

several hundred peasants, gave the middle class voter of the cities a voting power equal to half a hundred peasants, and allotted to the working people a proportion of the electors scarcely better than that of the peasantry themselves.

After the warning the Government had already received at the first elections, we may wonder that it did not put into effect its *coup d'état* before these second elections. It decided to try to obtain a docile Duma by police measures without breaking its solemn pledge to maintain the law, so as to satisfy the foreign money-lenders, on whom Russia is so dependent, that the country was really entering into a modern parliamentary form of government.

The outrages committed by the police went so far that some of them were even branded by Russia's highest courts — after the second Duma had already been dissolved. This was the case with the candidates Hellat and Pold who were thus robbed of their seats from the Baltic Provinces. The elections in the province of Minsk were quashed by the St. Petersburg authorities without the slightest reason. They acted at the suggestion of the notorious Schmidt, whom I have already mentioned and who has now become an outcast even from the reactionary parties. One of the candidates so elected and illegally thrown out was Isaac Hourwich, long resident in the United States and known there by his economic writings. In the government of Kiev, the Central Government struck off thirteen thousand voters from the lists because their apartments did not correspond to an official's idea of a home as specified in the law. Newspapers were confiscated for merely giving the lists of electors, and in the province of Vladimir they were forbidden even to mention political questions. That a very large Socialist minority was elected in spite of all these measures shows unmistakably the strong and irresistibly Socialist and revolutionary current in Russian opinion.

Of the majority of the deputies elected by the masses of the people over a hundred were members of the so-called "Labour Group," founded by Aladdin, Anikine, and others in the first Duma. There can be no question that a universal suffrage law, as demanded even by the moderate opposition parties, would have given to the Labour Group a majority of the whole Duma.

Almost equally important were the democratic parties which use the Socialist conception as the basis of their programme and in the title of their organisation, the Socialist Revolutionary, the Social Democratic and the National Socialist parties, which combined also returned more than a hundred members. In the first Duma these organisations had had only twenty deputies, in the second Duma they had approximately one hundred and twenty. While the moderate Socialist "Labour Group" had doubled its representation, the still more revolutionary and wholly Socialist parties had increased theirs sixfold.

After these elections it is unnecessary for a true democrat to give any further consideration to the Constitutional Democratic party. Doubtless the middle-class electors were dissatisfied with the party for the reasons I have already stated, but there is a more deep-seated reason separating the conservative element of the moderate party now in control of the party from the masses of the people. Before the first Duma met Aladdin called attention to the fact that the large majority of the Constitutional Democrats elected were landlords and that the peasants had no deep confidence in the liberalism of any part of the class whose estates they proposed to expropriate. We must remember always with the peasants that the fathers of these men, however liberal, had been slave-owners and the older of them had themselves been masters of white slave servants in their youth or childhood.

The peoples' underlying distrust of the Constitutional Democrats has its counterpart in the Constitutional Democrats' distrust of the people. They have constantly doubted the peasant's capacity and have even regarded him as a savage by nature. It is not only a lack of faith but a lack of scientific observation, true sympathy, and understanding, that marks this patronising and undemocratic organisation. I do not imply that the leaders of the movement are governed by their interests as landlords, but I do assert it as a profound belief that they have not lost entirely the slave-owner's psychology, and I know that the people's true leaders share this view. The democracy of the Constitutional Democratic party is patronising and tinged with a sort of benevolent feudalism. Their constitutionalism, taken largely from the professors and the-

oretical publicists among them, is of a purely logical order — uninspired as it is by knowledge, love, or faith, it is no wonder that it has broken down in the great crisis.

It is interesting to observe that the several million votes given to the nationalist parties were on the whole more favourable to the Socialist than to the moderate standpoint. The Polish situation is so complicated that it could only be properly analysed in a work apart and it is best not to endeavour to explain it here at all. The Tartars, even a more important element numerically in Russia's population, numbering as they do more than fifteen millions, furnish a less complicated problem. I shall touch on them only as an illustration, leaving aside the Poles and the Armenians, Georgians, Letts, Esths, and other minor but not unimportant nationalities.

The Mussulman group in the second Duma had thirty-one members, enough to hold the balance of power. Until the close of the Duma this organisation was outwardly allied with the moderate parties, but there are elements in its programme and its tactics at this moment which justify the belief that its position was far more radical than the moderates', and that it would soon have forsaken the alliance. I talked with a leading member who stated that his group had decided to vote for a full political amnesty and not only for a partial one as the moderates had proposed. In the important land question also the position of this party was nearer to that of the "Labour Group" than to the moderates. Among other of the Mussulman principles was that no compensation was to be paid for lands that had been made as a gift by the Government to former officials. As such lands form a very considerable part of the whole nobility's possessions, a measure embodying this principle would have brought on a most violent conflict. Another important item of the Mussulman programme was that the people's representatives should demand the right of legislating, not only within the bounds laid down by the Czar, but also concerning the so-called "fundamental laws," which is as much as to say that the party favoured turning the Duma into a constitutional assembly.

It is probable, then, even without taking into consideration that a large part of the reactionary members had no right to

their seats, that the second Duma did not really have a moderate majority. It is probable that it was dissolved by the Government just before it had time to show to the world its true revolutionary character.

In the Viborg manifesto the revolutionary proposals were largely of a political nature. The deputies of the majority of the nation in the second Duma were in favour of a social revolutionary programme. The social revolution which the masses of the people had united to demand was concerned principally with the land question. On the other social questions a certain part even of the revolutionary deputies might be called mere radicals, on the land question they were Socialists. All the parties which had any claim to represent the peasant majority of the nation were in favour of the State expropriating, with or without compensation, all the land belonging to the nobility and the wealthy classes, of creating out of this land a national land fund, and of giving either to individual peasants, to villages, or to other local government bodies, a permanent right to share in this fund. The proposed measure was not like the land grants made to settlers by the United States Government. In America there was at first too much land and not enough settlers. In Russia there is not enough land for the people. It is therefore proposed by all the popular parties not to divide the land permanently into private property, but either to lease it for long terms to individuals, or to leave it in the hands of the villagers or of local governments to dispose of as they will according to some plan arranged by the National Representative Assembly.

It is recognised by all the popular and Socialistic parties that this programme amounts to a social revolution, and that the Government can only be forced to grant the programme either by a general insurrection or by continued agrarian rebellions which it will be unable to repress. Stolypine said to the Duma; "You shall not frighten the Government, for it has behind it the physical power." "Behind us," said Karaviev, a leader of the Labour Group, "are justice, science, and a hundred million peasants, four-fifths of the population of the Empire."

On the land question, when it became acute in the discussions of the second Duma, the Constitutional Democrats entirely

failed to satisfy the people's representatives. Ex-Minister Kutler, their leader, while confessing that many interests of society were above that of private property, reached in his argument only that degree of radicalism attained many years ago all over the world by the opponents of "absentee" landlordism. Passing lightly over the historic wrongs under which the peasants are suffering, the only evil he saw was that certain landlords should draw an income from their estates without really taking part in their management. His party did not ask that any of the other great wrongs which were crushing the Russian peasantry should be redressed. The party proposed to pay for the land to be expropriated for the peasants' benefit a sum less than its present artificial market value, but it wished the starving peasantry themselves to pay half of this sum.

All of the popular groups took a more advanced position. At first glance it might appear that the Social Democrats, who were looking forward in the future not to the growth of small farms in Russia but rather to their gradual absorption by large estates even after the expropriation, were taking up a more conservative position than the Constitutional Democrats, who rather expected to see the new small properties now to be instituted becoming a permanent feature of Russian agriculture. However, the Social Democrats did not want the peasants, or even the Government, to pay anything to the landlords for the expropriated property, while the Constitutional Democrats voted in committee with the most violent reactionaries and secured a majority in favour of compensation. The Constitutional Democratic position was dictated both by a desire to please the landlords and a lack of true contact with the peasantry — that of the Social Democrats was derived solely from a distrust of the peasants. Primarily a city workingmen's party, this organisation does not believe in the permanence of the peasants' Socialist tendencies, but considers that the peasants will soon be satisfied with unrestricted private property, and considers that they play also a secondary rôle in the revolution — that the peasant disorders, in the words of their spokesman, Zeretelly, were only an echo of the emancipation movement in the towns.

In spite of their skepticism in regard to the peasants' Social-

ism and revolutionism, however, the majority of this party has forced a somewhat conservative minority to a friendly position toward other Socialist parties that stand nearer to the peasants. The party does not believe, with one of the landlord speakers in the Duma, that the peasants are an ignorant herd that cannot be left without a nobleman pastor. It is genuinely democratic and understands that the peasants must be allowed to decide their questions for themselves. It urges only against the other popular parties that a national land fund entirely in the hands of the centralised State might prove dangerous to the people's interest because it might increase the power of an undemocratic government. It proposes, therefore, that the distribution of the land be left entirely in the hands of local government organisations, the provinces, districts, and towns. It also objects to making those small properties, relatively few, that are now in the hands of individual peasants a part of the national land fund, on the ground that this class of small farmers would become hostile and dangerous to the success of the revolutionary movement. The party suggests that the local government should either rent the land to the peasantry, or operate it itself in the form of large estates, or divide it finally among the peasants.

It is principally the present form of communal property in the villages that this organisation opposes, the very form favoured by the rival organisation, the Socialist Revolutionary Party, on the grounds that it is the historic Russian land institution. We need not anticipate, however, a serious conflict, as both parties are entirely democratic in their principles, and will leave the question to be decided finally by the people themselves. Certainly the Social Democrats, who consider these communes not an advanced but a retarded form of land ownership holding back the full modern exploitation of the land, and consider them the genesis of large estates and of propertyless agricultural labourers, cannot refuse to allow the peasants to try this form of property if they wish. On the other hand the Socialist Revolutionary Party cannot refuse to give the local authorities, duly elected by the peasantry, full power to give over the land into private property or administer it municipally if they so decide. When at the beginning of the first

Duma I asked Aladdin, of the Labour Group, whether his organisation favoured communal ownership, he answered: "We favour leaving this question to the peasants themselves. Certainly we are not going to send Cossacks and machine guns to any locality to enforce either communal or private property."

The proposal which must shock most the earnest believers in private property is that of confiscating without compensation, as proposed by the Socialists, or without full compensation as proposed by the Constitutional Democrats. But the arguments used in the Duma would convince any broad-minded and disinterested hearer. Zeretelly called attention to the punishment expeditions, which, in burning homes, villages, bombarding houses and whole city districts, had ignored private property in every part of the country. He might also have spoken of the wholesale confiscation of estates by the Government for purely political reasons. He looked on these Government confiscations as a war measure and declared his party answered by proposing the destruction of the present State, to its very bureaucratic and landlord foundations. A deputy from Little Russia reminded the Duma how the Government had given away to court favourites twenty-five million acres of land that had been the property of the Cossack population who had won it from the Turks and Tartars at the cost of innumerable lives. At the same time that this property was confiscated by the Czar the free population of this part of Russia was the first time sold into serfdom, at the end of the eighteenth century!

The members of the more moderate Labour Group were in favour of fair compensation by the State, but the majority were persuaded that the peasants themselves, who had been forced by the Government to pay an exorbitant price for their own lands and also for the mere fact of their emancipation, should pay nothing. The landlords then were to be rewarded by such payments only as a democratic government could afford, which would have as its principal source of income from taxation only the middle and upper classes.

The solution of the land question proposed by this, the most important group in the second Duma, lies in some respects between the Social Revolutionary and Social Democrats proposals already mentioned. With the Social Democrats

the Labour Group does not wish to expropriate the small properties of peasants who have already won for themselves a sufficient amount of land to fully occupy all their labour. With the Social Revolutionists it proposes that all private sales, mortgages and other deals in land shall be immediately and permanently put an end to, while the Social Democrats would leave this question wholly in the hands of the local government to decide in either way. In another aspect of the question the position of the Labour Group, which can best claim to represent the peasantry, is still more diametrically opposed to that of the Social Democrats. The Social Democrats welcome the Government's measure which allows every peasant shareholder in the common property of the villages to sell off his share as his private property. This measure favours those peasants who, not finding sufficient occupation in the villages, have drifted to the towns. By this law they can demand their property and sell it immediately to some well-to-do peasant, leaving the village that much poorer in the future. However hard on the peasants remaining in the village, this measure cannot but be welcomed by the workingmen owners. Acting on the contrary principle, the Labour Group demands that in the allotment of the new lands to be taken from the proprietors the agricultural population be first provided for.

The arguments used by the present deputies in support of the proposed expropriation were of the most revolutionary character. "Do you really think," asked one, "that you will succeed for a moment in convincing the peasants, whose fathers, brothers and children's lives have been expropriated by the Government without their consent, that this cannot and must not be done with the land?" This militant challenge was greeted with a storm of applause. Another said, "We know from experience of one sacred form of inviolable property—it was the peasantry themselves who were kept in slavery. . . . Do you landlords sitting here think that we do not remember that you used to bet us on cards and exchange us for hunting dogs! (Thunderous applause.) . . . Once the people make up their minds to it there is nothing sacred. . . . You say your property is sacred and inviolable, I will tell you one thing, that we will never purchase it; the peasants that sent me here

told me to tell you the land is ours; we do not want to buy it, but to take it."

If in the question nearest the peasant's heart, the land question, he could expect nothing from the Government, the same is true also with the other great social questions referring to the peasant's economic, moral or intellectual situation. The same Government which robs its peasants of the land, so essential for their very existence, secures one half of its own income from the promotion of drunkenness among them, and spends most of this income on armament and wars for conquest and almost nothing at all on popular education, which it calls a "luxury." Alexinsky showed to the Duma that the United States spends twelve times as much per person. Education takes only 2 or 3 per cent. of the total expenditure of the Central Government and only a relatively small proportion of that of the local government bodies. A few years ago there was a movement among these organisations to improve the schools; in 1900 the Government shut off their principal source of income and put the improvement to an end.

The school system is at an incredibly low level. The teachers' salaries range between one hundred and two hundred rubles a year (from fifty dollars to one hundred dollars); the highest are about five hundred rubles, and hundreds of teachers are paid even less than one hundred. In those provinces where the landlords are relatively powerful, education is at its worst and the proportion of literates in the population is sometimes as low as one-fifth. In general the situation is not quite so bad. One-half of the young men are now literate, though of those of middle age, who suffered from the still worse conditions of the last generation, only one-fourth can read and write. Worst of all is the condition of the women. For many years less than 5 per cent. reaching maturity could read and write; the proportion has now risen, but only to about one-eighth of the total. While this situation is bad enough, and a terrible accusation against such an extravagant government as that of Russia, it must not be exaggerated. We must notice that half of the present generation of young men in the country read and write, and that the proportion in the cities is very much higher. This condition is certainly better than that of

the people of the western part of the United States a few generations ago, when no one questioned the capacity of the people of this part of the country for intelligent self-government. Yet it is a disgrace to Russia, which did not spend as much for the elementary schools of the whole Empire in 1900 — fifty million rubles — as did the city of New York alone (if we take into account the expenditure for school grounds, rents and buildings). But the official organ of the Russian Government, the *Rossia*, stated recently that the proposed paltry increase of expenditure of seven million rubles on the schools was a luxury! The peasants see that they will only get good schools when they have conquered the Czar.

The Russian Government is now making a net profit every year of five hundred million rubles on the nation's drink bill. The peasants are not very heavy drinkers compared with other nations, but unfortunately they drink in spells. Depressed by their always impending economic ruin, starving in times of famine and confined to village drudgery by their extreme poverty, they occasionally take refuge in drink. However, the consumption of alcohol per capita was falling rapidly in the last generation, till the Government took up the monopoly of the business. Before 1880 the people were consuming four litres per year per head; in the years immediately before the assumption of the business by the State (1897) the consumption had already fallen to two and a half. Before the opening of the State saloons every village had a right by the vote of the majority to shut up the local public houses; not only is this no longer tolerated since the Government has assumed control, but, as we have seen, any village that even passes a resolution to boycott the liquor store is heavily fined by the local czars. Before the institution of the Government monopoly the elected village authorities used to extract large sums of money for the relief of local needs whenever a licence was granted. In one province the total sum so paid to the villages amounted to one million rubles, a tremendous amount to a pauper population. After the institution of the Government monopoly the value of alcohol consumed doubled within five years, rising from 254,000,000 to 504,000,000 rubles (in 1906) and the amount also rapidly increased.

At the present moment the Government and the reactionaries are making a great pretence of conducting a campaign against the drink evil. As it is obvious that the success of such a campaign would ruin the Government one must doubt its sincerity.

Even in the third Duma a moderate peasant leader had the courage to denounce the Government and the Duma's position on this question. Immediately after Stolypine's declaration at the opening of the Duma, he arose and, gazing severely at the astonished premier, cried out in stentorian tones: "I am amazed to have heard nothing from his Excellency about the most important, the most vital question in Russia — the drink question . . . Drink kills Russia . . . You speak of the hopeful condition of the State finance, but your budget is built up of the poison given to the people, upon the poisoning of its vital forces by drink encouraged for financial purposes." So obviously just was every word this peasant said, and on the face of it so removed from any political revolutionism, that a large part of the Duma cheered the speaker and listened to him attentively afterward every time he brought up the question. The whole Duma has decided that something ought to be done about the drink question, but nothing in Russian politics is more certain than that no serious reform will be accomplished without revolution. The moral deterioration of the masses of the people is as much a matter of indifference to the Government and to the landlords as are their intellectual and physical starvation.

In view of the hopelessness of getting the Government or landlords to do anything on any of these vital social questions, in view of the contempt in which the peasants know they are held by the ruling classes, it is not to be wondered at that they have lost all interest in the Duma, and that in many parts of Russia all the parties representing them decided to have nothing to do with the third election which placed the Duma entirely in the landlords' hands while leaving it as helplessly in the power of the Government as before. By the *coup d'état* of the 3d of June, 1907, the electors of the workingmen, the peasants, and of the non-privileged and poorer part of the city middle classes, were reduced to one-half of their former number, while those of the landlords were increased 30 per cent. This left the

majority of the provinces of Russia entirely in the landlords' power, and nearly all the rest in the hands of the landlords in combination with the richest class of the city electors, who had been given by the new law a right to vote apart not only from the workingmen, but also from the majority of the middle classes.

The Constitutional Democrats complained of this new law, and it is true that their power, compared to that of the reactionaries, was very much decreased, but at the same time they suffered far less than the workingman and the peasant. In the third Duma the Constitutional Democrats and groups allied to them have about one-fourth of all the deputies, whereas in the second Duma they had about one-half; the peasants' and workingmen's parties, on the other hand, which also had nearly one-half of the deputies of the second Duma, have less than one-eighth of those in the third. Under the new law a landlord has the vote of about ten ordinary citizens, but every such citizen has the vote of fifty peasants, and of more than fifty workingmen. We can see, then, that the injustice done to the masses of the people is much greater than that done to the classes from which the moderate party secures nearly all its votes, and this accounts largely for the relative satisfaction of the latter with the third Duma.

The real distribution of political power in Russia is better shown by the fact that any two landlords had the same voice in the elections for the third Duma as any thousand peasants. We must not forget also that in case the Duma should by any chance happen to displease the Government in any way, the latter has the power to reduce it to a nullity. The people would perhaps have distrusted the third Duma on this account alone, even if the election law had remained unchanged, but when the relative voting power of their enemy, the landlords, was increased several fold all over Russia, they lost their interest almost entirely. In the Province of Viatka the landlords had been given sixteen times the influence compared with that of the peasants that they had before. For the most part the peasants either took very little interest, or boycotted the elections entirely. When they did vote, however, they voted for Socialist and revolutionary electors just as before. I have already shown that there were only a handful of reactionaries

among sixteen thousand peasant electors. In a large number of the towns also revolutionary electors preponderated. If the workingmen had been given an equal vote and had combined with the revolutionary element of the middle class, two-thirds or three-fourths of the population of every city in Russia would have voted Socialist.

Another class of the population from which both the Government and the moderate reformers hoped to get great support, took the attitude of the peasants. Of the small landowners, very few participated in the elections. In the Moscow district, out of one thousand four hundred and eighty electors only sixteen appeared, and in the district of Odessa only one came out of one thousand nine hundred. In the country at large so few of this class of votes appeared that more than one-half of the elections could not take place at the appointed time. It need not be inferred that the small landlords are very revolutionary, but it is evident that they do not now consider the Government's promises to be worth even a few hours away from business, though they were much interested in the former Dumas.

The Socialist Revolutionary Party, which next to the Labour Group is most successful among the peasantry, boycotted the elections everywhere. Their manifesto calling for the boycott explains the attitude of a very large number of the Russian people. It runs in part as follows:

As the third Duma will inevitably be a sort of organisation of the reactionary pseudo-constitutional and anti-revolutionary forces in general; as the participation in the Duma of revolutionary elements will only help the Government to give the next Duma an appearance of an authoritative parliament; as this will strengthen the financial and international position of the Government; as under such conditions to go into the Duma would be logical only for those who have lost faith in the revolution and to whom therefore the non-participation in the Duma is equal to passivity and inactivity; the council of the Socialist Revolutionary Party therefore resolves to take a most energetic part in the election campaign agitation for the propaganda of an effective demonstrative boycott by the population at the elections as well as in the Duma itself; to make a pressure by means of public opinion upon radical deputies in the Duma, if there be any such, with the purpose of impelling them demonstratively to go out of the Duma and leave it to its naturally wretched lot.

In accordance with this policy the few popular representatives who have really entered the Duma have lost no occasion to tempt the reactionaries to expel them. Liachnitzky, a member of the Labour Group, told the Duma that "the great mass of people who most need reform are not represented here" — to the great scandal of the reactionaries, who scarcely allowed his voice to be heard through the tumult they created. "As a representative of the population," said another member of the same group, Petrov, "as a workingman, I repeat what my comrade voters have told me. We are suffocating under these laws, we are dying under these laws. The voters said to us, 'demand the rights for the people that are rotting in the prisons and mines; your duty is to fight for freedom.'"

It would seem that even this relatively moderate revolutionary party, the Labour Group, is entirely of the opinion of the more radical Socialist Revolutionary leader, the late Gregory Gershuni, who, though his own party had boycotted the Duma and had no representatives there, urged the Labour Group to demand frankly the execution of the national will, full political amnesty, the realisation of the promised liberties, the judgment of the autocratic Government by the people and the convocation of a constitutional assembly elected by universal suffrage. This is the task, says the well-known revolutionist, that the Labour Group must assume; it must understand that its end is not the realisation of half-way reforms, for it will never succeed in tearing anything from the Government, but the frank and clear statement of the popular demands in order that the people should consider the Labour Group as the true representative of its interest.



TYPICAL PEASANT MEMBERS OF THE SECOND DUMA
Extreme Revolutionists from the heart of Russia



A TYPICAL EDUCATED LEADER OF THE PEASANTRY

CHAPTER VII

THE PEASANT PARTIES ABANDON HOPE IN THE DUMA

AS THE people have grown conscious of their unity, the revolutionary movement has become more profound. At the opening of the first Duma the members of all the popular parties, including those of the Social Democratic workingmen's party, were organised together in the "Labour Group," all were looking forward to an early overthrow of the Czarism, and all were demanding a constitutional assembly elected by equal suffrage. But the unity was based on *political* grounds. As the land question came into the foreground and the revolutionary movement became a *social* movement, the unity was threatened, and it was only after a vast discussion and much disagreement on the fundamental land question that the popular parties have again all reached a very similar standpoint. As long as the Duma had any chance of becoming an organ not alone of a political but also of a social revolution, the parties were somewhat disunited, principally on account of the essential question as to whether the city working people or the peasants were to be the principal factor in the movement; but after the Government had destroyed all hopes of bringing about any revolution through the Duma, the parties again began to come together. There remain important theoretical differences, but practically on the land question and on the agreement that the revolution needs for its success outside the Duma the overwhelming majority both of the peasants and workingmen, the popular parties are again united.

The organisation which has done the most to bring about this unity is the Labour Group. It was revolutionary enough to declare at the dissolution of the first Duma that the people must be the absolute masters of the State, and that all the land of Russia must belong to the entire people; and it was Socialist enough to demand measures leading toward a *permanent* equali-

sation of the land among the peasantry. This organisation was able to please more or less all the other Socialist and revolutionary parties, and became at the same time immensely popular among the overwhelming majority of the peasants, those not yet organised. The party wanted the Constitutional Democrats to insert in the Viborg manifesto an appeal to the people no longer to obey the Government "in fratricidal war with the nation" and to return to St. Petersburg and attempt at least to resume the session of the Duma. Meeting a refusal on the part of the moderates, it turned to the people with a proclamation that closed by calling for a Duma of the people with full sovereignty, or in other words, a constitutional assembly. "The Czar with his ministers," the Labour Group declared, "has closed for us all peaceful roads to liberty and justice, let us try to clear them by force."

From the beginning this party owed most of its ruling ideas and the majority of its most active leaders and organisers to the Socialist Revolutionary Party; not being a dogmatic organisation, however, it has laid aside all the theoretical elements of revolutionary Socialism and retained only the programme of the immediate measures proposed. In the first Duma half of the group consisted of the peasants who had not yet made up their minds on the leading issues; of the others a part were connected with the Socialist Revolutionary Party and Peasants' Union, or held independent Socialist views; another part leaned to the Socialist Democratic Party or were members of that organisation, but these soon left the group and the Socialist Revolutionary influence became dominant. In the first Duma one-third, and in the second Duma one-half, of the members of the group signed the land bill of the Socialist Revolutionary Party. In the second Duma the majority of the party became more revolutionary in a political sense, and made use of their position in the Duma solely to stir up an agitation among the people of the country, abandoning all hope of turning the Duma itself into a revolutionary body; both of these actions helped to secure a tremendous popularity for the organisation among the peasantry. The party, which in the first Duma had forced the moderates and the whole Duma to a revolutionary position,

used the second Duma to unite the masses of the people on a revolutionary and Socialist programme.

The keynote to the Socialist land reform of this organisation is a proposal to equalise *permanently* the distribution of the land, just as the founders of the American Republic had *temporarily* equalised the Government lands in the new part of the country. As there is not enough land in Russia to enable the Government to provide for all, measures must be taken to prevent its accumulation in the future in the hands of a few persons, a process which takes place very rapidly wherever the population is crowded as in Russia. The group realises that pure political democracy, far more advanced than the constitution of the United States, is necessary in order to put into execution such a revolutionary measure, and it is therefore for political revolution; but it also feels that only with an equal distribution of the land would the democracy be truly strong, and so it insists also on the principle of a permanent economic equality in the distribution of the land. It has long been recognised by democratic writers of all countries that political liberty itself depends on some approach at least to economic equality. From Rousseau to de Tocqueville in his comments on America, we have been told that political equality cannot continue to exist where there is an unequal distribution of wealth.

The Russians are hopeful for a social solution of the land question, because the large majority of the peasants are not only its converted but its born partisans, having maintained a certain economic equality in the villages for generations through their common ownership of the land. Whatever be the solution of the land question, whether the communal ownership continues or not, Russians are convinced that its principles are a part of the peasant's very soul and that the peasants will demand not only political, but also economic, equality as a permanent principle of Russian society.

"We wish to have the land to work it," said Anikine in the first Duma. "We do not want it as private property — no, and again no! No private property; such notions do not exist in the juridical conscience of the Russian peasants. It has been claimed here that the peasants want private property in land in

order to be able to will it to their children, but look at the transfers of the land in the various sections of the country and you will see that this is not the case and that the peasants have rather a horror of this private property." Anikine then cited at length many documents proving that even in the western provinces, where the communal form of property does not prevail, the peasants in their village regulations of inheritance have ideas against private inheritance and are in favour of the distribution of the land of deceased peasants on principles of social justice.

It is only in the non-Russian parts of the country, Poland and the Baltic provinces and Lithuania, and in relatively small sections of White and Little Russia and the three Border provinces, that private property is the dominant form among the peasantry. Even in the western provinces, Little and White Russia, from a quarter to a third of the peasants live under the communal system. In the other parts of the country, two-thirds of the whole, common ownership by village prevails in from 80 to 95 per cent. of the peasant households. In the centre the proportion rises to 90 per cent., in the north and east to more than 95. Of the fifteen million peasant households in Russia proper, only four hundred thousand have private property in land. The Government is using every effort to increase this number, and it may soon rise to a million or perhaps even to a million and a half; even then in the villages only half a dozen families out of one hundred or two hundred will have private property.

Communal property has even been growing in popularity. In some of the eastern provinces the redistributions of the land by which equality is maintained have doubled in frequency since the emancipation, until now in two-thirds of the villages redistribution takes place within each decade. In thirty-seven provinces statistics show that one-half of the villagers are redistributing the village property according to the needs of each household — that is, according to the mouths to be fed — while in the most typical agricultural section of Central Russia the proportion rises to two-thirds. The village property is also often redistributed to each family in proportion to the amount of workers in the family, or its "labour power." The



ANIKINE

The most respected of the leaders of the people



ALADDIN

Perhaps the most effective enemy of the Czar in the first Duma



BIELEVSKY

Under "house arrest" in Moscow at time of my interview

majority of the peasants of Russia, then, have no underlying instinct for private property, but quite the contrary; the habit is rather one of coöperation, seen not only in many undertakings by the democratic government of the village, but also in the associations for coöperative labour, or "artels," that are so common among the peasantry. There is no mystic idea among them of some legal bond existing between a man and a thing which he has not produced. The land is felt by them to be a thing apart, very precious and insufficient in quantity, and so obviously to be divided according to democratic and social principles.

Conservative authority is not lacking to support this interpretation of the Russian peasants' attitude in regard to land. Count Witte declared a few years ago that, in spite of all the Government's efforts, it was unable to innure peasants to private property, and Milyoukov has declared to the Duma that the small individual property ideal is no Russian ideal.

Mushenko, a member of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, said that the principal defence of private property in land was that it assured durability in the possession of the land for the persons working on it. He then denied that this was the fact in most countries and quoted a Russian Government report on the question as follows:

The study of other countries has proved to us beyond doubt that small peasant households, when submitted to the same free conditions of purchase and sale as other property, are not durable and gradually vanish away, giving place to land ownership of a different character: on the one side, a concentration of a great number of separate lots under the ownership of a single person takes place, larger households are formed and a large part of the agricultural population is misplaced; on the other side, there arises an extreme sub-division of the land (by inheritance), some lots becoming so small that it is impossible to till them economically, the land loses its productivity and finally falls into the hands of larger landowners.

It is indeed precisely to this process, as we have seen, that both the Government and leading party in the third Duma are looking calmly forward. A few hundred thousand peasants, or perhaps a million or more, are to become relatively prosperous, while many millions are to be expropriated by natural economic laws, thus furnishing an enormous army of cheap labour for

the landlords and capitalists. The Government itself recognises that the process might go so far as to become dangerous, creating desperate village disturbances, and proposes the limitation of the expected concentration of property in the hands of a few peasants to the shares that would naturally fall to six average families — viz., twenty-five dessatines or about sixty-five acres.

The Government proposes to favour a few at the expense of the many by two measures. The first is by abolishing all the communal property, or rather, since such a measure cannot be executed against the will of the peasantry, of allowing individual peasants to demand some particular piece of land, equal in value to their present share, as their permanent private property. This may seem to one unfamiliar with the commune to be no more than just to the individual, whether a wise measure socially or not, but this is not the case. Many villages have even persuaded all the peasants to swear allegiance to the communal form of ownership, and not to take advantage of the law. In the discussions that are going on about this question among the peasants all over Russia, the sentiment is overwhelming against the dissolution of the commune, as was evidenced by nearly all the Duma members representing the peasants. It is against their deepest feelings of morality and justice that a man with few or no dependents should be allowed to take away from his fellow villagers a share of the land attributed to him years before, when his family was larger, while some peasant households with ten to twenty members are without sufficient land for the barest livelihood. So strongly do they feel this injustice to them as individuals that they are taking every measure to coerce unsocial members of the community who are disposed to take advantage of the law. Although in force for many months, the number of persons making use of the law has been very disappointing to the Government, and arbitrary police measures have failed to increase it.

The second measure promises to have more success from the Government standpoint. By helping financially the Peasants' Bank, the Government has enabled it to buy up and divide many large estates and sell them to individual peasants. It is

true that the prices asked are exorbitant and that the land is often overburdened with payments to the bank — that is, to the Government — greater even than its full value; but nevertheless a great deal is in this way passing over into the peasants' hands, in the one year 1907 more than in any ten years before, nearly twenty million acres. Through this second law the Government is accomplishing the same purpose of favouring the creation of a new class of small landowners at the expense of the masses. Its reasons are obvious. It is not alone that these measures favour the capitalists and landlords, who want to exploit the new army of pauper labour which will arise, though this motive is doubtless the main influence with the majority of the third Duma. Stolypine, with Witte, has probably still more at heart the direct interests of the Czar's treasury. The State income, as I have shown, depends largely on the building up of industry, and industry has its principal market among this small landowning class, since the peasants, as has been explained, barely produce enough to eat and therefore can purchase little. It is chiefly from this class that the Government can hope to obtain greater sums, either by direct taxation or by indirect taxation of the tea, sugar, and other articles they buy in quantities the ordinary peasant cannot afford. As Witte has explained very clearly, the peasants are so poor that it does not *pay* the Government to help them. There is no promise that the great mass of them will have enough money in the near future either to promote Russian industry by their purchases, or to be able in any way to help out the Russian treasury, so near to bankruptcy.

Indeed, from an economic standpoint, half-way measures of relief to the masses of the peasants would lead to further impoverishment of the nation as a whole, for the reason that the largest of the estates of the landlords are much more productively operated than the small holdings; the decrease of the former and the increase of the latter, while benefiting the peasants, would impoverish the nation as a whole, and the Government treasury would feel the result. Statistics from the province of Poltava show that the large properties produce 25 per cent. more wheat and 40 per cent. more rye than the small. Indeed, there is already raging a hopeless economic

conflict between the two cultures—the landlords' and the peasants'. The famishing peasants having so little land themselves are pressed to rent that of the landlords, but they cannot produce as large crops and often do not get enough even to pay the rent, to say nothing of making anything to repay their labour. For example, a certain Poltava landlord calculated that he could get nineteen rubles a dessatine by renting his land at an exorbitant figure, whereas he made twenty-seven by cultivating it himself. It is evident then that half-way measures under these conditions might really imperil the State finances, even under a modern and democratic government; and it is just because they feel this that the peasant parties want to find a far more fundamental solution.

Nearly every measure proposed by the Government is a half-way, and therefore a retrograde, measure. It is doing everything possible, for instance, to encourage emigration to Siberia, and in the last year for the first time has had considerable success. However, even if half a million peasants are removed to the new country every year, the Government will not in this way be able to provide even for a third of the annual increase of population. The Siberian peasants would seem to be relatively prosperous, exporting as they do large amounts of butter and eggs, but we find on investigation that no section of the Russian peasantry is more revolutionary, and we see the explanation of this attitude partly in the heavy railway rates on which these isolated farmers are absolutely dependent. Like the new small landowning class the Government is creating in Russia itself, they are burdened with immense taxation either on their purchases of goods or in payment for the land; even the amount advanced by the Government to get them to Siberia is a serious matter for the pauperised peasants. This taxation is not likely to be diminished. The Government, on the verge of bankruptcy, is using every possible means of extorting money; it will hardly exempt these new classes that have no representation either in the Duma or the Government.

The discontent on account of the heavy taxation is not the only additional danger the Government has to fear from this new class. The first famine that appears, a large proportion of the new debtors of the Governmental Peasants' Bank will prove

delinquent and will turn all the wrath formerly spent on the landlords against the Government. All the revolutionary representatives of the peasants in the Duma are looking forward to this new class, which the Government is trying to create, as a powerful factor in the coming revolutionary movement.

In a private conversation I had with Anikine in the summer of 1907, the most popular of all the peasant leaders set his main hope of the revolutionising of the peasantry on the high payments which would be demanded from them by the Government for the new land. He thought that these reforms would bring about a new revolutionary movement quicker than any other measures the Government could take. "In trying to satisfy the peasants' land hunger," he said, "the Government is digging its own grave." The same view is held by the Socialist Revolutionary Party; it expects that the peasants will be both unable and unwilling to pay for the land they are now buying, and basing its hopes largely on this measure it is preparing to renew its agitation in the villages in the most thoroughgoing way.

The Socialist Revolutionary Party expects to win to the Socialist ideas not only such peasants as have become landless, and therefore uninterested in the preservation of private property in land, but also the communal peasants who have already learned to believe in the equal distribution. It does not wish to see Russia proceed further "along the sad and beaten path of capitalistic development," and to prevent this it hopes to preserve the village commune against all Governmental attacks. The Socialist Revolutionist expect to make use both of the vague yearnings for social liberty and equality that have grown up in the democratic village assembly and of the very clear social conceptions with regard to land, labour, and human relations that have resulted from the long prevalence of communal property. These yearnings and these definite conceptions they hope to combine into an intelligent political programme.

For the purpose of arousing the peasants they hope first of all to make popular among them the agrarian bill signed by the majority of the peasant deputies of the second Duma. They expect to adapt this bill to local conditions and thus to make its application clear to the villages. They appeal also to the

peasantry to take advantage of their right of communal property, to redistribute the land not after the end of ten years or more, as is the usual custom, but immediately. In this way they hope to satisfy all elements in the community and to eliminate the chief motive that tempts the individual to sell out — namely, dissatisfaction with his present allotment. They expect to take advantage of the peasants' coöperative traditions to form new organisations, especially for the lowering of rents and the raising of wages. In general they are using every effort to strengthen and further organise the village as a unit and to promote its interests both against the anti-social individual and the anti-social State.

In most of the practical features of its programme the Socialist Revolutionary Party has the support of several other very important organisations, including the Teachers' Union, the Railway Union and, best of all, the Peasants' Union. The policy of the Socialist Revolutionary Party is to promote in every way these and similar organisations, while preserving its own political independence. Besides meeting the majority of the chief leaders of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, I have taken pains to make the acquaintance of nearly all the founders of the Peasants' Union and of several of the active officers of the Teachers' and Railway Unions. I have visited these organisations in their headquarters and attended one of the congresses. The policy of these organisations has been to aid only in a general way the revolutionary movement, without adopting a too definite programme which might offend any particular revolutionary political party. The Socialist Revolutionary Party gives full recognition to the Peasants' Union as being the important economical organisation of the peasant classes. At no time have there been fundamental matters of difference between these two organisations. They have always had many important members in common, while the party has furnished a large portion of the persons who have done most to spread the union among the villages.

I have written at some length of the Labour Group. I must call attention now to the fact that it took nearly all its programme, as well as its tactics, from the Peasants' Union, and that many of the founders both of the union and the Labour

Group were former members of the Socialist Revolutionary Party. The principal element of the Labour Group's solution of the land question, that each peasant is to have only so much land as he can work with his own labour, was taken directly from the Peasants' Union. But the latter organisation has always been somewhat more revolutionary. The Labour Group was under the necessity of assimilating and educating many peasants who, though all broadly speaking revolutionary and in favour of expropriating the landlords' estates, had no other very definite political ideas.

CHAPTER VIII

THE LEADERS OF THE PEOPLE

THE founders of the Peasants' Union were all merely seeking to express the existing state of opinion of the peasantry. The union was really founded by the peasants themselves. The resolutions of its first congress in Moscow in July, 1905, were printed in all the Russian press, and, through the teachers or progressive and educated peasants, soon reached a large part of the villages. It is not surprising that it was everywhere received with favour, for the first congress was composed largely of ordinary peasants. To understand how the idea of the union was received, and branches formed without any local agitation, let us take an account of a meeting that was held in Saratov in the summer of 1905. This and other meetings in that province were reported to the Central Committee by the writer Bogoraz, and had a good deal to do with shaping the future policy of the union, of which Bogoraz became a secretary. After a long discussion by the peasants, who had assembled to discuss not the Peasants' Union but the question of coöperation, they decided that there was no use in organising a coöperative society under the insufferable conditions that prevailed, and drew up after several hours' labour the following resolution:

We are born and brought up in the villages. We do not know any other occupation except agriculture. We are not in a condition to occupy ourselves with other things because we are lacking the means for it. Agriculture has to nourish us; it has to give us the possibility of saving a few pennies for our dark days, for the famine years, or in case we have to marry off a daughter or send our sons into military service. This occupation has to give us means of paying taxes, of paying for our elected authorities, our clergy, our school, our hospitals, and of constructing our roads and paying the indirect taxes, which are the most important of all and fall entirely on us. All the taxes on alcohol, petroleum, tea, sugar and matches come principally from us. We have to extract

hundreds of millions of rubles from our land to pay for the needs of the State, and in spite of this the land that we possess gives us a chance to live only in a half-starved condition.

That is what we are suffering from, the lack of land; but the lack of liberty makes us suffer still more. We have such a quantity of officials over us that at times we do not know whom we ought to fear most. We do not know why they exist in such a number, or who has installed them, but we know that those who are most numerous here are like guards over prisons. One might think that we peasants are the greatest of criminals. All our officials shout at us, curse us, threaten us with prison, the whip and "nagaika," and with forced military service. They have only one law, the club. They know only one kind word to address us with; it is "give."

The "land officials," the police captain, the police colonel and the governor, even the elected authorities of the village, even the priests who ought to be our fathers in Christ, they too do nothing but laugh at us. Our assembly has no power over them. All the power is in the hands of the officials and the upper classes. We build schools to have our children taught. We want our children to learn the truth in these schools, but the officials send us teachers not of our choice. These teachers teach our children all sorts of stupidity in the place of true knowledge. They forbid our children to read good books. They hide the truth from them. We do not know where the taxes go that are collected from us, but we know that if we do not pay them in time acts of violence are committed against us.

We have no true justice. We have no defence, if injustice is committed against us. When we want to defend ourselves soldiers are sent and beat us. It is our brothers and sons that do the beating, our brothers and our children whom we tear from our families and send to defend the Fatherland. They teach them instead to kill their own brothers, but they do not learn how to defend the Fatherland.

This cannot last. We must confess that we find it necessary to bring it about that this state of things be changed.

People elected by everybody ought to govern the country, and not only the officials. All the voters ought to be equal, the rich and the poor, the educated and the uneducated. Those elected by the people must give equal laws for all and they must follow the way in which the people's money is being expended.

The army must be replaced by a popular militia, so that every man should learn military science at home and during his free time. We are sure that such a militia in the case of war will know how to defend our country as well as the present army.

The people must have the liberty of meeting and of speaking freely about everything, about affairs of state and about social questions. The censorship must be abolished.

All crimes must be judged by jury, and the right should not exist to arrest any one more than two days without judgment.

Taxes ought not to be collected as now by the taxation of poor people alone. A certain per cent. of income ought to be taken and this per cent. ought to be increased according to the size of the property owned; a large part of an inheritance that one has received ought also to be taxed, for this is not money earned.

Complete liberty of conscience ought to exist. The clergy must be elected by the people. Education of the people must be free and equal for all, and the Government must give the money for it.

Finally, and this is the most important, this will put an end to our servitude and stop our ruin — for servitude still exists, and alongside the peasant agriculturists are living landlords who are enriching themselves by the peasants' labour, which they can do because of their right of possessing God's property — finally, it is indispensable to expropriate all private lands and to give these lands into the possession of the villages which will give it only to him who cultivates it with his own labour. Only when all that will be accomplished will the people be able to live and commence a regular life, but if all that is not accomplished a great misfortune awaits our country.

To realise all these demands we find necessary the immediate convocation of a constitutional assembly on the principle of universal, equal, and secret suffrage.

For the struggle to obtain these reforms we are founding the Peasants' Union of the district of Petrovsk. The founders of this union are all the members present at this conference.

The last words give us a key to the origin of the union. Everywhere the peasants themselves took the initiative as soon as they heard that such an organisation was being formed. All those who did the work of organising report that villages sent to request them to put these villages into relations with the national organisation. Locally no agitation was necessary.

A few words about the educated organisers of the union in Moscow and St. Petersburg might not, however, be inappropriate. In the country the organisation was promoted chiefly by the employees of the local governments, teachers, doctors, agricultural experts and others, all of whom had their national organisations which aided in the movement. Besides these organisations there was a little group of men in Moscow among whom the idea at first took root, largely as a reaction against the effort of the Government to organise the peasants into some form of "patriotic" association. The "patriotic" association was a failure, but the Peasants' Union was perhaps the most remarkable and quickly successful effort to bring into unity

a disassociated mass of many million people, of which we have any record.

Perhaps the first initiator of the idea was a lawyer named Staal, who had obtained his first ideas of social movements while a student in Germany. He saw then, he told me, that the organisation of the masses after the manner of the Social Democratic Party in Germany would never succeed in Russia, principally because only a very small proportion of the Russian people are working people while a vast majority are peasants. Yet he felt that the future social transformation must come through some form of popular organisation.

After the massacre of January 22, 1905, the Czar granted certain limited rights to meet to discuss "the needs and the benefits of the Government." Taking advantage of this law, Staal conceived the idea of starting some kind of Peasants' Union in opposition to the association that the reactionaries were trying to establish. Bringing together several friends and acquaintances in Moscow, principally active members of the national organisations of agricultural experts and statisticians, who had been in close contact with the peasantry, Staal proposed the idea of his association. Most valuable among his friends was a peasant Kurneen, still in touch with his village, but a man of affairs and agent for the Rothschild oil business in Moscow. The small committee wrote a proclamation with Kurneen's assistance and sent it out among the villages of the Moscow province through Kurneen's agents and the salesmen of tea and caldrons. The proclamation was at once well received in all the villages and the agents soon brought back suggestions from the peasants about the future organisation of the union. At the same time Masurenko, a former army officer, was carrying on similar work independently in the Don district. It was soon decided to call a congress.

With the aid especially of the teachers' organisation, and of Masurenko, a very large number of the villages, representing perhaps a million peasants, sent delegates to the first congress. From the outset the members of the union and the delegates to the congress took a radical position on economic questions, demanding the expropriation of all the landlords' land, its division among only those who work the land themselves,

the abolition of indirect taxation, and the establishment of a progressive income tax.

It was evident that the union was no artificial organisation but had grown up from the people themselves. The majority of the founders of the union were what may be called independent Socialists; most of them were inspired with the Socialist Revolutionary programme, but they did not feel that it would be just or practical to urge their ideas on the peasant delegates and left them entirely free to work out their own programme with a few stimulating suggestions. They were democratic leaders, that is, they were helping the people to go where they themselves desired. I talked with nearly all of them. One of the most interesting of these conversations was with the well-known writer on agriculture and economics, Bielevski, while he was under house arrest with the gendarmes before his door. It was just about one year after the first congress of the union. Bielevski was looking forward to a long and frightful revolution. He said that a foreigner only imagined he observed Russia's condition, for he could not see how Russian hearts were full of hate. He spoke of the Czar's punishment expeditions, of his armies of revenge, and said that the people were almost insane with anger.

"The Government," he said, "is used to using the 'nagaika' and blows; it hates the people, while the people hate the Government, as a slave does his master." He believed that the Government had gone so far in betraying its promises that it had compromised among the people not only itself but the Czar also. He tried to picture the state of mind of the peasants by calling attention to the thousands and thousands of flayed backs all over the country. These were things that were never forgotten. He thought that the people had learned more during the year since the union had been founded than they had in a generation. He insisted not only that the revolutionary sentiment but also the Socialist programme of the union came from the peasants themselves, since they knew that if free trade in land was allowed in starving Russia they would be forced to sell their little lots at the very first famine.

Staal and Kurneen also insisted that the union had only put in words what the peasants were already thinking. The union

indeed was so thoroughly popular that even the reactionaries were forced to change their plan for organising the peasants and to adopt the Peasants' Union programme almost in full, with the single exception of ignoring the call for a constitutional assembly.

The founders of the union have been tried and condemned to a year's imprisonment by the Government. That the punishment was not longer is owing to the very intelligent and broad attitude that these men took in their work. In the trial itself it was made thoroughly clear that there had been a demand among the people for political leadership that had been filled by a number of the devoted and patriotic "intellectuals" of the kind I have mentioned. These intellectuals proved that their principle had been to spread among the peasantry a correct understanding of the land question. One leader, Pieshekanov, defended himself in the trial by saying that there were only two roads to be chosen, either to let the peasants pour by themselves into a torrent of anarchistic revolt, or to take the direction of the movement and reduce it to order. It was shown in the trial that where the union was best organised the disorders were least; and I myself have had it pointed out to me by the peasants that the union and the revolutionary parties try to restrain them from revengeful violence. The peasants told me of an incident in which the president of a local government board, a landlord, the guards of whose estate had fired on the peasantry, was attacked by the latter and sent to town to secure some revolutionary student to talk to the peasants and protect him from their revenge.

Among the St. Petersburg members of the union a new and still more definitely organised party, that of the National Socialists, took its origin. The Peasants' Union and other revolutionary organisations had successfully taught the peasants that they must look forward to a constitutional assembly and that they would have to take the land for themselves. I believe that this new organisation may possibly find the correct solution of the problem of the distribution of the land. There is no doubt that each of the parties we have mentioned will contribute something to this solution. In the programmes both of the Labour Group and of the Socialist Revolutionary Party one of the measures for equalising land is a heavily

graduated land tax on the principle of Henry George. Miacotin, one of the chief leaders of the new party, told me he considered this the most important element for the purpose of bringing about the desired economic equality; and considering the enormous difficulties of the actual redistribution of land itself as it is now carried on in the Russian villages, there seems no doubt that this measure will be the one on which ultimately the Socialist and revolutionary parties will all unite. The Nationalist Socialist Party is the organisation which is best liked by all the other revolutionary parties at considerable rivalry with one another.

Although the democratic Socialist movement that has embodied itself in the Peasants' Union, the Labour Group and the National Socialist Party, owes its theoretical inspiration to the Socialist Revolutionaries and its real origin to the spontaneous demands of the people, it has not been wanting in leaders among the chief men of Russia. Vladimir Korolenko, whom I have already mentioned, a novelist known abroad and beloved by every Russian, has been in the forefront of all the great movements of protest in which Russia's most distinguished and talented names have figured. Korolenko has for years been in close touch with the Socialist Revolutionary movement and is now considered to be one of the chief leaders of the new popular Socialist parties, without, of course, being a partisan of any. I visited him in his home in Poltava and found him looking forward to a greater and broader and more profound revolutionary movement with the same hopefulness as the masses of the peasant people. He was under no illusions as to immediate prospects, realising that the Government had succeeded in imprisoning or exiling the brains of the movement, but he did not consider this check at all as an insuperable calamity, but rather perhaps even as a piece of good fortune in the end. To Korolenko and all the great Russians in real, close and sympathetic contact with the people, the revolution is such an immense thing that it ought not to succeed too rapidly; too hasty victories in such a cause would necessarily lead to later defeats. He felt that the great thing needed was organisation in the spirit of the Peasants' Union and the Labour Group and considered that tremendous progress had already been made in this direction. He did not believe that any amount of dis

organised and blind revolt could do anything but strengthen the Government. Far from agreeing with Milyoukov that the continuance of disorder in Russia would force the Government to rely on the reformers to straighten things out, he felt that just the contrary was the case and that disorderly revolt could only weaken the revolutionary movement.

Korolenko is an excellent type of Russia's famous men who have participated in the popular revolutionary movement. Of the new leaders that are also springing up plentifully all over the country each of the Dumas has produced a score. One of the most influential and typical is Karaviev, perhaps the most impressive speaker of the Labour Group in the second Duma. When a youth he was a physician to the local government board of Perm. Having exposed a corrupt judge, the latter tried to have him removed; however Karaviev's peasant friends were so outraged that they threatened to kill this official if the measure was carried out; to solve the difficulty Karaviev removed to one of the districts of the St. Petersburg provinces. Again he was arrested, because the political police had decided "that he was too popular and influential and that his beliefs were dangerous to the State." No other accusations could be made against him; indeed, while Karaviev is both a revolutionary and a Socialist, he belongs to the moderate wing of the movement and has always been very careful in his public life. It happened that some of the factories situated in the district where he was living at this time (1897) were English, and that some of the members of the English colony were interested in him and secured his release from prison, but he was forbidden to reside in any industrial province. Without his knowledge the peasants of the neighbourhood had sent an application to the Czar that he should be allowed to stay. Later on he removed to Kharkov in the south of Russia, but his persecution by no means ceased. His election to the second Duma and the prominent part he played in it, far from relieving him from petty and serious police persecutions, have made them worse.

When I visited him in the summer of 1907 he had just had the good fortune to be elected as physician of a certain factory hospital; the governor, however, had notified him that he would remove him from this position if he accepted it. Kara-


viev, it must be remembered, is under no legal process of any kind, and the Government has never been able to formulate any accusation against him. He had decided to accept the position offered in defiance of the governor. I have no doubt that he will soon end in Siberia, but persecution everywhere in Russia is now so bad that progressive people do not feel it is of any tragic importance where they live, in Siberia, or in their native town.

Karaviev was strongly in favour of a peasant party entirely independent of the theoretical influence of the Socialist organisation, but he also realised that the Socialistic and revolutionary proposals adopted by the Peasants' Union were of a thoroughly practical character and applicable to the present condition of the country. He therefore wished the peasants' party to be headed by the Peasants' Union. Although he thought that the peasants felt that a hereditary ruler was a sort of law of nature, he was certain that they were also so democratic that, if they had their way, they would so qualify and limit any monarchy that there would be very little place left in it for the Czar. Besides, he had noticed that an anti-monarchical sentiment was growing up very rapidly among all the more educated villagers. He thought that social ideas of the peasants had gone further even than their political ideas and believed that, if political equality were established, Socialist ideas in some practical form would be readily accepted by the whole population.

Like Korolenko he was hopeful for the future. He thought there was much promise in the view prevailing among the peasants that, after a few years when the army was composed entirely of new recruits sworn by the villages not to shoot against the people, the revolution would be able to conquer; and he was confident that the peasants now purchasing property through the Peasants' Bank, and so seemingly accepting the Governmental land reform, would, within a few years, revolt against making any further payments and accentuate the revolutionary situation.

I talked with many other leaders of this class, active Duma members in thoroughly intimate contact with their constituents. All were hopeful of a renewal of the revolutionary movement within a few years, and all were in general accord with the opinions and feelings stated by the peasants themselves.

PART FIVE
REVOLUTION AND THE MESSAGE



CHAPTER I

THE WORKINGMEN

IF THE peasants have become revolutionary and Socialistic, the city workingmen, better paid, better educated, and better organised, have both preceded them and gone further in this direction. Indeed the most important events of the revolutionary movement up to the present have been brought about solely by the workingmen. The Czar's promise of a national assembly was forced from him by the indignation of Russia and the whole world at his massacre, on January 22, 1905 (Western calendar), of the courageous workingmen petitioners before the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg. On October 30th of the same year the general strike instituted by the Railway Union wrung from the reluctant Czar his promise of universal suffrage for this assembly and of the rights of man for Russian citizens. All these promises were empty phrases, but nevertheless the most momentous political acts of all Russian history up to the present day. Having gone so far, having made such sacrifices, and having won such a moral victory for the nation, the working people began to ask something for themselves. They saw it was possible that even under a free government, if it fell into the hands of other social classes, they might still continue to starve.

They had never placed a mere political liberty above their hope to reach a position where they might cease to go hungry. The petition of January 22d itself was the result of a strike for better wages and bearable hours of labour. The national general strike was instituted by the Railway Union driven to exasperation because the Government had refused it the elementary right to organise railway employees for economic betterment. The Russian workingmen have fought not only against political conditions worse than those of other countries,

but also against an equally inferior economic situation. They are not willing to give up their lives to a fight for a political freedom that would not bring a corresponding economic improvement.

The Russian working people are for the most part able to read and write. For many years the country has been in such a disturbed condition that they have had the advantage of the leadership not only of the intelligent individuals in their midst but of a large part of the equally revolutionary educated class who have turned to the working people with their ideas for political and social regeneration of Russia. They have come to be keenly conscious of the superior conditions of workingmen in other countries, and at the same time of all the social and political evils against which labour unions and social parties everywhere are fighting. They have found much matter of vital import to them in comparing the condition of their country with that of other lands.

They found that the American workingmen, with the aid of education and modern machinery, are producing three times, and the Englishmen twice, as much as the Russian, that the Englishmen are paid four and the American five times as much wages per hour, while the cost of living is on the whole as high in Russia as elsewhere. The meat is indeed dearer, the bread is as dear, and only clothes are cheap; yet the average yearly wage in Russia is less than \$100; the very highest wages in any industry is that in the construction of machines, \$262.50. The hours are longer than in other countries, even if we take into account in reckoning the annual working time of the Russians the large number of holidays. The hated system of company stores prevails widely, fines are in very wide use, and the employers pay the wages at such times as they think fit. Worst of all the conditions, perhaps, is the fact that the factories own a large part of the workingmen's homes and the overcrowding is greater than in the worst tenement districts in New York, sometimes several families being put into a single room. Sometimes the homes are even in the factories. There are labour laws, some of which look very well on the statute books. However, the law of 1897 about hours shortens them only to eleven and a half and is poorly enforced at that.

The big strikes began in the very beginning of the recent industrial movement in Russia, in 1885. Conditions at that time amounted practically to slavery and the result was a sort of anarchy in the factories. The chief cause of the large disturbances in the Moscow district in 1885 was that the employers were taking back from the working people of the Morosov factory every year three hundred thousand rubles, or nearly 40 per cent. of the workingmen's wages, in the form of fines. The strike was successful in a sense; laws were passed against the fines and company stores and irregularity in the payment of wages, but of course they were not enforced. The strikes continued to grow from this time, until in St. Petersburg in 1896 the strike of the weavers was so serious that the question came up in a conference between Finance Minister Witte and the chief of police of the city, Kleigels, whether it would be practicable, under modern conditions, to force workingmen, like slaves, to their work. The city chief of police answered that he could force workingmen to labour "if they would only make disturbances on the street," but that if they sat quietly at home he could do nothing against them. As a result of this strike the eleven and a half hours law I have mentioned was written on the statute books.

All the strikes during the recent revolutionary movement, both before and after the St. Petersburg strike that led to the massacre, have had as part of their object shorter hours and higher wages. In some cases the hours have actually been shortened to ten, nine, or in a very few even to eight hours. The workingmen have felt they have a certain power, however large the reserve army of starving peasants ready to take their places, or the army of police ready to shoot them down. They have felt at the same time that this power rises or falls with the general revolutionary movement, for as soon as the Government began to get the upper hand during 1907 wages were again curtailed and hours are being gradually put back to the old level.

Even more than the peasants, then, the working people had a social element in their revolutionary programme. Even before the meeting of the first Duma they had arrived at a very revolutionary position, demanding no mere reform of any

kind, but a constitutional assembly. They did not wait, like the peasants, to see whether the Duma succeeded or failed in wringing important concessions from the Czar; they wanted the Czar to turn over the Government into the hands of the people, and they felt that no lesser measure would give them any guarantee of the promised freedom.

Soon after the Labour Group was formed the eleven workingmen deputies left it. They were not satisfied with the address of the Duma to the Throne, but issued another of their own, in which they accused the Czar of having already broken his "sacred" promises of the October Manifesto of only a few months before, and of having lessened rather than increased the rights of the people. They further accused the Czar in issuing the fundamental laws of April 25, 1906, of having attempted to abolish the other part of the October Manifesto, viz., the promise of a popular Duma. It was certainly true that the power given to the Upper Chamber by this law and the restriction of the Duma's rights over the budget left the latter practically no power whatever. The workingmen's representatives demanded again immediate amnesty for all political prisoners, liberty and justice for those who had fought against the Government. They further asserted that the great land question could not be rightfully decided by the present Duma, elected on restricted suffrage, but must be turned over to another Duma elected by equal votes of all the people. They concluded that the only purpose of the first Duma, its only *raison d'être*, was to pass a universal suffrage law, and they declared that this must be done speedily if it was to be done peacefully.

The workingmen had reached the extreme revolutionary position without having to learn anything from the Dumas. The majority of the peasants only reached it after the dissolution of the first Duma, and a considerable part is only just now learning to take this advanced position. Not only had the workingmen reached this point, but the overwhelming majority were already republicans. The Social Democratic Party, to which most of them belong, demanded not only an immediate trial of "those bloody murderers, the ministers and the Czar," but also the abolition of the monarchy once

for all. It asserted before the meeting of the first Duma that all the ministers were simply the Czar's servants, and that he, therefore, must be held strictly responsible for all the outrages they committed.

The workingmen of Russia would be glad to secure the half-freedom of the workingmen of other countries, or even of the United States, but they are not ready to die for it. They did not have themselves shot down on the 22nd of January, executed by hundreds in Moscow, Riga, and Odessa, imprisoned by thousands in every Russian jail, and exiled to the deserts and the arctic regions, in exchange for the doubtful privileges of the workingmen of Goldfield or Cripple Creek. They knew these American stories; I have heard them from their own lips. I have talked with labour leaders of all the factions—pure and simple unionists, revolutionary Socialists, independent Socialists, and Social Democrats, members of the Duma, and the practical leaders of the great Railway Union. They were all agreed that our political institutions are much preferable to their own, but they were not very anxious to exchange one despot for another. The enthusiasm with which they, more than any other class in Russia, throw away their lives is due to the great hope that they may not exchange the despotism of the Czar for a despotism of private capital. No faction has any idea of the immediate creation of a Socialist state, but every faction hopes that the Russian working class, if it once makes possible the greatest revolution of the world's history, will demand such a voice in the reborn nation as to make it impossible that the new Government should be dominated by a handful of capitalists.

For a short while it looked as if labour might combine with capital against the Czar. After the 22nd of January, employers coöperated for a time with the workmen, and the workmen with employers, in a common cause against the Government. The strikes at that time had almost without exception a political character. Many employers freely paid for waiting time during these purely political strikes, a direct subsidy to the revolution. Even during the Moscow barricades several of the largest manufacturers openly or secretly supported the insurrection. But now the situation has cleared and the

Russian revolution, the only great revolution the world has seen since the rise of modern capitalism, is directed as much against landlordism and capitalism as it is against the Czar. For the Czar, by the "fundamental laws" of April 25th, invented an improved style of American Senate. Half the members of this august body are elected by employers, landlords, bankers, and clergymen — half appointed by the Czar. For fear the Duma might do something popular this second body shares the power. The employers were finally cured of their revolutionism by this measure, for from the capitalistic standpoint the new body was an ideal representation of the nation. When a few months later the second Duma was dissolved and a third created almost in the image of this Senate, or Council of the Empire, the capitalists became enthusiastic supporters of the "new" Government. The workingmen's unions and political parties, which never had anything but suspicion toward their self-professed ally, were at least in the fortunate position of having both their opponents, absolutism and capitalism, in a single camp.

Witte saw the danger that the workingmen would demand a share in the political power of the future Russian Government which his friends, the capitalists, would be unwilling to concede, and did not fail to try to thwart it. He advised the labour leaders to leave politics alone. He favoured purely economic action for his "brother workingmen," as he styled them. As much class struggle as you please, but no class politics!

When I called, Witte referred me to his Minister of Commerce (and Labor) Timiriaseff, with orders to the latter to talk freely for the benefit of the American workingman. Mr. Timiriaseff believed, he said, in the widest possible democracy — much beyond the "checks and balances" of the American Constitution. He believed in cabinet government; that is, that every executive should be always and forever responsible to the legislative power — an idea that, put into the American Constitution, might do much to restrain the unbridled conservatism of our elected executives and the judges, their appointees. He believed in many kinds of labour legislation, such as a legal maximum for the working day and workingmen's insurance. He believed, in fact, in everything the workingmen wanted, *but he did n't*

want them to take it themselves. He explained the benevolence of the new Government, which was ready to do everything, and showed how he and Witte had fought in the cabinet for toleration of "good" unions (the non-revolutionary ones). It was not Witte, he explained, but the Czar's pet minister, Durnovo, chief of police, gendarmes and spies, that had not even permitted these pious unions to hold a single meeting. Witte himself would have had them given every privilege.

Here was Mr. Witte's scheme to foil the revolution. The workingmen were to be divided into two parts — the wild and the tame. The wild, he said to a friend of mine, those who were not satisfied with his benevolent efforts, were to be killed or caged, "like the wild beasts they were." The tame were to be further tamed. First came Gapon with his 30,000 rubles subsidy for restoring the workingmen's clubs, under police supervision to be sure. But Gapon was inconvenient for the taming. He played such a hidden game — either very deep and subtle or else very oily and false — that he was trusted neither by the watchful workmen nor by the watchful police. His long, involved career is of more interest to the searcher for clever plots for novels than it is to the serious public. He stands for no great clear idea, and he spent the last year of his life trying in vain to explain himself.

Gapon's successor was Ushakoff, with whom I have talked frequently and at length. He certainly considered himself an honest man, though he has taken Witte's money for his movement. But labour did not fall into the trap. Ushakoff, as it happened, took more money than he was willing to confess. Exactly like one of the Gapon troop, he turned it over to the union, but he was ashamed to turn it over in Witte's name. The real origin of the money was discovered, and his movement was ruined. The Russian workman, his eyes more widely opened, now decided to keep his hands clean of Count Witte's benevolence. Later, when independent labour parties and unions appeared, condemning both Gapon and Ushakoff, but satisfied with political conditions and permitted by the Russian Government, this was enough in itself to condemn them in the eyes of the honest workman. So the tottering liberal (capitalistic) ministry had at last to give up its attempt to

defeat the revolutionising of the working class by terrorising its more active part and cajoling and deceiving the timid and ignorant.

The Russian workingman is revolutionary, but he is neither violent, dogmatic, nor unintelligent. He is ready for barricades, but he has studied them, and alone of the workmen of the world he has learned about them from actual experience. He believes in the class struggle. He is ready and willing to fight his oppressor, the capitalist class, to the finish. But he does not ignore the existence of still other classes. He merely asks that the other classes take one side or the other in the bitter conflict that draws so near.

He is unwilling to antagonise the agricultural classes, the peasants, though they may not always agree with him; he hopes rather to secure a common basis of action. There are many orthodox Marxists in Russia, but the great mass of the Russian workmen do not expect the peasants to disappear, absorbed either in the capitalist or working class, according to the stricter Marxist formula. Far from expecting the increasing lower middle classes of the cities to disappear, the workingmen invited their aid to build barricades and carry out the general strike — and the Moscow insurrection was carried on not alone by workmen but by students, clerks, office workers, Government employees, teachers, doctors, engineers. The majority faction of the Social Democratic Party (the progressive and more Russian part) having seen this light, is now for coöperation with these "little bourgeois."


The Railway Union, which formed the heart and core of the great October general strike, realises that the success even of a general strike does not depend on the working class alone. For if the October strike won the Manifesto, the December strike, at the time of the Moscow barricades, failed. The workingmen of the cities joined the strike, but it was only in Moscow that the whole mass of the population, excepting only the rich and privileged, was thoroughly roused. The Railway Union has proved itself wise. It favoured the October strike and the strike was won. It opposed the December strike and the strike was lost. It realises fully the enormous cost and danger of tying up the transportation of a great



FATHER GAPON

Killed by enraged workingmen for trying to buy them for the Government





TYPE OF A RUSSIAN WORKINGMAN

country. Its wisdom consists in knowing that if the population is not thoroughly with the strike, the strike will fail. It does not oppose a new strike, but it proposes to wait until success is assured.

The railway men and the labour movement at large have not lost their heads. In October, 1905, they showed the world the first great example of a successful general strike on a national scale. At the first stroke they secured the Manifesto — the first promise of freedom ever wrung from the Czar. The next stroke is to be for nothing less than the final sovereignty of the people, in place of the sovereignty of the Czar — who, if he is kept at all, will retain little more than his name. The workmen are as one man in their demand for a constitution, and they know they will have to force it by revolution — “open, violent rebellion” as Carlyle defines it.

But they propose to make this revolution as speedy and orderly as it can be made, and for this end they propose one more great general strike. The working people, having forced the Czar to promise freedom, propose now to force him to make his promise good. It is to be a class struggle against officials, landlords, and employers. But the working class will not antagonise any other class except that of the rich and privileged. The Russian labour movement is under no delusions as to the “benevolence” of the employing class, but it does not extend its hatred to every other class outside its ranks. In the next great revolutionary crisis behind the rejected working people will be found the great mass of the intelligent city population of Russia — all those not held back by private interests, privileges, or public office, and above all, the overwhelming majority of her agricultural population of a hundred million souls.

CHAPTER II

THE POSITION OF THE WORKINGMEN

IMMEDIATELY after the great general strike the labour unions and the Socialist parties became at once aware that the promises in the Czar's Manifesto had no real value. If there were any illusions they did not last beyond the massacres of the second day; most of the leaders were thoroughly conscious of the emptiness of the victory from the first moment they heard the Manifesto and saw that it was a compromise that left all the actual power in the hands of the Czar. That the next movement would have to be, not a peaceful general strike, but an insurrection, was realised fully by the famous Council of Labour Deputies.

In St. Petersburg and many other places the insurrection-strike that followed was a complete fiasco, but in Moscow the revolutionaries succeeded with a little body of armed men, far inferior numerically to the army to which they were opposed, and with the aid of the population, in holding for several days large portions of Moscow. They were without cavalry, without artillery, and the great majority were without discipline; the trained revolutionary militia formed a very small part of the whole. Their success was due to the enthusiastic support of the population. If the revolutionary militia consisted of workingmen with a certain proportion of students and professional Socialist leaders, the barricades were built by workingmen, servants, clerks, engineers, lawyers, and members of the professional class.

A great lesson remains fixed in the minds of all the revolutionists, especially of the workingmen — the possible success of guerilla tactics in a modern city. It was because the population could *safely* aid the revolutionary militia without being caught; because the arms could be passed from hand to hand, so that one gun did the service of three, and the military

had no rest; because of the impossibility of the Government's deciding which house-owner was terrorised into aiding the revolutionists and which was glad to do so; because of the possibility of the sudden transformation of a peaceful citizen into a revolutionist and a revolutionist into a peaceful citizen at a moment's notice and without the least chance of detection — it was because of these conditions that the revolutionists performed their astounding feat. In a week were belied the theories of a whole generation of revolutionary but timid European Socialists and a century of military dogmas on the hopelessness of insurrection. The spontaneous and universal use of guerilla tactics by the revolutionaries and the assistance of a large part of the people of Moscow came near placing the second city of a great empire in the hands of the revolutionists.

In other sections of the country where the whole population had for many months been preparing for an armed insurrection, the movement, also guided by the workingmen, was more difficult to conquer. In one part of the Empire it even had a complete victory, and the Czar has not yet been able to force this section under the old servitude. In the Finnish, as in the other insurrectionary movements of which I have been speaking, the working people played by far the most important part. Aided by the "Red Guard," entirely under the leadership of workingmen and Socialists, moderately well supplied with arms and supported by nearly all classes of the population, the revolutionists were able to abolish entirely the Czar's Government, to remove the Russian officials and police and to establish Finns in their stead. It is well known that the Finnish revolutionary movement was orderly from the outset, that there was no unnecessary bloodshed and that there has been none since. The Czar's Government, occupied seriously with other insurrectionary movements in the heart of the Empire, conceded nearly everything, and for a while there was no freer country in Europe. Now the Red Guard has been disbanded, but the Finnish people have learned a lesson and if there is any sign of revolutionary movement in Russia they will undoubtedly at once undertake active measures for the defence and recovery of their liberties now being gradually stolen away.

Similar revolutionary movements of the overwhelming majority of the population, under the leadership of the working classes, placed considerable parts of Poland and the Caucasus for a time in the hands of the people. But with the aid of armies of 50,000 and 150,000 men these movements were completely suppressed. The movements in both these regions were on the whole orderly and humane, while the Government repressions were savage and barbarous from the first moment.

The intelligent classes in both sections saw that the rule of the revolutionary committees was in many respects better than the former rule of the police. The systematic lynching of thieves and the deliberate destruction of houses of ill-repute by the revolutionists did more for the good of Warsaw than years of its miserable, inefficient, and corrupt police, often in league with the thieves and *souteneurs* and occupied almost entirely with the oppression of political suspects. The Government has occupied, rather than conquered, these two regions, and it does not dare to remove any considerable part of the occupying forces. The people are not defeated, but only waiting until the Russian people are ready to renew the war against the Czar.

The same revolutionary committees were also conducting the only schools and classes to be found during the height of the movement. When all the schools were closed and all the scholars, from little children to students of law, medicine, and engineering, were on strike, the Socialists were conducting secret evening classes in reading and writing for the neglected children of the workers, and secret evening courses in these and other subjects for the adults. And for years every evening literally hundreds of these circles, necessarily confined to a dozen pupils or less for fear of the police, have gathered in every corner of Warsaw, taught by the students of the universities and higher schools, by young men of the professional classes, by young salesmen and clerks.

The schools are only a small part of the education the revolutionists provide. There are secret revolutionary pamphlets by the million, and even many regular revolutionary journals, the only truly popular newspapers, which handle every sort of political, economic, and social question under the direction

of university-bred editors and contributors. The innumerable Government prosecutions have failed utterly to hold this flood of printed matter back.

Simultaneously with this great educational movement, both in Poland and throughout Russia generally, the revolutionary movement enabled the working people to organise into large and successful trade unions in spite of the prohibitions and persecutions of the Government. Wages were raised and hours shortened, until sometimes the wages were 50 per cent. more than before. From any standpoint of the public welfare or the best economic interests of the country at large, this movement must be considered entirely a progressive and profitable one. As soon as the Government once more secured the upper hand the unions were again suppressed, until now membership in nearly any union in Russia is a crime under the law. Doubtless the Government from its point of view is quite right in reaching this decision, since it is impossible to imagine that any labour organisation could long continue under the present Government without deciding to fight it to the death.

During the revolutionary movement the peaceful constructive work of organising the working people, not only in trade unions but in coöperative organisations, has gone on much more rapidly than before. Just as the Government has destroyed the unions and attacked the tremendously successful "People's Universities" or university extension movements as dangerous to the State, so have the reactionary organisations proposed that the Government should either close by force, or put out of business by subsidised competition, the astonishingly successful coöperative movement that began recently in St. Petersburg. There are already thousands of these workingmen's coöperative stores, just as there are thousands of secret classes to which the teachers and professors of the country, nearly all public-spirited men, are freely giving their time. It is certain that both of these movements are untinged by any direct political object; it is equally certain that the Government from the standpoint of the safety of autocracy, is right that anything that elevates the condition of the working people or increases their intelligence is likely soon to become an imminent danger to the Czarism.

It has, of course, been realised that the support of the army must be secured, and of the numerous mutinies that have occurred from Vladivostock to Sebastopol, Riga, and Cronstadt, nearly all have been brought about principally by workingmen agitators and by such elements of the army as have been composed largely of workingmen. The reason for the mutinies that all but put the fleets both of the Black and Baltic seas into the hands of the revolutionists was that sailors are also workingmen and in close touch with the rest of the working classes. Even the conservative wing of the Social Democrats has always favoured agitation in the army and hoped that the Government might fall into the hands of the people through widespread army rebellion. The prosecution of the fifty deputies of the Social Democratic Party of the second Duma, which was used by the Government as a pretext for dissolving the Duma when it refused to turn over the deputies to the courts, was based on the fact of this army agitation. The trial has now taken place; a third of these deputies have been sentenced to hard labour in the mines and another third exiled, while only a very few have gone entirely without punishment.

But these mutinies, isolated from one another, occurring also at different times, never succeeded even in gaining the whole garrison to their side. This was a necessary result of the propaganda as carried on by the workingmen's parties; the propaganda among soldiers already enlisted was necessarily a barracks propaganda and necessarily dealt largely with the conditions of the soldiers themselves, which varied greatly from regiment to regiment, and town to town. The leaders of the agitation soon saw two great necessities. One was to convert the soldiers before they enlisted, so that they would understand that they were fighting, not for temporary or small military evils, but for a great national cause. Another was to secure some form of common movement between the army and the rest of the people, without which no mutiny could, of course, ever develop into a national revolutionary movement. But before these lessons were learned hundreds of persons had been executed and thousands sent to hard labour for their lives for agitation in the barracks. The parties now know very well that no army movement, any more than a general strike, can

succeed until the general state of public feeling has reached an extremely acute stage. They know that no revolution can be planned beforehand; but they propose to be as ready as possible when the psychological moment has arrived. Unfortunately, a certain difficulty still exists between the workingmen's and the peasants' organisations. It is well understood that co-operation is necessary but some of the workingmen's parties, especially those composed largely of "intellectuals," feel that in the general movement the working people should have the leading rôle. This seems a very wrong attitude, since the peasants in Russia are five times more numerous than all other working classes.

The organisations that were initiated and managed by the workingmen themselves with the minimum of assistance from outsiders have always shown a very friendly spirit toward the peasantry. Most remarkable of such organisations were doubtless the Councils of Labour Deputies, purely revolutionary or insurrectionary bodies, that arose after the general strike and before the Government had again seized firmly the reins of power. These organisations were of a purely Socialist character but they were at the same time strictly non-partisan and took care not to develop a too definite political programme; they were composed of workingmen but they were not by any means labour unions, or even a federation of labour unions. They were nothing more nor less than a framework for a revolutionary government, perhaps some vague foreshadowing of what may develop into a very real power in some future revolutionary moment. It is largely on account of experience with these organisations that the Government hesitates to allow any labour association of any kind and continually fluctuates between two equally impossible policies. First it forbids all unions, but this only leads to the more rapid development of conspirative parties and every form of violence, as well as that disorganisation of industry which now exists at Odessa, Lodz, and many other places. Urged, then, by the employers themselves, and perhaps by the small moderate element among the workingmen, the Government decides to tolerate loyal and peaceful unions, but it has no sooner done this for a few months than these organisations, outraged at every point by the pre-

vailing despotism, turn into purely revolutionary associations. It was the Council of Labour Deputies to a large degree that taught the working people their power and placed the Government in the dilemma from which it can find no issue.

The Councils of Labour Deputies have usually taken a broad national view of the revolutionary movement, coöperating in the fullest way, for instance, with the Peasants' Union. Far from taking their leaders from the Socialist parties, they have rather given those parties some of their most active organisers. Such an example is Khrustalev, a figure so important and also so typical of the organisers of the labour movement in general that I have obtained from him a personal statement of his life.

Khrustalev, more correctly Nossar, was a peasant's son from the province of Poltava. His father had become a Tolstoian and was sentenced to exile for twenty years by the Government, though he was allowed to return under police supervision. His home was the centre of all revolutionary thought in the neighbourhood and the young man was early surrounded by every shade of revolutionist. As a Tolstoian his father demanded that he should work with his hands. He was employed at times by his landlord and at times attended a board school.


At this period, the early nineties, the revolutionary movement existed chiefly among the students, and young Nossar was urged to become one in order to carry on agitation. The police, knowing his revolutionary environment, wished to prevent his entrance to the high school, but the director was a friend of peasant and self-taught students and he was accepted. In 1897 he was one of the organisers of a students' congress. The police insisted on his being expelled from the school but he was allowed first to graduate. He then went to St. Petersburg and entered the university. The first great students' strike took place in 1898, and for having aided in the organisation of the national movement he was kept three months in prison. It was at this time that he changed from the radical people's party, of which Korolenko was at that time the leader, and joined the Social Democratic organisation, which, with its rich German literature, has always been popular among the student class.

He was exiled to South Russia, took part there in the organi-



A CORNER OF OLD MOSCOW





PRINCE KROPOTKIN
Greatest living enemy of coercive government

sation of unions, a workingman's party, and a workingman's paper. Later he went to the Caucasus and tried to organise a railroad union and only escaped another imprisonment because he was employed as tutor to the son of the prosecuting attorney. The latter advised him to leave. He returned to St. Petersburg to continue his studies, but the police interfered and exiled him to Yaroslav, where he passed his law examinations and received the rights of citizen and the privilege of holding a chair at the university, providing, of course, he could secure a vacancy.

In 1904, returning again to St. Petersburg, he met Gapon and took a prominent part in the movement that led to the general strike in St. Petersburg and the massacre of the working people on January 22d. It was at this time that he got his name of Khrustalev. When, after the massacre, the workingmen were allowed to elect a delegation to deal with the employers, Nossar was elected as a member, but since he was not a workingman he could not serve. Offered his place by a workingman, Khrustalev, Nossar assumed the workingman's name and has since borne it. The members of the commission were all arrested, among others Nossar. He stayed two months in prison and was condemned to eight years hard labour in Siberia. In the meanwhile he was exiled to Kharkov. But at the first station out from St. Petersburg he left the train and returned. In St. Petersburg he was again arrested, again kept two months in prison, again exiled, this time under escort. When the train arrived at Moscow a street demonstration was taking place and Khrustalev again managed to escape. Here he helped to organise a Council of Labour Deputies, and when the great general strike of October began he was sent as a delegate of this council to St. Petersburg to aid in organising a similar body there. He was successful, and after the great strike became the central figure of the revolutionary movement. He was again arrested and again exiled, but managed to make his escape. The conduct of his organisation and his opinions showed sufficient force and originality to interest the world at that time; and to this day, of course, he continues one of the leaders of the movement.

Another leader, Trotsky, likewise a young man in the early

thirties, is equally known among the revolutionists. In a recent talk with the latter I asked what was the final conclusion reached by the leaders of this movement as to the future of the revolution, and he answered that the future army would have to be educated for revolt in the villages themselves. In four years the army will be entirely composed of new recruits. It is hoped by Trotsky, as well as by a large part of the peasantry themselves, that the new army, made up of young men familiar with existing conditions, will be made up of revolutionists.

In the new revolutionary tactics which are working toward a complete unity of the peasants and working people in the revolutionary movement, the popular faction of the Social Democratic party has played a still more important rôle perhaps than the Council of Labour Deputies. But there has been a certain current of opinion in the party against this evidently practical and indispensable proposal of unity. The minority faction, represented by a number of leaders, among others by Zeretely, has a very great scorn for peasant rebellions, which it claims have always been easily suppressed. It might, of course, be answered that rebellions conducted by workingmen alone have likewise failed. Fortunately, this attitude of suspicion toward the peasantry and underestimate of their power in the popular movement are confined almost entirely to the leaders. The majority faction and the Council of Labour Deputies, both composed largely of workingmen, have evolved no such theory of the superiority of workingmen over all other classes, either during the revolutionary movement or after it. The workingmen have from the first shown themselves more social than the majority of the professional Socialists, especially in their attitude toward the peasant class.

Nevertheless, the attitude of these leaders of the Social Democratic Party, more workingman than the workingmen themselves, more proletarian than the proletarians, has been a great retarding force on the revolutionary movement, and one of the great changes through which the masses of the people have gone has been to learn to distrust those who believe that there is a fundamental antagonism between the two most important classes of the country, the peasants and the working people. It was because of this suspicion toward the peasantry

that the leaders of the minority succeeded in getting the last congress of the party to reject guerilla warfare and the expropriation of Governmental funds as a means of combat at the present moment. The resolution, however, would have been lost had it been put to the vote of the Russians of the party alone. The delegates from Poland, the Baltic Provinces, and the Caucasus, though most revolutionary, were against the practice of guerilla war at the present time for a very practical reason peculiar to these non-Russian provinces — that the guerilla war in these sections has necessarily taken an anti-Russian turn, and the Russian soldiers stationed as garrison there have been severe sufferers. Many lives of innocent peasant soldiers have thus been sacrificed, and sometimes it has happened that Russian revolutionists themselves have been killed through inevitable mistakes. This reason does not apply in Russia itself, and the overwhelming majority of the working people of Russia, even of those who are members of this party, favours relentless warfare against the Government and the expropriation of Government money.

It can be asserted with all confidence that the Lettish, Polish, and Caucasian leaders of the party are not of a moderate but of the most revolutionary opinion. A Lettish leader has assured me that his party is only temporarily against guerilla war because the Russian movement itself is scarcely ripe for these tactics. A leader of the Poles has pointed out that a solution of the difficulty has been found by one of the chief Polish Socialist parties. This organisation has declared itself in favor of guerilla war, but at the same time against all war on the Russian soldiers. This restricts guerilla tactics very narrowly, but the principle is that in which the large majority of the Russian working people and nationalists undoubtedly believe. The most important Caucasian leader, though a member of the minority faction, declared to me that the peasants of the Caucasus are both revolutionary and well armed, that they make use of the strike and boycott almost as frequently and as successfully as the workingmen, that they are largely members of the party, and that the party hopes to keep them in its ranks, even those who are property owners. Certainly these peasants are not opposed generally to guerilla war.

The abandonment of guerilla war means the crippling of the agitation in the army itself. All the conferences of those who have risked their lives in this work favour both guerilla war and the expropriation of Government money. In the resolutions introduced by the majority faction, both these measures are favoured as a means of preparing the members of the party and the working people in general for future revolutionary conflicts. This is naturally the principal question within the party, for, if the organisation goes in for a guerilla civil war, it must expect to receive the most bitter opposition of all well-to-do and prosperous classes, who will necessarily suffer by the resulting confusion, and it must at the same time seek the closest possible alliance with the peasantry. The leaders of the majority now in control of the party clearly recognise this significance of the new policy. It is for this reason that they are in favour not merely of guerilla war but of the organisation of armed bands composed partly or altogether of non-party members, thus offering the possibility of the most complete co-operation with the peasants, who have shown very little tendency to join the Social Democratic organisation. The majority faction realises thoroughly the necessity of a full unity in the revolutionary movement and points out that the lack of this has been the chief failure up to the present point.

The leaders now in control of the party feel that the peasantry and the less well-to-do element of the middle classes of the large cities are entirely against both the landlords and the absolutism and altogether ripe for a thorough democratic revolution. This is why they favour the fullest co-operation both with the peasants and with the majority of the middle classes of the towns. But even these leaders do not concede that the Socialism of either of these classes can possibly be as genuine on the whole as that of the working people; they do not feel that unity is possible on the great land question, the first social issue to be solved by a democratic government. But they do feel that these classes can all struggle side by side for a constitutional assembly. It seems, then, that this party under the present leadership has shown that it may assume a part, but not the whole, of the leadership of the revolutionary movement.

I talked with the chief speaker and also with the chief writer

of this party in their separate hiding places in the woods of Finland. Alexinsky, one of the chief figures in the second Duma, is part workingman, part student, very much in the same way as Khrustalev. When he was elected to the Duma he was member of the Central Committee of the party in St. Petersburg. He is also a very young man, scarcely above thirty years of age. Like all the present leaders of the party, he feels that it must struggle as much against the "traitor Constitutional Democrats" as against the Government itself, and he stakes all his hope in the future of the revolution on the further development of the peasants' movement. He thought that the power given to the landlords in the third Duma was a reactionary movement that would especially stir up the peasants' hatred. Before this, he said, the landlords were only parasites, now they are occupying themselves with the politics of oppression as much as their noble heads permit. He felt that it was only when the peasants were in a revolutionary movement that it would be possible to secure the aid of the army, and so he, it is seen, was in substantial agreement with the organisers of the Councils of Labour Deputies.

Still more important for understanding the position of the workingmen's party at the present moment was my talk with the man who is perhaps the most popular leader in Russia, Lenin. He feels that the revolution in Russia is being retarded consciously by foreign capitalists and governments, which are very glad to be able to hold it back at any cost, knowing that it is sure to have a social character in the end that will affect even their own governments. All of his views are formed with a very full knowledge of the economic and political situation of other countries and are especially interesting because he sharply differentiates his Socialism from that prevailing in Germany, whence the leaders of the opposite faction have taken bodily nearly all their ideas. The German movement, he finds, has been too anxious to be legal. Under a despotic government like that of Prussia he would have been glad to see it take a more illegal and violent form; he thought that it had been deluded by the fact that Prussia had a paper constitution.

Like Alexinsky, Lenin awaits the agrarian movement, favours

the guerilla war at the present time, and hopes that a railway strike with the destruction of the lines of communication and the support of the peasantry may some day put the Government of Russia into the people's hands. However, I was shocked to find that this important leader also, though he expects a full coöperation with the peasants on equal terms during the revolution, feels toward them a very deep distrust, thinking them to a large extent bigoted and blindly patriotic, and fearing that they may some day shoot down the revolutionary workingmen as the French peasants did during the Paris Commune.

The chief basis for this distrust is of course the prejudiced feeling that the peasants are not likely to become good Socialists. It is on account of this feeling that Lenin and all the Social Democratic leaders place their hopes on a future development of modern large agricultural estates in Russia and the increase of the landless agricultural working class, which alone they believe would prove truly Socialist. At the same time Lenin is far more open-minded on the subject than the leaders formerly in control of the party, and conceded it was possible that such peasants or farmers as were not at the same time employers might join in a future Socialist movement.

We see, then, that the Russian working people in all their organisations are prepared for a cordial and full coöperation with the agricultural population in the revolutionary movement, but we see at the same time that their leading political party expects the city working people to maintain the chief rôle and that the confidence of the leaders of this party in the peasantry is without any deep roots. There is another Socialist and revolutionary organisation in Russia, however, that has as much trust in the peasants as in the workingmen, an organisation that has also a very large following among the working classes. It is to this revolutionary body that we must look to find out how far the movement for the unifying of the various revolutionary tendencies, for the formation of a single national revolutionary movement, has progressed.

CHAPTER III

ORGANISING

THE principles and tactics of the Socialist Revolutionary Party afford the best insight into the heart of the whole revolutionary and Socialist movement that is taking possession of the greater part of Russia's peasants and workingmen. Like the majority of the peasants and workingmen, the party is not looking backward on recent defeats and victories as marking any final stage in the movement; there is no sign of surrender or compromise. A recent party statement claims that the revolution has scarcely seen the end of its first act; that the chief characters in this first act were the city workingmen — the advance guard of the revolution — but that it would be erroneous to believe that this advance guard can take the place of the bulk of the army, the peasantry. It is just at this point that the party differs from the Social Democratic organisation which looks to the peasants to play a secondary, if essential, rôle.

"We are only at the beginning of the revolution," says this declaration, "and we have before us a long period of obstinate struggle, of organization, of new open conflicts, of new defeats and new victories." The Government, it acknowledges, is again in full power, but the general atmosphere is no longer the same and no repression in the world can efface from the conscience of the people what it has felt and endured during the period through which it has just passed. The task is the same as before the Manifesto, but the conditions are more favourable. In a conversation with one of the younger, but most important leaders, of the party, Sevenkov, the man who planned the "executions" of the brutal von Plehve and the Grand Duke Sergius, I found he held the same view. Far from underestimating the obstacles ahead of the movement, Sevenkov felt that the difficulties of the French Revolution were a bagatelle by comparison. The executive committee of the party

feels the same way: it looks at the third Duma as having the power of considerably strengthening the Autocracy; it does not deny that certain elements of the population, frightened by the growing profundity of the revolution, its development from a purely political to a profoundly social movement, have been driven into the camp of the enemy; it acknowledges that a part of the educated leaders of the revolutionary movement have become tired out, that another part have become disappointed, and that a third part have lost their heads; it sees that the Government repression has successfully prevented the organised movement of the masses, and it recognises that active and rebellious individuals, finding no possibility of an organised outlet for their passionate anger against the Government, have taken to individual actions which have no social value, however much they may have been prompted in the first instance by the social spirit. Nevertheless, it feels that this very situation will still further intensify the struggle and will weld all the revolutionary movements into a single whole.

Viewing the situation thus seriously, but without the least despondency, the party with its powerful allies, the Railway Union, the Peasants' Union and the majority of the Social Democratic Party, has laid out a whole plan of campaign against the Autocracy to be carried out without regard to the length of time or number of lives necessary for its execution. The party especially urges the peasantry to concentrate their efforts against the Government and its agents rather than against the landlords, and has a highly elaborate series of suggestions of means by which the struggle can be carried on with the greatest possible effect. The party undertakes to direct into a common plan of action the innumerable devoted persons who propose to sell their lives for those of officials who are carrying out the Czar's plan of murder on the wholesale scale. These persons are advised by the party as to the means of organizing their actions, of bringing them as far as possible into a general plan, of making them simultaneous, of directing them against the most nefarious persons, of aiding them to reach a successful result, and, in such few cases where this is possible, to escape with their own lives. The party also is always busy with plans for all possible insurrectionary and revolutionary movements

on a national scale that seem to have any chance of success; above all, it concentrates its attention on the army and navy, and as far as possible on the officers, feeling that intelligent organisation is most of all necessary in an army movement. To the workingmen the party says above all that the labour unions must enter, *independently of all political parties*, into Socialist and revolutionary politics.

In order to promote the unification of all the elements of the population that recognise that the only way to answer the war the Government is levying against the Russian people, is for the people to levy war against the Government, the party is endeavouring to maintain the friendliest relations with all organisations that are ready to fight. It has been especially ready and willing to grant whatever national autonomy is demanded by the movements of the very many oppressed people that live under the Czar's rule. By this policy it has brought into intimate relations with itself the principal revolutionary party in Poland and also the principal Armenian organisation.

This important organisation has conceived a broad idea not only with regard to tactics; its principles also are so broad as to admit all the important revolutionary elements in the country. The preamble to the party programme, besides employing the usual Marxian formulas, broadly attributes social progress to the conscious action of those who struggle for truth and justice; while the party expects to use, in order to realise its end of revolutionary Socialism, *all* the positive elements of economic evolution in the capitalist régime and also independent and autonomous creative powers of the working classes, whether propertyless or not. Thus the party appeals not only to the industrial working classes, but to the small farmers and to the professional element, without regard to the question as to whether they are well-to-do or not. The language of its programme, as that of many of its leaders, suggests that its attack is levelled against capitalism rather than against private property, this is partly why it has had considerable success in bringing about a unity among all the revolutionary classes of Russia.

The party assumes that war exists between the Russian

Government and the Russian people. It assumes that this war ought to be conducted under the rules of civilised warfare, and it strictly limits and disciplines the action of its party members to such a degree that the moderate parties recognise that it lives up to its own code, which can by no means be said of the Russian Government. The party saw at once that in this war against odds more overwhelming perhaps than those of any war on record, new methods and new tactics are necessary, but it believes that the measures that it undertakes are an inevitable outcome of the mere fact that this civil and social war exists.

Already there is a roll of thirty thousand people killed in the struggle for freedom — the majority in massacres in which the police and Cossacks have participated. Not only the outlying and non-Russian provinces, like Poland, the Caucasus, and the Baltic Provinces, are involved, but every part of Russia without exception. At the present time all but 26 of the 661 districts of European Russia are either under some form of martial law or the local governor is given by Nicholas II. the right to issue any order he pleases with the force of law.

A glance at a few places where the conflicts have been most acute will help to show how far this war has gone. In several Russian cities, like Odessa and Bielostock, several per cent. of the population have been killed or wounded. In Odessa as well as in Warsaw and Lodz, tens of thousands of persons have been imprisoned and exiled. The condition is such that scarcely one family out of ten has not suffered through its own members or intimate connections. Many other places have suffered more severely: Rostov and Novorissisk on the Black Sea, Tomsk in Siberia, and Kronstadt a couple of hours from St. Petersburg, have been partly depopulated.

This is war of the most barbarous kind; and without attempting to judge the morality or practicability of the measures adopted in their counter-war by the revolutionists, I have no hesitancy in saying that they are justified in using any means that tend to reach their goal without damaging innocent persons. Archangelsky declared in the Duma that as long as the demands of the people with regard to the pardon of the hundreds and thousands of political prisoners, and the

abolition of martial law, were denied, as long as the Government refused to abdicate in favour of a constitutional assembly elected by the equal votes of the whole people, the war would continue.

The character of the war waged by the revolutionists is rapidly changing. During the year 1907 the war was reduced almost exclusively to the executions of exceptionally brutal officials as a check on the ruthless massacres and "legal" murders practised by the Government. Widespread prevalence of this kind of warfare, it will be readily seen, is almost an inevitable result of Russia's condition. This is recognised by moderates as well as by all the popular parties; by the moderates when they refuse to condemn these acts, except in stating at the same time that they are the natural accompaniment of the violent acts of the Government; by the popular parties in refusing to condemn them altogether, except occasionally on purely tactical grounds. The execution of officials is justified as the only possible check to the savagery and cruelty of the official class. It is not supposed that such measures will long continue and it is purposed even by the most extreme organisations to replace them at the earliest moment by an entirely different mode of warfare.

When Ministers Sipiaguine and von Plehve were killed, a majority of the Russian people applauded, and a large part of Europe has since learned to recognise that these acts were as patriotic as that of William Tell. The killing of Bobrikov is certainly approved by the majority of the peaceful people of Finland, and like the execution of von Plehve brought decidedly beneficial results, since no man so strong and ruthless was to be procured to succeed him. Of those since executed, Ignatiev, a favourite of the Czar, was the chief instigator of the massacres of thousands of Jews; von Launitz was the savage head of Russia's savage police; Pavlov, who while speaking to the first Duma from the Minister's bench was driven out of the room with calls of "murderer," was the first organiser of the lawless military courts that have executed hundreds of persons without any real trial; Maximovsky, as head of the prison system, was responsible for the wholesale tortures and murders of political prisoners; and the Grand Duke Sergius was perhaps the

most cruel, brutal, and corrupt member of the royal family since Ivan the Terrible. It is impossible to deny that the nation has gained tremendously by the death of each of these individuals, and relatively few Russians outside of Government circles are disposed to question the public utility of most of these executions. Although, as the executions spread from the highest authorities to lower officials, their social utility becomes more and more questionable — laying aside for the moment all questions of morality inapplicable to a state of war, and remembering only the deep human instinct against all unnecessary cruelty and unnecessary sacrifices of life — we cannot doubt that such of them as are justified by the national conscience have afforded much temporary relief from the horrible practices of the Government.

The revolutionists and other outraged citizens have killed and wounded in the two years before July 1, 1907, seven hundred police officials and several thousand spies, political police, and other persons engaged in similar work. The proportion of the police officials attacked has been a considerable part of the total, but there can be no question that nearly all such officials are engaged in a perfectly relentless war against those who are trying to overturn the Government. Nor is the proportion of the total number of common police and gendarmes killed or injured a small one, although the policy of all the parties is to attack such persons as little as possible, since it is recognised that they are mere mercenaries, selling themselves perhaps only temporarily for their bloody work.

A large part of the common soldiers as well as Cossacks have been used against the revolutionists, yet even when both are classed together only a few hundreds out of the army of nearly two million have been killed or injured, for the revolutionists hope to ultimately win over most of the soldiers and even a considerable part of the Cossacks. Unfortunately, a good many private citizens have also been killed or wounded for political causes by peasants or workingmen, but the total out of Russia's millions is only a few hundred; not at all a serious matter in these times of tremendous losses of life.

Moreover, it is only in a very few parts of the country that these acts of violence have gone to a bitter extreme. In

Sebastopol and Kronstadt, two small towns of a half a hundred thousand people, over a hundred officials have been killed or wounded as the result of the repeated mutinies of soldiers and sailors engaged in a desperate war with the authorities. In the Caucasus, also in Tiflis and Baku, hundreds of these attacks on officials have taken place and the ordinary life of the community has certainly been forced into an entirely new course. The same is true of all the chief cities of Poland. Outside of these districts there have been massacres, mutinies, and other serious forms of revolutionary disturbances, but the attacks on officials have never reached such an acute stage as to mean anything in the daily life of the ordinary citizen.

This method of warfare is pretty well under the control of its principal advocates, the Socialist Revolutionary Party. During the first Duma the party ordered that the executions should cease, and they fell to less than one half of what they were before, such attacks as were made being those of half-organised groups or individuals on the police.

Recognising the inevitability of this form of self-defence on the part of the population, neither of the first two Dumas were willing to condemn it, without attacking in the same breath the Government also. The representatives of the people in both bodies, the deputies of 95 per cent. of the Russian population, the peasants and workingmen, were unwilling even to characterise with similar expressions the violence of the Government and that of the popular revolutionary organisations, for the latter they recognise as a legitimate means of replying to the warfare of a government. Even the moderates, in condemning violence on both sides, put the chief blame on the Government; assuming that this violence will and must continue until liberty is granted to the people, they do not defend it, but accept it, once and for all, as the inevitable result of the Government's own action, and hope that one day the Czar, realising his inability to restore order, will turn over his power into their hands.

Those of the popular parties which do not themselves take part in the practice of these executions, defend them. Alexinsky, the Social Democratic leader in the second Duma, proclaimed that these executions were as legitimate a weapon of

warfare as the courts-martial of the Government. "The State," he said, "is a gallows State, a nagaika State, a State of murder." Even the leaders of the more moderate faction of this party have confessed to me in private conversation that they recognise the utility of popular executions and wish to see them increased, desiring especially at the present time the execution of Stolypine, a strong and brutal servant the Czar would find it very difficult to replace.

The first of the present series of great executions was not accomplished by a member of any party. The Minister of the Interior, Sipiaguine, was shot by Balmachov in April, 1902. "My only accomplice in this act," said the popular executioner, before paying its penalty, "was the Russian Government; I was always against terrorism and violence, I was in favour of law and the constitution; it was the Russian ministers who converted me to the belief that there is no order and law in Russia, but instead only unpunished lawlessness and violence that can be resisted only by force."

The Social Revolutionary Party has been responsible for all the important later deeds. Since it has undertaken to organise this kind of warfare, it is natural that individuals who have decided that the nation has had enough of some particular oppressor, should join their forces with this organisation for the purpose of carrying out their proposed act. One-quarter of the persons executed by the Government in the first year of the courts-martial were members of this party. Already over a year ago (April, 1907) the party had lost fifteen thousand of its members, more than one-quarter of its total membership, by imprisonment, or exile in Siberia or in the mines; there can be little question that at least one-half of this organisation has been now captured by the enemy. But the party is by no means destroyed; the fighting spirit of the remaining members is rather intensified, and new recruits supply the empty places in the ranks. Each martyrdom brings in numerous new persons. If we can judge by the case of the revolutionists released from imprisonment or exile of fifteen or twenty years by the amnesty of the Government in 1905, we can be assured that as often as those now imprisoned or exiled are released or make escape, they also will rejoin the

movement. All the world knows of the cases of exiles, both men and women, some of them in the later years of life, and of prisoners who have been locked up in the fortresses ever since the former revolutionary movement in the eighties, who on their escape or release have plunged at once into the war of the new generation.

But the warfare is fast moving out of this stage; the revolutionists are now planning not isolated acts of "popular defence," but to teach the whole nation how to wage aggressive war against the Government. For this purpose the party is trying to draw into its camp all persons of whatever nationality or social class who are ready to give up their lives to overthrow the Czarism, and it has considered every possible plan for accomplishing its purpose. At present it is dividing its energies between plans for a general military and popular insurrection and its efforts to teach the people how to wage a guerilla war on the Government, which might, in the course of a few years, lead up to this national revolutionary movement. A relatively small portion of its energies now goes to the execution of officials, and the day is certainly drawing near when these executions will be almost entirely abandoned. At a period when the masses of the people had already reached a revolutionary attitude, but did not yet know how to fight against the Government, the party members considered it necessary to give up their lives in exchange for those of the most brutal of the oppressors. Now that the masses are being drawn into the warfare, a growing part of the membership considers it not only a possibility, but also a democratic duty, to leave the fighting largely in the hands of the masses themselves. Recognising this first principle of a democratic revolutionism, the party is on the verge of a very fundamental change. From the beginning its principles have been those of a revolutionary democracy. It proposed to use violence only for the purpose of establishing democracy, the rule of the people, and not for any other element of its programme.

It was in accordance with the previous interpretation of its duties that it should act for, rather than through, the people, that the party had decided in favour of the popular executions carried out by the party and against the growing violence of

the peasants themselves. It boasted that in the early peasant disturbances managed by the party in Poltava and Kharkov in 1905, that there was not a single murder in more than twenty provinces. But as we have shown, the peasants are being treated in a manner which does not allow them to refrain from waging war on their oppressors. The party, fearing that this independent warfare of the peasantry might develop to excess, has passed repeated resolutions against it, but the young leaders are all now seeing that these spontaneous conflicts cannot be restrained much longer. Already the party is trying to afford an outlet for the peasants' martial instincts in organising guerilla bands in each village and finding a proper work for them to do. It recommends that only officials be attacked, and among these only the most cruel. It allows landlords to be assaulted only when they have taken an active part in the anti-popular violence, in the Government expeditions of murder and revenge; but as the cases of such landlords are very many, the peasants will have enough to do without infringing the party's principles. One step further and the principal revolutionary party will have placed its full reliance on the capacity of the people to wage their own war of liberation, attempting only to organise it, to give it a national character and to bring it to the earliest possible conclusion.

This guerilla war does not any longer require preparatory organising. . In a half dozen parts of the country it has already been developed into a very high state — in the Baltic Provinces, in the Caucasus, in Siberia, and in the Ural Mountains. Although the insurrectionary disturbances and mutinies in the centre of Russia have ceased for more than a year, Cossack armies have not even yet succeeded in stamping out these various guerilla movements. A few months ago a whole company of soldiers who had deserted were still to be seen in the neighbourhood of Briansk in the heart of Russia. During a mutiny last year in Kiev this company had escaped to the woods and none were captured for months, until about them a sort of legend grew up in the neighbourhood and the peasant population ascribed to "the hundred" almost fabulous achievements. A band of half a hundred men were able to elude capture for many months in the Ural Mountains and to make innumerable suc-

cessful attacks on Government property and Government officials; always polite to the population and regardful of private property, they became exceedingly popular. It was only in January, 1908, that the leader Lvov, who had by this time become nothing less than a popular hero for hundreds of miles around, was captured. All these incidents are of the keenest interest to all the peasantry and must have given every possible encouragement to those among them that have decided to devote themselves to guerilla war.

CHAPTER IV

PLANNING THE WAR

THE goal of all revolutionary striving is the army. No revolutionary movement can hope to accomplish anything of lasting value until the larger part of the Czar's army is turned against him. The revolutionary parties have assigned thousands of their members to the work of agitation among the troops; many of these are executed, imprisoned or exiled every month, but the ranks are continually filled and the agitation goes on almost undiminished. All the parties have very numerous organisations among the troops of all the garrisons and all branches of the service. It is only the Socialist Revolutionary party, however, that has made any progress in the organisation of the officers. Before his recent arrest, Tchailovsky assured me that there were no less than four hundred or five hundred members of the revolutionary Officers' Union.

Before the nation can make use of the army for its own purposes there are three great difficulties to be overcome: first, the number of officers ready to give up their lives for the cause has to be greatly increased; second, further inroads have to be made into the loyalty of the troops, of which a very considerable portion is still faithful to the Czar; third, the soldiers who are already converted to the revolutionary cause have to be taught not only to refuse to shoot at the people, but to make war on such regiments as remain stubbornly loyal.

I shall show that none of these obstacles are insuperable. Every year sees more and more officers of the highest rank and greatest capacity becoming bitterly discontented with the existing conditions in the army; loyal regiments, even among the Cossacks and Guards, have only a year ago gone over to the revolutionary movement; and the common soldiers of several fortresses have shown that, being unwilling to wait for the word of command, they were even too ready to die for the cause.

Intelligent and progressive officers, even those whose chief interest is in arms and war, are on the very verge of deserting the Government, not only on account of its ruin of the nation and of the people at large, but especially because of its misuse of the army, of the waging of unjust and senseless wars and the humiliation of both officers and soldiers through crushing and unnecessary defeat.

I talked with an officer of the Guards who was at the same time a member of the most extreme revolutionary organisation. It was difficult to meet him without danger to himself, but by taking great precautions I was able to discuss at considerable length the revolutionary situation in the Guards' regiments. He acknowledged that at the time of our conversation there were no other revolutionary officers among the Guards, but he said this was because it was assumed at that time, a few months after the October Manifesto, that certain constitutional guarantees were in existence. He said that before the Manifesto there were scores of officers organised and ready to aid in overthrowing the Government, and he predicted that this would soon be the case again when it was seen that the constitutional promises were without value. Now that the whole nation is disillusioned on this score, this time has probably arrived.


I met other officers of various grades, including four generals of the highest rank. All acknowledged that the warfare of the Government against the people was injurious to the army — even the Minister of War, it will be remembered, confessed as much before the whole Duma. General Subbotitch went further. He is the most important military figure that has joined, not the revolutionists, but the most extreme opposition party. He was the chief figure in the very large group of officers that supported for several months a remarkable army daily, the *Soldiers' Voice*. Day after day for several months this organ appeared with the most fundamental and bitter criticisms of the Government's conduct of army affairs. The facts it exposed could hardly be more injurious to the credit of the Czarism than those recently laid before the whole world by the famous trial of the generals who conducted the Japanese war. But the matter was of a different character. It dealt with the use of the army in the suppression of the revolutionary disturbances

and the resulting disorganisation, and with internal politics in general; no day passed when some of its declarations would not have satisfied the most active revolutionist.

The chief position of this journal, so popular among the Russian officers, was that the army ought to remain neutral in the internal politics of the country. This is as much as to say that such disturbances as could not be suppressed by the police must be treated as insuppressable. It would follow, of course, that the Government would have to make terms with the revolutionists. General Subbotitch, having since been dismissed from the army for conducting his governorship of Turkestan according to these neutral ideas, has come out openly against the Government, demanding a constitution. In a long attack on the whole policy of the Czar at the present moment he says frankly that the internal warfare being waged by the Government against the people must necessarily lead to the demoralisation and embitterment of the army and the destruction of military discipline. He accuses the Government of unrestrained violence, of allowing the people to starve and of driving them to rage and exasperation.

The Government realises the seriousness of the army situation. As a first measure of protection it is proposed to raise the army's pay. But while the common soldiers have been given an extra twenty kopecks (ten cents) a month, a little tea and sugar, soap and towels, and an extra shirt each year, the Cossacks have been granted enormous subsidies and special pay for every day of service against "the internal enemy." They are now clamouring for a gift of horses from the Government and for a shortened service. To make up for their relatively shabby financial treatment, such common soldiers as have served the Government faithfully against the revolutionists are being rewarded with the decoration of St. Anne, with the decoration of St. George with the words "for courage," or with a plain medal with the words "for zeal." We doubt if the common soldier enlightened by the revolutionary agitation will take such trinkets as compensation for shooting down his relatives—especially in view of the handsome treatment of the Cossack regiments.

But the lion's share of the new Government's expenditures



SOME OF THE MEN WHO HAVE HELPED ORGANISE THE SOCIALIST
REVOLUTIONARY PARTY AMONG PEASANTS

On floor, right, Stepniak; left, Tchaikovsky. Seated, right, Volkovsky; left,
Chisko



THE TWO TYPES OF VILLAGE PRIESTS

The left is reactionary—part of the police system of the Government. The right is liberal, and is beloved by his people

will go to the commissioned and non-commissioned officers. It is especially by high pay and pensions that the war ministry has hoped to secure a permanent army of 100,000 non-commissioned officers, who would make a life work of executing the Government's orders without question. The increase of pay demanded by the commissioned officers is so large that the Government has not dared yet to put it into execution, but the bill will unquestionably be passed by the present Duma and become a law, January 1, 1909.

As the money for all of these expenditures, so wasteful for starving Russia, must come from Germany or France, it will be difficult for the Government to make it out that this extravagance is of a patriotic character, to develop an army to be used against foreign foes. It will be easy for the revolutionists to convince the peasant soldiers that not only are they getting too little of these immense sums but that the whole plan is only to secure an army for the further oppression of the Russian people.

The *Soldiers' Voice* confessed repeatedly the growing bitterness between soldiers and officers. One article warned the military authorities against converting the barracks into prisons. "Every movement of the soldier," it stated, "is controlled; visits of acquaintances or friends are strictly forbidden; the soldiers have been forbidden to walk in the streets, to talk in a crowd, to read newspapers or books. Even their letters are submitted to the officers' censorship." The paper quoted a soldier's letter with approval, in which the writer accused the officers of humiliating the soldier at every opportunity and displaying a malice that awoke in the soldier's heart the profoundest hatred.

The most significant of all the military revolts was that of the Preobrajenski Guards. The famous Guards mutinied almost to the last man, demanding first of all to be better treated by their superiors, to be relieved of police duties, to be granted the free right to come and go from the barracks and to have their private correspondence respected. Two others of the demands of this crack regiment were of the most revolutionary character: that the duty of saluting officers excepting commanders of battalions should be abolished, and that political opinions should be free in the regiment and that no one should be

punished for his convictions. Under existing conditions this latter reform would rapidly lead to the same demand for neutrality on the part of the soldiers as is now put forward by the more progressive officers. The result would be that the Government would soon find itself in a helpless condition and that the army, appealed to both by the revolutionists and the Government, would take necessarily a constitutional and popular standpoint. It is impossible that this, the chief demand of the Russian soldiers, should be granted by the military authorities. It is impossible, on the other hand, that the clamour for the elementary liberties of the individual should not continue to grow in the army as everywhere else.

Fortunately for Russia, the conditions of the army have not reached such a point that the army has been roused to carry out a purely military revolt and so gotten into its hands the destinies of the nation. But I think I have shown that the discontent has come at least to this, that the army could not be relied on to take a stand against any very widespread revolutionary movement, and that it would only be a matter of a relatively short time when the army would go over to the people's side. The revolutionary leaders do not expect more. Whether army officers themselves or leaders of the peasants, they are of the same opinion — that the future revolt must begin among the peasantry and that it must rely on the army only for assistance and not for carrying on the principal work of revolution. The reason for this, as stated by the Officers' Union, is that no one questions that a considerable part of the Cossacks, police, gendarmes, and non-commissioned officers, will remain loyal, amply satisfied with the large financial reward the Government is able to lavish upon them owing to the generosity of the capitalists of foreign countries who are so freely supplying it with the means. Against such mercenaries the revolutionists are prepared ultimately to wage a relentless war.

The mass of the peasants take the same keen interest in the army as do the most enlightened and educated of the revolutionary army officers. Journeying among them in the late summer of 1907, I found that they were everywhere expecting that the new recruits, sworn in the last two years and to be

enlisted in the two years to come, would prove loyal, not to the Czar, but to the people. Many villages are making the recruits take an oath to the nation against the Czar, and everywhere I found the people looking forward to war. "What kind of a war?" I asked. They answered, "A war for the land; a people's war in which the soldiers will not fight against the peasantry as before." This people's war, the peasants understand as well as do the revolutionary organisations, must be begun by themselves, and they seem to be very nearly in a proper mood for this.

In the last village I visited, in September, I was photographing the poor little houses when some women came along and asked what I was doing. On explaining that I was going to use the picture to describe the village to foreigners, they shouted out in a tone of bitter irony: "If you go back to St. Petersburg, show your pictures to the White Czar and let him see how we live — like dogs." They said that they knew the Czar did not care how they lived, but that he cared precious well for the landlords. A few minutes later a passing peasant, noticing what I was doing, said: "See what the Czar has brought us to! He helps the landlords when they are in trouble, gives them jobs in the army and the Government. For us he does nothing. The Czar is responsible for all this; he did away with the Duma and the liberty he had granted us." One peasant, when told of the dissolution of the second Duma and the creation of a landlords' Duma, cried out before the whole crowd: "What a crook!" What is interesting in these expressions is not that they were new, but that they were said openly before perfect strangers. Certainly the peasants have got a long way from the old belief in the "God-given powers of the Czar"; certainly they are not troubled with any feeling of loyalty or duty toward his Government.

The peasants on the whole seemed to prefer the Socialist Revolutionary Party at the present moment to all other revolutionary organisations. They are all friendly disposed toward the Peasants' Union and the Labour Group, but the former is mainly an economic and the latter mainly a political organisation, whereas the Socialist Revolutionaries have given more study to the question of how to organise the peasants' war

and to make a successful revolution than all the other parties combined. In nearly every one of the six hundred districts of Russia, they have their members, or their committees, and in tens of thousands of villages they have little groups of adherents. I have shown how they are urging the full exercises of its great powers by the village assembly, the formation of co-operative societies and the organisation of strikes and boycotts; besides, along with the Peasants' Union, they are trying to get the peasants to boycott the Government saloons, the source of half of its net income. Long before the beginning of the present hypocritical movement among the reactionaries against the drink evil, the revolutionists had declared total prohibition, aiming to save the peasants morally and to ruin the Government financially at a single stroke.

Not only do the enlightened revolutionists consider every form of organisation as of utility for the terrible future conflicts, not only do they feel that good revolutionary fighters must be sober and moral in their habits and submissive to the will of the community, but they feel, above all, the need of greater intelligence. Already a large part of the literature read by the peasants comes from the secret presses of this revolutionary organisation. Since the Government forbids to the peasants all but the most antiquated and stilted reading, denying them nine-tenths even of the literature that is allowed to the city people (we have seen that in the cities many purely scientific and literary works are forbidden, to say nothing of histories), the revolutionists have supplied the lack with popular science, history, and literature from their own standpoint. Chisko's "History of Russia" has been circulated to the extent of half a million copies, which means that nearly every village in Russia is supplied with this well written and extremely revolutionary book that sums up the whole history of the ruthless and brutal oppression of the Russian peasants. As Chisko is at the same time the chief theoretical writer of the party, we can see what an influence the party has gained over the population by this book alone. Besides, there are hundreds of other brochures and newspapers of the greatest popularity.

Thus far it has seemed that the Government has been succeeding gradually in suppressing the peasant disorders, but

two or three illustrations will show how ineradicable the revolutionary movement has become, and how near the Government is to the limit of its power for checking the movement's growth. So frequent have attacks on and executions of officials become that a very large part of the village population is already more or less involved and it is becoming nearly impossible to find the culprits. In a recent investigation of a killing of a political order, the guilty party was found to be on the investigating jury. When one of the most cruel of the German barons of the Baltic Provinces, Budberg, was killed on the way from his estate, there was no way of finding any trace of the one who had done the killing, and the helpless Government, feeling that it had to do something if such acts were not to be encouraged by such examples, laid a heavy fine on the two villages between which the killing had occurred. As the fines were not paid troops were sent to seize the peasants' property. By this act the Government turned all the moderate persons in the village, of whom there were doubtless still a few, into bitter revolutionists.

Another example of how the Government is reaching the limit of its powers is found in the rural guards, recently drawn from the ranks of the people and still in many cases very near to them in their sentiments. It is upon this newly created army that the Government must rely to keep order in the countryside. I found recently, for instance, that the brother of one of these guards kept the supply of revolutionary literature in the village. In many cases the guards have refused to act against rebellious villagers, finding them "in the right." When a village is not able to win the friendship of the rural guards, it is often able to frighten them into powerlessness. It finds out from what village the guard comes and has action taken by this village against the guard's interests. If this measure does not succeed the guards are often attacked by superior numbers and disarmed. In one case the peasantry were able to get the better of sixty of them and seized nearly two hundred rifles and three hundred pounds of cartridges. Another measure is for the villagers to boycott those who take in the rural guards for the night, and even to burn down the houses of the villagers who show the enemy any friendship.

Certainly it seems that it will be difficult for the Government to increase very largely this new army corps, without still further increasing at the same time the number of its members who are revolutionists at heart.

The guerilla war has an immediate object, to drive the hated landlords and officials from the countryside. I have already pointed out that the peasants have achieved some success in this direction. Formerly it was required that the land officials should be noblemen; the Government has found so much difficulty in getting anyone to accept this dangerous position, that it has been forced to abolish the rule, and even then the vacancies, in spite of the enormous power of the office, are frequently unfilled.

The goal of the new revolutionary movement is agreed upon both by the peasants and the revolutionary parties. The parties are making considerable headway toward organising the people for the struggle to reach this goal, and it is even clear that the leaders needed for such a movement will not be lacking. One of the most popular revolutionists among the peasants, a man perhaps who has longest advocated the new movement and is at the same time the most mature of its leaders, Prince Hilkhov, feels that the time is very near when it is only a question of securing the right leaders to launch the movement. He does not think it likely that the movement will begin in an entirely intelligent and revolutionary manner; he believes that it is likely to be directed rather against the landlords than against the Czar, in spite of the efforts of the revolutionists and of the disillusionment of a large part of the people with regard to the Emperor. He feels that another Father Gapon, trusted by the peasants as was Father Gapon, whether he deserved it or not, by the workingmen, will some day lead millions to a half-blind but irresistible revolt; and that when such a movement is once started, it will soon pass into the hands of the revolutionists and remain there, as happened with the Gapon movement.

The most important psychological element in the coming conflict Prince Hilkhov considers to be the people's militant religious instincts. A few years ago the Baptist peasants of his village, persecuted to despair by the Government, burned

the orthodox church; every time two or three met together to read the Bible they had been fined fifty rubles as a penalty. These peasants, who have gone freely to prison and exile for their beliefs, have now been reading the revolutionary literature; without losing any interest in the Bible, they have laid it temporarily aside, trying to inform themselves from political literature of the day — and now their indomitable spirit is turning into politics and Socialism. So strong is the tendency for them to throw their religious enthusiasm into revolution, that the police have vainly urged them to renew their former narrower religious activities. Such of them as have been arrested for their political ideas and held in prison for several months, have listened to the orators there and returned bringing back an intensified political enthusiasm.

This idealism and enthusiasm, Prince Hilkhov thinks, can be organised by some popular leader, who will then have an unconquerable army to lead against the enemy. So sympathetic is Hilkhov's grasp of this religious instinct and so fervid is his revolutionary spirit that one cannot help supposing that he himself might prove to be such a leader, or at least a power behind the leader, of such a movement.

CHAPTER V

HOW THE PRIESTS ARE BECOMING REVOLUTIONISTS

I HAVE been speaking at such length of the economic problems that underlie every great social movement, and have given so much attention to the political struggle in which the economic conflict expresses itself, that I have spoken little of the quite independent spiritual revolution which may in the end have as great an influence in reshaping the destinies of Russia's one hundred and forty millions as the political and economic revolution itself.

I do not speak of the spiritual regeneration of Russia as a thing apart. If the Czarism had not grown so infamous as to destroy all the illusions of trusting religious natures in the possibility of benevolent despotism whether in State or Church, if the peasantry had not evolved out of the most elementary human instincts a fundamental reaction against every form of oppression, if modern capitalism had not invaded Russia with its creation of new industries and new social classes, if modern science and modern ideas had not taken possession of all of Russia's intelligent classes, if the Duma had not created a centre to bring all these democratic tendencies together — then the spiritual and religious revolution could never have taken a general and national form. It would necessarily have been expressed, as for generations past, in the personal revolts of unconquerable individuals or in the localised, poorly organised and by no means entirely enlightened religious rebellion of Russia's numerous and highly interesting religious sects.

All elements of the people recognise that something of the greatest import is going on in Russia's religious thought. It is unnecessary to show how general this recognition is since the Government itself has proposed extraordinary measures to put it to an end. The first of such measures was the proposal

to grant what the Government was pleased to call "religious freedom"; the second, equally significant, is the calling of the first general congress of the Russian Church. It is hardly necessary to say that neither have the foreign religionists in Russia — Catholics, Mohammedans, Lutherans, or Jews, or the Russian sects, or the half-orthodox "old believers" — been in the least deluded by the Government's promises; nor have the ordinary members of the Orthodox Church, the liberal element among the democratic village priests, or those national leaders clamouring for church reform who have developed during the recent emancipation movement, put any hope whatever in the promised congress. The grounds for all these suspicions are very obvious

The Holy Synod, which now has the active backing not only of the Government but of at least one-third of the artificially elected reactionary Duma and the passive support of perhaps two-thirds of that body, has already set its "interpretation" on the new "religious freedom." Indicative of the general position taken is its demand that no new religions or religious sects shall be allowed "except if subordinated as before under the supreme spiritual authorities." The Synod has also practically decided to ask for the maintenance of all the principal elements of its control over religions and sects already "tolerated." It holds it for "its holy duty to insist that all the privileges of the Orthodox Church hitherto existing in Russia shall be reserved to it unchanged in the future, and that the right of the free propaganda of religious teachings shall belong alone to the Orthodox Church, while all other religious confessions shall be allowed to take into their faiths only such persons as come over to them of their own free impulsion." We might consider this reactionary proposal as merely a very despotic measure of defence. Other parts of the Synod's "reforms," although in the same defensive guise, are really almost savagely militant, reminding one of the persecutions and even tortures in force recently under the Pobiedonostzev régime. The Synod finds it necessary "in order to protect the dignity of the Orthodox Church and its servants against attacks, that all insults and expressed contempt of its laws shall be severely punished whether they take place in ordinary private conversation or in the press.

or in representations on the stage" — a sort of a law of *lèse majesté* of the church, going as far certainly as any of the outrages of the past.

Recently the convention of a certain society, not of the non-orthodox but of the half-orthodox "old believers," ordinarily most loyal to the Czar, was forbidden in Moscow although it had held its sessions free and unhindered even under the rule of Minister von Plehve, supposedly the most oppressive that Russia has ever endured; while a priest of this creed that counts perhaps fifteen million believers in Russia was punished "because he had had friendly intercourse with the members of the village and had been able to convert the orthodox to the 'old believers' church."

Known to the whole nation and even more outrageous has been the attempt of the State to coerce the priests and members of the Orthodox Church politically. In the last elections in the province of Tver, for instance, the bishop required twenty priests that had been chosen as electors by the people to meet in his house and to take no part in electoral assemblies. He threatened that he would deprive them of their positions and also punish them in other ways if they did not vote for the extreme reactionary parties. Everywhere the priests were instructed by their superiors to preach from the pulpit that the people must not elect to the Duma "enemies of the sacred Faith and the Throne." In Voronege the Church functionary, Anastasius, thundered against "intellectual rebels." In Bolkhov the head priest urged his flock to choose unlearned men and true Russians, suggesting by the latter phrase members of the massacre organisations.

Where the priests did not wish to obey the ecclesiastical authorities they were persecuted and dismissed by the whole-sale. A priest of the town of Salucce in the Government of Tchernigov, asked by his parishioners if there was any need of beating the Jews as some of the officials were instructing them to do, replied, "You must not listen if anyone advises you to do such a thing, even if the person that does it wears a uniform of the police. The Jew is useful to us; besides he must be pitied and not struck; he works for his family and, nevertheless, remains very poor; he has not enough to eat." A few days afterward the parishioners were surprised to learn that their priest had

been thrown into prison. Aroused by this news they made a collection and sent a telegram to Count Witte. Thirteen days afterward the priest was released, but on the order of the bishop he was excommunicated and deprived of his robes. Accompanied by an escort of Cossacks to protect themselves from the enraged populace, who knew how to appreciate this kind of priest, the clergy came to the village to make an inquiry and found nothing against him; but the order remained in force and the priest had to go to a hospital and leave his family without food or shelter.

So much for the "religious freedom" and the political freedom of the priest, matters of general interest to the whole population. The proposed Church Council is, on the other hand, so much a Church affair that it is best understood and must necessarily be exposed largely by the lower clergy themselves, without much assistance from the general public which during the centuries of the State Church has lost all interest and hope of participation in its administration. The village or white clergy, so called to distinguish them from the black clergy or monks that furnish the higher ecclesiastical authorities, is almost unanimously opposed to the new Church Council — because they know it is a fraud, but equally because they are to be given no voice whatever in its deliberations, although they are the only ones who could by any chance bring a new life and popularity to the Church. At a recent meeting of seventy-nine priests from all parts of the country, it was decided unanimously not to take part in this Council, even as guests, the humiliating position allotted to the white clergy. At the same time it was demanded that not only the white clergy, but also the people themselves, should be allowed active participation in the Council.

The white clergy's position, then, toward the official religious reforms, as well as that of the believers and clergy of all other sects and creeds, is wholly opposed to that of the Government. I except, of course, the very numerous cases of neutral and timid individuals who do not express any opinion on any subject. At the time of the October Manifesto a part of the white clergy explained it sympathetically to the people. They were soon seized and cast into prison, so that in many parishes no one was left to perform the religious ceremonies. In many

sections there were meetings of priests that decided it was high time the clergy should declare themselves in relation to the emancipation movement, and national organisations like the "League of Workers for Church Reform" were established. Moreover, congresses have been held of the various sects hoping to find some common basis for a sort of general Protestant Church. There was much agreement on many questions, and it was only a rather serious contention on infants' baptism that prevented some kind of a union.

Most significant of the spirit of rebellion has been the participation of the priests in the Duma. At last, in the third Duma, by the combined action of a Chinese election law, barbarous police threats, and the official Church, the Czar has secured a solid delegation of some forty more or less reactionary priests. In the first Duma, elected by the people, there were several radicals, while in the second half of the dozen priests elected were distinctly revolutionary. The Government has prosecuted six of them because of their political attitude and convicted five. The most revolutionary was the priest Brilliantov; he was accused with four others of having absented himself from the Duma when a resolution condemning political assassinations was being voted upon. When asked for an explanation of his action, he refused to give it or to leave the Social Revolutionary Party, of which he was, and still is, a member. Three others of the priests, Tichvinski, Archipov, and Kolokolnikov, were members of the Labour Group, and this membership was the accusation against them on the part of the Church, which rightly called the Labour Group a revolutionary organisation. On technical grounds the priests denied this latter accusation, but they did not deny their political tenets in general and they were all unfrocked.

Tichvinski, the most important of the three, wrote a well known letter to Metropolitan Antonius, explaining his political views.

I, a former reactionary and narrow-hearted conservative, have revised my views in the course of four years under the influence of the needs and sufferings of the people, who have placed their conditions before the priests; and I have put myself on the side of the interests of the people and of a legal state. Now according to the order of the Synod of

12th May, in the course of three days I must turn over to the opposite side "according to my conscience," change my convictions and join the reactionary monarchists or the independent reactionaries. We are not only asked formally to leave our party but according to conscience to change our convictions. I declare that I cannot change my convictions. My political opinions, all my economic views, my Christian orthodox standpoint, my activity in the past, are known to you. I stand disclosed before you and I have talked nothing secretly. These my convictions, my life, my activity and the conduct of my office, are known to the people who honour me with their confidence through my election to the Duma. How can I change my convictions without becoming a traitor to the people? Such a day would be the disgrace of my life.

The persecutions of these priests only began with their ecclesiastical punishment. They have been hounded from one end of the Empire to the other, exiled from this place to that and always prevented from undertaking any kind of fruitful work. Two who tried to study at universities were driven hither and thither. The outright revolutionist Brilliantov wrote a letter to the Social Democrats in the third Duma in which he describes his sufferings. Studying in the University of Tomsk, he was arrested and banished from Tomsk and forbidden to live in Moscow, anywhere near the Siberian railroad, in the towns of the Caucasus, and so on and so on. He chose Ufa as his dwelling place and was sent there on foot, but when he arrived he was put not in freedom but in solitary confinement. He complained bitterly over his treatment. He wrote, "On what grounds I came into solitary confinement I do not know. I know only that this little room only four feet long, the lack of walks, the perpetual half darkness of the room, have finally undermined my shattered health."

The Government did not suppress the revolutionary feeling among the priests by these persecutions. Especially noteworthy had been the continued denunciation of two very well known priests, both of high rank and national reputation, Father Petrov and the Archmandrite Michael. The latter kept up a continual series of brilliant letters to the radical press even after he was banished to a monastery on a dreary island of Lake Ladoga. Finally, he found a way out of his difficulties by voluntarily quitting the Church and joining the "old believers." Indeed, it was told me by Father Petrov that this was the

most practicable step for all the radical priests and would perhaps lead to a very important tendency in the revolutionary movement. The "old believers" are so Russian and so numerous that State policy requires that they be granted certain moderate rights. If the radical priests go over in considerable numbers to this church, an educated leadership now waiting will be supplied, and a new and powerful revolutionary force created. Archmandrite Michael denounced the proposed Church Council as a fraud before he quit the fold and fearlessly demanded a review of the judgments passed against the revolutionary priests of the first and second Dumas. He questioned whether the people of the Church had accepted their dismissal. So radical were his opinions that the papers in which they were printed were confiscated by the Government. But Michael could not be gagged.

The most striking clerical figure that has been developed so far in the course of the recent movement is Father Petrov, a figure of such importance that he promises not only to urge forward the coming religious transformation but also to furnish a very important leader for the revolutionary movement at large, since his political capacity and his power as a popular writer are as great as his influence as a preacher and writer of religious tracts. In fact, Father Petrov is a movement in himself. The author of a hundred religious, moral, political, and social pamphlets, with a combined circulation of more than ten million copies, he is master of a style so popular that it is said that the peasants read him with greater pleasure than they do Tolstoi. At the same time he has been the editor of the most popular newspaper that ever circulated among the Russian peasantry, and his name is perhaps as well known to the people of all the country as that of any living man.

Most interesting in the personal life of Father Petrov is the fact that he has been in contact with the whole of the Russian people from the peasantry to the court. For years the tutor of the families of two of the Grand Dukes, it is said, on the highest authority, that he was selected to become the future tutor of the Czarevitch, the heir to the throne. The present Queen of Greece, by birth a member of Russia's royal family, was such an admirer of his that she alone has circulated, it is

estimated, a million of his pamphlets. When I add to this that Petrov was elected to the second Duma from St. Petersburg as one of the small number of deputies elected by the capital, not as the member of any of the influential parties but as that very rare thing in the Dumas, an independent, we begin to realise the importance of the rôle he has played.

Not a pope's son, like most of the priests, he chose the clergy freely as his profession, having an ambition to fill the rôle of a regenerator of the true religious instincts of the people. Brought up in his father's grocery store in a village near St. Petersburg, he had every opportunity of observing the common people. Like Gorky, he became especially fond of tramps and outcasts. Feeling at the same time their misery and their humanity, he both loved them and thought that he was sent by God to deliver them from their suffering. When he taught later in an aristocratic school he saw, he assured me, that these tramps were better people than the highest aristocrats in the country.

A certain ecclesiastical law allows the students of the theological seminaries to preach. Taking advantage of this law Petrov often returned to his village to deliver impromptu sermons and was delighted to find that he was always able to interest his audience. In this very early period of his life he had already conceived the idea which it seems to me is his contribution to the present movement. He expressed it to me in these words: "Even Kant can be understood by the people." This assumption, though similar to Tolstoi's, is exactly the opposite to that of all the Socialist parties. Conceiving as they do the economic and political principles of the emancipation movement from a scientific standpoint, they are unable to bring them into popular language and very seldom succeed in clothing them in flesh and blood. Among such doctrinaires the opposite belief of Petrov has given him a tremendous importance. Almost alone among the important leaders he believes that the people understand all clear language and clear ideas even better than do the educated class.

In the theological seminary he was intelligent enough to be bitterly disappointed. Imagining in his simplicity that all mysteries would be explained to him there, he rather found that

in proportion as one immersed one's self in the theological studies, one was buried alive. However, students of the theological seminaries are no exception to the general rule for Russian students. Even they are imbued with the current revolutionary and Socialist ideas and know what independent thinking means. So far has this gone that recently nearly all the theological students of a certain province, after graduation, refused to go into the ministry and the whole province is short of preachers. Father Petrov then was able without much difficulty to form a small group of students to read history, literature and philosophy, and it was in this group, he told me, that he got an entirely different and broader conception of life. Among the influences that he fell under at this time he places second to none Ruskin and Carlyle. He was especially impressed with a story of Ruskin's who, seeing an announcement that prayer was to be said to God in a certain church between nine and eleven, asked "to whom do you pray before nine?" This expresses Petrov's fundamental religious feeling that all life should be prayer and that mere words were useless.

After graduation from the seminary Father Petrov went to preach in the slaughter-houses near St. Petersburg, where for six years he delivered eight to ten lectures a week, attaining a tremendous popularity among the peasants and working people. It was through the common people indeed that he was introduced to the upper classes. A servant in the family of the Grand Duke Paul heard of him and begged his master to have him give a private sermon. This was arranged and he was taken into the family of the Grand Dukes Paul and Constantine as teacher of their children. He lectured everywhere among fashionable schools and organisations, in the pages corps, in the Guards, and so on. He says he might have filled sixty hours a day.

Before he accepted this opportunity to work among the court circles, as a profound democrat he hesitated. It was only after long arguments that his comrades persuaded him to accept, since the fate of Russia was entirely in the hands of these people. But he soon found that he had made a mistake. "While the common people want light like grass wants the sun," he said, "the nobility are a separate race entirely; they cannot understand the wants of the people. They read willingly what I



Photograph by Gulla, St. Petersburg

TWO REVOLUTIONARY PRIESTS

Left, Father Petrov, the most famous churchman of Russia, former pastor to a grand duke; right, Father Kolokolnikov





TWO TYPES OF PRIESTS, BOTH DUMA MEMBERS



Bishop Eulogius, left, is an extreme reactionary; Father Tichninsky, right, is liberal and is being persecuted by the Government

wrote, but they admired only the figures of speech and phrases, in the same way as they would a pretty landscape painting or society poem. The children of the grand dukes and nobility cannot understand; they are taught from the first that they are superhuman and different from other people. One girl exclaimed to me once, 'How difficult it is to be human in the Court!' She had a true human instinct, but the teachers do not appeal to and awaken such higher instincts, but only the lower."

Father Petrov learned very much in the court. He met not only Russian but also foreign aristocrats. He found that everywhere the aristocracy feel that the people must be thankful to them, that Russia or any other country in their power is merely a private estate, that the masses should be glad to pick up what falls from their table, that the people owe everything to the aristocracy and the aristocracy nothing to the people. In 1904 he met the Grand Duke Sergius whom he found had read his book, "The Evangel as the Basis of Life." The murderous grand duke remarked: "You reformers are all dreamers; the people are all beasts; they only understand what is taught them with the fist and the 'nagaika.'" Petrov answered: "You said that to the Japanese and they replied with a still heavier fist. That is what the people will do to you."

Father Petrov withdrew from the court circles, but at the time of the October Manifesto was still professor in the theological and military academies. He soon saw it was impossible to continue even in this work. He thinks that the gulf is so wide between the people and the ruling class that it is impossible to stand with one foot on either side, and so he left the ruling class. During the year and a half that elapsed before the elections to the second Duma he occupied himself almost entirely with his writing and the editorship of his wonderfully popular paper, *God's Truth*. He attributes his success to the fact that he came from the people, that they know that his heart beats with them, that they understand that he knows their wants and is ready to give up his life if necessary in their behalf. Servants, cabdrivers, and other common people used to come to his office to ask not for *God's Truth*, but for "our" paper.

CHAPTER VI

THE RELIGIOUS REVOLUTION

AFTER his election to the Duma from St. Petersburg in February, 1906, by an immense majority, Father Petrov was immediately banished to a monastery by the Holy Synod and returned only when the Duma was dissolved. He was dismissed then by the order of the Holy Synod from all the schools and colleges in which he had taught and was forbidden to preach in any church. However, his paper, *God's Truth*, attained enormous success among the masses of the people both of the cities and of the villages. I was assured by those able to judge that nothing ever written in Russia reached more directly to the heart of the people, and I was unable to find any illiterate cabdriver or peasant who had not heard of Father Petrov. When I asked the opinion of some common man about him I was always answered: "How could we fail to be pleased by what he writes; it is God's truth."

During a few months twenty-seven prosecutions were started against him with a view to depriving him of his robe and civic rights. On all occasions he was able to prove that neither he nor his writings had ever turned aside from Christianity. At last, in the beginning of 1908, he saw that the Government would condemn him to be unfrocked in spite of anything that he could do, and taking the advantage of the prestige of his robe before he was deprived of it he wrote a public letter to Russia and the world.

In order that this important letter should not be suppressed Father Petrov addressed it not only to the Holy Synod, but to the somewhat liberal Metropolitan of St. Petersburg, Antonius, and also mailed copies to all the ministers and to persons who would assure its publicity. Within a few days he met his punishment. He was deprived of his robes, the right of residence in St. Petersburg or Moscow for seven years, and of

most of the other privileges, such as they are, of the Russian citizen. Strong as are the denunciations of the Czar in this letter, Father Petrov is so popular in Russia and so known abroad that, as in the case of Tolstoi, the Government did not dare to go further. I give a large part of this very important letter, summing up as it does the situation of the Russian church and the attitude of a large majority of liberal Russians, whether priests or laymen, on the condition of the Church and the feeling of truly religious persons about the Czarism and the revolution.

YOUR HIGH EMINENCE, LORD ANTONIUS:

. . . The second accusation was founded on complaints against my work and speeches. From these complaints the ecclesiastical investigators drew up a long series of questions. To reply to all these questions would be easy for me and I could have closed the affair in this way, but such replies would not have satisfied the questions that I have put to myself.

The thing which our Holy Synod passed for the Orthodox Church and the composition of the Synod itself, can these be considered as at all the true church of Christ? Am I in accord at all points with the Synod and the Orthodox Church? If I differ, in what and upon what are the differences founded?

To reply to these questions that I have put to myself, I have preferred, instead of addressing myself to the ecclesiastical prosecutors, to send to Your Highness an exposition of my religious opinions and of the political opinions which result from them . . .

I am explaining my whole way of understanding the duty of the Church at the present moment. My conscience demands it. You will act as yours commands you to act.

We have to-day, after nineteen centuries of preaching, individual Christians, separate persons, but no Christianity; there is no Christian legislation; our customs and morals are no longer Christian; there exists no Christian government. It is strange to speak of the Christian world. The mutual relations of the various peoples are altogether contrary to the spirit of the Evangel; the most Christian states maintain millions of men for mass butcheries, sometimes of their neighbours and sometimes of their own citizens.

To justify these monstrous butcheries the very soul of the mystified population is sapped away. The same butcheries are erected into a science. They are the object of the military art, the art of killing. In what way are these relations of Christian people distinct from the relations of the people of pagan antiquity? Governments violate, states oppress, entire populations. Kings look at their countries as their property; at the people as their herds. They do not serve the people but they demand that the people serve them. They try to replace the will

of the nations by their own desires and even by their caprices. Every year they plunder the poor population of millions for their palaces, and such a state of affairs is called legal!

On the other hand, the demand of the people addressed to the king to recognise the rights of the nation, is a crime to be pitilessly punished. With what cruelty Christian Czars have made the blood of the people flow, when attempts have been made by the latter to find some relief for their sad destiny. What pitiless brutality there is in the punishment that they have let fall on countries already enough oppressed . . .

There is no Christian Czar and no Christian government. Conditions of life are not Christian. The upper classes rule the lower classes. A little group keeps the rest of the population enslaved. This little group has robbed the working people of wealth, power, science, art, and even religion, which they have also subjected; they have left them only ignorance and misery. In the place of pleasure they have given the people drunkenness; in the place of religion gross superstition; and besides, the work of a convict, a work without rest or reward. That which the upper class have taken either by force or by artifice they have called their sacred property. When the nobility had serfs the latter were very sacred property; at present some of them have taken possession of the land and this they call the sacred property. If the rich had been able to take the sky, the air, the sea, or the stars, they would still have called all this their sacred property. They squeeze out heavy rents for the maintenance of their idleness, and when the people, brought nearly to exhaustion by suffering, outraged in its highest feelings, speaks of rights, demands for its labour a part of their abundance, the rich classes send against it with cannons and bayonets its own brothers — only dressed up in the uniforms of soldiers and transformed by barrack drill into a machine that kills.

It that Christianity?

The true servant of the true Church and Christ, John Slatoust, said in discussing the question of the unequal distribution of wealth in society. "Every rich man is a criminal or the son of a criminal." Those whom he attacked rebelled at this declaration. He replied to them, "My speech puts you out of temper. You say to me, when will you cease to speak against the rich; I answer, when you cease to oppress the poor. What, you cry out, more thunders against the rich? Against your cruelty to the poor! You abuse without check your power over the poor and me, and I will never check my curses."

But the words of John Slatoust, like the words of several other fathers of the Church, were only rare rays of light which scarcely pierced the thick fog of satiety of the rich classes. The unequal distribution of wealth is being corrected by charity. An infinitesimal part of what has been taken away from them is given back to the disinherited, and this passes for a virtue! As to the crying misery of millions of working people alongside of the extraordinary opulence of the rich classes, the preachers say: "It has pleased God that it should be so. Where there

is light there is always shadow." Such preachings are a calumny of God . . .

Christian morality would have been limited and little developed if it had had no other end but the life and conduct of private persons without throwing light on the organisations, the rulers, the life and conduct of societies and states. "But that is politics," says the clergy; "our business is religion." . . .

True politics is in fact the art of the better organisation of life in society and the state; but is not the Evangel, with its doctrine of the Kingdom of God, the science of the better organisation of life, of society, and of the entire State? This being true the clergy cannot say that politics is the business of politicians; it cannot say that the labour question, the agrarian question, the question of the class and race hatred in the State does not concern them, for these are just the questions that do concern them . . .

But Christianity has become the State religion before the State has ceased to be pagan. How should we explain otherwise the fact that the influence of Christianity has not really been exerted on the laws of society and the organisation of the State? The Evangel, from the broad road of the organisation of the Kingdom of God in societies and states, has had to pass into the narrow path of personal virtues and the salvation of the individual. How has this happened? Christianity itself is accused. Defects are sought for in the doctrine of Christ; this is wrong, for it is the fault rather of the higher clergy which in spite of the triumph of Christianity has not been able to resist the seduction of power. It is not the clergy that has influenced the State, but on the contrary, it has borrowed from the State its external brilliance, its organisation, its means of action, its constraint and its non-spiritual punishments . . .

The Papistry is not the disease of the Roman clergy alone. All the Christian religions suffer from some form of Papistry. The Greek Church no less than the others. As in the West, the higher clergy aspire greedily for power, but it could not conquer the imperial power so mighty here in the East. And it did not even conceive such a notion; it directed all its greed to the interior of the church, pushed aside the lower clergy and the faithful and said to them: *L'Eglise, c'est moi!* And to enjoy without any obstacle from the Government a complete administrative power, the princes of the Church shared with the Government. They left to it sovereign power over society and the State, and they reserved for themselves the direction of the Church . . . The clergy governed the Church and submitted to the temporal authorities and served them as a docile tool . . . Whatever crimes the authorities accomplished, the clergy repeated invariably to the people: "Obey and submit; God requires it." Or still further, "All authority comes from God."

All over our country every day are proceeding executions by shooting and hanging. It is all done at the order of the power of the authorities. The hangman builds the gallows and throttles the victim with the rope. But it is not the hangman that kills. He is but an instrument connected

with the execution, like the gallows and the noose. It is the high-placed executioner who kills. The judge who passes the death sentence, the administrator who sanctions the sentence. It is the minister who covers the face of the country with the gallows, who sees in the gallows the support and upholder of his power — he it is who throttles. It is the sovereign power that throttles, the sovereign who appoints the hangman minister. A whole hierarchy of authorities strangles people already bound and solitary, already rendered harmless; in the place of giving justice it gives proof of an unrivaled, cowardly and cruel spirit of revenge.

Can one say that such authorities are placed there by God?

The ruling regular clergy, with its cold, heartless, bony fingers, has stifled the Russian Church, killed its creative spirit, chained the Gospel itself, and sold the Church to the Government. There is no outrage, no crime, no perfidy of the State authorities which the monks who rule the Church would not cover with the mantle of the Church, would not bless, would not seal with their own hands. What power would the voice of the Church possess were it raised in genuine Christian words! If it should speak them to the rulers and to the people, to revolutionists and to reactionaries, if it should speak to the whole country! Such words would become the voice of the eternal Gospel truths addressed to the conscience of the country. They would strike every heart, they would penetrate into every corner, they would chime above the thunders of revolution, above the clamour of execution, like the voice of a church-bell through the howling of the tempest.

When on January 22, 1905, the people, that immense, naïve child, went with ikons and crosses to beg the authorities for truth and justice, in answer to them was arranged a monstrous onslaught; when the bleeding heaps upon the square made the whole world shudder, the Synod approached the quivering mass of bodies not yet cool, stopped before them, and in a priestly message struck them with a vile and brutal libel. It declared that the murdered ones were not seekers of justice, that they were Japanese agents, bought by Japanese money. The Synod could not find one word of reproach for the murderers, one sigh for the victims — nothing but a libel. A libel signed by the Synod in the name of the whole Church.

In the Church the creative power of truth became withered, dried, and anæmic; separated from life, the thought of the Church was condemned to turn about in the world of abstract dogma and theological discussions.

. . . God was reasoned about without being introduced into life itself. A sort of special Atheism was created, practical Atheism. Certainly in words and thoughts the existence of God was recognised, but life activity went forward as if it was not so, as if God was only an abstract word, a sound without meaning. An example of such practical Atheism is Pobiedonostzev, of sad memory, or rather the tendency of the life of the Church that has borrowed his name. This tendency was indeed not created by him for it existed before and after. He only put

strongly in relief this current of clerical life; it is the same morally anæmic, Byzantine spirit which drove Christianity from the Church and substituted itself in its place. . . . The principal aim of his Church was the same as that of the Papacy: to replace the Kingdom of God by the kingdom of the princes of the Church and the reigning monks. Separated by an asceticism, by their monk's mantle, from all the joys of the world, even the most pure, the reigning monks tried to find consolation in what they had repudiated — in their power over the world We have no Papacy but we have what is called correctly the Papacy of the Czar. With us even in the code (Vol. I, Chap. VII, Art. 42) the sovereign is called Lord of the Church, Lord even with a capital L. In the true Church the Lord is Christ. In the Papacy the chief of the state is the pope, and in the Russian Church it is the sovereign

The majority of the lower clergy is ignorant, poor, dulled; nobody occupies himself with its moral welfare. It is crowded by the reigning monks into a corner, it has its arms tied; it is deprived of the liberty to think, to speak and to act. They who are so near to the masses of the people, to the centre of life, they who see all its misery, the deprivation of justice from which the whole country suffers, who hear the ceaseless groans that rise from below, who are choked by the tears of the people, blinded by the sight of the frightful nightmare created all over the country by the impious violence of the reigning power, they have not even the right to speak of the sufferings of their flocks, not even the chance to cry out to the violators, halt!

Indeed, according to the opinion of the monks, who are at the same time reigning dignitaries of the Church, all that goes against the State goes against the Church, against Christ and against God. This is to reduce the great work of the salvation of humanity to the petty rôle of bodyguard to the temporal autocratic organization The Church is the universal union, the organisation of all humanity, above nations and states. For to the Church none of the existing organisations of the State are invariable, perfect, permanent, or infallible.

Such an organisation is the work of the future; expressing one's self in the language of the Evangel, it will be the future Kingdom of God. An organisation in which everything will be maintained not by external violence but by a common interior moral bond, in which there will be neither exploitation nor arbitrary government nor violence nor master nor workman, where all will support equally the burdens of life and all will profit equally from its good. This is the task of the Church, but the organisations which exist at present, whether they are autocratic or not, are worth nothing. Their only difference is in the degree of uselessness; one is more, another is less useful; yet our old expiring organisation is the worst of all that exists in the Christian world.

Of course this letter made it unnecessary for the Synod to carry to a finality its other prosecutions that contained such accusations as that, on a visit at Yasnaya Polyana he had asked

Count Tolstoi (excommunicated, it will be remembered, from the Orthodox Church), for his blessing on his work, and that during a visit in the Crimea he had spent most of his time with two Jews.

Father Petrov is more than the most formidable enemy, aside from Tolstoi, of the Russian State Church. He is an independent religious and political thinker and leader; in fact, the great interest of his standpoint is that he neither separates politics and religion, nor allows one to interfere with the other. In many countries he might be classed in spite of himself as a Christian Socialist, but he objects vigorously to this term. He says he is a Christian and a Socialist but that his Socialism and his Christianity are both unqualified. He wishes to be considered simply a Christian and not a Christian of any particular sect, objecting, therefore, even to the limitation of the social obligations of his Christianity implied by the term "Christian Socialist." He is a Socialist, differing from the others only in that he has arrived at precisely the same point by the religious path instead of the study of Marx or the indirect experience of the economic conflict. He does not wish to differentiate himself from other Socialists by qualifying himself as a Christian Socialist.

We might be tempted to compare him in some respects with Tolstoi; but the difference is profound. He is a great admirer of Tolstoi, for he says that the latter has done an incalculable service to Russia in reviving the interest in the Evangelists among educated classes at the very moment when Buchner, Darwin, and materialism were sweeping all before them. He shares Tolstoi's indifference to mere political forms, but he does not share his indifference to the organisation of the future state. Tolstoi confesses himself to be an anarchist in the philosophical sense. Petrov is a Socialist and hopes that the spirit of Christianity will not destroy but regenerate the State. Indeed, in one of his brochures he goes so far as to express a preference for the republican form of government which with Tolstoi meets almost the same contempt as does the Czarism itself. Like Tolstoi, Petrov is interested in the psychology of the ruling classes, and it is because he understands this psychology so well that he denounces this class. For these denunciations he ex-

pects to be considered wild, seditious, revolutionary, and criminal, just as those who denounced serfdom a generation ago were branded by these same terms of reproach.

Like Tolstoi, Petrov's attitude toward existing society is that of a revolutionist. "In other forms and with certain changed aspects," he says in a typical message, "the relation of the slave-driver and serf-holder to the lower strata of the people remains in force in our own day. The majority of people of our time who have privilege or power either through capital or noble birth, have not learned to understand that no one has the right to exploit another, to turn a man like himself into a tool as a means of promoting his own welfare, and that all privilege is not lawful and right, but unlawful, violent, unjust. All men are men. All have the same right of the recognition of their personality. Nature, which created man and the means of his existence, does not know of any selection and special favouritism."

But Father Petrov is not a revolutionist who places his sole hope on the regeneration of the individual, as does Tolstoi. He seeks rather a regeneration of both the Church and the State, his efforts being equally directed to remove the growing "contempt and hatred" of the people toward the clergy, and to introduce democracy and Socialism into the State. In his politics he has nothing in common with the moderates, just as he has perhaps nothing in common with the violent revolutionists. He felt bitterly toward the pusillanimous attitude of the Constitutional Democratic party in the second Duma, who in order to persuade the Czar not to dismiss the Duma were ready to concede everything to the Government. Petrov thought, on the contrary, that as long as the Duma existed it ought to have been worthy of its task, outspoken on every question and ready to submit to the Czar on none.

Father Petrov does not believe in the possibility of a peaceful political evolution in Russia. He believes that a period of great violence is inevitably approaching, since there is no hope of any spirit of progress in the Court or upper classes. The preachers in the Court he brands as men without principles or ideas, like the Vostorgov who has been mentioned, who is a leader in the organisation that is preparing the massacres. He con-

siders that the Government's so-called punishments dealt out by this time to literally millions of people are not in truth punishments in any true sense of the term, but mere revenge. He feels that the ministers have the instincts of hunting dogs, that the Government is not conducting its persecutions from any standpoint of State but merely as a war against an enemy without belligerent rights. He feels with the other revolutionists that the way in which the Government is conducting this campaign is not as humane as ordinary war and urges that The Hague Conference ought to interfere. It does not occur, he says, in modern countries that an officer outrages a captured girl, as recently happened in Russia. Petrov knows the court and his indignation is in proportion to his knowledge. He looks gloomily upon the approaching struggle, but is sure of the triumph of justice in the end, though only after great bloodshed. The people, he is confident, will not recede in the least degree from their revolutionary demands, based as they are on necessity.

Father Petrov looks more hopefully toward the expected spiritual regeneration. He realises that at the present moment the Church is losing adherents every day on account of its intimate connection with the infamous Czarism, but as soon as the least elements of democracy begin to appear during the course of the coming struggle he feels that there will be a rapid revolution in the Church also. The chief ground for his hope is that the village clergy will not only join in large numbers in the popular movement but will even become martyrs for the cause. He feels also that as soon as the least religious liberty is offered the whole mass of the peasantry will go over to the "old believers," who differ from the Orthodox Church chiefly in that they have no connection with the State.

He does not take so much interest in the sects as he does in the "old believers," because he has observed with Prince Hilkhov that the members of the sects are interesting themselves at the present time rather in politics than in religion. I agree with Father Petrov — that the majority of the Russian peasants will probably only reach the point of the "old believers." But I feel that the sects are the most advanced element of the Russian population, though not the most numerous, and I believe that their participation in politics will be as spiritual

as their religious development has been practical. Indeed I have met complaints from among their most revolutionary members that the Socialist parties were not sufficiently imbued with ideals, but too much interested in the mere questions of wages and rents and elections of a constitutional assembly. I believe that the chief religious movement and hope of a spiritual regeneration in the near future lies in the increasing spirit of self-assertion of these sects which promise a tremendously rapid growth as soon as the least real religious freedom has been won from the Government.

Let me remind the reader of a typical sect, that natural product of the Russian soil, the Dukhobors. To be sure, transferred to the strange soil of Canada, it has manifested itself in some peculiar forms, but in its original state in Russia it could not have failed to inspire any sympathetic observer. I am confident that this is a type of faith that will grow most rapidly among the peasants, and that as it grows the economic and political movements will receive a spiritual reinforcement that will make finally certain the victory of the reigning Socialist and democratic ideas.

The members of this faith cast aside all ceremonies and externalities. The only important dogma of their belief is the justification of God as "the spirit of truth." They recognise the Trinity but declare that it has a purely spiritual sense. By "the Mother of God" they understand the endless grace and bounty of God, which produces "the spirit of truth" in ourselves, which they call the Son of God. For the saving of the soul the belief in this purely spiritual Christ is necessary, but a belief without deeds is dead. God lives in the soul of man and He teaches men Himself. It is in us that Christ must be born, grow up, teach, be resurrected and carried to heaven. The Church and religious images are not recognised. The church, the Dukhobors say, is in ourselves and wherever two or three men gather together in the name of Christ.

The Dukhobors' faith is their only law in their daily lives; they apply their doctrines to their whole existence. Most important is their communal life; property is held in common, each one takes for his family according to its recognised needs. Their refusal to go in for military service is notorious. They

accept the most severe and cruel punishments liberally bestowed on them by the Russian Government, or a whole lifetime in prison, rather than to kill their brother men. War they declare to be murder, contradicting flatly the idea of brotherly love.

Such evident purity of religious faith, such depth of social and moral principle in daily life, and such unconquerable courage in defending their practices, may prove after all the most insuperable obstacle that the Government has to meet. Among the Dukhobors and related sects a resistance may take the form of refusal to participate in the suppression of disturbances. Among the Russian Baptists (Stundists), who have millions of adherents, it is already taking the form of a religious warfare against the Government as determined and invincible as the religious wars of the English Puritans and Levellers against the king and his church, and in the same unconquerable spirit with which the Tyrolese Catholics or the Swiss Protestants defended their homes against their religious foes. The Czarism has conquered the bodies of its subjects; we doubt if it will ever be able to conquer their souls.

CHAPTER VII

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

In new song the old note of mournful meditation was absent. It was not the utterance of a soul wandering in solitude along the dark paths of melancholy perplexity, of a soul beaten down by want, burdened with fear, deprived of individuality and colourless. It breathed no sighs of a strength hungering for space; it shouted no provoking cries of irritated courage ready to crush both the good and the bad indiscriminately. It did not voice the striving elemental of the animal "instinct" for freedom, for freedom's sake, nor the freedom of wrong or vengeance capable of destroying everything and powerless to build up anything. In this song there was nothing from the old, slavish world.

It floated along directly, evenly; it proclaimed an iron virility; a calm threat. Simple and clear, it swept the people after it along an endless path leading to the far distant future; and it spoke frankly of the hardships of the way.—MAXIM GORKY, *Foma Gordeeff*.

I

THE struggle in which Russia is engaged is so desperate, the brave and intelligent people are at present so helpless, that the foreigner is almost incapable of grasping the full tragedy of the situation. We moderns can conceive tragedies of the individual. We are not accustomed to tragedies in which whole peoples are the heroes. In Russia a single class of men, put by circumstances in entire control of the destinies of the nation, has become so cold, so false, so dulled to all its higher interests, that our minds refuse to credit their actions. In other countries we do not have a ruling class with such utterly irresponsible power, and we have almost forgotten the depth of evil that still remains in mankind. Russia's rulers are to all appearances modern educated men that would pass anywhere for good Europeans or Americans, but they have been given a mastery over others, a right to govern others without their consent, and through this they have become like the tyrants of old.

"The debauched, idle and blasé men that compose the governing classes generally," says Tolstoi, "must find some goal for their existence, but this goal can only be the increase of their own glory. In all other passions the point of satiety is soon reached; only the passion for glory is unlimited." We have forgotten that it is a law of all history that men in a false position of power are bound to degenerate, that no man is good enough to govern another against the other's consent, and if he does so that he is bound to bring about both his own and that other's ruin. Unless we seize again this principle which lies at the bottom of all social life, we cannot hope to grasp one iota of the awful tragedy that faces the Russian people at the present moment.

It is just because its spiritual life has been deepened and intensified by great experience in the suffering of the whole nation, that Russia's message is able to stir the other countries; happier lands less experienced, living more superficially, have had no such insights into the evil that still lies buried in man, into the horrors that can be perpetrated in the present state of society, and into the heroic capacities that lie latent in us to enable us to fight even without success against a world of evil. It is not another society that Russians are learning to understand through suffering, but our own. We know capitalism, of soulless corporations that rob consumers, starve employees and corrupt the State. Russia knows that this same capitalism gives the Czar the money to build prisons for hundreds of thousands of his people, to buy the rifles and machine guns of the Cossacks and to hire an army of thugs — knows that this same capitalism is as ready to take profits directly from murder and plunder supported by murder as it is to grow rich through bought corporations, lawyers or legislators.

The Russian people have reasoned it out that modern capitalism will stop at no wrong, even that of the murder of whole peoples — they have experienced this illuminating truth in their own flesh and blood. They know that each individual capitalist has doubtless this or that moral code for his private life, but they know that the capitalists, all bound together by the bond of international finance, are ready to murder all mankind and secure higher interest rate. So there has been planted

in Russia's heart a great and ennobling hatred; not a hatred of persons but of a system, a hatred raised to great social principles and ideas. Hatred against men brings the world no message. Such of Russia's victims as have been killed in a war of mere mutual hate, however just the cause for which they have died, however honoured by their companions in arms, will never be viewed by the world as mankind's martyrs, as world-heroes who "when we are born are straight our friends." Russia's martyrs have often died with their hearts filled with love not hatred, not for a party merely or even for a nation, but quite consciously for all mankind.

They died as victims of that capitalism which oppresses the whole race. Like the early Christians they died for the emancipation of humanity. Some, it is true, seek first a material emancipation for their fellow men, putting things spiritual in a second place; others merit Tolstoi's accusation that though sincere, they have an egotistic passion for leadership in the new cause; but most of those who go gladly to prison and exile and death go for the spiritual elevation of the races, for the ideal of a better society that is to produce better types of individuals than the world has yet seen.

II

The Russian people had already won their battle against the Czarism when the foreigners interfered and threw in their forces with those of the Czar — lending him 1,000,000,000 rubles, satisfied with 7 per cent. interest and making no conditions for what murderous purposes the money was to be employed.

The battle was won when the Czar was allowed to reach his hands into the vast treasury house of the international capital — and now, until he is cut off from the colossal subsidies that enable him to continue his murderous Government, the situation is desperate indeed. Cases are common in which despots have allied themselves with foreign powers. But this is new — this is the unique instance of all history, when foreign powers have each contributed something to support the oppressive government. There is hardly an important banking interest in France or Germany that has not contributed something to

the Czar's murder funds, and scarcely a prominent capitalistic institution of Austria and England that is not indirectly connected with it. Even America was tainted a few years ago.

The Russian people, I say, had won their struggle at the time of the first Duma when the foreign capitalists loaned 1,000,000,000 rubles to the despotic Government, pretending to assume that they thought the Czarism was becoming constitutional, but really well aware that it was absolutely irresponsible toward the people. The European military situation was only a part of the cause of this monstrous international pride. France and Germany, overloaded with military burdens and forced to subordinate their greatest social reforms to military necessities, are entirely depending on the position toward the other nations taken by the Czar's criminal Government. Before the last loan the immense sums of gold secured from France to make possible the perpetuation of the Czarism, were obtained largely on the ground that the money would go to supply arms to an enemy of Germany. The new crushing tax burdens for the rebuilding of the navy destroyed by the Japanese — burdens which make impossible any genuine reform inside of Russia in the near future — were levied to please the Czar's cousin, William II. of Germany, who wants to see another European fleet that might be used in an emergency against his rival, England. As long as the Russian Government remains despotic and half independent, it will engage, like every other despotism, in aggressive enterprises of one kind or another, if not in Turkey in Japan, if not in Japan then by pledging its army to this or the other power as mercenary troops. The last monster loan also was in part a sale of Russia's organised forces for murder. It will be remembered that large contributors to this loan, besides France, were also Austria and England, and other countries. In return for these immense sums the Russian Government, it appears, promised the world to work against Germany in the cause of international peace; it was a sort of international blackmail.

But the murderous Czarism probably gets more of the money of the international bankers by selling the natural resources of the impoverished country in the form of industrial privileges granted by the Government, or by means of high rates of inter-

est squeezed from the starving population, than it does as pay for its mercenary army.

For many years English, Belgian, and German money, as well as French, has been pouring into Russia's industries under the tutelage of the State, until the country is rapidly becoming like India, Egypt, Turkey or Persia, with both the Government and industries largely in the hands of foreign financiers. Already leading conservatives even have spoken of Russia's real parliament, the international bankers. There is a decided danger, indeed, that the country may in the not distant future become a sort of international protectorate, like China — unless in the meanwhile the Czarism is overturned.

The Russian people, in resisting the alliance between the foreign financiers and its Government, are fighting to prevent another effort of international capital to still further strengthen itself, to enlarge the territory of its "colonies" or "subject races," and by means of its vast income so secured to further corrupt the world's governments and maintain its power.

The Russian fight is in this sense a world fight indeed, but it is also a world movement in a more direct and much more spiritual meaning. It is a world struggle for modern or social democracy. The Russian movement is the only revolutionary movement of a whole people in our times. Russia is therefore the only country where, under the guidance of the best knowledge and the highest ideals of our period, a new foundation is being laid for the democracy of the future.

For whenever democracy has taken deep and permanent root it owes its first beginning to revolution, to open violent rebellion. This is notoriously true of France; it is true of England; it is true of the United States. That country which has had no revolution has had no real democracy. Many persons look at modern Prussia, where there has been no revolution, as possessing a semi-democratic government. Let such persons recall the principle of Bismarck when, as recently as 1863, he governed the country without the consent of the Landtag as it was governed centuries ago. There has been a constitutional deadlock, and as there has never been a revolution to put an end once and for all to the last vestiges of the old autocratic system, Bismarck could very reasonably claim that

in such cases when the new laws did not work it was necessary to return to the old. When the constitution fails to work in the United States the reactionary forces cannot turn back to the laws of George III., because the United States has had a revolution; nor do English judges revert in political questions to English institutions before 1688, nor the French to laws that existed before 1789. In these countries revolutions have cut off the line of retreat of reactionary forces. In every great contest between reaction and progress, then, progress has the advantage, for reaction can only obtain a foothold by basing its claims on the barbarities of the past. In supporting a profound revolutionary movement, then, the Russian people are laying the only possible basis for a new democracy. This democracy, struggling into being to-day, must be based on the world conditions of the present moment. It is evident that the problem before any great revolutionary movement in our time will be the great problem of the age — the social problem.

III

A revolutionary social movement in any one nation would be rich in lessons for every other. But the only countries that can really advance new and great solutions are the large countries — those that are powerful enough to be independent, that embrace such a variety of conditions and of peoples that their solution may be of a universal application. It is evident that countries like Germany or France, the slaves of constant terror of destructive war, or Great Britain, oppressed by the nightmare that one day she may be reduced to poverty by the loss of her control of the ocean, are not entirely free to undertake solutions of great social problems; they must give the first place in the policies of State and the expenditure of public money to problems of national defence. Russia, on the other hand, has long ago lost all terror of becoming a province of some other nation, just as the United States is under no necessity of maintaining either a large land force or a navy of the size of Great Britain's.

Russia, like the United States, is a self-sufficient country; more than a country, a world. Like the new world, the Russian

world forms an almost complete economic whole, embracing under a single government nearly all, if not all, climates and nearly all the raw products used in modern life; both countries are large exporters of agricultural products, both are devoted more to agriculture than to manufacturing industry. Both of these worlds are composed largely of newly acquired and newly settled territory; though both are inhabited by very many races, in each a single race prevails numerically and in most other respects over all the rest, and keeps them together as a single whole. As the result of the mixture of races and the recent settlement of large parts of both countries, their culture is international, world-culture, unmarked by the comparatively provincial nationalistic tendencies of England, Germany, or France. We may look, according to a great German publicist, Kautsky, to America for the great economic experiments of the near future and to Russia for the new (social) politics.

America is essentially a country of rapid economic evolution, while Russia is undeveloped, economically and financially dependent. America is the country of economic genius, a nation whose conceptions of material development have reached even a spiritual height. The great American qualities, the American virtues, the American imagination, have thrown themselves almost wholly into business, the material development of the country. Americans are the first of modern peoples that have learned to respect the repeated failures of enterprising individuals with a genius for affairs, knowing that such failures often lead to greater heights of success. They have learned how to excuse enormous waste when it was made for the sake of economies lying in the distant future. They can appreciate the enterprise of persons who, instead of immediately exploiting their properties, know how to wait, like some of our most able builders that, foreseeing the brilliant future of the locality in which they are situated, are satisfied with temporary structures and poor incomes until the time is ripe for some of the magnificent modern achievements in architecture, in which we so clearly lead. All three of these types of men we admire are true revolutionists, who prefer to wait, to waste, or to fail, rather than to accept the lesser for the greater good.

So it is with Russians in their politics. There seems no

reason for doubting that the near future will show that the political failures now being made by the Russians are the failures of political genius, that the waste of lives and property will be repaid later a hundredfold, and that the hopeful and planful patience with which the Russians are looking forward and working to a great social transformation promises the greatest and most magnificent results when that transformation is achieved. Already the political revolution of the Russian people, though not yet embodied in political institutions, is becoming as rapid, as remarkable, as phenomenal, as the economic revolution of the United States.

IV

As the Russians have to contend with world forces and are bringing about world results, it is no ordinary war or revolution in which they have engaged themselves. Already it has become a part of the social struggle of all Europe; if it lasts many years it must ultimately become a part of some future world upheaval of unprecedented magnitude, of new and widespread world revolutions and world wars. We are not so likely to deny the possibility that such events as the French Revolution and the world wars which accompanied it may occur again, as to be misled by a too close comparison between the present situation and that of 1789. Considered even as a world movement the French Revolution was a success, but it was also a failure, so it has come about that whenever we hear of revolutions we hear also of the inevitable "reaction that must follow revolution," and of the avenging "man on horseback."

Certainly there was a reaction in Europe soon after 1800; certainly Napoleon was of all men that ever lived *the* man on horseback. But were this reaction and this man on horseback results of the French Revolution? To answer this question we must first divide the revolution into two parts — the true revolution, the movement that embraced the whole of the nation, that resulted in the final overthrow of feudalism in France, and led to the calling of the Constitutional Assembly. In contrast to this we have the later Insurrection of Paris which resulted in the execution of the king — a measure by no means

approved of by the whole nation — and in the capture of the Legislative Assembly by the mob of Paris with the assistance of a few regiments of professional soldiers. Moreover, the Paris of 1792 was in a sense the tyrant over the nation. Modern capitals have no such power as did Paris then. It was this insurrection that produced the reign of terror and led ultimately to the inevitable reaction, not against the revolution, but against the insurrection.

The insurrection of Paris in 1792, not the Revolution of France in 1789, produced the terror — a reign of violence not against the Government, not from below, but by the Government itself against the captives in its power. There has been no single important example of such mob violence in Russia. The so-called "terror" does not consist in the execution by revolutionists, without risk to themselves, of persons within their power, but of heroic attacks on murderous officials that hold the community by the throat, attacks which almost always result in the instant death or execution of the revolutionists. Every political party in Russia is even opposed to capital punishment, not only for political but even for ordinary crimes. The Russian nation, far from being led to any reaction by terroristic deeds, looks at these executioners of the popular will as national heroes and martyrs in the same sense as were the early Christians that braved the wrath of Nero or Domitian.

There was, however, an international reaction against the French Revolution that put the nation under the necessity of granting military powers to Napoleon, that robbed the French people of a part of the victories they had won, and that long supported a reactionary government in the country itself. Napoleon would never have been created had it not been for the reactionary attacks of all the foreign powers of Europe on Republican France; he would never have been entrusted with the powers of a despot if France had not been under the desperate necessity of fighting a life and death battle for her very existence. It is literally true that England, Russia, Austria, and Prussia placed Napoleon on the throne and that they kept there one king or another for more than a generation afterward. Even Napoleon III. would have had no success in appealing to the imperialistic instincts of the country if it had not been for the

general movement and reaction of Prussia, Russia, and Austria, a sort of renewal of the Holy Alliance after 1848.

The reactionary countries of Europe were able to plant their despotic autocracies in France after the revolution because, leagued together, they were far more powerful than that nation. There are still reactionary countries in Europe. As we have shown, the Prussian Government is in some respects even behind her Russian neighbour. But the other nations of the world to-day, especially France, England, and the United States, will by no means be so far behind democratic Russia as the monarchies at the end of the eighteenth century were behind France. There is no power that can force the Russian people in self-defence to rely on a man on horseback. Nor is there any tendency amongst the Russians themselves to worship individuals to the exclusion of great principles. France had had the evil example of a feudalistic Catholic Church and its infallible pope. In Russia there is no pope and the Church has no prestige among the people. France had been engaged in wars with her neighbours uninterruptedly for many generations; to a certain degree she had learned the military spirit that could be used by Napoleon and the foreign oppressors. Russia has long ceased to expand territorially, and she possesses such a large part of the surface of the earth that the keenest ambition of her people is rather to hold and develop what they have than to gain more. Nowhere are the masses of the population so pacific as in Russia. Let us, then, not judge the Russian Revolution by the French. The reaction in France and the coming of Napoleon are both explained by the special conditions of the world at the time, and none of these conditions exist to-day.

In France, as in Russia, the more prosperous and privileged part of the middle classes, at first enthusiastic revolutionists, soon left the movement, but in neither country has this desertion been great enough to create a reaction. Carlyle shows how constitutionalism in France "in sorrow and anger" demanded martial law against the revolutionists and obtained it, an act that soon may be expected from the majority of the Russian constitutionalists and that is already supported by a large minority. This step, says the great historian, can be justified on one premise only — that "constitutionalism is of

God and mob assembling the devil, otherwise it is not so just." Like the Russian Constitutional Democrats, the august National Assembly, according to Carlyle, never really wanted riot. "All it ever wanted was riot enough to balance court plotting." In Russia, as in France, the people very soon learned the worthlessness of their moderate constitutionalist allies. "To them it was clear," writes Carlyle, "that Philosophism has baked no bread; that Patriot Committee men will level down to their own level, and no lower."

The Russian moderates have not carried with them in their retreat even as large a part of the population as did the French. Nearly all the unions of the professional classes which at first allowed themselves to be used by the President of the Union of Unions, Professor Milyoukov, for the purposes of the Constitutional Democratic Party, have cast this organisation off. From the first most of them refused to throw their weight in for any lesser measure than an assembly elected by an equal suffrage, while such as temporarily joined the moderate party have left in large numbers.

V

From the very first the intellectual leaders of the Russian people have been opposed heart and soul to the Czarism, and there is hardly one name of the first rank from the beginning that has not made every sacrifice, even to suffering imprisonment, exile, and death, in the struggle against it. Over a century ago Novikov, who founded the first newspaper and publishing house of importance and established scholarships and libraries all over the country, was imprisoned by Catharine II. until his death. Roditchev was similarly persecuted by the same monarch. Catharine said of him, "He is spreading the French plague (the Revolution), he is a rebel worse than Pugatchev, he praises Franklin." These were among the founders of Russian literature, since educated persons before this time wrote and even spoke almost exclusively in French. I need barely mention the later writers whose works and persecutions are known to everybody: Pushkin, Turgeniev, Gogol, Tchernichevsky, Dostoievsky, Tolstoi, Korolenko and Gorky; there

are also a dozen others equally well known to Russians as these, who have suffered as much.

Since the last generation educated and refined women have taken the same part in the movement as the men; in fact, they have been even more high-spirited, devoted, and consistent. It is not that the equality of women is a special feature of Russian civilisation, for Russian women until the emancipation movement had been perhaps even less prominent in literature, politics, and affairs than had the women of some other countries. It is that there began in Russia a generation ago the first life and death struggle of a nation, carried out on the very highest social principles. Into this struggle women plunged from the very outset and they have furnished a very considerable part of the martyrs to the cause. In the revolutionary movement of the '80s, in some of the big trials, often a fourth or a fifth of the prisoners were women of the educated and noble classes. Several of these women who have spent fifteen or twenty years in exile or solitary confinement have rejoined the revolutionary movement. Still more important, they and less active friends and admirers who were legion, have taught their children either to look up to or respect the revolutionists. As Russian children are already without any inbred love of the State or Church, they are ripe for the most complete sacrifices for the revolutionary movement.

I cannot even sum up the wholesale sacrifice made by hundreds of thousands of the young men and women students of Russia for the social liberty and equality of the whole Russian people and for Socialism the world over. I will only deny the reports that are being spread that there is any relaxation of this movement. It has been said that a certain part of the students are becoming less revolutionary, that the Government has been able to terrorise another part into submission. Both statements are entirely false. If the proportion of timid or naturally conservative students in the universities has somewhat increased, it is because tens of thousands of the brave are languishing in prison or exile. This year already the majority of the leading universities of Russia have been closed again on account of revolutionary student disturbances. A reactionary paper recently reported with glee the reopening of one of them — the

picture it drew of the reopening is sufficient to show its true significance: "The University is again open. At the doors there are standing policemen and sentinels with loaded guns; inside of the University is a company of soldiers and a large squad of police. The students have to show tickets on going in and to have them marked. The lectures are going regularly forward. It is to be noticed that there is no tearing about in the corridors, with cries, noises, and alarms, with the caps on the head. The strong measures have forced order. The revolutionists are foaming with rage." Let us not leave the picture without recalling the misery of these students who give up everything, present opportunities, their freedom, and their future careers, for the cause, who go about in the university towns in the terrible Russian winters without warm overcoats, who are ready to accept any sort of old clothes from anyone sufficiently sympathetic with the revolutionary movement to donate them in the name of the cause, who earn their living by any means, from shaving to giving lessons for two or three rubles a month.

There can be no question that the overwhelming majority of the educated class of Russia are devoted heart and soul to the revolution. This is not an accident; it is not due to any particular element of the moment, nor perhaps even to the political situation of Russia in general. The Russian educated man is not bourgeois like those of other countries. His character has never been drawn better in a few words than by Merejkovsky, one of Russia's most brilliant writers, whose works are being translated to-day into every language. "Recall," he says, "the figures of Rasbolnikov, Bazarov, Karamazov (perhaps the three most famous characters of Russian literature). What strange characters! You can call these men what you like; they are not bourgeois. In their presence Flaubert would not have dared to say that politics is the business of the mob. For them politics are a passion, an intoxication, a devouring flame. They are heroes and martyrs who leave of their own free will the camp of the successful to go into the camp of the dying."

The character of nations, like that of individuals, can be made great by tragic experience. Some of our modern countries

are so far from such calamities and deep experiences that they have forgotten what can be learned from misery and suffering. The Russian people are losing much of their vital forces and even something in certain elements of character by the struggle, but they are gaining more than they lose. Every year sees an astounding and inspiring increase of the intelligence and seriousness of all classes of the people. There is, for instance, little tendency to patronise light and superficial literature and plays, to look at great situations in a superficial or comic manner, to idealise the brutal and ugly forces of life because we are on the whole satisfied with our present state. The nation is becoming refined, chastened, elevated and ennobled by the indomitable struggle it is making for great and pure ideas.

Under the leadership and guidance of men devoted to great causes, the Russian people is surely awaited by a greater destiny than is so far known to history. All the best writers of the country, read as no others perhaps by the whole civilised world, are trying to express the message that this heroic and devoted people are sending to humanity. It will only be after the climax of the great revolution that we shall know definitely what this message is. In the meanwhile that which lends most of all an absorbing and irresistible interest to the Russian revolution is the dim foreshadowing of large ideas. Whoever tries to peer even a little way into the future must make his essay at a characterisation of the Russian message. Certainly its import to humanity does not promise to be inferior to the message of Rousseau and Voltaire, and we should not be surprised to find one day that the world has been more affected by the Russian revolution than it has by any of the great world transformations that have taken place since the fall of the Roman Empire and the general adoption of Christianity by the European people.

For Russia it seems to be at once a revolution, a reformation, and a renaissance. To the world it may be the beginning of a still greater change. For Rome the adoption of Christianity was a profound transformation in the Church and State, for civilisation it was the reversal of the aims and ideas that had guided it for a thousand years. A conscious social revolution victorious in Russia might set in motion an untold

world-change in both the organisation of society and the ruling ideas and aims of mankind.

"Christian humanity — if not all humanity," says Tolstoi, "is at present at the beginning of a universal transformation that has been smouldering during centuries, even thousands of years."

What is this transformation? What is Russia's message?

CHAPTER VIII

RUSSIA'S MESSAGE

I

THE Russian revolution is an heir to the ages. It is descended in part from primitive Christianity and partly from the Reformation, but its immediate predecessor was the French Revolution. The first Russian revolutionists, the Decembrists of 1825, received their ideas and inspiration directly from France itself. Both Russia's great religious Socialist, Tolstoi, and its new political Socialism, are deeply indebted to the French Revolution and its thinker, Rousseau. In the last generation many liberal and educated Russians have been brought up from the cradle on the pure and noble democracy of Rousseau. For more than a generation the "*Nouvelle Heloise*," "*Emile*," and the "*Contrat Social*," were the source of social inspiration not only to France and Russia, but to the world. In France they were gospels — as Carlyle had said, "*the Evangel according to St. Jacques*"; and in Russia even to-day if we want to understand the political side at least of the new faith we must turn back for at least a moment to Rousseau.

Unlike the faith of his predecessor, Montesquieu, the father, if there was one, of the American Constitution, and unlike the sociology and most of the Socialism of our time, the social faith of Rousseau was based on a conception of the moral duty of the individual rather than on a mere evaluation and acceptance of the conditions and necessities of history. Rousseau based his principles and ideas not on what has been, but, as he declared, on what ought to be. Here he is at one with Tolstoi, who replaced him in a sense in Russia. Like Tolstoi also, Rousseau was not at all satisfied to give society a mere scheme of political or social principles. He felt that no healthy social organism could exist on the basis of a sort of civil religion, common beliefs

that should hold society together and furnish the foundation of a social faith.

To-day Rousseau no longer answers definitely the prevailing social questions, but at least he formulated the great question as it should be formulated. He asked not what kind of government is best suited to the men of the time, but what kind of government will form the best men. His question is, then, what is permanent and what can be improved in man. His social principles all rest on a moral study of human nature, with no special relation to conditions that happen to exist now or have existed for a few generations or centuries. He asks what is the destiny of man, what can be made of him, and what government is necessary to this end. In contrast with Montesquieu, whose ideas prevailed before Rousseau and still prevail in England, the United States, and other countries, Rousseau was a pure democrat. His first principle was that the sovereign people could not be bound even by its own actions; to him there could be no written constitution, for he demanded that the first question to be asked in every governmental assembly ought to be, what form of government do we want. The sovereign people of Rousseau had the right at any moment to revoke the power of its agent, the government; this was the principle that we know to-day as the imperative mandate. A law that the people had not ratified was not a law; this was the principle now called the referendum. To Rousseau a representative government was a really free government only during the elections, only while the voters were actually exercising their will — afterward they were absolutely enslaved.

All these principles, it will be remembered, were adopted during the French Revolution by not only the extreme revolutionary Jacobins, but even the moderate Girondists. If they had been put into practice, as the latter indeed demanded, during the trial of Louis XVI. the French king would never have been executed and the chief disgrace of the Revolution, the "Terror," would never have come to be.

Sovereignty for Rousseau was also indivisible. He abhorred Montesquieu's (the American) system of checks and balances. In all other important respects also Montesquieu was a perfect contrast, demanding as he did that laws be rarely altered, that

the only way to rule rulers was to change them frequently and to divide their power, that if two dangerous arms of government were both limited by the other the people were comparatively safe from oppression, that there should be a second legislative chamber composed of persons of birth, wealth and honours — all principles that in their application in America to-day enable the capitalistic power to go far toward controlling the government. But Montesquieu was at least logical. Like Alexander Hamilton, he was perfectly conscious that he was as much of an aristocrat as democrat. If a democratic republic, he says, be founded on commerce, individuals may safely possess great riches, for the spirit of commerce brings with it that of economy, moderation, labour, wisdom, tranquillity, and order. In other words, a commercial state to Montesquieu has all the political virtues. For Rousseau it has all the vices; for him democracy requires absolutely certain equality of fortune. To Rousseau Montesquieu's republic might indeed be a republic after the order of the oligarchies of Venice or Florence, but it had no claim to the title of democracy.

In the free and democratic form of government conceived by the prophet of the French Revolution, "each one of us puts his person and all his power under the supreme direction of the general will; and we receive into our body every member as an indivisible part of the whole." This great conception rested, it may be seen, on faith in the absolute unity between the individual and the government, transcending in this respect all social philosophies which see some conflict of interest between society and the individual. Rousseau reached this height in his view of society because of his equally unified conception of the moral nature of the individual. "The truly free man," he says, in "Emile," "wishes only for what he can achieve and only does what pleases him."

Applied to social life this feeling of the unity of man's nature, led to the conclusion that "as soon as the public service ceases to be the principal business of the citizens . . . the state is already near to ruin." Rousseau demanded then, as much as Tolstoi or the Russian Socialist of to-day, not only pure democracy but the complete devotion of the individual to the general welfare. He had no mystical belief that the devotion

of every man to his own private business would necessarily lead to the general good.

Rousseau's successor in Russia was partially, and for a certain time at least, Tolstoi, but contemporary with Tolstoi, or almost so, have been the teachings of another international thinker, read more in Russia than in any other land, Karl Marx. I shall not stop to characterise the teachings of the founder of German Socialism any longer than to say that his influence in present-day Russia has to be reckoned alongside that of Rousseau, and certainly above that of Tolstoi. Perhaps the chief significance of Tolstoi for Russia, where Marxism is the dominant social theory among the present generation, is his antagonism to it. Tolstoi himself feels so strongly his antagonism to Marx that he bears proudly the title of Marx's most bitter opponent, the philosophical anarchist, rather than that of Social Democrat monopolised by the Marxian school. We look on him, however, as a complement rather than an opponent of Marx. We do not and cannot deny the antagonism, but as far as their practical proposals are concerned we say that the points of strength in Marx are for the most part the weak points of Tolstoi, just as we say that the essential weaknesses of Marxism are the very elements of strength in Tolstoi's doctrine.

Tolstoi indeed recognises many of the most fundamental principles of Marxian Socialism and elaborates them in the most effective way. To Tolstoi, as to Marx, the struggle between the rich and the poor, the employer and the employee, is a bitter reality. Both recognise the existence of this "class struggle."

But while Tolstoi recognises the struggle he does not express it in Marx's dogmatic form, but feels, like so many other Russian Socialists, that it is a conflict not between the "haves" and "have-nots," but rather between those who have more and those who have less. Laying the chief emphasis, as he does, on its spiritual and not on its material aspect, he does not feel that the question of a small amount of property decides the position of an individual in the conflict. At the same time he gives equal importance to other struggles, those between individuals and nations, and condemns all as the expression of the same irreligious and unsocial hatred that characterises present-day mankind in his social relationships.

It might appear that the economist, Marx, and the religionist, Tolstoi, had few points of contact; but since Marx concerns himself with all society, including religion, and Tolstoi applies his religion to economic questions, this is not the case. In regard to the land question, Tolstoi is undoubtedly a kind of Socialist. He agrees with the fundamental principle of Socialism that the work of society must be reorganised. In our conversation he explained that he thought this could be done according to the principles of Henry George; at any rate he had a supreme faith in the soundness of the life and instincts of the country people. But at the same time he surprised me by acknowledging quite frankly that he was not clear as to how the future society could be organised in the towns. Here, then, we have a point where a third person may well reconcile Tolstoi's economy with that of Marx. Of course the disciples of neither would tolerate such a reconciliation. But since Marx expressed more or less pity or even contempt for the peasant and displayed very little knowledge of the evolution through which the peasant has passed, we may well decide that Tolstoi understands better the conditions of his peasants, just as Marx was unquestionably a master of all questions concerning most nearly his workingmen. It is indeed on this principle that the Russian political movement is solving the great social problem. It is bent on finding a common ground for the best parts of the doctrine of Marx and Henry George.

The Labour Group in the Duma, representing the majority of the Russian peasantry, in proposing a solution of the land question, proposed at the same time to solve the labour question for the workingmen. It was for this reason perhaps that its delegate, Anikine, was received as a Socialist by an international congress at London in 1906. For this revolutionary land reform of the Labour Group is Socialism of the broadest and deepest kind. In demanding that each individual shall be supplied with land, while knowing full well that there is not enough land to give any one all that he needs, the Labour Group proposed to make the Russian Government responsible for the economic well being of each and every citizen. In insisting that every individual should have a right to his share in the soil the Group offered an alternative of agricultural labour to every workingman

in the country. In declaring that no man should have more land than he could work with his own hands the Group proposed to abolish wage labour in the agricultural sections.

The result of this great social revolution would be that the farmers would become interested in the upbuilding of industry, not only to gain a market but also to lift from their own shoulders the necessity of dividing their land with the disinherited. The farmers would share the burden of the underpaid and unemployed workers of the towns, but in return they would demand by right from the general Government every possible support for agriculture in the form of cheaper transportation, cheap credit, and wherever beneficial to them, free trade. At the same time, having the burden of the labourer on their shoulders, they would have his interest at heart; they would want to build up industry and encourage business enterprise, while they would be jealous of all exceptional profits and would join their forces against those of private capital alongside the working people and professional classes of the towns. For according to Tolstoi, according to the Labour Group, and according to all the popular and Socialist parties of Russia, the larger part of the profits of private capital are unearned. Tolstoi has best expressed the feeling of all.

"If a statesman," writes Tolstoi, "says that besides a personal advantage he has in view the common benefit, we cannot help believing him, and each of us knows such men; but a business man from the nature of his occupations, *cannot* have and would be ridiculous in the sight of his fellows if in his business he did aim at something besides the increasing of his own wealth and the keeping of it. And therefore the working people do not consider the activity of business men of any help to them, for their activity is associated with violence toward the working people; and its object is not the good of the people but always and only personal advantage."

This is the view not of Tolstoi alone, nor of the popular class, but of nearly all classes of Russian society. Of course he is speaking not of the business man who is also something else, but of the business man as business man. As far as a man is absorbed wholly in business, says the Russian opinion of to-day, he cannot have in view the common good.

Tolstoi has also expressed better than any other Russian the common belief of the majority of the nation that capitalistic property is the root of all the evil of present-day society. In another passage, equally a part of Russia's message, Tolstoi used the word "property" instead of "capital," but since he is a follower of Henry George, he doubtless has in mind rather than property of all kinds only capital and land.

"Property," he says, "is the root of all evil; and at the same time property is that toward which all the activity of our modern society is directed, and that which directs the activity of the world states and government intrigues, makes wars for the sake of property, for the possession of the banks of the Rhine, of land in Africa, China, the Balkan Peninsula. Bankers, merchants, manufacturers, landlords, labour, use cunning, torment themselves, torment others, for the sake of property; government functionaries, tradesmen, landlords, struggle, deceive, oppress, suffer, for the sake of property; courts of justice and police protect property; penal servitude, prisons, all the terrors of so-called punishments — all is done for the sake of property."

In spite of the jealousy felt against him by the Socialist parties, especially the more orthodox Marxian party, Tolstoi is the greatest opponent of capitalism in Russia and in the world to-day. He is indeed a party in himself — not a political party, of course, but the exponent of a social programme. This social programme may be impracticable, but it is among the greatest menaces to the continued existence of the Czarism supported by international capital. Tolstoi's great contribution, as I have already suggested, is his attack on the intellectual defenders of the present system. "Science," he says, "has proclaimed struggle and hatred as necessary and beneficent conditions of human life." This also is a feature of the criticism of all the very intellectual and truly philosophical Russian movement. "The appropriation of the labour of others by a strong man, which formerly theologians called Divine predestination," says Tolstoi in another of his strongest passages, "which philosophers called inevitable conditions of life, scientific science now calls the organic division of labour. All the importance of the ruling science consists in this alone. This science now becomes the dispenser of diplomas for idleness, because she alone in her

temples analyses and determines what activity is parasitic and what is organic in the social organism. As if men could not, each for himself, much better decide it and more quickly, too, by consulting his reason and conscience." "When art and science really existed," he says elsewhere, "they were intelligent to all men." This demand, then, for democracy, applied not only to political, economic, and social questions, but also to science and art, is the great contribution of Tolstoi to revolutionary Socialism. Often half-hearted democrats take refuge in the advocacy of an "aristocracy of mind and heart." This to Tolstoi is not only a sin and a crime but the very source of all the evil of our time, since men are led astray not so much by their mere selfish desires as by their very unwillingness to obey the appeals of society instead of answering only their own intellectual or æsthetic whims.

Tolstoi, as I have said, placed all his hopes on the peasant, while Marx in his communist manifesto spoke of the "idiocy of rural life." According to a recent interpreter (Boudin) Marx was at the best filled with "compassion" for the "hopeless case of the poor peasant." The new Russian Socialism takes no such patronising view. It does not share the common suspicions against either half of the population, the peasants or the workingmen. Already even the Russian Marxians concede that the peasantry of Russia may make as good revolutionists and democrats, if not as good Socialists, as the workingmen. But the Socialist Revolutionary Party goes further and feels that the agricultural population will make good Socialists also. Their chief writers stake everything on the peasants without deserting the workingmen. One of them, Tchernov, tries to interpret Marx, to prove that he did understand the peasant and points to the efforts of nearly all the European Socialist parties to fix up their doctrines to please the agricultural population and to accept as justifiable some form of private property in land, in order that the country people shall not be frightened away from Socialism by fear of losing their possessions.

But another thinker of the Socialist Revolutionists, rather than endeavouring to make one more interpretation of Marx, seeks the historical predecessors of the new Socialist doctrine in the French Revolution. Chisko and others who think with

him value Bakunine, Marx's chief antagonist, almost as much as they do Marx himself. In championing the cause of the founder of modern anarchism they show that they are as much opposed to coercive government as they are to private property and justify the claim that the object of their attack is not private property any more than it is government, but capitalism in so far as it roots itself in both.

"The fundamental ideal of the communists' manifesto" (the ten commandments of Marxian Socialism), says Chisko, "that economic phenomena, *independently of the will and tendencies of mankind*, are preparing the technical material and psychical elements of the social revolution, must be renounced." Chisko then, as well as the majority of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, is at one with Rousseau and Tolstoi in placing the first emphasis on the will of man.

The Socialist Revolutionists accuse their orthodox Marxian predecessors of defending only the interests of wage labourers who possess nothing, the so-called "proletariat," and not those of labour in general. It is on this ground that Tchernov accuses them of lacking both in true Socialism and true democracy. Indeed, in attacking private property instead of private capital, in refusing to recognise that a peasant even though he is in possession of a piece of land, provided he does not employ another, may be as social as the workingman, the older Socialists had abandoned a principle of equal importance certainly with Socialism itself, namely democracy. The Social Democracy has brought Socialism in the various nations to a many-sided crisis precisely because of its undemocratic character.

If a Socialist organisation is attached to Socialism (collectivism) rather than to democracy, it is a natural result that English Fabian Societies should arise — that favour, or at least accept without much resistance, even so undemocratic an idea as the justification of a minority rule. This leads at once, of course, to the idea of a domination by some minority, usually some part of the middle class. The Socialism then proposed is not any fundamental change of society but only a State Socialism, the extension of the functions of the government.

If the working people, unwilling to accept the domination

of a numerical majority, insist on pushing forward their Socialistic beliefs in a revolutionary manner, then the penalty of this form of undemocratic Socialism is a Paris Commune. If, on the other hand, while still remaining revolutionary and undemocratic, they propose to wait for a majority, they announce that with the aid of their majority they are going to establish a "dictatorship" of the proletariat, and all the neutral and wavering elements of society are frightened into reaction by the idea that all minorities are to be crushed by the working class.

But the undemocratic Socialists give up their revolutionary spirit. They console themselves by some illusion of politics, some kind of parliamentarism. So in Germany we have seen the naïve working class under the leadership of Bebel calmly looking forward to the day when the majority of the nation would be workingmen — a day whose arrival we may well doubt in any self-sufficient modern country. Nor is this the greatest danger for this latter peaceful and undemocratic type of movement. It stakes everything on the permanence of constitutionalism and universal suffrage; it fails to learn from the recent examples in Germany and Russia and many other countries that it is as easy for political institutions to be turned backward as forward, and that without democracy, without a majority in possession of the concrete power to enforce its will, no people has the hope of evolving a great social movement, that no people is protected by a mere paper constitution or an election law in the hands of a hostile power.

The Russian Socialists are both revolutionists and democrats. They know that they have to win liberty and Socialism by fighting for them, and they know that they can hope for nothing unless they can maintain a unity of the masses of the population both of the towns and country. It is in order to maintain this unity that they have sought a reconciliation of the revolutionary social principles with regard to the land, those of Henry George, and the revolutionary view of capitalism, that of Marx.

It is this unification of all the highest conceptions of Socialism and politics that we shall learn from Russia, rather than any entirely new social ideals. It is precisely because Russia is

so much a part of the modern world that we cannot and must not expect an entirely new and strange ideal, but we can expect and have already received from her higher and better expressions of the profoundest social conceptions that have yet been formulated by men.

II

The Russian Revolution gives the world more than a social programme. The new Russian ideas tend to revolutionise the very basis of modern thought, not only with regard to society, but with regard to all life; they tend to revolutionise the method of reasoning and feeling of every individual; they attack the modern religion, the only real deeply rooted religion of our day, the theory of evolution, considered not as a mere hypothesis of physical science, but as a guide to all life. Russians in general, even conservatives, are agreed that the great movement that is gaining possession of the nation means not merely a change of the constitution, but if I may quote from a private conversation with Michael Stachovitch, one of the most moderate, "a change of all institutions, of all relations, of all life, of everything."

In developing the new idea of the laws of the growth of society, the Russian people are also reaching a new conception of all life, of all realms of human activity, even of science, art and religion. For the conception of the law of social growth that prevails in any society itself, marks the whole psychical condition of that society. When this conception changes all other ideas change; this is why Russia is leading, not only in social thinking and ideals, but in all the realms of spiritual life.

Because all the nations have common economic problems — how to secure for society the enormous unearned land rents that now go into the pockets of individuals, how to manage the railways and how to give the profits from the great economies of modern industry to consumers and employees instead of leaving them in the hands of capitalists — the social programme and philosophy of the revolution is international. But the new conception of life itself had to come from Russia, the only country in profound spiritual upheaval since the conquest of

the world by the new scientific religion, now too deeply rooted to be eradicated under ordinary conditions of life. The French Revolution overthrew not only Louis XVI. in France and shook feudalism in all Europe; it also upset authorities in philosophy, religion, science, and art and prepared the way for Kant and Darwin as world powers. Humanity has undergone no French Revolution, no spiritual world upheaval for a century, and as a consequence new authorities begin to rule and we have been sinking gradually into unfruitful skepticism and even into a virulently anti-social faith.

Several generations ago several great social thinkers, like Marx and Proudhon, began to write how society develops, not only by slow, quiet, orderly, and continuous evolution, but also by rapid changes, by apparent though not real breaks in the ordinary process. The best known and most influential of these writers was Karl Marx. Marx conceived a new idea of the law of social development, especially of that particular form of development known as revolutions. He, however, was chiefly concerned with that revolution which he thought was rapidly approaching at the time he wrote. As he conceived of revolution as the "open and violent rebellion" we usually know under that name, he did not look further ahead into the future than to the next catastrophe, he did not try to foresee the kind of revolution that humanity should have to go through with for a longer period. This lack of far-sightedness vitiated his doctrine. To followers of Marx the conception that revolution in the social psychology of mankind, in the methods of the control of society over individuals and of individuals over society, should continue forever, might be even a misuse of the term revolution.

In spite of the fact that the world is already in possession of Marx's elaborate doctrine of revolution, the so-called scientific Socialism, the prevailing conception of social growth in all countries, even among the most scientific persons, is still of the simplest order. The great masses still believe in the same form of linear social development. To them society moves along more or less straight lines in one direction or another, and this they call "evolution." To the more educated the conception is slightly more complicated and the idea is perhaps that of an

"evolution" along the line of a spiral — society is supposed to move from one side to the other of the spiral, to return to a similar position vertically to the one it occupied before, but on a higher plane. It is doubtless true, as many psychologists say, that we must use, as handles or tools of thought, certain physical images and certain mechanical figures of speech, but if our logical and reasoning powers have not developed further than this, let us at least see that our images and figures are more developed. Let us try, like those Russians, all of whose waking and sleeping thoughts are absorbed by the social problem, to conceive society in a more subtle and realistic manner. If we must use figures, let us imagine social development as taking place, not along any single line, no matter how curved or complicated, but in every possible direction at once and in all three dimensions. By the use of this figure we would be rescued from many of the absurdities of the prevailing conception, we could for the first time conceive of society as growing in two opposite directions at the same time, or developing in one direction without losing what had already been gained in another. We would not speak, then, of political revolution as being the result of reaction, or of reaction as the inevitable result of revolution. If we must put our concept of the tendency of society at a given moment in a single figure of speech, we could speak of the movement of the centre of gravity of the growing body politic in some new direction, and along some given line. But a solid body growing always in many directions would be something far different from our old figure of society as a point moving along a line, since bodies of the same bulk and the same centre could have an infinite variety of form and structure. To employ this figure for our own purposes, if the resultant, the sum of all the motions of society in various directions, the general movement of the whole, should itself suddenly take a new direction, or commence to move much more rapidly along the same path, we should have what would be more properly called revolution than evolution.

Revolution is simply a new rapidity, or suddenly changed direction, of evolution. This is the great truth that the moderns, outside of Russia, are forgetting, and in forgetting it are risking all the freedom, democracy, and accelerated development of

the race that revolution has obtained for mankind. Some advances have been obtained by evolution, exclusive of revolution; I am not opposing one to the other, but on the contrary I am objecting most vigorously to this very fictitious opposition, to the consideration either of evolution or of revolution as a superior form of social development. To speak of evolution as against revolution, or to exclude rapid and strikingly new developments as entirely inadmissible, as a higher form of social progress, is to adopt the most fundamentally conservative and reactionary idea ever yet thought out by the mind of man. Many religions and theories of the state have spiritually subjected humanity, but none were ever so universal, so dangerous, and so terrible as this. If we speak of social development as evolution, and if from this term evolution we exclude all revolutionary development, we are in the toils of a dogmatic creed or philosophy worse than anything the world has seen since the time of the ancient Egyptians.

This reactionary scientific-religious faith was invited by the dull neutral attitude toward moral and social questions held by the great scientists in the middle of the last century, who divided life into science and — life. Spencer and his school had no social or individual faith to offer. They converted mankind to an almost servile respect for physical science, destroyed by the aid of this science much of the old philosophy and many of the old moral and social ideals, and offered nothing to take their place. Their successors have not been so modest; the place was there visibly empty; only the voices of the devotees of science could fill it, for other voices were no longer heard; God had been overthrown, the throne was empty and there was every temptation to set up the devil in his stead.

A generation ago John Morley in his interesting book on "Compromise," that sums up so well the best political thought of our intellectual predecessors, deplored the lack of faith in the thinking of the English people of that day. To-day we are facing a still greater evil in the prevalence not of indifference but of a positively anti-social faith. Morley complained of a profound distrust of all general principles, of the popular supposition that there was some antagonism between principle and expediency, between theory and fact. He accused his

generation of thinking only of the interest of the day and very little of the day to come. "What great political causes," he asked, "her own, or another's, is England defending to-day?" He might have asked the same question of any other people of the time, and of a large part of any people to-day.

Morley, like Spencer and the other great individualists of his time, who still have an immense influence, especially in America, felt deeply the need of the recognition of "the sacredness of principle." "Elements of national deterioration," he said, "will disappear only when the world has grown into the possession of a new doctrine; when that day comes, all good things will follow. . . . The new doctrine itself will never come except from spirits predisposed to their own liberation. Our day of small calculations and petty utility must first pass away. Our vision of the true expediencies must reach further and deeper; our resolution to search for the highest verities, to give up all and follow them, must first become the supreme part of ourselves." Yet Morley and his generation are responsible more than all others for the further deterioration of public opinion with regard both to political and all other great principles. For instead of welcoming the only new doctrine that could save or help society, they opposed it with all their power; like Morley himself, who, though he acknowledged some form of Socialism was inevitable, proposed to die fighting it with back to the wall, or like Spencer who called it the coming slavery. "Ours is a country where love of constant improvement ought to be greater than anywhere else, because the fear of revolution is less," wrote Morley—but the fear of revolution, or rather the hope of revolution, is the mainspring of the greatest progress of the race.

It is because they have grasped this principle of social politics that the Russian spirit is so great to-day. Once having lost the highest social verities, it was natural that Morley and his whole generation of individualists should fall into the very gulf of compromise that they all so wished to avoid. Already Mill had questioned the sovereignty of the people, the first principle of all social progress, and given some credit to the belief that society was in need of heroes or deliverers to govern it. Morley accepted Mill's waverings and fell even further than he. Seek-

ing "the right kind of compromise," like the moderate party in the Russia of to-day, he bargained away most of his great principles, even to avoiding the issue as to whether he favoured a republic or a monarchy in the England of the present day.

Since individualism, much as it saw the need of it, supplied no social faith, Nietzsche and Kipling have come along to fill the empty place until now the new popular social science, as Tolstoi rightly says, even in the midst of our so-called civilisation, defends the survival of the principle of the tooth and claw; while a Henley or a Nietzsche actually glorifies war, not for its fruits alone but because they see in it the noble art. In seeking to lay the philosophical foundations for a higher individualism, in endeavouring to inspire mankind with the passionate desire to produce a higher type, Nietzsche has indeed not only ignored society, but he has constructed a positively anti-social belief, leaving no place but slavery or death for the overwhelming majority, who are not "supermen." Yet this man's philosophy rules in Germany and the number of his disciples grows apace in other lands!

This is as we might have expected; men cannot live without faith; we must either idealise the coming society, including as part of it the coming man, or we must idealise the individual of the future without regard to society and the race, and accept the worship of mere power without regard to any other question. Humanity need no longer go without a faith adapted to the times; the Russians have already found it. During the present generation, say the Russians, we are in need of preachers of revolution, and of revolution in all things. The goal of the human race is best expressed perhaps in Schopenhauer's "will to live" or Nietzsche's "will to power"; the living out of our deepest instincts, however doubtful when applied only to individuals, may hold true if applied to humanity as a whole; but if this is so, if society exists to fulfill its own purpose and not to conform to fatal and fixed conditions of environment, the now popular use or misuse of the conception of evolution would again be consigned to a secondary rôle. We should say with Maeterlinck in his essay, "The Bees," that it is our duty to seek out the ends of our existence, not in the natural environment or even in human history, but rather in the study of the structure of our

own psychical and physical organs; and since functions are fixed by the structure of organs, to live the life we were born for — to travel in the directions pointed out by our own organic ends and capacities, under the limitations of our own physical and psychical organisms, rather than under the external limitations imposed on us by the outside universe, considered by the evolutionary or historical school as the only really important element of our environment. According to this conception it is not the function of man and society to try to see life from a dead scientific standpoint, to endeavour to be objective and external, as it were to put ourselves outside of our bodies, but to give up this equally useless and impossible task and to live the life for which another kind of science, a physically and psychically introspective science, a science that restores man to his true place in the centre of his universe, shows we were created.

Here is a truly spiritual conception of evolution and the struggle for existence. In this conception we do not struggle against one another, forced to internecine strife by the narrow limits of a fixed environment; but the environment presents itself to our senses, to our intelligence, our will and our power, dumbly pleading to us for such recognition as it humanly deserves, each element of the environment struggling with the other to be taken into the only realm that is real to man, that of our physical and psychical life, in order there to become an element in the further evolution of our being. This is indeed a revolution of the prevailing evolutionary theory. Instead of individuals struggling against one another under a more or less fixed environment, this new world-outlook regards human evolution as being a struggle of environments before the human individual, the arbiter of the universe, at least as far as mankind is concerned. This beautiful concept loses nothing of what modern science has gained for us; it merely reverses the inhuman social and moral principles that have been allowed almost to monopolise the applications of science to our ideas of human life.

To worship nature objectively as some scientists advise us to do is to return very near to the psychology of the primitive man, who in his devotion both to the devil and to God was

paying a no greater tribute to the maleficent and beneficent powers of nature. It is to go back even of the ancient Hebrews; it is to forget that mankind is a chosen race, that as long as there is a single human family left, we must obey nothing, not even non-human "nature," which is absolutely external to ourselves, but must follow our own best moral reasons and instincts supported by a scientific study of the nature of our physical and spiritual selves.

This modern return to nature and betrayal of man, this adoption of the standpoint of the savages, which is supposed to be preached by the theory of evolution, is nothing less than impious to a truly social people like the Russians of to-day. Of all the countries of the world, it is the only one where such pseudo-scientific sociology is completely discredited. Yet we all feel there is something wrong.

It is because Tolstoi attacks this pseudo-science more effectively than anyone else that he is the most respected and venerated man alive to-day, even in countries where pernicious doctrines rule. If Tolstoi has lost nothing of the love and admiration in which he was held since he gave up trying to entertain and please his readers and took to preaching to them — this is due to the fact that he takes an absolute and moral view of life, retaining all the best conclusions of the ancient philosophies and religions on the nature of man, but drawing his materials entirely from our time. Tolstoi does not know that we are *related* to all things as well as to all men, but he contends nevertheless that our individual and social duty is not relative but absolute. There is for each individual in each given moment only one best way; if we fall below our appointed function as it is shown us by nature and our own best instincts and reasonings, or if society falls in the same way below its appointed functions, we hear from our individual or social conscience and know we have done wrong.

This view places man again in the centre of the universe, and gives him a truly unified and unbroken conception of life and of society. If we look at society not from the human, but from the pseudo-scientific or objective standpoint, we shall fail to understand a single social problem. If, for instance, political development is studied apart from all the other developments of

the life of society and of the individuals that compose it, we shall not only see political revolutions in the sense of a rapid evolution or evolution in some new direction, but we shall imagine we see or fear we may see positive gaps in the continuity of the process of development. As long as we consider political or even social evolution as a thing apart from the rest of the science of life, we shall stand in fear of these gaps. Indeed, ill-understood interruptions of continuous political evolution are so common that it is often even denied that there are any laws of political development. We do not know what politics will bring for us to-morrow because the political situation of to-day depends not on the political situation of yesterday, but on that of industry, science, religion, education, public morality, or even on some obscure corner of social life. There is no steady evolution of politics; there is only a continuous evolution of life, while politics consists of an endless series of more or less revolutionary transformations. Indeed it is only when politics are least important and have the least fundamental contact with life, that there can be anything resembling continuous and quiet political evolution. When politics become vital, when the energies of the individual and of society go principally and consciously in a political direction, the evolution of politics becomes to a large degree the barometer of the whole evolution of the race; and since it is certain that in trying to prophesy the political future we shall leave important elements of this greater evolution out of the reckoning, it is also certain that revolutions or breaks in the imaginary chain of political development will occur to surprise the "scientific" observer.

The Russians learned the danger of the old political thinking from their own experience. The Government through its prime ministers endeavours to promote such "scientific" thinking. As soon as the Government can succeed in polarising the popular thought, and concentrating the public attention on any two extremes, it is easy to persuade it that both are to be avoided. As soon as the people are divided into two camps, even in discussion, while the timid elements of the community are situated between, the Government can step in, and taking advantage of the chaos, itself induce some principle of that unity which every society imperatively

demands. When it can stir up such a spiritual conflict it is as if the Government had itself ordered the placing of the enemy's forces. Unity there must be; if in the chaos of competition of American industry, it is a great economic unit, a trust, that introduces the new and necessary unity, to the economic subjection of the people; if in Russia, it is the Czarism that steps in to restore the balance in race struggles and social conflicts it has itself encouraged, replacing by an artificial and violent unity the revolutionary Socialist unity for which the nation is striving.

If in Russia it is the Government that takes advantage of the division in the thought of the individual, it is the moderate party that is now trying to make use of this old and crude dualistic manner of political thought in order to put an end to the revolutionary movement. Contending, like Witte, that there are no interruptions in political evolution, the philosophers of Russia's moderate party and of the conservative wing of the Marxian Socialists as well, deny the possibility of revolutionary political changes, assume a legal or constitutional régime even before it exists, obey the present Government, and wear out their souls in vain working for the smallest beginning of a real constitution. The moderates' dualistic attitude toward life, their separation of science and the human soul, was recently expressed by the well known writer Berydaiev when he said: "We desire a neutral social development, the freeing of humanity and the lifting of it out of animal state, but not the transforming of social visions and dreams into a religion; for with a neutral sphere we can make our religion harmonise." But for the Socialist Christians or almost religious Socialists of the type that is dominating in Russia to-day, whether a Father Petrov or a Maxim Gorky, it is precisely these social dreams and passions that must be transformed into a religion and a social faith, and it is this social faith that constitutes the essence of all the deepest human thought and feeling, whether we call it religion or something else. Socialism as a purely political or economic doctrine can be opposed to a well harmonised purely political religious creed as Berydaiev suggests, but to the new revolutionary Russians there can be no contradictions between Socialism and religion, or one's social and personal creed. To

divide life into science and matters of the soul is for the Russians of to-day as much crime as it was to Rousseau or his followers in the great revolution of France, who lived and breathed their social faith before they preached it to mankind.

III

One of Russia's brilliant political writers, Bulgakov, demands in the name of Russian public opinion that the political party of the future should be a religious party in the broadest meaning of the term, including even a certain kind of atheism as a religious force.

In the true conception he claims every political party should constitute a single spiritual whole, should have a common soul, a common thought, a common will, should be literally a collective organism. The object of the religious political party he says should be "to participate in social and political life with the object of transforming it in equal spirit of love, liberty, equality, and fraternity. Sooner or later there must arise in our midst a purely Christian party absolutely alien to clericalism, obscurantism, and other spectres of the past, but inspired by great faith and in the name of this faith by ideals of democracy and Socialism." In these terms a devoted Christian is expressing a feeling that is common to all parts of the Russian people. Whether we hear speaking the radical Petrov or the conservative Bulgakov, the Christian anarchist Tolstoi or the communist anarchist Kropotkin, we have a common instance of the fusion of social and religious faith. Among the political Socialists and the great popular and Socialistic parties that are taking hold of the masses, we hear often the same cry, or still more often the simple demand, that Socialism raised to the height of a religious conception should become the faith of mankind.

These individuals and parties say that faith like this is not mystic; that their religion is no theological abstraction; it resembles rather the high rationalistic faith of Tolstoi. In Tolstoi's creed religion must inspire all individual and social morality, but this religion we find is based on a simple and rational conception of brotherly love, the desire to do to others as we would have others do unto us. Even the philosophy of

Comte, Tolstoi classes with religions which he defines as efforts to establish the relation of man to the world and its principle. God is the principle of the world, but the will of God is to bring about the welfare of man, the end of religion is social service. The end of society, on the other hand, is God. "For man, through man, to God," is Tolstoi's latest formulation of his social creed. But God's will is the spiritual welfare of mankind.

The religion of all who make their individual belief also a social faith is necessarily of a highly revolutionary order. Tolstoi's religion, for instance, teaches above all independence, it leads to both a spiritual and practical anarchism. So clearly is this true that we doubt if under our anarchist law, Tolstoi, any more than his friend, Prince Kropotkin, could be admitted into the United States, for Tolstoi not only speaks of the submission to human power as a sin, but preaches openly and clearly, like our great Thoreau, that nobody ought to submit to any government. He says repeatedly, as he also made clear in our personal talk, that he agrees in large part with the leading anarchists, Thoreau, Bakounin, Kropotkin, Proudhon and the rest.

But the social faith of the majority of Russians has no direct relation with any religious creed; it is inspired with the depth of feeling and faith that characterises religious thought, rather than with its intellectual formulation. Tolstoi and most of the revolutionists who have received their inspiration rather from religion than from the social situation itself, are inclined to favour a non-political and inactive verbal attack on the existing régime; whereas the revolutionists who have obtained their ideas largely from the struggle itself, believe not only in a militant activity but in martyrdom for the cause. Both are equally revolutionary in what they teach, but it is only the political Socialists that are revolutionary in action.

There are only two courses to humanity in the minds of most honest and intelligent Russians. We must either defend our principles against the universe to the last drop of our blood, as the majority of the Socialists demand, or with Tolstoi we must abandon social as opposed to individual progress, surrender all claims to the exercise of our physical energy in behalf of our principles, and become with him non-resistant to evil.

We must either devote ourselves whole-heartedly and aggressively to the service of our conception of the welfare of society, whatever it may be, and so hope also for the best possible development of each of society's members, or we must devote ourselves first of all to our own perfecting and expect with Tolstoi that the best social results will follow. We must either make the great social cause the first business of each of us, as Maeterlinck has lately so brilliantly urged, or beginning at the other end we must first socialise the individual with Tolstoi. In either case we find a religious ideal that gives equal account to the individual and society, that re-creates the individual and gives him a chance through social service to feel at home in the world and at one with the race.

I have traced briefly the social principles that the Russians are dying for, I have shown the new conception of life itself that is arising out of the revolution of social ideas. Russia has to offer the world something far greater even than a better and truer social philosophy or a larger conception and feeling about life; she is raising a new goal for all human endeavour. No Russian would consider it a misfortune that Maeterlinck and not one of their own compatriots has best expressed this imaginative striving after a social goal that lay beyond our own comprehension, for Russians, as has been said at the beginning, are international, not merely patriotic in their feelings, and international above all in their ready assimilation of the world's best thoughts.

Maeterlinck, who after Tolstoi is perhaps the most popular of all living serious writers, has seized the very soul of this revolutionary nation; indeed, we can have little doubt that he had the great revolutionary movement of the times in mind when he wrote his brilliant essay on "Our Social Duty."

"What are we to do in the present state of society?" asks the great Belgian, and answers that there can be no question about destroying it. The most spiritual argument against overthrowing the present society is, he thinks, that of those who ask only for a few years of respite on the ground that the great social question, with the onward march of science, will solve itself and render useless all the difficult sacrifices that justice now demands of men; but he denies this argument and refuses

this respite. Man must fulfil his organic duty, he says; he must play the rôle written for him by nature. He writes:

Humanity has appointed us to gather that which stands on the horizon. It has given us instructions which it does not behoove us to discuss. It distributes its forces as it thinks right. At every crossway on the road that leads to the future, it has placed, against each of us, ten thousand men to guard the past; let us therefore have no fear lest the fairest towers of former days be insufficiently defended. We are only too naturally inclined to temporise, to shed tears over inevitable ruins; this is the greatest of our trespasses . . .

Let us not say to ourselves that the best truth always lies in moderation, in the fair average. This would perhaps be so if the majority of men did not think, did not hope, upon a much lower plane than is needful. That is why it behooves the others to think and hope upon a higher plane than seems reasonable. The average, the fair moderation of to-day, will be the least human of things to-morrow. At the time of the Spanish Inquisition, the opinion of good sense and of the just medium was certainly that people ought not to burn too large a number of heretics; extreme and unreasonable opinion obviously demanded that they should burn none at all. It is the same to-day with the question of marriage, of love, of religion, of criminal justice, and so on. Has not mankind yet lived long enough to realise that it is always the extreme idea, that is the highest idea, the idea at the summit of thought, that is right? At the present moment, the most reasonable opinion on the subject of our social question invites us to do all that we can gradually to diminish inevitable inequalities and distribute happiness more equitably. Extreme opinion demands instantly integral division, the suppression of property, obligatory labour, and the rest. We do not yet know how these demands will be realised; but it is already quite certain that very simple circumstances will one day make them appear as natural as the suppression of the right of primogeniture or of the privileges of the nobility. It is important, in these questions of the duration of a species and not of a people or an individual, that we should not limit ourselves to the experience of history. What it confirms and what it denies moves in an insignificant circle. The truth, in this case, lies much less in our reason, which is always turned toward the past, than in our imagination, which sees further than the future . . .

Let us listen only to the experience that urges us on: it is always higher than that which throws or keeps us back. Let us reject all the counsels of the past that do not turn us toward the future. This is what was admirably understood, perhaps for the first time in history, by certain men of the French Revolution; and that is why this revolution is the one that did the greatest and the most lasting things. Here, this experience teaches us that, contrary to all that occurs in the affairs of daily life, it is above all important to destroy. In every social progress the great and the only difficult work is the destruction of the past

And let us not fear that we may go too fast. If, at certain hours, we seem to be rushing at a headlong and dangerous pace, this is to counterbalance unjustifiable delays and to make up for time lost during centuries of inactivity.

We are certain that almost to a man all the great parties and individuals that are driving forward Russia's great revolutionary movement could sign this confession of faith. Nearly all have seen in the life around them not only the evolutionary, but the revolutionary, truths; nearly all value the life of the coming generations more than they do that of the months and years in which they happen to be living; nearly all are listening only to the higher experience and are following the greater expediency. None have the belittling fear that society may go too fast. To them as to Maeterlinck social duty is a religious faith.

The Russians have not an over-confident nature, and this is why in their great crisis they have studied so carefully, so sympathetically and profoundly the histories and literature of all other countries to find if there is not a great and helpful truth that can aid Russia now. They have found many such truths and made them their own, and it is because of their open-mindedness and sympathy that they have now rather to teach humanity than to learn from it, and that the world is listening for their message. For a generation and more, especially during the last few years, they have been hearing and assimilating the world's best thought and experience — as no people that ever went before them. Maeterlinck's stirring appeal to social revolution is not received as it is in other countries as new, startling, and sensational, but rather as a perfectly accurate and true expression of what the Russians already feel. And this is Russia's message — not the words of any individual, not the principles of any party, but the daily thoughts and feelings and actions of a people ready to die for what they think and feel; a message involved in every living speech or writing, in every great deed, a message that goes out from Russia to travel around the world, to become implanted and to take root among all peoples and individuals that deserve and will win a share in the new civilisation of which the Russian Revolution is perhaps the dawn.

APPENDIX
AND BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

NOTE A

THE BASIS FOR RUSSIA'S CONSTITUTIONAL ILLUSIONS

THE CZAR'S MANIFESTO OF OCTOBER 17, 1905. (OCTOBER 30,
1905 — WESTERN CALENDAR)

WE, NICHOLAS II., by God's Grace Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russias, Czar of Poland, Grand Duke of Finland, and so forth, announce to our loyal subjects: The disturbances and movements in our principal cities and numerous other places in our realm fill our heart with great and intense anguish. The happiness of the Russian Ruler is inseparably bound with the happiness of the people and the pain of the people is the pain of the Ruler. From the present conditions there may arise a deep national disturbance and danger for the integrity and unity of our empire.

The high duty of our mission as Ruler compels us to bestir ourselves with our whole might and power to hasten the cessation of these disorders that are so dangerous for the State.

While we have ordered the proper officials to take measures to allay the direct manifestations of disorder, riots and deeds of violence and for the protection of the peaceful population which is striving to quietly fulfil all of the duties imposed upon it, we have at the same time recognised it as indispensable in order to accomplish successfully the general measures for the calming of public life to give to the activity of the highest officials of the Government a unified direction. We obligate the Government to fulfil our unchangeable will as follows:

1. The population is to be given the inviolable foundation of civil rights based on the actual inviolability of the person, freedom of belief, of speech, of organisation, and meeting.

2. Without interrupting the elections already ordered for the State Duma and as far as the shortness of the time at our disposition for the calling of the first Duma allows — such classes

of the population which are now altogether shut out from the right of suffrage, are to be called to participate in the Duma, upon which the working out of the principle of universal suffrage will be left to the new legislative body.

3. As an unchangeable principle it is declared that no law can be put into effect without the consent of the Duma of the State and that the elected representatives of the population will be guaranteed the possibility of an effective share in the revision of the legality of the commands of officials appointed by us.

We rely on all true sons of Russia to reflect concerning their duty to the Fatherland to work together for the cessation of the present unheard of disturbances of order, and to place all their powers along with ourselves at the disposal of the Cause of the restoration of order and peace in the Fatherland. Given at Peterhof on the 17th October, 1905, in the eleventh year of our reign.

(Signed) NICHOLAS.

NOTE B

THE REPLY OF THE FIRST DUMA TO THE SPEECH FROM THE THRONE MAY, 1906

YOUR MAJESTY:

In a speech addressed to the representatives of the people it pleased your Majesty to announce your resolution to keep unchanged the decree by which the people were assembled to carry out legislative functions in coöperation with their Monarch. The State Duma sees in this solemn promise of the Monarch to the people a lasting pledge for the strengthening and the further development of legislative procedure in strict conformity with constitutional principles. The State Duma, on its side, will direct all its efforts toward perfecting the principles of national representation and will present for your Majesty's confirmation a law for national representation, based in accordance with the manifest will of the people, upon principles of universal suffrage.

Your Majesty's summons to us to coöperate in a work which shall be useful to the country finds an echo in the hearts of all the members of the State Duma. The State Duma, made up of representatives of all classes and all races inhabiting Russia, is united in a warm desire to regenerate Russia and to create within her a new order, based upon the peaceful coöperation of all classes and races, upon the firm foundation of civic liberty.

But the State Duma deems it its duty to declare that while present conditions exist such reformation is impossible.

The country recognises that the ulcer in our present régime is in the arbitrary power of officials who stand between the Czar and the people, and seized with a common impulse the country has loudly declared that reformation is possible only upon the basis of freedom of action and the participation by the nation itself in the exercise of the legislative power and the control of the executive. In the Manifesto of October 17,

1905, your Majesty was pleased to announce from the summit of the throne a firm determination to employ these very principles as the foundation for Russia's future, and the entire nation hailed these good tidings with a universal cry of joy.

Yet the very first days of freedom were darkened by the heavy affliction into which the country was thrown by those who would bar the path leading to the Czar; those who by trampling down the very fundamental principles of the imperial Manifesto of October 17, 1905, overwhelmed the land with the disgrace of organised massacres, military reprisals, and imprisonments without trial.

The impression of these recent administrative acts has been felt so keenly by the people that no pacification of the country is possible until the people are assured that henceforth arbitrary acts of officials shall cease, nor be longer shielded by the name of your Majesty; until all the ministers shall be held responsible to the representatives of the people and that the administration in each step of State service shall be reformed accordingly.

Sire: The idea of completely freeing the Monarch from responsibility can be implanted in the mind of the nation only by making the ministers responsible to the people. Only a ministry fully trusted by the majority of the Duma can establish confidence in the Government; and only in the presence of such confidence is the peaceful and regular work of the State Duma possible. But above all it is most needful to free Russia from the operation of exceptional laws for so-called "special and extraordinary protection," and "martial law," under cover of which the arbitrary authority of irresponsible officials has grown up and still continues to grow.

Side by side with the establishment of the principle of responsibility of the administration to the representatives of the people, it is indispensable, for the successful work of the Duma, that there should be implanted, and definitely adopted, the fundamental principle of popular representation based on the coöperation of the Monarch with the people, as the only source of legislative power. Therefore all barriers between the Imperial power and the people must be removed. No branch of legislative power should ever be closed to the inspection of the representative of the people, in coöperation

with the Monarch. The State Duma considers it its duty to state to your Majesty, in the name of the people, that the whole nation, with true inspiration and energy, with genuine faith in the near prosperity of the country, will only then fulfil its work of reformation, when the Council of State, which stands between it and the throne, shall cease to be made up, even in part, of members who have been appointed instead of being elected; when the law of collecting taxes shall be subject to the will of the representatives of the people; and when there shall be no possibility, by any special enactment, of limiting the legislative jurisdiction of the representatives of the people. The State Duma also considers it inconsistent with the vital interests of the people that any bill imposing taxes, when once passed by the Duma, should be subject to amendment on the part of any body which is not representative of the mass of tax-payers.

In the domain of its future legislative activity the State Duma, performing the duty definitely imposed upon it by the people, deems it necessary to provide the country, without delay, with a strict law providing for the inviolability of the person, freedom of conscience, liberty of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of association, convinced that without the strict observance of these principles, the foundation of which was laid in the Manifesto of October 17, 1905, no social reform can be realised. The Duma also considers it necessary to secure for all citizens the right of petition to the people's representatives. The State Duma has further the inflexible conviction that neither liberty nor order can be made firm and secure except on the broad foundation of equality before the law of all citizens without exception. Therefore the State Duma will establish a law for the perfect equality before the law of all citizens, abolishing all limitations dependent upon estate, nationality, religion and sex. The Duma, however, while striving to free the country from the binding fetters of administrative guardianship and leaving the limitation of the liberty of the citizen to the independent judicial authorities, still deems the application of capital punishment, even in accordance with a legal sentence, as inadmissible. A death sentence should never be pronounced. The Duma holds that it has the right to proclaim, as the

unanimous desire of the people, that a day should come when a law forever abolishing capital punishment here shall be established. In anticipation of that law the country to-day is looking to your Majesty for a suspension of all death sentences.

The investigation of the needs of the rural population and the undertaking of legislative measures to meet those wants will be considered among the first problems of the State Duma. The most numerous part of the population, the hard working peasants, impatiently await the satisfaction of their acute want of land and the first Russian State Duma would be recreant to its duty were it to fail to establish a law to meet this primary want by resorting to the use of lands belonging to the State, the Crown, the royal family, and monastic and Church lands; also private landed property on the principle of the law of eminent domain.

The Duma also deems it necessary to create laws giving equality to the peasantry, removing the present degrading limitations which separate them from the rest of the people. The Duma considers the needs of working people as pressing, and that there should be legislative measures taken for the protection of hired labour. The first step in that direction ought to be to give freedom to the hired labourer in all branches of work, freedom to organise, freedom to act and to secure his material and spiritual welfare.

The Duma will also deem it its duty to employ all its forces in raising the standard of intelligence, and above all it will occupy itself in framing laws for free and general education.

Along with the aforementioned measures the Duma will pay special attention to the just distribution of the burden of taxation, unjustly imposed at present upon the poorer classes of inhabitants; and to the reasonable expenditure of the means of the State. Not less vital in legislative work will be a fundamental reform of local government and of self-government, extending the latter to all the inhabitants upon the principles of universal suffrage.

Bearing in mind the heavy burden imposed upon the people by your Majesty's army and navy, the Duma will secure principles of right and justice in those branches of the service.

Finally, the Duma deems it necessary to point out as one of

the problems pressing for solution the long-crying demands of the different nationalities. Russia is an empire inhabited by many different races and nationalities. Their spiritual union is possible only by meeting the needs of each one of them, and by preserving and developing their national characteristics. The Duma will try to satisfy those reasonable wants.

Your Majesty: On the threshold of our work stands one question which agitates the soul of the whole nation; and which agitates us, the chosen and elected of the people, and which deprives us of the possibility of undisturbedly proceeding toward the first part of our legislative activity. The first word uttered by the State Duma met with cries of sympathy from the whole Duma. It was the word amnesty. The country thirsts for amnesty, to be extended to all those whose offences were the result of either religious or political convictions; and all persons implicated in the agrarian movement. These are demands of the national conscience which cannot be overlooked; the fulfilment of which cannot be longer delayed. Sire, the Duma expects of you full political amnesty as the first pledge of mutual understanding and mutual agreement between the Czar and his people.

NOTE C

THE FIRST NATIONAL ASSEMBLY'S DECLARATION OF REVOLUTION

THE VIBORG MANIFESTO. JULY, 1906

TO THE PEOPLE:

The Duma has been dissolved by the Ukase of the 8th of July. You have elected us as your representatives; you have elected us and you have given us instructions to struggle for land and liberty. According to your instructions and to our duty we have drawn up these laws to assure liberty to the people. We have demanded the resignation of irresponsible ministers who transgress the laws with immunity, suppressing freedom.

But first of all we wished to formulate a law relative to the distribution of land to agricultural labourers, a law which demanded the division for this purpose of the lands belonging to the Crown, the monasteries and the clergy, and the expropriation of private estates. The Government considered this law as inadmissible, and when the Duma again presented its resolution in a more urgent manner on this subject of forced expropriation the Duma was dissolved.

The Government promises to summon a new Duma in seven months. Russia will have then to remain for seven long months without a people's assembly at a moment when the population finds itself a few steps from ruin and when industry and commerce are tottering. When all the country is filled with a feverish agitation and when the ministers have definitely shown their incapacity to do justice to the popular needs.

During the seven months the Government will act arbitrarily and will fight against the popular movement to obtain a pliant and obedient Duma. If it should succeed, however, in completely suppressing the popular movement the Government will not convoke the Duma at all.

Citizens, rise for the defence of your rights to a popular assembly which are being trampled under foot and for the defence of the Duma. Russia must not remain a single day without popular representation. You have the means of procuring this representation. The Government has without the consent of the representations of the people no right to levy taxes on the people nor to call the people into military service. Consequently, now that the Duma has been dissolved, you are fully justified in giving neither money nor soldiers. If, however, the Government should contract loans to procure an income, these loans contracted without the consent of your popular representatives are null and void. Russian people will never recognise them and it will not feel itself called upon to repay them. As a consequence until the popular representatives are called together do not give a kopeck to the throne, nor soldiers to the army. Be firm in your refusal. No power can resist the united and inflexible will of a nation.

Citizens, in this obligatory and inevitable struggle your representatives will be with you.

NOTE D

ONE OF THE CZAR'S CONFESSIONS

THIS secret document, one of the many of which the revolutionists have stolen a copy, shows how Russia gets her best, most accurate and irrefutable knowledge of the true character and statesmanship of her Czar. The marginal remarks were written by the Czar's own hand. The report, it will be noticed, was issued just before the close of the Manchurian war.

Report of the Controller of the State for the year 1904. Dated 6th August, 1905 N 741.

1. The Controller has noticed that the number and quantity of the materials, ammunition, provisions, etc. in the Army Corps do not correspond to the standards set by the law. The Controller of the State proposes to ask the Minister of War to give an account of this matter. It is necessary

2. The projectiles manufactured in the Perm workshops according to the specifications of the Krupp Company have shown a poor quality during the trials. Sad but true

3. The ammunition of the 5th and 6th Siberian Corps are altogether exhausted. In one of the travelling cars they have not been renewed since the campaign of 1877-78. Difficult to believe

4. In the 4th Corps the winter shoes are in frightful condition; the soles are made from chips of wood covered with strips of leather. This is disgraceful; how many legs have been frozen as a result?

5. The financial results of the activity of the State workshops in the Urals are very disappointing, the quantity of their product is insufficient and their qualities do not correspond to the needs of the Ministry of War. It is time to organise the State workshops of the Urals in a manner to render them useful to the State

7. The construction of the railways of the State demands enormous sums. The principal cause: The contractors give their rights to other persons, receiving 20 to 40 per cent. for having conceded them. (This article was twice underlined by the Czar)

9. The Controller thinks that the management of the State railways gives insufficient results because the members of the Central Administration who receive high salaries are not interested in the increase of the railway revenue. This is the way it seems to me too. He proposes to divide the salaries into two parts, first, a constant, second, varying according to the increase of the railways.

NOTE E

EXAMPLES OF AUTOCRATIC LEGISLATION

S. MARUDA, in the Constitutional Democratic organ, gives these examples of the delay and arbitrariness of "legislation" without an elected assembly:

In 1881 was begun the revision of the criminal laws. At length in 1903 the new code was finally affirmed. But only a few sections, those differing least from the old ones, were put into execution.

In 1882 the civil code was ordered to be revised. After twenty-two years the work had not gotten further than a project for a new code.

In 1881 the law about courts-martial and the so-called "states" of "strengthened" and "extraordinary" defence which are almost in universal use as supreme over all civil law at the present moment, was first "temporarily" introduced for not longer than half a year (an apology for its outrageous character), then extended year after year for twenty-seven years—to the present moment.

In 1895, perhaps partly as the result of George Kennan's book, the Czar ordered a revision of the laws about exile. After twelve years this order is not yet completed, and has just been put into execution in its uncompleted form.

The laws about doctors and veterinaries progressed so slowly that before their completion technical changes in science had made them obviously absurd, and it was not even tried to put them in execution. But worst of all was the fate of the law that was necessary above all others to prevent corruption—namely, that concerning the control and inspection of official expenditure.

In 1866 began the work of gathering material for a new inspection law. Perhaps this, too, was partly the result of a book—Gogol's satirical masterpiece, "The Inspector," that

had drawn the whole world's attention to the almost universal corruption of Russia's official caste. With great pains and trouble the project was at last written out, but it contained nothing new. Besides, it was not "approved," and the controller is in no better position than before to put a check to the bureaucratic robbery. Indeed matters are worse, for in 1862 the minister of finance was deprived of the right of distributing the public moneys at his will, according to one or another paragraph of the laws, while this year the minister, Kokovzev, has again claimed this right.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

THERE are very few books and articles bearing directly on the present Russian situation in English, French, or German. The writer has not made a very thorough search but, aside from daily papers, especially the *London Tribune*, the *London Times*, and *Vorwärts* of Berlin, and the *Humanité* of Paris, all of which he has found useful — he has discovered almost nothing. If the student wishes to go deeper, he must either read Russian or employ a translator. In either case he would probably be obliged also to transfer his labours to Russia, where he would of course at once strike an enormous literature. In mentioning the few works and articles that follow, I refer only to such as bear directly on the present situation; there is a much more abundant literature in all modern languages on conditions that existed before the beginning of the present revolutionary movement.

More full and reliable than the reports to be obtained from the daily papers I have mentioned have been the frequent articles of *L'Européen* (defunct) and *Le Courier Européen* of Paris, and especially of the *Correspondance Russe*, published at Berlin, London, and Paris during the last two years by an important group of Russian liberals, giving in a brief form several times a week invaluable documents and statistical information about the political situation and the revolutionary movement.

On the general situation the only book of first rate importance in English, French or German is the work of Professor Paul Milyoukov, "The Russian Crisis," which describes in a very satisfactory way the situation at the moment at the beginning of the present revolutionary movement in 1905. Another interesting general work (in German) is "Russen über Russland," which contains articles by the best Russian authorities on many phases of the present situation — as for example, an article by Ozerov on finance, by Struve on politics, by Kornilov on the peasants, and by Amfiteatrov on the women of Russia.

Two books in particular have been very useful to me in their exposure of the inner workings of the Government; the "Mémoires d'un Russe" by Prince Urussov, and "Une Page de la Contre-Revolution Russe" by Semenov. I believe that both of these books are now obtainable in English translations.

On the economic conditions of the country, there is a group of Russians in America that have produced their numerous interesting articles in our scientific and popular reviews. The writers of these articles, Messrs. Hourwich, Simkhovitch, and N. I. Stone, are known as authorities on these questions in Russia as well as in the United States, where they now reside. I must also mention the very useful monograph of the United States Department of Statistics on Commercial Russia, prepared under the able governmental statistician, Jacobson, also a Russian by birth.

On the Russian parties themselves, we have some very interesting publications in French. For several years, *La Tribune Russe* (83 Rue de la Santé, Paris) has given full monthly accounts of the whole Socialist revolutionary movement. The Socialist Revolutionary Party has also published a very full report for the last International Socialist Congress at Stuttgart — to be obtained from the International Socialist Bureau at Brussels. Lastly, I recommend the reader to Prince Kropotkin's able work in English on Russian Literature, which is not only the best book we have on the subject, but also shows from a passionately sympathetic standpoint the revolutionary character of Russian literature from its first beginnings about a century ago.

For pictures of the condition during the recent revolutionary disturbances, we have the excellently and truthfully written books of several of the most capable correspondents. Among these are "The Dawn in Russia," by Nevins, "The Red Reign," by Durland, and two similar works, though not written by correspondents, "A Year in Russia," by Baring, and "Russia in Revolution," by Perris, which describe the revolutionary movement just at the moment of the beginning of the recent disturbances. I also recommend a number of the articles in *Collier's* and *Harper's Weekly* by Albert Edwards and by Harold Williams, as describing accurately and from a broad standpoint the situation during the heat of the conflict.

INDEX

INDEX

- Absakov, 35
 Address to throne, 457
 Agrarian uprisings, 131, 265; disorder, 222; incendiarism, 249; warfare, 255-258
 Agriculture, 81; American farming, 138; estates of nobility, 181; features of, 182; crisis of, 211
 Aladdin, 28, 135, 228, 319; in America, 311
 Alcohol industry, 118, 236; monopoly of, 322
 Alexander II., 34, 35, 229
 Alexander III., 24
 Alexinsky, 229, 321, 369
 America, 35; political institutions of, 3; wages, 190
 Andreief, 36
 Anikine, 209, 212, 335; at International Congress in London, 432; in first Duma, 329
 "Annals of a Sportsman," 195
 Appeal of October, 1905, 76
 Apraxin, 23, 81
 Army, 262-267, 300-302; common soldiers, 384; mercenaries, 386; military revolt, 385; mutiny, 362; officers' desertion of, 383; recruits sworn against Czar, 387; revolutionary organisations in, 285
 Austria, 105.
 Authors. *See* Andriev, Chisko, Gorki, Korolenko, Turgeniev, Tolstoi
 Autocracy, 11, 90, 129, 193; constitutional government versus, 40; legislation, 466 (*See also* Czarism)
 Baltic provinces, 23
 Bebel, 437
 Berdyaiev, 447
 Bessarabia, 26, 68
 Beveridge, Senator, book on Russian peasantry, 148, 149, 150
 Bibliography, 468
 Bielostock, 25, 26; pogrom of, 47-50
 Bismarck, ruling of Prussia in 1863, 417
 Bobrinsky, 23, 93, 303
 Budberg, 389
 Budget, 107, 176
 Bulgakov, conception of political parties, 448
 Bureaucracy, 29, 38, 39, 103, 105, 109; anarchy of, 58 (*See also* Czarism).
 Carlyle, 8
 Catharine II., 34, 109, 193
 Caucasus, 28
 Censorship. *See* Press
 Charles IX., 27
 Church, 3, 4; council, 395; league of workers of church reform, 396; loyalty of, 224. (*See also* Russian Church, origin of)
 Clergy, 396
 Collapse of 1903, 3
 Communal ownership, 329, 330
 Commune, 332
 Communism, 159
 Constitution, 3, 40, 88
 Constitutional Democratic Party, 92, 287, 297; acts against its own principle, 302; mistake of, 293; opportunity of, 298; severance of unity, 288
 Constitutional Democrats, 298; course of, 276; measures adopted by, 225; monarch defence of, 135; reforms proposed, 211; social reform, 208
 Coöperation. *See* Government coöperative stores
 Council of Labour, 217, 282; programme of, 263
 Court, 37
 Crimean war, 34, 115
 Crops, 84
 Czar, 4, 6, 31, 44, 50, 60, 63, 67; absolutism, 89; chief support of, 84; common people, 216; early life of, 21-23; enmity to Jews, 26; lineage of, 108; promises of, 9, 11
 Czarism, 3, 61, 75, 85, 101, 447; Duma, 47; economic failure of,

Czarism—Continued

- 116; members of court, 37; nature of, 11; opposition to, 41, 260, 423; preservation of, 39, 40, 89; pretensions of, 182, since dawn of history, 63; support of, 17, 122
- Czar's encouragement of massacre, 52, 60; Manifesto of October 19, 1905, 455, 456; statement concerning the Jews, 82; telegram to official organ of League of Russian Men, 58

- Decembrists of 1825, 428
- Deduline, 23
- Dolgorukov, 36, 84, 95, 273
- Doukhobors, 156
- Drink. *See* Alcohol industry
- Duma, 5, 44, 52, 89, 228, 271; centre of democratic tendencies, 392; dissolution of, 312; Jewish members, 73; landlords, 52; peasants' demands, 215
- Duma, first, 16, 208, 228, 329; unity of, 278, 279. (*See also* Address to throne)
- Duma, second, 282, 285, 329; constitutional assembly, 315. (*See also* Stolypine and Zeretelly)
- Duma, third, 68, 72, 134, 273, 332, budget, 294; drink problem, 323; elections, 325; elements of, 292; purpose of, 307
- Education, 321, 462. (*See also* Masses)
- Election law, 108, 128, 312, 324, 325
- Emancipation of serfs, 137, 192. (*See also* Landlords' gain)
- Exports, 121, 178, 186
- Expropriation, 67, 211

- Famine, 122, 177, 178
- Farming, 180, 186; implements, 183
- Finland, 89
- Finns, 26
- "For Czar and Fatherland," 54
- Foreign loans, 12, 115, 300; creditors, 124; international relations, 416
- Foreign newspapers, 145
- France, 8, 15, 422
- Freedom of speech, 462
- French Revolution, 7, 34, 421

- General strike, 9, 13, 217, 272; railway, 349

- George III. of England, 100
- Germany, 106
- Gershuni, 326
- "Globe," 311
- Gorki, 36, 413
- Government, 126, 127, 227, 263, 264; bureaus, 38; campaigns of, 71; constitutional, 40; cooperative stores, 36; despotism, 31; financial position of, 123; present degradation of, 181; small landowners, 333; trade unions, 361; war waged against, 374
- Grand dukes, 11, 25
- Guerilla warfare, 359, 368; peasant bands, 380

- Herschelman, 23
- Herzenstein, 28
- Heyden, 36
- Hungary, 35, 61
- Holy Alliance, 34, 422; Synod, 393
- Iliodor, 76
- Industry, 417
- Institutions, 3
- Insurrections, 12; general, 13, 15
- Ivan the Terrible, 32

- Japanese war, 6, 10, 25, 103; cost of, 11
- Jewish question, 64, 65; families, 51
- Jews, 41, 55, 74, 307; as soldiers, 80; expulsion of, 64, 65; massacre of, 46, 54, 57, 89; occupation of, 66; persecution of, 84. (*See also* Priests' advice)


- Karaviev, 345
- Kaulbars, 23, 27, 53, 55; position in court, 54
- "Kazan Peasants' Weekly," 222
- Kennard. *See* Russian peasants, book on
- Khristalev. *See* Nossar
- Kiev, 77
- Kipling, 443
- Kishinev, 42, 76
- Konovitzin, 23, 27, 52, 55
- Korolenko, 36, 237, 238, 423; letter to Filinoff, 238-240
- Kronstadt, 217, 377
- Krushevan, 42, 164; massacre, 76
- Kutler, 36, 46, 84


- Labour Group, 211, 215, 258, 282, 284, 327, 328; solution of land question, 337

- Landlords, 90, 227, 280; gain through emancipation of serfs, 204
 Land question, 211, 321, 368; Anikine on, 432; division of land, 205, 206; Tolstoi on, 432
 Laws concerning non-Russian races, 61
 League of Russian Men, 54, 61, 70, 81, 87, 128; official organ of, 85
 Lendin, 370
 Letts, 26
 Lithuanians, 26
 Lvov, 36, 90
 Lynch justice, 247, 248
- Maeterlinck, 443, 452
 Magazines. *See* "Novoe Vremya," "Russian Wealth," "Sviet"
- Manchuria, 10
 Manifesto, 40, 43. *See* Czar's manifesto of October 19, 1905; and Viborg manifesto
 Martial law, 58, 85-87
 Marx, 439
 Masses, 227; democracy of, 157, 159; education of, 322
 Massacre, 44, 45, 51, 58; Government encourages, 51; of January 22, 1905, 11, 85; of non-Russian races, 24
 Michael, Archamandrite, 36
 Mill, 442
 Milyoukov, 84, 96, 305; and the enemy, 306; in America, 311; early attitude toward revolution, 304; opportunism of, 289; persecution of, 293; statement of, 288; Stolypine, 309, 316
 Ministers, 5
 Mohammedan Group, 285
 Monarchists' congress of July, 1907, 127
 Morley, 441, 442
 Moscow, 23, 32, 33
- Napoleon, 421
 Navy, 104, 107; mutiny of, 362
 Newspapers, 58, 79, 85. (*See also* "For Fatherland and Czar;" "Kazan Peasants' Weekly;" "Northern Star;" "Soldiers Voice")
 Nietzsche, 443
 "Northern Star," 302
 Nossar, 365
 Novitzki, 27, 53
 "Novoe Vremya," 249
 Novgorod, 32
- Octobrists, 72, 89, 291
 Odessa, 23, 28, 54, 85, 86; Massacre of, October, 1905, 27, 52
 Old Believers, 156; advanced element of Russian population, 411, punishment of, 394
 Orlov, Prince, 23, 24
- Peasant, agriculture, 175; children, 174; dwellings, 70; women, 173
 Peasant group, 159, 222
 Peasantry, 130, 131; Bessarabian, 68; programme of, 225, 226; racial hatred among, 68; religious belief of, 397; revolts, 229-231
 Peasants' Union, 24, 215, 222, 225, 272; Congress of 1905, 338
 People's Party, 210
 Peter the Great, 33, 34, 38, 112, 114, 125
 Petrov, Father, 36, 39, 409; his letter, 402-404
 Pobiedonostzev, 22, 78
 Poland, 23, 61
 Poles, 11, 26, 76, 89
 Police, 44, 47, 53, 223, 249
 Press, 73, 224; foreign, 10; Government newspapers, 85
 Priesthood, 36, 129
 Priests, 154, 155, 224; advice concerning the Jews, 395; persecution of, 397 (*See also* Michael, Archamandrite, Petrov, Father)
 Prisons, 84, 236
 Progressists or Peaceful Regenerators, 135
 Prussia, 61, 106-109
 Pureschevitch, 43, 73, 302
- Railroad Union, 218, 274, 282; in Siberia, 13; strike, 217, 265
 Red Cross, 80, 104
 Rousseau, 428, 429
 Russia, 105, 110, 165, 332, 419; future of humanity, 3; powers foreign, 416; present struggle, 18; private income, 124; profound spiritual upheaval, 438; regeneration, 8; tradition, national and political, 4
 Russian assembly, 70; church, origin of, 154; development of the, 5; farmer, 121, "Russian Flag," 28, 101, 283; Government, 39, 126; "Russian Peasant," by Kennard, 150; people and Czarism, 415; people's new con-

- Russian assembly—*Continued*
 ception of life, 438; problem universal in its applications, 419
 Russian Revolution, 209, 213; dawn of new civilisation, 452; Finnish people, 359; goal of, 382; international capital, 369, 415; literature of, 221; problem of, 418; spirit among working people, 282
 Russian Revolutionary Party, 265; activities of, 224
 Russian Revolutionists, 44, 265; activities of, 224
 Russian Revolution movements, 36, 277, 287, 288; Duma, 9; in Poland, 360
 Russia's confidence in future, 17; fight, 417; Magna Charta, 279; message, 414, 452; rulers, 413; social problem, 449; success, 267; tragedy, 14
 St. Bartholomew's eve, 27
 St. Petersburg, massacre of January, 1905, 45
 Schools, 10, 107
 Senate, 37, 107
 Sergius, 23, 96
 Siedlice, 49
 Social Democratic Party, 215, 301; Deputies, prosecution of, 367; guerilla bands of, 38
 Social Democrats, 302; programme of, 318
 Socialism, 448; among Russian working men, 210; view of in Russia, 435
 Socialist commune, 161; land reform, 329; nationalist party, 343
 Socialist Revolutionary Party, 215, 325; army, 382; demands of, 326; on verge of fundamental change, 379; peasantry, 325, 388; programme of, 335, 336
 Socialist Revolutionists, 378; campaign of, 272, 273; execution of officials by, 375
 "Soldiers Voice," 383, 385
 State, finances, 334; religion, 23; slavery, 99; socialism, 126
 Stolypine, 48, 87, 89, 99, 105, 111; reform, 179; second Duma, 297; strikes, 351, 358
 Subbotich, General, 30, 36, 384
 Suffrage, 12; universal, 280
 Tariff, 185
 Tartars, 11
 Taxation, 38, 228, 334
 Taxes, 11, 15, 175, 176, 203; Jews 80, 81; Peasants, 205
 Tchaikovsky, 311
 Teachers, 96; condition of, 95; salaries of, 321
 Tichamirov, 66, 67, 75
 Tolstoi, 36, 46, 156, 408, 414, 427, 432, 434; and Marxism, 431
 Trepov, 44, 82, 88
 Trubetzkoi, 36
 Turgeniev, 4, 96, 195
 Turkestan, 38
 Ukase, 213, 214
 Union of Fatherland, 69, 70
 Union of Unions, 274
 United States, 8, 16
 Universities, 361
 Urussov, 26, 47, 66, 102
 Viborg Manifesto, 16, 293, 282; political nature of, 316
 Villages, 169; quarantine of, 167
 Von Plehve, 42, 95
 Wages, 190, 350
 William II., 22
 Witte, 47, 219, 477; conditions of Russian working men, 182, 354; Czar, 23; reforms, 112, scheme to foil revolution, 355
 Women, 274
 Zemstvos, 94, 95; congress of, 272, 275
 Zeretelly, 317; address, 297; declaration against the Government, 319; peasants, 366









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